Port Shelter
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Clear Water Day
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BASALT ISLAND
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STEEP ISLAND
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NINEPIN GROUP
LAM TONG ISLAND
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ISLAND
SCALE OF MILLS
Haights
Sak Kwu #
LES
WAGLAN IS.
1000
BEAUFORT
ISLAND
REFERENCE
Railways Roads
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ISLAND
Villager
Bull-up Areat
Rivers & Streamt. Reservoiri Ferry Services
100
Crown Copyright Reserved
ㄛˊˋ
16/6/
Events in
Hong Kong-1987
Limited edition. Published February 1968.
an official report
The Face of Confrontation
EVENTS IN HONG KONG - 1967
The pictures in this report bring some of the facts of Hong Kong's
months of confrontation into focus. They give some idea of the problems
faced by the police who displayed great discipline and tolerance
throughout and who dealt with the early disturbances with the minimum of
force. They show too, moments of human kindness in the midst of
violence. Most pictures in this booklet were taken by photog- raphers of
the Colony's newspapers.
Here, a police cordon quietly stands its ground against a barrage of
heckling
and abuse.
SINCE May 1967, communist organizations in Hong Kong have sought to
impose their will on the government and the people by intimidating
workers, fomenting work stoppages, by demonstra- tions and rioting, and
by indiscriminate violence. It has been a testing time for the people of
Hong Kong.
But these events must be seen in their proper perspective. The
communist-initiated confrontation, between themselves and the Hong Kong
Government is in no sense a popular movement; indeed it does not have
the support of any significant section of the people, much less of the
people as a whole. Those who have taken part represent a very small
fraction of the population, and they have had no success in their
attempts, either by persuasion or by intimi dation, to gain support for
their cause. The overwhelming majority of the people have shown clearly
that they support the government and the maintenance of law and order.
Moreover, despite the claims made by the communist press, and despite
the impression that might have been given by the world wide press
coverage given to the disturbances, the ordinary life of the Colony has
not been disrupted. The rioting that has taken place has been limited in
area and in scope and has been contained. The stoppages that were called
have had little effect on the Colony's economy. Throughout the summer,
when the effects of confronta- tion were at their height, the ordinary
man in the street was able to go about his work, not quite as usual and
not without con- siderable inconvenience at times, but sufficiently
easily to keep the business of the Colony operating efficiently.
The origins of confrontation stem directly from the cultural revolution
in China, which has inculcated among its adherents a fervent patriotism
and an intense adulation of Chairman Mao Tse Tung and his teachings. The
dedicated Maoist has come to believe
that he has a duty to propagate the gospel of the cultural revolution
and that armed with the Thoughts of Mao he is invincible. Hong Kong was
an obvious target for this missionary zeal. Its population is
predominantly Chinese by race, who as 'compatriots' could be expected to
rally to the attack against a colonial government; and its free economy
is an affront to revolutionary doctrine. The recent events in nearby
Macau had shown that a colonial government could be made to accept the
communist demands; while nearer home a similar confrontation had been
successful, in March 1967, in a dispute with a major shipping company in
Hong Kong. It must have seemed to many ardent communists in the Colony
that the time was ripe to bring the cultural revolution to Hong Kong.
The less fanatical among the communists may have been more concerned to
preserve the very real economic advantages that a stable and prosperous
Hong Kong has tor China, and no doubt for themselves as well. But they
could not oppose confrontation without appearing to oppose the teachings
of Chairman Mao Tse Tung; they could only hope and do what they could to
ensure that its physical effects would be limited. The outbreaks of
violence that have occurred and the attempts that have been made to
disrupt the economy of the Colony have made it clear that they have been
unable to restrain or effectively control the more hot-headed elements
among them, whose aim it is to dominate the government by any means. It
was the latter who precipitated confrontation, as a result of a
comparatively minor incident arising from a labour dispute.
In the early months of the year industrial relations in the Colony
were generally good but there were a few disputes which had either been
artificially inspired by the communists or were the result of deliberate
political exploitation of a genuine industrial grievance. These involved
four taxi companies, a textile factory, a cement company and the Hong
Kong Artificial Flower Works. The Hong Kong Seamen's Union was engaged
in a dispute with a shipping company and, at the same time, it continued
its official boycott of the Government Seamen's Recruiting Office. These
disputes were all confined to undertakings where there was a predominant
or strong communist element in the work force, or where a communist
trade union was involved.
་ །
}
The tactics employed were identical in each case. Workers were
intimidated and threatened with physical violence. Attempts to settle
the disputes were deliberately frustrated by the injection of political
issues, expressed in the form of demands which were required to be
accepted 'unconditionally'. These demands were followed by a succession
of rowdy demonstrations, designed to intimidate the management, in which
slogans and extracts from The Thoughts of Mao Tse Tung were chanted in
unison. The attitude of the unions became increasingly truculent. A
press photographer taking pictures of a typical demonstration was
attacked and a demand was made that his camera be confiscated. Offers
made by the Labour Department to mediate in disputes were dismissed as
'unwelcome meddling'. It became clear that the extremist elements among
the communists might provoke a major clash at any moment.
The opportunity was provided on May 6. A group of dismissed workers from
the Hong Kong Artificial Flower Works at San Po Kong were picketing the
factory premises and, ignoring repeated warnings from the police, they
persisted in illegally trying to prevent the removal of goods by the
management. The police finally intervened and arrested 21 men. It was a
minor incident; there was little or no violence and no one was seriously
injured. It was, how- ever, enough to provoke an immediate reaction;
headlines appeared in the communist newspapers denouncing the government
and accusing the police, in the most violent terms, of persecution and
of brutally attacking unarmed workers. The Hong Kong and Kowloon Rubber
and Plastics Workers Union, whose chairman was among those arrested,
published four demands:
The Hong Kong Government must cease its brutality immediately and ensure
that it is not repeated; All the arrested people must be released
immediately; Compensa- tion must be paid by the government for all
injuries and damage and those responsible must be punished; There must
be no government interference in labour disputes. These demands were
endorsed by the Hong Kong and Kowloon Federation of Trade Unions.
Meetings were held in pro-communist organizations in support of the
arrested workers and posters began to appear attacking the government
and protesting against police brutality.
祝仪
阁
;
At the San Po Kong factory itself there were further demon- strations,
with processions and the chanting of slogans. These inevitably attracted
crowds of idle spectators as well as hooligans and mischief-makers and,
when, on May 11, communist pickets threatened to break into the factory
and there was a further clash with the police, there was a mob at hand
ripe for violence. There was serious rioting, which spread from the
streets in the vicinity of the factory to adjacent areas of Kowloon, and
for three days mobs, including many who were paid to take part, battled
the police, attacked and set fire to buses and other vehicles and broke
into and looted government offices and staff quarters in an orgy of
destruction. A curfew was imposed in the affected areas during the
nights of the 11th, 12th and 13th, but it was not until the 14th that
calm was restored. These disturbances were dealt with firmly by the
police but with the minimum of force; no firearms were used and the army
was not called upon for assistance.
Meanwhile, a campaign of intimidation had also begun on Hong Kong
Island. An 'All-Circles Anti-Persecution Struggle Committec" was formed,
with a membership drawn from all communist organizations in the Colony.
It was given considerable publicity in the communist press. Delegations
of employees of communist newspapers and department stores and
representatives of communist trade unions and other organizations began
to converge on Govern- ment House with petitions protesting against
government brutality and insisting that the communist demands be met.
On May 15 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Peking issued a statement
protesting against the action taken by the British au- thorities against
Chinese residents in Hong Kong. (This statement possibly reflected the
highly coloured reports put out by the com- munist press in Hong Kong.
On May 23, for example, the New China News Agency alleged that 200
people had been killed or injured. As a matter of record, one person had
been killed and not by police action but probably by a brick thrown or
dropped from above him by one of the rioters).
In the days that followed the demonstrations at Government House
increased; the demonstrators became more unruly and aggressive and the
posters, both at the gates of Government House and elsewhere, more
violent and seditious. Powerful loudspeakers
◄Chanting demonstrators plaster
the gateway of Government House
with posters.
were mounted on the Bank of China building, in the centre of the banking
and business area of Hong Kong, which encouraged the demonstrators
forming up in the vicinity with a stream of violently provocative
propaganda, including vicious personal attacks on the Governor.
Propaganda was broadcast from other communist buildings in Hong Kong and
Kowloon; the press campaign increased in violence; and there was an
outbreak of rioting in Kowloon in the vicinity of the Magistrates Court
where cases against those arrested at San Po Kong were being heard.
On May 20 it was announced by the government that while it was not
proposed to revoke the right of any person to present a petition to the
Governor, this must be done in an orderly manner. No further processions
would be allowed and delegations wishing to present petitions must not
exceed 20 people.
This decision was challenged on the following morning when organized
groups of communists formed up at the bottom of Garden Road and demanded
to be allowed to pass through the police cordon on their way to
Government House. Permission was refused and there were a number of
scuffles in the vicinity. The crowd, which had grown to more than a
thousand, was dispersed by tear gas and by the early evening the
situation was quiet.
On May 22 the communists returned to the attack and it soon became clear
that they had planned a propaganda 'incident'. Groups of people again
formed up in Garden Road and the police were again subjected to a
barrage of heckling and abuse. Crowds were building up in nearby Statue
Square and the loudspeakers at the Bank of China boomed out a continual
stream of threats and appeals to violence. In this daunting atmosphere
the police quietly stood their ground and in an impressive display of
discipline ignored both the verbal provocation to which they were
subjected, as well as the threatening gestures of the mob that faced
them. But the communists were out to provoke violence. A constable was
kicked and others were attacked. The police moved forward to arrest the
man responsible. There was a general melée and the police used their
batons. At once many of the demonstrators fell to the ground whether
they had been hit or not; bandages (some of them already provided with
artificial 'bloodstains') were produced and
applied; the blood of those who had really been injured was liberally
daubed on others. The results of these childish expedients were duly
photographed by the communist press and subsequently published as
evidence of police brutality, though what little effect this might have
had was spoiled by the crowds of witnesses looking on from the Hilton
Hotel, as well as by the full coverage of the scene by impartial press
and television cameramen,
Further demonstrators appeared during the day and some buses and taxis
were abandoned in the area, in an attempt to cause traffic jams and to
add to the confusion. There was intermit- tent violence in Queen's Road
and the adjoining streets and at 6.30 p.m., for the first time since the
war, a curfew was imposed on Hong Kong Island.
It soon became apparent that anti-government propaganda and the
spreading of false and malicious rumours was to be a major weapon in the
communists' tactics. Communist newspapers published highly distorted
accounts of the events that were taking place, designed to present the
police and government in the worst possible light, and accompanied, as
in the case of the disturbances of May 22, by contrived or unashamedly
faked photographs. Rumours were fabricated with the intention of
spreading confusion and panic; some plausible and more difficult to
combat, others too improbable to deceive even the most credulous.
To a large extent these propaganda efforts were most effectively
countered by the reports of the non-communist press, as well as by the
Colony's wireless and television services that produced a steady stream
of factual reports and pictures. Further counter- measures were taken by
government departments and by the Department of Information Services in
particular, which took immediate steps to keep the public constantly
informed of the true state of affairs by wireless broadcasts, press
releases, short films that were distributed to all cinemas, and, where
necessary and practicable, by word of mouth.
Additional, and unusual, publicity methods were brought into use. The
loudspeakers at the Bank of China building were countered by setting up
rival and more powerful loudspeakers at buildings in the vicinity which
regaled the public with the music of Cantonese opera and effectively
drowned the stream of communist propaganda.
The battle was deafening and caused considerable amusement to the
onlookers, but it ended in the defeat of the communists who were unable
to make any further effective use of this weapon.
The tactics employed by the communists up to the major incident on May
22 had not attracted any noticeable increase in support for
confrontation and the attempts to make political capital out of the
clash on that day met with little success. Indeed the feeling of the
majority of the population was made clear by a number of public
expressions of support for the government. A group of businessmen in the
Colony set up a fund for the higher education of the children of police
officers, which attracted support and donations from thousands of
individuals. In a fortnight it reached a total of $3 million, an
extraordinary acknowledgement by the people of Hong Kong of the debt
that they owed the police.
The Hong Kong Federation of Students, as well as kaifong
associations and leading members of the community, publicly expressed
their loyalty and confidence in the government. This lead was followed
by similar expressions of support from numerous organizations
representing a complete cross-section of the Colony and ranging from
hawker associations to professional associations and business houses.
They included clansmen and district asso- ciations, multi-storey
building management associations, religious organizations and social
organizations of almost every kind. In all some 620 letters, petitions
and statements of support were received and, while it is difficult to
estimate the total number of people they represented, the Hong Kong
Buddhist Association and the kaifong associations between them claimed
membership of well over a million people. In a political situation of
such gravity, where many factors might lead people not to express an
opinion, such massive support for law and order was particularly
impressive.
There is no doubt that it also affected communist strategy as the
tactics of street demonstrations and provocation did not continue on May
23. The campaign then entered a new phase; slogans were painted on the
walls of public buildings and there was a rash of inflammatory posters.
At the same time a series of token stoppages was engineered affecting
transport, including the cross harbour ferries, the port and the dock
companies and the main utility and service organizations. These
stoppages had a certain
Some of the young troublemakers who harassed the police with stones and
bottles. The smoke is from a fire, typical of the many started by
hooligans when mobs took to the streets of Kowloon in May.
amount of nuisance value, particularly those in the transport field, but
they caused no lasting inconvenience.
On June 1, emergency regulations were made strengthening the law against
the display of inflammatory posters and action was taken to remove them
from government buildings and elsewhere. In the doctrine of the cultural
revolution street posters are regarded almost as sacrosanct as being the
visible expression of the will of 'the masses', and in Hong Kong they
were defended with the utmost tenacity.
Some impetus was given to the force of this reaction by an editorial
in the Peking People's Daily of June 3, which called on the Chinese in
Hong Kong to organize a courageous struggle against the British and to
be ready to respond to the call of the motherland for smashing the
reactionary rule of the British'. The article also stressed that the
working class in Hong Kong was to remain the main force in the struggle,
but in Hong Kong the communist press chose to interpret it as a
declaration of active support by the Peking Government and gave it wide
publicity. Employees of the Star Ferry Company stopped work in protest
at the removal of posters. At the Taikoo Dockyard the general manager
and two senior staff members were surrounded and held prisoner by their
employees. Workers at the government electrical and mechanical
workshops, in Kowloon, and at the nearby Kowloon depot of the Hong Kong
and China Gas Company, barricaded the door and armed them- selves with
iron bars and other offensive weapons. Police forced their way into both
premises and arrested more than 500 workers, of whom 120 were charged
with various offences. There were stoppages of work in other concerns
and numerous scuffles and minor incidents occurred at several other
places throughout the Colony. The People's Daily provided more fuel for
the flames on June 10 by urging workers, peasants, the Peoples
Liberation Army and the revolutionary masses' in China to prepare to
support the struggle in Hong Kong with concrete action. Broadcasts on
similar lines were put out by Radio Peking.
On June 23 there was another major incident. A small police party,
photographing posters in Canton Road, was suddenly at- tacked by a gang
of men armed with iron bars, bottles and sharpened iles. The police, in
self-defence, opened fire with their revolvers and
Police moved in swiftly to arrest law-breakers.
in the ensuing battle two policemen were injured and one of the
assailants was fatally wounded. The remaining attackers retreated into
the premises of the Hong Kong Rubber and Plastic Workers Union, which
was close by, and a strong police party was called up which, with some
difficulty, forced an entry into the union premises. After fierce
resistance, in which a number of police were injured, 53 people were
arrested, of whom three later died of the injuries they had received.
This period of unrest came to a head on June 24 when a 'general
strike' was called, heralded by another fanfare from the People's Daily.
In spite of lavish payments by the communist unions, sup- ported by a
gift of $10 million from the All China Federation of Trade Unions, it
was not a success. The Kowloon Motor Bus Company was the most seriously
affected, but nevertheless managed to continue to provide an emergency
service. The other transport companies maintained a reduced service,
while the utility companies, though short-staffed, continued to operate
effectively. The public was considerably inconvenienced, but a fleet of
private cars and nine-seater vans appeared on the streets to fill the
gap caused by the shortage of public transport and, despite claims to
the con- trary by the communist press, life went on much as usual.
One of the major factors that led to the comparative failure of these
stoppages was the firm action taken by the government in dealing with
its own employees. They were warned that these were not legal 'strikes'
arising from an industrial dispute and that if they took part they would
be liable to dismissal. Those who did take part, including, in the first
phase, some staff of the Marine Department and the Waterworks, were
interdicted from duty or discharged. Those who could subsequently show
that they acted under duress, that they were forced to withdraw their
labour through intimidation and the threat of violence, were reinstated
and returned to work. Following this lead, similar action was taken by
private companies affected which gave notice that absent employees would
be considered for re-employment if they registered ithin a limited
period. Those who did not do so were considered be dismissed and were
not paid from the time that they stopped ork. Emergency regulations were
also enacted by the government make it an offence to intimidate or
threaten any worker who
wished to continue at work. These measures made it possible for both the
government and private firms, by selective re-employment, to weed out
those responsible for intimidation in their labour force and at the same
time they encouraged the flow of loyal workers returning to work.
A further attempt to intimidate the government by the declara- tion of a
four-day 'food strike' had little better success. Supplies of foodstuffs
from China were refused by local communist importers- though by an
apparent lack of co-ordination they continued to arrive by train at the
frontier-and there was a shortage of pork and vegetables and a
consequent rise in prices. The stoppage came to an end on July 2, and
food prices returned almost to normal.
Later in the month there was to be a more serious threat to food
supplies caused, not by confrontation in Hong Kong, but by the unsettled
conditions in China, which led to a general disruption of
communications. No trains arrived on the border on July 24 and 25 and,
though there was an irregular passenger service there- aster, it was not
until September 14 that any substantial imports arrived by rail. The
main commodities affected were pigs and vegetables. Although limited
quantities continued to arrive, ir- regularly, by sea and by road from
China, the quantity was well below demand. Some of the shortfall was
made good by imports from other countries, but a sharp increase in
prices reflected the general scarcity. The situation slowly improved
towards the end of September, by which time the amount of foodstuffs
imported from China had again almost returned to normal.
One of the main targets in this phase had been the Port of Hong Kong,
which was the subject of some of the most extravagant claims in the
communist press. In fact, while the stoppage caused some disruption in
the working of cargoes, the general efficiency of the port had been
surprisingly little affected and an adequate service was maintained
throughout. A further attack was launched in the middle of July by the
Seamen's Union, which declared a general boycott of the port. Goods from
Chinese ports by-passed Hong Kong and were re-routed through Singapore
or through Japanese ports, while goods already landed from China and
await- ing transhipment in Hong Kong were retained in the godowns.
Communist organizations in Hong Kong declared that, because of
BL11
+
the boycott, the port was at a complete standstill and advised leading
shipping lines to tranship cargoes at other ports. This propaganda had
some effect, in that some cargoes were diverted to other ports and some
shipowners re-arranged their schedules to sail ships either to Hong Kong
or to China ports, but not to both. The threat offered by the boycott in
Hong Kong itself was met by an intensive counter-propaganda campaign
mounted by the Marine Department to explain the facts and to answer
queries from seamen and to counter the intimidation, both veiled and
direct, to which they had been subjected. As a result 1,222 seamen
reported for jobs at the Government Seamen's Recruiting Office during
the first ten days the boycott was supposed to be in operation and in
only two cases (where there were other considerations) were ships
delayed for lack of a crew. A small number of seamen signed off their
ships but were replaced, without difficulty, through the Seamen's
Recruiting Office. Indeed in many cases those who had signed off
re-applied for employment after spending a day or two ashore having, no
doubt, decided for themselves that all was well in the Colony. During
the second week of September four ships arrived in the port from China
to discharge cargo consigned to Hong Kong, to mark the first break in
the boycott; and since then the tonnage of cargoes from China has
steadily increased.
These work stoppages, both in the port and elsewhere, were purely
political and there is no substance in the suggestion that labour
conditions have been the underlying cause of confrontation in Hong Kong.
The labour dispute at the artificial flower works was discarded as soon
as confrontation was under way, and the voluminous poster campaign and
the endless propaganda that emanated from communist sources during the
summer made no mention at all of industrial conditions.
While these events had been taking place in the urban areas the New
Territories had remained comparatively quiet. There had been some
demonstrations and a sporadic display of posters in the market towns and
in the industrial complex of Tsuen Wan but, mainly due to the firm line
taken by the leaders of the New Territories Heung Yee Kuk, who came out
strongly on the side of law and order, there had been only a few minor
incidents. In the sensitive area of the land frontier with China it had
been mainly
◄A blind woman is led safely away from a street mob.
ร
a propaganda war carried out on the Chinese side of the border. There
had been demonstrations, often on a large scale; a loud- speaker had
been set up at the border station of Lo Wu which at regular intervals
poured out a stream of anti-British propaganda; trains from China were
plastered with posters and even cattle imported into the Colony had
slogans painted on their sides.
There was, however, no violence until June 24 when a crowd of about 200
people attacked the police post at Sha Tau Kok with stones and bottles.
They were dispersed by gas shells and order was restored. This incident
was followed on June 26, by the first protest made by the Peking
Government at diplomatic level since confrontation began.
On July 8 there was a further mob attack at Sha Tau Kok. The police post
was attacked and, when the police opened fire with gas and wooden
'baton' projectiles, both the post and the Rural Committee Office, where
another police company had been stationed, came under heavy sniping and
machine gun fire. A detachment from the 1/10 Gurkha Rifles was called
out to assist the police and, with the aid of armoured cars, they
relieved the police companies, which by then had five men killed and 11
wounded.
This incident received wide publicity and gave rise to some exaggerated
and alarmist reports overseas. It was a serious affair but it was not an
attempt at armed invasion of the Colony, No regular units of the Chinese
Army were involved. All the evidence suggests that it was a purely local
affair organized and executed by the villagers in the immediate
vicinity.
Since then the border remained unsettled and, while there was no
repetition of violence on the same scale, there was a succession of
incidents at Lo Wu, at Sha Tau Kok, and at the road crossings at Man Kam
To. A number of farmers living on the Chinese side own land in British
Territory and, by long-standing agreement, they have been allowed to
cross the border to work their fields. This practice has continued, but
the truculent attitude displayed by the farmers has led to constant
friction. The border bridge at Man Kam To has had to be closed for
periods of several weeks, despite
protests from the Chinese side, and because of the continuing unrest the
army took over from the police the responsibility for patrolling the
whole of the border area. Man Kam To, however, remained a trouble spot.
Two off-duty policemen who inadvertently crossed the border at this
point were forcibly detained; and a senior police inspector, who was
engaged in trying to conciliate a group of villagers in the vicinity of
the bridge, was seized by them and forcibly taken over the border. The
inspector managed to escape, after being held for 36 days, and made his
way back to Hong Kong. The two policemen were returned to the Colony at
the end of November after talks held with Chinese border officials.
The Sha Tau Kok incident was interpreted by the communist press in Hong
Kong as armed support for confrontation and it was followed by renewed
violence both in Kowloon and on Hong Kong Island. Demonstrations were
staged in the vicinity of communist shops and other premises from which
gangs emerged to ambush the police as they arrived to investigate.
Attacks were made on police units and on drivers of public vehicles.
From July 9 to 12 there was a widespread succession of incidents in
which one police- man and seven rioters lost their lives.
July 12 marked a turning point. Up to this time the various methods of
attack by the communists had been met and contained and they had gained
no ground in their struggle. But it was they that had done most of the
attacking and they had put considerable strain on the police and on the
many public servants and others who had been forced to work long hours
in the maintenance of public order. On July 12 the acting Colonial
Secretary announced in the Legislative Council that from then on the
government was deter- mined to grasp and maintain the initiative. This
promise was followed by immediate action. On that day, and on the days
follow- ing, strong parties of police, backed up by military units,
raided the principal communist strongholds, including union premises and
schools; they seized stocks of home-made weapons and explosives as well
as inflammatory posters and literature, and they took into custody a
number of people suspected of subversive activities.
The initial raids were strenuously resisted. In an action against the
Kowloon Dock Workers Amalgamated Union premises the defenders used
bottles, daggers, acid and firebombs and it took
the police three hours to complete the break in. The secretary of the
union was killed during the struggle; and 81 people were arrested, to
the obvious approval of other occupants of the building. Sub- sequent
raids met with little or no physical opposition. Indeed the threat of
invasion by the police, at any time, forced the opposition to avoid
gathering for meetings at their usual premises and many centres that
were raided were found to be unoccupied. Sporadic violence continued,
but the communist organizations were disrupted and driven underground.
They began to talk of a long struggle and, although their newspapers
continued their stream of inflam- matory propaganda and were now
inciting to armed insurrection, their readers grew less and support for
confrontation dwindled to a hard core of dedicated and fanatical men and
women.
Pressure against the communist organizations was maintained. Action was
taken against known centres of subversive activity and, in August, three
communist newspapers were suppressed and two of their editors were
prosecuted for sedition, an action which resulted in a strong protest
from Peking. A similar protest had been made in July when an employee of
the New China News Agency was arrested for taking part in an illegal
assembly. The protest was rejected and was followed by the Reuters
corre. spondent in Peking being placed under house arrest. Two other
employees of the New China News Agency in Hong Kong were subsequently
arrested on similar charges and the Peking Govern. ment, on August 20,
issued what amounted to an ultimatum. Within 48 hours all three
employees of the New China News Agency must be released and action
against the newspapers and their editors must be withdrawn. Failure to
do so would result in 'serious consequences'. This demand was also
rejected. The threatened reprisal took place, not against Hong Kong, but
against the office of the British Chargé d'Affaires in Peking, which was
sacked by a mob on August 22.
In Hong Kong, confrontation entered a new phase of indis- criminate
'bomb' attacks. There was a hint of terrorism to come in the
publication, in August, of a list of prominent members of the community
who were said to be marked for assassination. But, in the event, the
only victims were a well-known wireless commentator, Mr Lam Bun, and his
cousin who, together, were drenched in petrol
In the midst of all the noise and violence a policeman finds time to
comfort a frightened child.
and burned to death in a particularly vicious attack which excited
horror and disgust. Attacks were also made on individual police officers
in order to gain possession of their firearms. In four such attacks two
police constables were killed, an inspector severely injured and another
constable slightly injured.
Explosive attacks, which at first were directed at selective targets,
became indiscriminate. All known stocks of explosives and fireworks in
the Colony were called in during August and September, but it is
apparent that some stocks evaded the government net and the planting of
bombs, both genuine and simulated, continued. This campaign was
essentially a propaganda move, to stimulate the flagging communist
support by a show of strength. Most of the *bombs' have been simulated
and many of them carried such messages as 'compatriots don't touch'. The
majority of the real ones were made from black powder extracted from
fireworks and produced more noise than danger. But some were deadly and
all had to be treated with the utmost care. While the more militant
among the communists no doubt hoped that these devices would cause
casualties, particularly among the police and military bomb disposal
squads that had to deal with them, the main aim appeared to be to sap
public morale by the disruption that was caused and by the constant
threat of danger. When innocent passers-by were killed or injured, as
inevitably happened, the communist press sought to evade responsibility
by describing the matter as an *unfortunate accident' or by putting
about that not all bombs were planted by communists. But, whatever their
intentions, the deaths that were caused, and particularly those of two
young children, brought a general revulsion of feeling against the
perpe-
trators.
Bomb attacks continued as an almost daily occurrence until the end
of December. The visit to the Colony in October by the Minister of State
for Commonwealth Affairs, Lord Shepherd, was marked by a noticeable
increase of both real and simulated bombs, while in November there was a
flurry of violence directed against police units. Since December 25,
however, no explosive bombs have been planted and, while a number of
suspicious objects continued to be reported, it appears to be likely
that this violent phase of confronta- tion has come to an end. Since it
began the police and service bomb
disposal units dealt with 8,074 suspected bombs, of which 1,167
were genuine bombs.
In many cases children took part in these attacks. Teen-age girls have
been arrested in possession of explosive bombs and, in at least one
case, a schoolboy was injured by the explosion of a bomb he was
carrying. Indeed, towards the end of the year there was a noticeable
increase in the number of schoolchildren involved in activities
connected with confrontation and in the truculence to- wards authority
they displayed. These children were almost all pupils of
communist-dominated schools in the Colony and it must be concluded that
they were being encouraged in these activities by their teachers as part
of a concerted plan by the communists to bolster up their dwindling
ranks. Many of these schools had become centres for the storage and
dissemination of inflammatory literature and even for the manufacture of
bombs, both simulated and real. On November 27 a youth was severely
injured in an explosion in the Chung Wah Middle School. The school was
closed by the government, and this action evoked a protest from Peking.
Not all of those who took part in the demonstrations and riots have
subscribed to the communist aims. Many were employees in communist
concerns who were instructed to take part, and others-particularly the
hooligans who exploited the initial riots at San Po Kong-were paid to do
so. It a sad commentary on communist tactics that they should have to
employ children as well in these activities and to expose them, not only
to arrest and imprisonment for their seditious activities, but also to
physical danger.
It is also a reflection on their failure to gain general support for
their cause. The incidents which attracted so much publicity overseas,
have been the work of a small minority. The bulk of the population
refused to become involved and has gone about its normal work. Indeed,
in spite of the strident claims in the com- munist press, the efficiency
of the Colony has been surprisingly little disturbed. While it is as yet
too early to assess the long-term economic effects of confrontation,
present evidence suggests that there has been no significant disruption
in any of the major sectors. Industrial production was not affected at
all, and exports continued
at substantially higher levels than in previous years. The tourist trade
continued satisfactorily in spite of alarmist headlines in some overseas
newspapers. At the height of the disturbances substantial deposits were
withdrawn from banks but, as most of the sums withdrawn were converted
into Hong Kong currency, outflow of capital was contained within fairly
narrow limits, although it was accelerated to some extent in June by the
Middle East crisis and consequent pressure on sterling. Their strong
liquidity position enabled the banks to withstand these withdrawals
without difficulty and without imposing any serious restriction on
credit. From the end of August deposits began to return to the banks at
a satisfactory rate. There had been no significant adverse effects on
public revenue.
The bus companies, which were perhaps the hardest hit by
confrontation, have made substantial progress in getting their flects
back on the road; other public transport services were almost back to
normal at the end of the year. When on June 7, voting took place for
five vacant seats on the Urban Council, the election passed off without
incident and, indeed, a record percentage (for Hong Kong) of the
electorate cast their votes. Confrontation did not affect such annual
events as the cross harbour swimming race, the dragon boat races and the
Cheung Chau bun festival while, in the autumn, the racing and football
season started on schedule. A determined attempt was made to wreck Hong
Kong Week which was held between October 30 and November 5 to publicize
Hong Kong products. But, in spite of a marked increase in explosive
attacks, the colourful festivities took place as planned and met with an
enthusiastic reception from the many visitors who attended. The Chinese
Manufacturers' Association's Jubilee Exhibition, in December, attracted
a record number of visitors.
For many people the main preoccupation during the summer has been not
so much confrontation as the water supply position. Hong Kong has no
sizeable rivers and it is dependent on rainfall which is collected in
reservoirs. By the current agreement with China, an additional 15,000
million gallons of water (which is paid for at the rate of $1.06 for a
thousand gallons) is provided from her more ample resources each year,
to be drawn during the period from October to June. By the end of 1966
the storage position was causing some anxiety and by an ad hoc agreement
a further 1,800
Bomb disposal men in action on Hong Kong Island,
million gallons was made available from China. In February, as a
precaution, the daily supply period in Hong Kong was reduced from 24
hours to 16 hours.
Rainfall during May and June was below average. The full ration from
China, including the agreed additions, was drawn by June 25 and during
the month the supply period had to be reduced to eight hours a day and
then to four hours every other day. On July 11, the total storage in the
reservoirs stood at 3,277 million gallons, that is about 50 days supply.
A request for an additional supply from China went unanswered and the
situation was serious. On July 13 the supply period was further reduced
to four hours every fourth day. Hospitals and other essential users
continued to be given a full supply while squatter areas and industries
received a daily four-hour supply and the resettlement estates a
four-hour supply every other day.
As in the previous severe drought of 1963, the population put up
with the discomfort with remarkable patience and cheerfulness despite
communist attempts to exploit the situation. The position, however, was
critical; any further reduction in the supply period would have been
almost insupportable and would in any case have been unlikely to reduce
materially the rate of consumption. Various possibilities were
considered of obtaining additional water from other sources, but they
offered little hope of success.
By good fortune there was timely rain in mid-July which eased the
situation, and further heavy rain in mid-August and September. At the
end of September it was possible to revert to a four-hour daily supply
and with the resumption of water from China on October 1 at the
beginning of a new supply period-the full 24-hour supply was reinstated.
In order to conserve supplies, however, saline water from Plover Cove
was added to the water issued for general consumption. The resulting
mixture, although salty to the taste, is below the maximum limit
recommended by the World Health Organization and it has no ill-effects.
It has, however, provided the communists with the opportunity to work up
a campaign against this 'con- tamination'.
They have also seized upon the adjustments made to the exchange rates
for the Hong Kong dollar, following the devaluation of
sterling by Great Britain, and propaganda on this issue, and on the
salinity of the water, provided the main themes for their news- paper
and radio coverage for several weeks. The tone of this pro- paganda was,
however, noticeably more moderate: the arguments were carefully
presented and were designed to attract the support of those sections of
the population which were most closely con- cerned. This departure from
the violent language used by the communist press in previous months, as
well as the apparent cessa- tion of physical violence, may well indicate
that a new phase of confrontation has begun.
Hong Kong has no quarrel with China, nor indeed with the communists as
such. It is not an offence to be a communist (or to belong to any other
political party) nor to practise the doctrines and beliefs of communism
although it is an offence to translate these beliefs into action that
conflicts with the law. The government has taken action against the
supporters of confrontation, not because of their political beliefs, as
the communist press has asserted, but simply because they have broken
the law. Its basic aim and policy, throughout, has been to preserve law
and order and to regain for the Colony its traditional role of providing
a place for people to live and work in peace, whatever their race or
political belief.
In this it has succeeded, at a cost to the Colony of 51 lives. Fifteen
people were killed by bomb explosions, including two members of the
police, an army sergeant and an officer of the Fire Services; and eight
police officers were killed in other incidents.
The various counter measures that have been taken in Hong Kong have had
the full support of Her Majesty's Government in London which has, on
several occasions expressed its admira- tion for the determination with
which confrontation has been contained. The three main phases of the
communist attack; demon- strations to gain popular support; stoppages of
work to paralyse the Colony's economy; terrorism to undermine morale;
have a!' failed. Great credit is due to the police who have, through,
un, exercised the greatest steadiness and restraint under the se rest
provocation and who have, at the same time, dealt firm with violence,
when it has arisen, with the minimum of force and at the cost of severe
casualties to themselves. But the same spirit of deter mination and
resolution informed all others who were concerned.
1
whether they were members of the government, members of the armed forces
or other auxiliary units, or private individuals. Con- frontation is an
issue that ultimately affected the lives of everyone in the Colony and
they all played a part in meeting it: some in the planning and
organization required to contain the different phases of the communist
attacks; others by cheerfully working long hours, often under conditions
of imminent personal danger, to keep the Colony functioning efficiently;
and others, again, simply by going about their normal work and refusing
to be panicked by communist threats and propaganda.
Confrontation may continue for some time in one form or another. With
this spirit and with the firm support that has been given by Her
Majesty's Government, the people of Hong Kong will continue to overcome
whatever new threats they may have to face and, with their inimitable
energy, will drive Hong Kong on to new peaks of prosperity and progress.
1
PUBLISHED FEBRUARY 1968
| This 12-year old boy lost an eye when a communist planted bomb
exploded in a street near his home.
Out to
provoke violence,
nists turn hostile.
Commu-
DESIGNED BY THE GOVERNMENT INFORMATION SERVICES DEPARTMENT
PRINTED BY THE GOVERNMENT PRINTER, HONG KONG
C
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