chant slogans. Pamphlets were handed out extolling the cause of the
workers while posters appeared urging the Police to turn against their
officers. These demonstrations inevitably attracted a crowd of people,
some of whom were merely curious while others were hooli- gans ready to
cause trouble. At this time the reputation of the Police was suffering
from the after effects of the brief rioting in Kowloon of the previous
year. All thinking people had admired the restraint with which they had
acted but there were not wanting those who, for reasons of their own,
had maliciously spread stories of their alleged brutality; and much of
this mud had stuck. At all events, while there was a complete volte face
of opinion as confrontation progressed, there were at this stage many
who regarded the Police as their enemies and who were quite prepared to
jeer and throw stones, or even proceed to more violent action if the
occasion arose. These feelings were worked upon by the communists who,
as later evidence showed, offered bribes to provoke a disturbance; the
going rate was said to be $10 to throw stones and $5 to shout, with
rather less for children. The crowds watching the demonstrations grew
daily and when the inevitable clash with the Police occurred on 11th May
there was a mob at hand ripe for violence.
6
19. As on 6th May, it was the pickets at the factory that started the
incident. Again disregarding the warnings they had been given regarding
the limits of legal picketing, they surged towards the factory gates and
threatened to break in. As they numbered about a hundred, with an
estimated crowd of 1,500 in the offing, the management asked for Police
assistance to control the situation. Two companies of Police were sent
to the scene shortly after 3.30 p.m. on 11th May but the crowd refused
to withdraw or disperse and bottles were thrown at the Police. By 4 p.m.
order had been restored: the crowd had been pushed back and, while there
was some shouting and waving of 'Red Books', it appeared that the
incident would die down. The Police had fired 'baton shells'; these are
wooden projectiles discharged from a 'Federal' gas gun which can
incapacitate at close range but are not likely to cause serious injury.
No tear gas or other weapons were used. The only known casualty was a
girl who had been hit on the knee and was slightly injured.
20. The crowd did not, however, disperse and further crowds began to
build up in adjacent streets. At the approach of the Police they would
melt away only to return to the attack again, often in a more aggressive
mood and in larger numbers. At 4.25 p.m. another company of Police was
brought into action and they achieved a temporary con- trol of the
situation. From experience gained in the disturbances of 1966 it was
thought that the presence of the riot police might in itself be a
provocation. With this in mind the Police were ordered at 6.20 p.m. to
withdraw from the affected area. They were unable to do so and had to
fight a rearguard action. The disorders continued: the Kowloon Police
companies were mobilized, a helicopter patrol was set up and, finally,
at 7.25 p.m., the Police Auxiliaries were called out. It was decided
that army units would not be called upon for assistance and they
remained in reserve. At 7.30 p.m. the Governor ordered that a curfew be
imposed in the area affected, to be in force from 9.30 p.m. until 5.30
a.m, the following morning.
21. By this time rioting had spread from San Po Kong westward to Tung
Tau Resettlement Estate and eastward along the Choi Hung Road. Within
this area marauding crowds roamed the streets, attacking buses, setting
fire to cars and assaulting the Police with stones and bottles. By
setting up road blocks and by breaking up the crowds by the use of tear
gas the Police gradually brought the situation under control. The main
resistance was centred at Tung Tau and, to a lesser
7
extour Wong Tai Sin Resettlement Estates. These estates, built to
re- Asose squatters, are densely populated and provided a natural
rallying posent for the rioters. Police action is difficult. They are
hampered by ide attendant crowds while the multiplicity and height of
the buildings mule them easy targets for bottles and other missiles. A
large and Nostik crowd had entrenched itself at the Tung Tau Estate and
it was och after cordoning off the centre of resistance and firing
several tear gas shells that the Police were able to subdue it.
22. By 10.30 p.m. the whole area covered by the curfew was
generally qeer although there were some isolated incidents during the
night.
23. The next morning, the 12th May, there was an uneasy calm,
Some anxiety was caused by the assembly of a group of textile workers
outside a communist-owned cinema and another group demonstrated bedy
outside the Green Island Cement Company's premises at Hung Hom, the
scene of another dispute; but they both dispersed without bent. One or
two groups of children jeered at the Police and threw a few stones.
During these days there were large numbers of children about, either
alone or mingled with the crowds, and they were a constant source of
provocation. Whenever possible the Police took no action against them
and did their best to ignore them.
24. Soon after noon, as workers in the factories in the San Po Kong arga
came out for their lunch break, crowds again began to build up Choi Hung
Road. There was no incident to set off the crowd but, possibly incited
by the communist agitators among them, they threw states and bottles at
the Police and a general melee ensued. Crowds continued to gather and by
1.30 p.m. the Police were faced by a mob of about 3,000 persons in Choi
Hung Road while gangs of youths armed with iron bars were attempting to
break into shops in the vicinity. The Police again set up road blocks
and had some success in breaking up the crowds by the use of tear gas;
but as on the previous day the crowds dis- persed only to reform again
and there was renewed violence for the rest of the afternoon and
evening. The rioting was confined to the same area as on the previous
day, but within this area there were serious disorders. Buses were
attacked and set on fire. Traffic signs were pulled down. Private cars
were overturned and burnt. The Police were attacked with stones, bottles
and iron bars. The resettlement estates were again the centres of the
disorder; the resettlement staff quarters at Wong Tai Sin were broken
into and looted, and fires were started at Tung Tau.
8
25. In order to give the Police a better chance of containing and
suppressing the rioting, a curfew was imposed at 6 p.m. but it had
little immediate effect. Crowds, numbering many hundreds, continued to
roam the streets and sporadic attacks were made on Police parties
enforcing the curfew. Fires were started and minor incidents occurred
throughout the night.
26. By 11 a.m. on the next morning, 13th May, crowds had again begun to
gather in San Po Kong and posters appeared condemning the Government for
injuring innocent people. By cordoning off the affected arcas and
carrying out 'sweeps', the Police dispersed the crowds and kept them off
the streets. But they collected in the resettlement estates, where they
could not easily be controlled, and rioting and violence continued. At
Tung Tau, a mob broke into the estate office and a school; they ran-
sacked the resettlement staff quarters and they overturned cars. At Wong
Tai Sin the staff quarters were again attacked and were set on fire. At
Lo Fu Ngam, fires were started, the Civil Aid Services office was broken
into and furniture was dragged out and set on fire. At one estate, Tsz
Wan Shan, the situation remained calm; a delegation from the estate Kai
Fong or neighbourhood association had visited the Police and had under-
taken to maintain law and order themselves. They were as good as their
word and throughout the disturbances the estate remained quiet.
27. A curfew was again imposed, to start from 7 p.m. On this night it
was effective. There were no further incidents during the night and it
appeared that the violence had run its course. The following day, which
was Sunday 14th May, there was some stone-throwing but no major in-
cident developed and no curfew was imposed.
28. There is little doubt that the riots were inspired and exploited by
the communists, both by their own ringleaders who were seen urging the
mobs on to further violence, and by the hooligans that they had
employed. The majority of those who took part were normally law- abiding
people and it is difficult to believe that they were consciously
supporting dissident workers in an industrial dispute, or that they were
moved by communist ideology or by any discernible cause other than a
senseless urge to destruction. The main attacks were against the Police
and against Government property which, as the symbols of authority, were
natural targets. But there is no reason to suppose that this reflected
general discontent or indeed anything more than the excitement of the
moment and the effectiveness of the communist agitators. It is signifi-
cant that, as the communist aims became clearer, they did not again
9
succeed in attracting public support. The rioting that took place after
these events was virtually confined to dedicated communists and
hooligans.
29. The Police and Police Auxiliaries acted with great restraint
throughout. Contrary to the allegations in the communist press, they
used only tear gas and baton shells in dispersing the crowds. No ball
am- munition was used and the sole fatality was a man who was killed at
Wong Tai Sin Estate, not by Police action but probably by a brick
dropped on his head from a verandah above. Between 11th and 14th May 391
persons were arrested, of whom 367 were subsequently charged, and 32
persons were injured, of whom 7 were admitted to hospital. The Police
casualties were 22, of whom 2 were admitted to hospital.
30. For the next three days there was comparative calm in
Kowloon. The number of posters increased, attacking the Police and the
Govern- ment. Rumours continued to multiply: the Peking Government was
about to take over the Colony; Chinese gunboats had been seen off Castle
Peak; electricity and water supplies were to be turned off: the
transport companies were about to go on strike. There was a run on some
food shops as people laid up stocks as a precaution. Householders filled
all available containers with water, and the resulting pressure caused
temporary stoppages in some areas-which strengthened the numours of a
shortage.
31. On the 16th May a crowd of about 500 people gathered outside
the South Kowloon Magistracy where some of the rioters were being tried.
They were kept supplied with refreshments by the communists, who no
doubt realized that bottles of mineral water were useful potential
weapons and when, at one stage, a group of taxis blocked the road
outside the courts it appeared that an incident would develop. There
was, however, no violence and the crowd gradually dispersed during the
afternoon.
32. The following day crowds again collected at both the North
Kowloon and South Kowloon Magistracies, and by 1 p.m. there were between
two and three thousand people near the latter, at the junction of Nathan
Road and Gascoigne Road. The crowd refused to disperse and started
stoning the Police, who replied with tear gas and baton shells. The
crowd then split up into groups which moved into the side streets and
gradually worked their way North and South on the line of Nathan Road.
There were several clashes with the Police, at Argyle Street, Soy
10
Street and at various other points along Nathan Road. Stones were thrown
at banks, hotels and other prominent buildings. The Post Office at Bute
Street was set on fire and there were fires at two other buildings in
Nathan Road. Both private and Police vehicles were stoned and two
private cars were set on fire. A curfew was imposed at 7.30 p.m. but
fires and violence continued until midnight.
33. The next day, 18th May, was quiet. Demonstrations outside the courts
continued but they were orderly for the most part and the demonstrators
dispersed without incident.
CHAPTER 4
DEMONSTRATIONS IN VICTORIA
34. The scene now shifted to Hong Kong Island. The rioting in Kowloon
had provided a pretext for renewed attacks on the Govern- ment, and to
back up the poster and press campaign, delegations from various
communist organizations made their way to Government House to protest at
the Government's 'brutality' and to insist that the com- munist demands
be accepted. The first delegation, consisting of four men and a woman
from one of the communist newspapers, had appeared at Government House
on the morning of 13th May, and they were followed by others on the 14th
and 15th.
35. On 15th May a statement was issued by the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs at Peking protesting at the events in Hong Kong. It referred to
the 'sanguinary brutality of the British imperialists', and it expressed
full support for the demands made on the Government by the com- munist
organizations in Hong Kong and insisted that these demands be
immediately accepted. On 19th May the Foreign Secretary delivered an
equally strong protest verbally to the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires in
London. While the latter did much to raise morale in Hong Kong, the
statement from Peking, which was given considerable publicity in the
communist press, was taken as evidence of full support for confrontation
and gave equal encouragement to the communists.
36. On 16th May it was announced with considerable publicity in the
communist press that an 'All Circles Anti-Persecution Struggle Com-
mittee' was to be formed. The number of delegations to Government House
increased in an organized exercise in intimidation. Groups of people,
both men and women, uniformly dressed in white shirts and
11
and in the vicinity of Pottinger Street. A second crowd moved away to
the Star Ferry while the remainder were shepherded eastward by the
Police burning the flag at the Fire Services Headquarters in Harcourt
Road on the way. By about 6 p.m. the position in the central area was
calm and there were no further incidents.
42. In the midst of these disturbances some communist
delegations, including a group of about a hundred school children,
passed through to Government House in the small parties permitted by the
Police. There were to be further, more or less orderly, delegations in
the days that followed but the communists were now plainly seeking a
major clash with the Police in order to manufacture a propaganda
'incident',
43. On the morning of 22nd May crowds again began to gather at
Garden Road and at 10 a.m. the Police were faced by about 100 com-
munists including students of both sexes. A passer-by who rashly aired
his opinion of Chairman Mao was set upon and assaulted. He was rescued
by a member of the public, who was later awarded the Belilios Star for
his bravery.
44. The demonstrators again demanded to be allowed past the cordon and
again shouted abuse and threats when this was refused. To provoke the
Police further they made threatening gestures, thrusting their fingers
at the eyes of the constables in the leading files opposite them and
kicking at their ankles. When this failed to produce the action they
wanted, one of them kicked a constable in the groin. The man responsible
was arrested; a general melee ensued and the Police used their batons.
At once the demonstrators fell to the ground en masse in simulated
agony, whether they were hit or not. They produced bandages from their
pockets, some already provided with artificial 'bloodstains, and they
daubed themselves with the blood of those who had really been injured.
45. The communists had achieved their incident, which was given wide
publicity in their newspapers. Its effect however was limited by the
fact that the scene was fully covered by non-communist reporters as well
as by photographers and television cameramen, while an interested crowd
was also watching from the windows of the Hilton Hotel. While the
supporters of confrontation might have been con- vinced by the pictures
of this play-acting published in the communist press, the true facts of
the incident were too well publicized for anyone else to be taken in.
The incident tended to prove not the 'brutality' of the Police but their
very considerable restraint.
14
46. By 10.30 a.m. the situation at Garden Road was quiet but crowds
began to build up elsewhere, at Statue Square, outside the Hilton Hotel
and in the vicinity of Government House. There were demonstrations
outside the Causeway Bay Magistracy and a hostile crowd at the Kowloon
Star Ferry concourse had to be dispersed by tear gas shells. In Victoria
the situation deteriorated. Soon after 2 p.m. the buses stopped running
and some buses and taxis were abandoned in the Central area in an
attempt to cause traffic jams. The ferry services had been temporarily
stopped because of the disorder and some trams were returning to their
depots. It was announced that a curfew would be imposed from 6.30 p.m,
and the crowds of office workers, many of them resigned to a long walk
home, added to the confusion.
47. However, the crowds dispersed without further incident. By 4.30 p.m.
most of the office workers had got away and the position was casier.
With the onset of the curfew, the central area was quiet and apart from
some incidents at Shau Kei Wan the curfew was effective. Although the
Central area had been occupied by large and generally hostile crowds
throughout the day there was comparatively little violence. 135 persons
were arrested, of whom only one had been injured seriously enough to be
admitted to hospital. Four policemen were slightly injured. It was
during this day that the Police used ball ammunition for the first time
since confrontation began. A detective in Statue Square saw a man
pouring what appeared to be acid on the back of a riot policeman and
fired three rounds from his revolver. The liquid was found to be petrol
and the policeman was not injured. The man responsible escaped.
CHAPTER 5
STOPPAGES OF WORK
48. After the disorders of 21st and 22nd May, it was expected that the
communists would continue the attack on the following day. In the event
the day passed in comparative calm and it became apparent that the
communist tactics had changed. The results that they had gained so far
in their attempts to win popular support for confrontation were
negligible. In the middle of the month the Federa- tion of Hong Kong
Students as well as Kai Fong leaders and other prominent members of the
community publicly announced their sup- port of the Government in the
maintenance of law and order. This lead was immediately followed by
similar expressions of support from
15
a large number of associations and societies representing a complete
cross-section of the Colony and an overwhelming majority of its
population. (A complete list is given at Appendix 1). On 18th May a
group of businessmen in the Colony opened a fund for the higher
education of the children of Police officers which in a fortnight
reached a total of $3 million, an extraordinary acknowledgment by the
people of the debt they owed the Police. In the face of this massive
and, to them, clearly unexpected demonstration of opposition to
confrontation, the communists turned to an attempt to display their
strength by a succession of work stoppages.
49. During the preceding days there had been persistent
rumours of impending stoppages and during the disturbances some bus and
lorry drivers had stopped work in sympathy with the demonstrators. From
23rd May onwards there was to be a wave of stoppages as a form of
protest against the Government's refusal to accept the com. munist
demands. They affected transport and utility companies, a few textile
companies and the staff of some Government departments. In most cases
they were planned as token stoppages only some incon- venience was
caused but it was not insurmountable nor was it lasting.
50. The main effect was on the transport companies. Employees
of the China Motor Bus Co., who had been aggrieved by the arrest of
three of their colleagues the previous day, stopped work on 23rd and
24th May. Inspite of considerable intimidation this stoppage was not
fully effective and some buses continued to run. The Hong Kong Tramway
Company had a reduced number of trams on the evening of the 23rd and on
the 24th but by the 25th the numbers had returned almost to normal.
Kowloon Motor Bus workers, who were among the most militant of all,
staged a stoppage on the morning of the 24th and, armed with iron bars,
prevented loyal crews from taking buses from the garages. This stoppage
was called off at 9 a.m. after discussions with the management and,
although many buses carried inflammatory posters, thereafter normal
services remained in operation. Communist employees of the two ferry
companies confined themselves to brief token stoppages, the Star Ferry
for one hour on the evening of 25th May and the Hong Kong and Yaumati
Ferry for three hours on the early morning of 28th May.
51. These were not 'strikes' in the ordinary sense of the
word as they did not arise from a genuine industrial dispute; they were
purely a political manoeuvre. In a meeting with officials of the China
Motor
16
Bus Co. on 24th May therefore the dissident workers were told plainly
that if they stopped work they would not be paid. There is no doubt that
this action by the company strongly influenced the decision to resume
work the next morning, although the strikers gave as their reason that
they did not wish to inconvenience the public. Employees in Government
departments were warned that absence from duty in these circumstances
might lead to dismissal, and absentees in the Marine Department and the
Public Works Department were interdicted from duty or discharged.
Following this lead, similar action was taken by the other companies
affected and it was this, coupled with Police intervention in any cases
of intimidation that were reported, that took most of the impetus out of
these stoppages.
52. The period of 'token stoppages had been accompanied by a spate of
posters that appeared on the premises affected and elsewhere, urging
attacks on the Government and support for confrontation. These posters,
usually crudely written by hand, had come to be regarded in China as a
legitimate expression of the opinion of the masses' and, as such, almost
sacrosanct. In Hong Kong they served the double purpose of providing a
useful vehicle of propaganda to gain and stimulate the interest of the
public and, at the same time, a challenge to the Govern- ment. If this
challenge had not been accepted the authorities would to a large extent
have abdicated from control of the situation. On Ist June, therefore,
emergency regulations were made to strengthen the law relating to the
display of inflammatory posters and action began to remove them.
53. The first reaction took place on 1st June, when a senior officer of
the Marine Department was forcibly detained by workers at the Yaumati
Slipway who stopped work and demanded, in a most hostile manner, that he
should apologize for removing posters. The following day the Director of
Marine announced that 515 employees out of a total work force of 850
were suspended. Only 70 men reported for duty that day and 90 the
following day. A total of 316 men were eventually dismissed.
54. During the next week the 'poster war' continued. A full-scale
operation was mounted by the Police to clear posters from buses and
ferries and from public buildings; this met with some opposition but no
outright violence. However, as soon as they were removed, more posters
surreptiously appeared. On 6th June posters appeared again en masse.
Every vessel of the Star Ferry had a dozen placards and
17
There were some absentees in the Post Office but other Government
departments were virtually unaffected. There were no further absentees
at the Public Works Department Waterworks and Electrical and Mechanical
depots. Plans made by drivers of the Urban Services Department to
barricade themselves in their garages were called off as their
intentions were known in advance to senior officers of the depart- ment
who had taken steps to forestall them. The utility companies were not
affected. It was only in some sections of the Dairy Farm organiza- tion
that work was seriously affected. These stoppages involved the Transport
Retail Delivery section, the engineering staff responsible for the ice
and cold storage plants and workers at the farm itself. The company
immediately announced that anyone who did not return to work immediately
would be dismissed. The farm workers returned that afternoon but, of the
rest, only six engineers remained on duty. The ice and cold storage
plants were kept going by staff lent by the Jardines Engineering
Corporation. (It has been suggested that the whole staff was confident
that confrontation would succeed and the farm workers only resumed work
to ensure that the animals in their charge were kept in good condition
until the communists took over). On the 11th June the company took the
initiative in dismissing a number of men from the catering section who
had not stopped work but were known to be com. munist agitators. At this
action, all except 40 of the remaining staff in this section stopped
work and were also dismissed.
64. Market stall holders and hawkers were urged to stop work
on 13th June. There was some response by pork and fish stall holders in
some markets but prices remained normal.
65. It was rumoured that there would be further stoppages, by building
construction workers and by employees of the Hong Kong & Yaumati Ferry
Company: about half the workers at one building site did stop work on
the 14th of June but the ferry company was not affected.
66. It was thought that the communists had planned the token
stop- pages as a show of strength and that they had taken care not to
in- convenience the public, on whom they depended for support. By about
the middle of the month, however, there were growing signs that they
were about to stage a major stoppage despite the disruption this would
cause and the possible adverse reaction of the public. This change in
plan may have resulted from the encouraging press reports and wireless
broadcasts that emanated from Peking at this stage. On 3rd June the
20
People's Daily called on the Chinese in Hong Kong to organize a
courageous struggle against the British and to be ready to respond to
the call of the motherland to smash the reactionary rule of the
British'. The article went on to emphasize, however, that the main force
in the struggle was the working class in Hong Kong, in a broad hint that
they could not expect physical assistance from China. This qualifica-
tion was ignored by the communist press in Hong Kong which pro- minently
reprinted the article as evidence of full support of confronta- tion by
Peking. A further article in the People's Daily of 10th June urged
'workers, peasants, the People's Liberation Army and the revolu. tionary
masses in China' to prepare to support the struggle in Hong Kong with
concrete action. At all events, what was termed a 'general strike' was
called for 24th June.
67. On the eve of the proposed stoppage there was a serious incident at
Canton Road in Kowloon. A Police party engaged in photographing posters
outside the premises of the Hong Kong and Kowloon Rubber and Plastic
Union was set upon by a gang of men armed with iron bars, bottles and
sharpened files. The Police opened fire. In the fracas one of the
attackers was fatally wounded and three policemen were injured; the
remaining attackers were seen to retreat into the union premises. Police
reinforcements were called up and, with some difficulty managed to break
in. The premises were defended by some 50 men, armed with choppers and
other weapons, who put up a fierce resistance injuring four policemen in
the struggle. Seven of the defenders were injured, three fatally. This
was the first occasion that the Police had raided the premises of a
communist union and the incident disposed of any communist illusions
that such premises were inviolate.
68. It was not known at this stage how effective the stoppage would be
and to what extent uncommitted workers would, under the impact of
communist propaganda, feel obliged to join what was loudly pro- claimed
as the winning side. With their finances augmented by a gift of $10
million from the All China Federation of Trade Unions, the communist
organizers had also promised lavish payments to those taking part.
During the intervening days, therefore, the Government Transport Office
held a series of meetings with the transport and utility companies to
co-ordinate the action that should be taken and to formulate plans for
the maintenance of essential services. Similar action was taken by other
Government departments concerned.
21
69. As with the token stoppages, it was the transport companies that
were mainly affected. In the Tramway Company all communist union members
stopped work but about half the work force remained loyal and a reduced
service continued in operation. The two bus com- panies had a complete
stoppage on the night of 23rd June but managed to rally a sufficient
number of loyal workers to run reduced services from the morning of the
24th although in Kowloon, with 120 buses operating out of a normal 800,
there was little more than a skeleton service. The Star Ferry Company,
which had dismissed its dissident employees after the stoppage on 6th
June, continued to operate its already reduced services. The Hong Kong &
Yaumati Ferry Company which, in consultation with the transport office
and the Police, had made comprehensive arrangements to combat
intimidation, lost only a hun- dred deck-hands; most of whom were easily
replaceable and the services were not vitally affected. About a third of
the usual number of taxis remained on the roads.
70. Considerable inconvenience was caused to the public by these
stoppages but the majority contrived to get to work somehow, some
crowding onto such public transport as was available, others travelling
in private cars, lorries and taxis and others on foot. Illegal taxis, or
'pak pais' as they are called, appeared on the scene in swarms and, with
the Police turning a blind eye on their activities for the occasion,
successfully filled the transport gap.
71. The utility companies and Government departments affected by
previous stoppages had dismissed the communist elements in their work
force and were mainly unaffected. There were many absentees at the two
electricity companies and at the Hong Kong Telephone Company but
services were maintained by the loyal staff remaining. A small
proportion of the staff of the Urban Services Department (mainly
labourers but including some drivers) failed to report for duty, while a
further 200 men stopped work at Tai Koo Dock which had re- opened on
14th June.
72. The managements affected by these stoppages generally
offered reinstatement to any absentee worker, other than those known to
have been active in organizing the strikes, provided they applied for
re- registration within two or three days. In fact, very few applied for
re- registration and the deficiencies in staff had to be made good by
new recruitment combined, in the case of the bus companies, by a re-
22
organization of operations. The two ferry companies and the Tram Company
resumed normal operations within a month, except that the Star Ferry
Company abandoned its subsidiary route from Victoria to Hung Hom. In the
bus companies progress was slower. It has always been difficult to find
suitable candidates to recruit and train as drivers and, in Kowloon in
particular, the programme of rehabilitation was seriously affected by
the attacks on buses and their drivers during the disorders in July
(which are described in Chapter 9). By the end of the year the services
on Hong Kong Island had been almost fully restored but there was still
room for improvement in Kowloon.
73. During the stoppages of May and June a total of over 17,000 men were
dismissed including workers in the port, who are referred to in the next
chapter. This figure may give an exaggerated impression of communist
strength in the Colony. It represents less than one per cent of the
total work force and the men dismissed were working in industries where
the communist influence was strongest. Moreover, by no means all of
those dismissed were supporters of confrontation. In- timidation was
widespread and, despite the efforts of the Police and the managements
concerned, there were many who absented themselves from work, and
declined the offer of re-employment, simply through fear of reprisals by
communist agents against their families or them- selves if they did
otherwise.
CHAPTER 6
THE PORT OF HONG KONG
74. The general stoppage of work proclaimed by the communists in June
included the Port, which because of its importance to the economy of
Hong Kong, was naturally a major target. Tallyclerks, crews of lighters
and towing launches and about half the operators of mechanical equipment
of the Hong Kong and Kowloon Wharf and Godown Com- pany stopped work and
there was widespread intimidation of loyal workers in these and other
fields. To meet the situation the Marine Department set up a Port
Working Committee, which included officers of the department, Police and
representatives of the companies using the port; its task was formulate
and execute measures to contain the stoppage and to nullify its effects.
The Police, both ashore and afloat,
23
took prompt action in cases of intimidation; lists were prepared and
disseminated of contractors willing to work; new licences were freely
issued to tallyclerks; acting within his discretionary powers, the
Director of Marine allowed some latitude in the professional
qualifications required of new crews coming forward to man launches and
other craft; officers of the Marine Department visited every ship in
port to advise shipmasters and to obtain first-hand information of their
needs; reports on the state of the working of the port were publicized
in the press and through local and overseas radio stations,
75. By these energetic measures and because the stoppage happened to
coincide with a relatively slack period in the port due to the blockage
of the Suez Canal, delay in cargo handling was kept to a minimum and
users of the port were hardly inconvenienced. By the middle of July the
Kowloon Wharf & Godown Company had replaced a number of their absentees,
who were dismissed, and most of the lighters were again in operation.
76. On 17th July the Hong Kong Seamen's Union declared a
'strike' which, as in the previous cases, was a political move and not
the result of an industrial dispute. The declared aim of the union was
to prevent the transport of goods into and out of Hong Kong; seamen
working abroad were instructed to advise the captains of their ships
that they would stop work if cargoes were loaded for transport to Hong
Kong. The union has never commanded the full support of its members.
When the Government set up the Seamen's Recruiting Office, in 1966, the
union raised strong objections, ostensibly on the grounds that it was
detrimental to the seamen's interests in that it restricted their oppor-
tunities for employment. This view was not shared by the seamen
themselves who were quick to see the advantages of the system. In spite
of an official boycott by the union some 32,000 seamen had registered
with the S.R.O. by the end of March 1967, a figure which clearly
included many who were ostensibly union members.
77. Despite this previous failure, the union now made the most strenuous
efforts to make the stoppage a success. Intimidation was widespread,
both in the port and at sea. Union members visited ships with Chinese
crews and, when their passes were withdrawn by the shipping companies,
they sent women agents to visit seamen's wives and families. Communist
agents among seagoing crews were well supplied with newspapers and other
literature and made full use of
24
their opportunity for indoctrination and the dissemination of subversive
propaganda. Seamen were also subjected to intensive indoctrination at
Chinese ports and at ports in Japan and Australia where there were
communist agents. This constant barrage had a considerable effect,
particularly on those who were away from Hong Kong, and there were many
seamen who were anxious for their livelihood.
78. The Marine Department again acted promptly. Before the stop- page
was due to come into effect it issued a firmly worded notice to all
seamen reminding them of the probable consequences to themselves if they
absented themselves from work. It also set up a team of experienced
officers whose job it was to talk to seamen and discuss with them their
problems, to disseminate information and to investigate and dispel
rumours. The Marine Department made special arrangements to keep the men
at sea informed of conditions in Hong Kong. A news- sheet was published
and distributed weekly and 16 mm films of recent local newsreels were
distributed free to ships with Hong Kong crews. In the port, press
conferences were held afloat to enable the foreign press and television
representatives to see for themselves what the situa- tion was.
79. As a result of these measures the extravagant claims made by the
communist press of the success of the stoppage were shown to be without
foundation. In the first ten days 1,222 seamen reported for jobs through
the Seamen's Recruiting Office and only two ships (where there were
other considerations) were delayed through lack of a crew. Some crew
members walked off their ships on arrival in Hong Kong but, with the
exception of about a dozen ships that sailed short-handed, the flow of
new applicants for berths was sufficient to meet all require- ments.
80. Towards the end of July, the China Ocean Shipping Agency circulated
a message to Hong Kong agents that the Seamen's Union's action was
supported by labour in Chinese ports. Chinese cargoes awaiting
transhipment in Hong Kong were detained by communist shippers in their
godowns and no further cargoes arrived from China. Consignees in various
parts of the world were advised by communist agents that, because of the
'port strike' in Hong Kong, cargoes could not be shipped.
81. On 12th August a Norwegian ship, the Hoi Kung, arrived at Hong Kong
from Whampoa with 918 tons of cargo for local discharge.
25
The agents of the ship claimed that the crew would stop work if the Hong
Kong cargo were discharged and some of the passengers on the ship, who
were in transit from Whampoa to Singapore, demonstrated in support of
the crew. A police party was put on board to ensure the safety of the
ship and the cargo was unloaded. The crew walked off but was replaced
through the Seamen's Recruiting Office.
82. This test case, which challenged the effectiveness of the boycott
and demonstrated that crews could be replaced in Hong Kong, did much to
restore the confidence of foreign shippers.
83. During the second week of September four non-Chinese flag
ships arrived in port from China to discharge cargo consigned to Hong
Kong. The arrival of these vessels marked the first break in the
boycott. Since then cargoes arriving in the Colony from China have
fluctuated from 5,000 tons in August to 49,000 tons in October and
26,000 tons in December. (During December the previous year 238,000 tons
of cargo had been imported from China.) As the vast majority of this
cargo was being carried by vessels (mainly Greek) chartered to Peking,
it would appear that the Chinese were either refusing cargo to
non-chartered ships, or that there was a shortage of cargoes and
chartered ships were being given preference for loadings. The answer was
probably a com- bination of these factors. Reliable reports indicated
that conditions at Chinese ports were chaotic, ships were being
subjected to lengthy delays and there were shortages of fuel oil, port
labour and cargo lighters. Certain British shipping companies continued
to claim that their ships were being refused cargo at Chinese ports
because these companies failed to observe the boycott of Hong Kong.
84. At Hong Kong, all cargo requirements were maintained
although during the latter eight months of the year the number of ships
calling and the amount of cargo moving dropped considerably compared
with the same period the previous year. During the period May/December
1967, a total of 4,610,273 tons of cargo was discharged, compared with
4,868,475 tons during the same period in 1966, a decrease of approxi-
mately 6%. Cargo loaded during the same eight months in 1967 totalled
1,504,646 tons compared with 2,034,410 tons during the same period in
1966, representing a considerable drop of approximately 35%. Never-
theless, the amount of cargo loaded during the whole of 1967, 2,417,344
tons, was the second highest since the Second World War, exceeded only
in 1966 when 2,803,443 tons were loaded.
26
CHAPTER 7
THE FOOD SITUATION
85. Towards the end of May a number of rumours were circulating that
communist shops, banks and other local establishments had advised their
staff to lay in stocks of food. This led to a minor run on rice retail
shops; but it was not serious and assurances by Government that there
were large stocks in hand was sufficient to halt the pressure which, as
usual, had caused a rise in retail prices.
86. The news of the closure of the Suez Canal on 5th June caused a more
serious reaction; the fact that this break in the supply route from
Europe would have no effect on rice supplies did nothing to reas- sure
the public. Large numbers of people rushed to rice shops to buy as much
as they could afford and retail stocks were quickly reduced at a faster
rate than they could be replenished from the West Point godowns. By 7th
June prices had risen by 90 to 100 per cent and people were driving out
to the New Territories to buy. The Government controls rice, to the
extent that can be imported only through authorized importers who are
required to keep a sufficient reserve con- tinuously in stock. At this
time there were in fact some 85,000 tons of rice in the Colony,
sufficient for about three months normal consump- tion. To allay the
public fears, the Commerce & Industry Department arranged for the press
to visit some of the main rice godowns to see the position for
themselves and to photograph the stocks. On 8th Junc the Director held a
meeting with all rice importers and wholesalers and arranged with them
that large firms would be able to buy rice direct from importers to sell
to their employees. These measures suc- ceeded in reassuring the public;
the demand eased and retail prices quickly returned to normal.
87. It was however clear by mid-June that the communists in Hong Kong
were quite prepared to interfere with the public's food supplies,
however much hardship was caused, if it suited their purpose; a special
interdepartmental committee was formed to co-ordinate measures to meet
this threat. Its services were required almost at once to deal with a
'food strike' announced by the communists whereby from 28th June to 1st
July all supplies from China would be stopped and at the same time all
food shops and market stalls would close. With their large importing and
wholesale organizations which normally controlled the flow of supplies
from China it was not difficult for the communists
27
to organize a stoppage of supplies. Retailers were threatened that they
would receive no more supplies from China if they refused to shut their
shops when the call was made.
88. Supplies from China did stop, and nothing came in by sea, rail or
road during the best part of these four days; but most shops did not
close and stocks were available for sale in a majority of the shops and
stalls during this period. Increased supplies of pigs, cattle, vege.
tables, chickens and eggs from New Territories farms helped to ease the
shortage and marine fish continued to be available. There were some
shortages, with consequent increases in price, but the publicity given
to the stoppage had alerted the public and there was no rush to buy
scarce supplies. The poorest members of the community were inevitably
those worst affected.
89. Supplies from China were resumed on 2nd July and the markets quickly
returned almost to normal. To keep the public informed of the position,
reports of fresh food supplies arriving from China were published daily.
There were rumours that there would be more stop- pages of supplies and
a number of attempts, almost entirely unsuccess- ful, were made to
incite food shops and stalls to close.
90. In July Chinese supplies to Hong Kong again began to diminish.
It quickly became apparent that this disruption was not deliberate but
was a direct result of unsettled conditions in China brought about by
the cultural revolution which had effected both processing plants and
transportation. As can be seen from the table at Appendix II, the
transport coming to Hong Kong, already affected by the June stoppage.
diminished dramatically during July, August and September. By the end of
the year it had still by no means returned to 1966 standards.
91. The commodities most seriously affected were fresh pork, fresh
beef, fresh vegetables and eggs; and the scarcity of these items caused
prices for other commodities to rise as the pattern of demand changed.
People accepted the situation with fortitude and patience and there was
no evidence of panic buying as there had been in June. The situation
deteriorated seriously throughout August and did not begin to improve
until the middle of September; during the month of August the number of
pigs imported from China fell to 74,359 against a monthly average for
the previous year of 157,711; head of cattle to 1,114 against an average
of 9,874; and vegetables to 13,241 tons against an average of 21,726.
(Details are recorded in Appendix III.) Happily, despite all
28
efforts to deter them, Hong Kong's fishermen continued throughout to
keep the markets supplied with marine fish, which went a long way to
redress the reduction in protein foods imported from China.
92. While there was at no time an inadequate supply of food, the
shortages had a considerable effect on prices particularly for meat,
vegetables and eggs. As one commodity became scarce the demand for other
available commodities increased and prices rose. The index for the food
element of the Consumer Price Index rose from 110 in May to 140 in
September and then started to fall away reaching 119 in November. The
price of rice was unaffected; offtakes from stocks predictably increased
but were rapidly replenished. An indication of the effect of these
disturbances on the cost of living is given in the table at Appendix IV.
93. Importers of food from other parts of the world were informed of the
diminution of supplies from China, and a special mission was sent to
investigate the possibility of obtaining increased supplies from Japan,
South Korea and Okinawa. The rise in prices encouraged importers to
bring in additional quantities from Taiwan, Thailand, Indonesia and
Cambodia; by the beginning of September these addi- tional supplies of
live cattle and pigs were becoming significant. At the same time Hong
Kong's farmers made considerable efforts to increase the local supply of
poultry, pigs, eggs and vegetables.
94. The situation in Kwangtung in September was still unsettled; indeed
some reports reaching Hong Kong at the time described it as chaotic. It
was however clear that, despite these difficulties, intensive efforts
were being made to resume the normal export of foodstuffs to Hong Kong
as soon as possible. The communists attempted to place the blame for
shortages on the closure of the border bridge at Man Kam To* which is
used for supplies coming by road from China. although it was obvious (as
can be seen from Appendix II) that only a small proportion of normal
supplies come by this route. The port 'strike' was also blamed although
the port was fully capable of accept- ing the cargoes which arrived.
Supplies improved quite rapidly, although somewhat erratically, just
before the Mid Autumn festival on 18th September which always gives rise
to a heavy demand for traditional foodstuffs. This improvement possibly
reflected the appreciation by local communists that the shortage of food
and its effect on the general
* See paragraphs 111 and 114.
29
public were damaging rather than helping their cause, and a
realization that increasing supplies were coming in from overseas. It,
no doubt, also reflected the efforts being made in Kwangtung to restore
the appearance of normality before the opening of the Canton Fair,
scheduled to open on 15th October but in fact postponed until 15th
November.
95. By the middle of November food supplies from China had still
not returned to the pre-disturbance level, but prices of fresh food,
subject to normal seasonal variations, had largely returned to those
prevailing in May 1967. The position was then further affected by the
devaluation of sterling by the United Kingdom Government, followed by
the devaluation and subsequent revaluation of the Hong Kong dollar. It
was some days before prices settled down after this fresh disturbance;
the change in exchange parities increased the food index by about two
points.
CHAPTER 8
THE NEW TERRITORIES
96. Unlike the urban areas, the New Territories had remained
comparatively quiet during May and early June. Apart from the industrial
complex of Tsuen Wan, the area is predominantly rural, the communist
influence is less manifest and there are few hooligans to fan the flames
of unrest. The leaders of the New Territories Heung Yee Kuk (a body
which exercises the functions of a rural consultative council) came out
strongly in support of the Government and the main- tenance of law and
order; although there were some demonstrations and display of posters in
the market towns these were on a minor scale. There were also
disturbances at Tsuen Wan but, except in the area of the land frontier
with China, there was no violence at all comparable with that in the
urban areas.
97. The northern boundary of the New Territories marches with that of
China, extending from Deep Bay in the West to the village of Sha Tau Kok
in the East. Since 1956, when waves of immigration from China threatened
to swamp the limited resources of the Colony, the border has been
closed. Controlled crossings are permitted at Lo Wu, which is the border
station on the Kowloon-Canton railway and the check point for passengers
entering or leaving the Colony, and at the road
30
1
bridge at Man Kam To over which there is a regular traffic of food-
stuffs and other goods entering the Colony. A number of farmers, living
in both Chinese and British territory, own land on the other side of the
border; by a long-standing arrangement they are allowed to cross the
border at various points to cultivate their fields. At Sha Tau Kok, a
fishing village on the eastern shore line, the border runs down the
middle of a street and there is constant and unchecked movement between
the Chinese and British halves of the village.
98. Before the start of confrontation there had been some incidents
arising from a chronic dispute over the cultivation of oysters in Deep
Bay in the West. The rest of the border area was quiet and, while there
was little or no communication between the frontier officials on either
side, there was a reasonable modus vivendi in force.
99. Soon after the disturbances at San Po Kong it became evident that
the distorted accounts published by the communist press in Hong Kong had
succeeded in rousing strong feeling on the Chinese side of the border. A
loudspeaker was set up at Lo Wu which regularly broad- cast anti-British
propaganda. Mass demonstrations were held within sight of the British
frontier posts. Trains arriving from Canton were plastered with
anti-British posters. This propaganda was continued with varying degrees
of intensity, but there was no overt violence until 24th June.
100. The incident took place at Sha Tau Kok, a village which lies
astride the border. During the morning there were signs of activity in
the Chinese side of the village. The militia guards increased in
strength and three light machine guns were mounted in shops facing
British territory. Stones were thrown at the Police patrols. At about 1
p.m. a crowd of some 500 people armed with iron bars and sticks had
gathered outside the Rural Committee Office and began to move down the
road towards a waiting Police company. They were ordered to disperse but
instead they attacked the Police, being at once reinforced by another
crowd of about 200 people from the Chinese side. The Police used tear
gas and made baton charges and within an hour they gained the upper
hand, the greater part of the attackers escaping into Chinese territory.
One Police landrover was burnt and another damaged and the tyres of two
armoured cars, that had been stationed without being manned near the
Police post, were slashed. Nine people were arrested, of whom one was
injured through jumping off a roof in an attempt to escape; seven
policemen were slightly injured by stones.
31
101. A crowd of about 300 people remained in sight in the Chinese side
of the village but all remained quiet. Later in the evening a Police
platoon engaged in recovering the damaged armoured cars received a
shower of stones and bottles and was fired at by air guns. There were no
casualties and the night passed without further incident.
102. This incident was followed by a protest from the Peking Government
(the first official protest since the start of confrontation) which
alleged that tear gas shells had been fired into Chinese territory and
reiterated that the demands made by the communists in Hong Kong in May
must be accepted.
103. During the following days there was an uneasy calm. The
trial of the Sha Tau Kok rioters at the Fanling Magistracy attracted a
crowd but there was no trouble. On 27th June a procession which grew to
some 5,000 persons, including members of the militia armed with rifles
and automatic weapons, demonstrated in the area opposite Lo Wu. They
marched through the railway station on the Chinese side and then
dispersed. More processions were seen on subsequent days; there was some
mild stone throwing at Sha Tau Kok and on 30th June a bomb exploded in
front of the Police post producing a loud report and a cloud of smoke
but doing no damage.
104. This period of comparative calm ended on 8th July when the
communists returned to the attack in force. During the morning crowds
built up in the whole border area. At Lo Wu there were about 600 people
shouting and singing and their numbers were increasing; and a mob of
about 10,000 people was seen marching South from Shum Chun. There were
hostile and menacing crowds during the day at both Lo Wu and Man Kam To
but the attack was confined to Sha Tau Kok. More machine guns were set
up and an anti-aircraft gun was sited in the Chinese side of the
village. Soon after 11 a.m. a mob streamed across the border and, after
brief demonstrations during which they shouted, sang and waved banners,
attacked the Police post. One company of Police fired tear gas and baton
shells and succeeded in dispersing part of the crowd but then came under
machine gun fire and had to retreat to the Rural Committee office. Both
this company and the company in the Police post were then subjected to a
hail of machine gun and rifle fire. The main attack fell on the Police
post. An attempt was made to blow up the perimeter wire and an
incendiary bomb set fire to some tents behind the post. The Police
retaliated with greener guns and killed at least one of the attackers
but were immedi-
124
32
ately fired at as soon as they appeared at the windows of the post. By
11.30 a.m. two policemen had been killed at the post and there were a
number of casualties both there and at the Rural Committee office.
105. Shortly before 1 p.m. the army was called upon for assistance and
two companies of the 1/10 Gurkha Rifles, with armoured cars of the Life