(Insert appropriate priority marking)
No.
Mr.......
Sir......
Permt. U.S. of S.
Parly, U.S. of S.
Minister of State
Secretary of State
ENCLOSURES
(Savingrams only)
Alc
Governor,
Hong Kong HK 380
(1) Pekmą 943 (2) Roted Singapore 2
Washington
1'8 MAY 1967
240
MEDIUM
Ea clair Cody
Liphas
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is inapplicable)
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Despatched HHG OTHER
4
On....7/5/67 17/5/18QTP Ac.. 17352/ 17-502 Hz.
Calr
SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS
diately preceding telen
My
wm me
Following
text
g
statement:-
DISTRIBUTION AND
FURTHER ACTION
Distribution H.K. W.I.D. 'C'
-
- I.G.D.
BEGINS.
J.I.C. EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
Copies also sent to:
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-
, Take in x-x
D.I.Q. J.I.R.
Mr. de la Mare
Mr. Bolland
Mr. Wilson
T
10
+
Mr. Denson
Mr. Foggon
Qur
Blos
SECRET
17/5-
OUTWARD TELEGRAM
FROM THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
The Secretary of State)
TO HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
70
En Clair
Sent 17 May 1967.
17352
Drafts Below
FLASH No.943
Addressed to Governor Hong Kong
Repeated
1
T
Peking (IMMEDIATE) POLAD Singapore (PRIORITY)
Washington
My immediately preceding telegram.
Following is text of statement:-
Begins.
H.M.Q. consider it necessary to state the facts about the disturbances
in Hong Kong.
2. The recent disturbances in Kowloon arose from an industrial dispute
in April between workers and their employers about wages and conditions
of employment involving 650 workers in two factories producing
artificial flowers. The injection moulding sections of both factories
were closed and the workers were dismissed. A Settlement could not be
reached in negotiations between employers and workers. The Labour
Department of the Hong Kong Government offered its services in an effort
to help the parties to reach agreement, but this offer was refused by
both sides.
3. Disturbances broke out on the 6th May outside one of these factories
situated in Kowloon. The police clearly informed those involved of the
laws governing peaceful picketing, warned them repeatedly of the
consequences of disorder and urged them to desist. These warnings went
unheeded, and the police were therefore obliged to act to keep the
peace. As a result, 21 persons were arrested. Subsequent efforts by the
Labour Department to bring the parties together to discuss their
difficulties and try to reach an agreed settlement were frustrated by
the outbreak of further disorders on May 11th in the vicinity of the
same factory. Again after repeated warnings the police were obliged to
take action to keep the peace and 143 persons were arrested. There were
more disorders in the same area between 12th and 14th May and a further
257 persons were arrested. All cases of arrest are being treated in the
normal way in accordance with the due process of the law. By 17th May of
those arrested 128 had been charged with riot, 100 with unlawful
assembly, 91 with breaking the curfew and 88 with such offences as
assault and affray. 14 have been released without charges preferred and
12 have been acquitted.
40 Throughout the disturbances the Hong Kong police, a number of whom
were injured in the three days of rioting. have shown great restraint in
carrying out their responsibilities and have used the minimum force.
69
2000
15.
5.
In labour matters the Hong Kong Government's policy is to make available
the specialist services of its Labour Department to give impartial help
to management and trade unions to settle any dispute that may arise
between them. It has already done so on this occasion and remains ready
to do all it can to facilitate a settlement.
The Hong Kong Government has an inescapable duty to maintain law and
order as impartially and fairly as possible for the benefit of all in
Hong Kong. H.M.G. fully support the Hong Kong Government in fulfilling
its duty both in maintaining law and order and in the efforts it is
making to bring about a settlement of the industrial dispute. It is
emphasised that the original cause of these disturbances is a
comparatively small industrial conflict which it should be possible to
settle soon if the management and trade unions would sit down together
to discuss it in reason and goodwill.
(Passed to D.S.A.0. for repetition to Peking,
POKAD Singapore and Washington)
Distribution
H.K. W.I.D. 'Ç'
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J.I.C. EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
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##
#1
11
= = =
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J.I.R.
Mr. de la Mare
Mr. Bolland
Kr. Wilson
- Mr. Denson
Mr. Foggon
Fri
may try to instigate, but at the same time to avoid so far as possible
action which could be regarded as unnecessarily provocative. While I
realise that in their present mood they will castigate any measures you
take as provocative, I think it would probably be wise
Pro-Communist to avoid prosecutions against the left wing press for c.g.
sedition, which is usually difficult to prove and generally provides
considerable opportunities for propaganda. The actual measures to be
taken to deal with the situation at any given time must continue to be a
matter of most careful judgment. I know that you will remain in the
closest touch with us, and continue to consult with us about the actual
choice of measures. 4. While continuing to show firmness in maintaining
law and order, we must obviously continue with our efforts to maintain
contact with the Left Wing, with a view to making clear to them that we
are not prepared to face a Macau-type compromise. I agree with you
(paragraph 5 of your telegram No. 609) that there is just a chance that
by taking a very firm line, avoiding any unnecessary provocation but
explaining our policy clearly to the C. P.G., there may be some prospect
of inducing a change of Chinese attitude which would enable both sides
to disengage without loss of authority on our part. I feel that, however
difficult the outlook may be right now, we must keep to this course for
so long as there is any chance of success.
We do not altogether rule out that we may have to start a яxxx dialogue
on these lines with the Chinese in Peking (because of the calibre of
Chinese
ħ
representation here there would be no point in our attempting this in
London). But, as you know, such a dialogue would introduce several large
complications, and for the time being at any rate we still think that
the best hope of getting the message through to the Chinese lies in your
using your local channels.
5.
It would be very helpful to me to have your assessment of the ability of
Hong Kong to cope with an all-out confrontation by the C.P.G. short of
armed intervention, i.e, widespread disorders in the Colony coupled with
the cutting off of Hong Kong's water and food supplies from the
mainland, and your assessment of the effect on the morale of the Hong
Kong Chinese if this situation lasted for some time.
Could you
organise
organise alternative supplies of food, and what assistance would you
need in this respect?
6.
If in your opinion it would not be possible for Hong Kong to survive for
long in the kind of situation foreseen in paragraph 5 above, once it
became clear that the C.P.G. intended to go for all-out confrontation of
this kind this might well be the point at which we should have to
consider withdrawal from Hong Kong. This whole concept presents huge
problems which must clearly relate to the point in time at which
withdrawal became inevitable. No doubt you too will have given some
thought to this, and we should in due course welcome your views
generally on this range of problems. 7. Your assessment of the points in
paragraphs 5 and 6 will be of greatest value to me in discussing this
whole problem with my colleagues.
8. Finally, I should like you to know how much we admire the way you
have handled this very difficult situation. Our thoughts are very much
with you and your Advisers in these anxious days.
a 17/5-
PRIORITY MARKINGS
Emergency
Immediate
Priority
Reply urgently required
Nil
Mr..
Mr......
Mr.....
Mt.....
File No......
*TELEGRAM
DRAFT
**SAVINI
* Delete whichever is inapplicable. If necessary. "Priority" may be
inserted before "Savingram."
Addressed
IMMEDIATE
Insert appropriate priority marking)
GOVERNOR
HONG KONG
No.
944
71
SECURITY, ETC.. MARKINGS
Top Secret Secret Confidential Restricted Unclassified Personal Guard
Repeated
Insert appropriate priority marking)
No.
Sir.......
Permt. U.S. of S.
Parly. U.S. of S.
Minister of State
Secretary of State
HK380
ENCLOSURES
(Savingrams only)
Ale's
MEDIUM
X Cypher X
(240)
SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS
DISTRIBUTION AND FURTHER ACTION
(Delete whichever
is inapplicable)
File References
SAVINGRAMS ONLY
FOR USE IN TELEGRAPH BRANCH
Your reference
Despatched....
On...
At.......
11/5. 14.50z Hrs.
1967 Cypher
SECRET
IMMEDIATE
[Insect appropriate security, etc., marking)
Following from Commonwealth Secretary. Kowloon disturbances.
I shall shortly be asking my colleagues to consider the issues raised in
paragraph 4 of your telegram No. 600. But I should like to give you my
own thoughts at this stage, and there are certain points on which I need
your assessment. 2. I am sure our intention must be to remain in Hong
Kong as long as it is physically possible for us to retain control of
the situation. I whole- heartedly endorse your own conclusion that we
should not accept a Macau-type compromise.
3. While we must obviously avoid an all-out confrontation with the
C.P.G. if this can possibly be avoided, I recognise that this is
unfortunately a risk inherent in the situation. therefore that our
policy must be to continue to deal firmly with any disorders which the
Communists
I think
(Delete whichever
NO PRINTING is inapplicable)
may
Cypher
SECRET
OUTWARD TELEGRAM
FROM THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
(The Secretary of State)
TO HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
Sent 17 May, 1967. 1950Z
35
IMMEDIATE SECRET No. 944.
Drayv Below
Following from Commonwealth Secretary.
Kowloon disturbances.
I shall shortly be asking my colleagues to consider the issues raised in
paragraph 4 of your telegram No. 600.- But I should like to give you my
own thoughts at this stage, and there are certain points on which I need
your assessment.
2. I am sure our intention must be to remain in Hong Kong as long as it
is physically possible for us to retain control of the situation. I
wholeheartedly endorse your own conclusion that we should not accept a
Macao-type compromise.
20
3. While we must obviously avoid an all-out confrontation with the
C.P.G. if this can possibly be avoided, I recognise that this is
unfortunately a risk in herent in the situation. I think therefore that
our policy must be to continue to deal firmly with any disorders which
the Communists may try to instigate, but at the same time to avoid so
far as possible action which could be regarded as unnecessarily
provocative. While I realise that in their present mood they will
castigate any measures you take as provocative, I think it would
probably be wise to avoid prosecutions against the pro- Communist press
for e.g. sedition, which is usually difficult to prove and generally
provides considerable opportunities for propaganda. The actual measures
to be taken to deal with the situation at any given time must continue
to be a matter of most careful judgment. I know that you will remain in
the closest touch with us, and continue to consult with us about the
actual choice of measures.
4. While continuing to show firmness in maintaining law and order, we
must obviously continue with our efforts to maintain contact with the
Left Wing, with a view to making clear to them that we are not prepared
to face a Macao-type compromise. I agree with you (paragraph 5 of your
telegram - No. 609) that there is just a chance that by taking a very
firm line, avoiding any unnecessary provocation but explaining our
policy clearly to the C.P.G., there may be some prospect of inducing a
change of Chinese attitude which would enable both sides to disengage
without loss of authority on our part. I feel that, however difficult
the outlook may be right now, we must keep to this course for so long as
there is any chance of success. We do not altogether rule out that we
may have to start a dialogue on these lines with the Chinese in
/Peking
20
82 83
SECRET
PAR
ļ
SECRET
Peking (because of the calibre of Chinese representation here there
would be no point in our attempting this in London). But, as you know,
such a dialogue would introduce several large complications, and for the
time being at any rate we still think that the best hope of getting the
message through to the Chinese lies in your using your local channels.
5. It would be very helpful to me to have your assessment of the ability
of Hong Kong to cope with an all-out confrontation by the C.P.G. short
of armed intervention, i.e. widespread disorders in the Colony coupled
with the cutting off of Hong Kong's water and food supplies from the
mainland, and your assessment of the effect on the morale of the Hong
Kong Chinese if this situation lasted for some time. Could you organise
alternative supplies of food, and what assistance would you need in this
respect?
Бо
If, in your opinion, it would not be possible for Hong Kong
to survive for long in the kind of situation foreseen in paragraph 5
above, once it became clear that the C.P.G. intended to go for all-out
confrontation of this kind this might well be the point at which we
should have to consider withdrawal from Hong Kong. This whole concept
presents huge problems which must clearly relate to the point in time at
which withdrawal became inevitable. No doubt you too will have given
some thought to this, and we should in due course welcome your views
generally on this range of problems,
7. Your assessment of the points in paragraphs 5 and 6 will be of
greatest value to me in discussing this whole problem with my
colleagues.
8.
Finally, I should like you to know how much we admire the
way you have handled this very difficult situation. Our thoughts are
very much with you and your advisers in these anxious daya.
Distribution - H.K. WID 'C'
- I.G.D.
J.I.C. External Distribution
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
Copies also sent to:-
Cabinet Office
Foreign Office
#1
D.I.O., J.I.R. Mr. de la Mare Mr. Bolland
#t
H
Mr. Wilson
==
H
==
Mr. Denson
Mr. Foggon
SECRET
London Press Service Verbatim Service
3
1 E
DA
MA
+
IN HONG KONG.
WEALTH
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POUPLING TECTIONS OF
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GOVERNMENT
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BY BOTH SILES.
TH MAY OUTSIDE ONE ·
PARLY
THESE
5 GÖY ̄RNING PEACEFUL PICKETING, QUÈSICES OF DISORDER AND URGED
AND THE POLICE WERE NY UNHERIT,
TO KEEP THE PEACE, AS A RESULT 21 PERSONS
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257 PERSONS ERE ARRESTED. A IN THE NORMAL
ד
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ARREST ARE BEING TREATED
T THE DUE PROCESS OF THE LAW. BY
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SUCH OFFENCES AS CHARGES PREFERRED AND
THROUGHOUT THE
WHOM WERE INJURED IN RESTRAINT IN
MINIMUM FORC
IN LABONN
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SETTLEMENT,
THE HONG KONG
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IN FUL
BREAKING THE CURFEW AND 88 WITH AND AFFRAY, 14 HAVE BEEN RELEASED
WITHOUT 1. HAVE BEEN ACQUITTED.
TURBAN.
11: HONG KONG POLICE, A NUMBER OF 14% OF RIOTING, HAVE SHOWN GREAT
NDOS)BILITIES AND HAVE USED THE
GOVERN, ENT
JUICY IS TO MAKE OF ITS LABOUS DEPARTMENT TO GIVE
ANY AND TRADE UNIONS TO SETTLE EPN THEM. IT HAS ALREADY DONE SO ON EADY
10 Dai A!! CAN TO FACILITATE A
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IT SHOULD BE PO UNIONS POULD
END VERUATIM SERV
+ -
AN INESCAPABLE DUTY TO MAINTAIN AND FAIRLY AS POSSIBLE FOR THE BENEFIT
SUPPORT THE HONG KONG GOVERNMENT
AN AND ORDER AND IN THE INING
A SETTLEMENT OF THE
SEI THAT THE "RIGINAL CAUSE OF
MALL INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT WHICH DE IF THE MANAGEMENT AND TRADE TO PLUCUSS
!! IN REASON AND GOODWILL.
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23/5
With the compliments of
THE BRITISH EMBASSY
(N.C.C.Trench)
RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No. 63
2 5 MAY 1,67
HUBIN
WASHINGTON, D.C.
R.0.Carter Esq.
D.T.D.
Commonwealth Office.
радо
17 May, 1967.
T
Τι
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IVE
173
Goteins to the Elbitt ite
te Stad Fo
THE NEW YORK TIMES, MONDAY, MAY 15, 1967
The Enter co
__(719)
HONG KONG LIFTS | Imperturbable Governor
3-NIGHT CURFEW
Minor Incidents Mar Gulet
at Scene of Ripting
Special to The Sew York Thaila
David Clive Crosbie Trench
Basend to the Xem Ten Time
HONG KONG, May 16-
When the Executive Conan- ell of this British Crows Col- ony was
summoned the other day to discuss the recent slot-
HONG KONG, May 14- Hong Kong was quiet tonighting, which has been
accorn. after three days of disorder in panied by strident Comm which
moba clashed with the nist-press xllæcks on the Brit- police, burned
ears and dam-ish authorities, members of these advisers appointed to
"ged property.
There were only a few minor İnekdents during the day and no repetition
of serious clsshot after nightfall. For the first Gimse in three nights
no eurfew was imposed on the area where the rioting has taken place.
The Communist press has [been strongly denouncing the Government in
connection with the rioting, which arose out of labor disputa involving
Teftist union
The Peking-oriented Hong) of Trade, Kong Federation Unions has leaped a
number of 14.mands that have been deli; tered to the Governor, Sir David
Treach
They on on the Goverment to release 300 arrested people, punish those
responsible for "a inguinary suppression" and maka an apology. It is
under stood that the Government does| not propose to accept these
demands.
Throughout the riols, the Governmeal was confident that fit could
restore order with tha
curity forces at its dispora!, but it has been concerned about whether
Communids here are act ex on their own initiative, for norma some
broader pad in
now at Peking's Instīgallon,
Na Word From Peking do far there has been no of- netai realian from
Paking or jiny report on the riots in the kaitstund press, although Con-
runt pipers in Haig Kong have been 25 ating almost their
Man In tha New
parlat The Gover nor were tense and preoccupied. The Governor, BLE David
Olive Čroe- bie Trench, bade them welcome and relieved tension when he
asked with a slight smile: "Well, whel's the first order of business to
day?"
Bir David, who was awarded the British Milliary Cross and the United
Blates Legion of Mert for his exploits behind Japanese lines in the
Solomon 1lända during World War II is not a man easily unsettled, "It is
the most unflappable person it has been my prive ilege to work with" and
a senior Government offolal
Day to day decisions fall ulmately on Sir David, rep: resentative of the
Queen and of the Commonwealth of. fice (Dependent Territories Division),