visit together with
George Foggon's report.
The Secretary of State said that he found my report very helpful, and
endorsed the conclusions in paragraph 24 of the paper. We therefore now
have the green light to take the necessary follow-up action, Accordingly
would you, during your visit, discuss with David Trench:-
(a) what can be done to reorganise the Secretariat
to bring it into line with current needs without loss of efficiency and
how unofficial members of the Legislative and Executive Councils might
be more closely associated with specific subjects of government
(paragraphs 13 and 14 of my report). As agreed with you Henry all is
sending David Trench a note giving some tentative views on these
subjects, and will send you a copy of his letter which will include some
thoughts on the establishment of a proper Private Office which I
discussed during my visit;
(b) what action is being taken by the Government
Information Services to tackle the "hearts-and- minds" problem
(paragraph 23 of my report) and to counter the inflammatory propaganda
of the communist press, A general discussion with the Governor about
public relations matters would also, I think, be helpful;
and
/(c) v
SIR ARTHUR GALSWORTHY, KCMG,
PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL
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PRIVATE AND CUNET
(c) what progress has been made on the proposal to
appoint District Officers in the urban areas to explain Government
policies to the people at the grass roots and to look into complaints.
The Secretary of State thought that George Foggǝn a paper on labour
matters was first-class and has asked me to authorise you to talk it
over with David Trench with particular reference to taking speedy action
on steffing problems, the
Our proposed Labour Policy Committee and social security. views as
crystallized at Monday's meeting are as follows:-
Staffing of the Department of Labour
*
We all agree that the status of the Department of Labour should be
lifted and that a more dynamic Commissioner is needed to breathe new
life into the Department. Although George Foggon hns argued a case for a
professional officer as head of the Department, he would be content and
I go along with him on this - to see the appointment of a thrustful
administrative ́officer such as Jack Cater, if he can be persuaded to
remain
in the Service and if he would be attracted to the post for a stint of,
say, 18/24 months. If Goodwin does well, perhaps he could take over at
that time.
We must assume from what we have heard that the two expatriate senior
Labour Officers, Messrs. Bennett and Price, are not likely to return to
Hong Kong after their present contracts expire next April. If this
assumption is correct it is important to know, at this stage, what the
Hong Kong Government proposes to do to find successors. Unless action is
taken urgently there is danger that the Department could collapse. I
think you might also usefully ask what the Department of Labour proposes
to do in order to attract and retain the more able of local entrants to
the public service. A career which at present stops dead at Senior
Labour Officer is simply not good enough.
Labour Policy Committee
David Trench is, I know, keen to see early action on improved labour
legislation, but under the present arrangements
PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL.
/all
PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL
all we are likely to get in the next six months is a modest improvement
in workers' compensation, This is, I think you will agree, entirely
inadequate to the scale of the problem which is to bring about, with
something approaching the speed and determination which Hong Kong has
shown in so many other directions, improvements both in labour standards
and industrial relations. The existing process for dealing with these
matters operates with painful slowness and we all attach great
importance, therefore, to the establishment of a Labour Policy Committee
whose object would be specding up decisions on labour policy and
maintaining a close oversight of the progress of projected labour
legislation at all stages. I appreciate that the senior members of the
Secretariat who will form the nucleus of the Committee are already
heavily burdened but it is precisely the need to lift these labour
matters out of the mainstream of day to day work that the proposed
Labour Policy Committee is intended to deal with.
Social Security
The Governor has expressed publicly in Hong Kong his interest in some
advance being made on the social security front; but apart from the
pending publication of the Working Party's report nothing is likely to
happen for some months at least, Would it not be helpful, as Foggon
proposes, to have the report of what, with all due respect was a working
party of non-specialists, examined quietly on the spot by someone with
specialised experience? We have in mind someone from our Ministry of
Social Security who has had experience of social security problems in
less developed countries. The Secretary of State has rightly pointed out
that the person appointed must have his feet firmly on the ground and
not his head in the clouds.
One final point on labour. My concern about labour conditions and reform
is tempered by the realisation of the
/economic
PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL
PRIVATE AND CONFIDDNTIAL
economic consequences that might arise affecting both the Colony
generally and the workers in particular. However, while I appreciate
that it may be necessary to phase in reform I firmly believe that a
start should be made and a clear policy programme be announced, An
announcement of this sort would enable industry to adjust so as to
reduce the impact of change,
These are, of course, just some of the specific points arising from my
visit which both the Secretary of State and I would like you to follow
up. We also assume you will discuss more general matters with David
Trench and I hope you will get around and see as many people as
possible. I would particularly like you to see Jack Cater.
If you can persuade him to remain in the Service it would, I think, be
in the best interests of Hong Kong.
I hope your journey so far has been interesting and worth- while and
that you were not too distracted by the fair maidens of Tonga! I look
forward to comparing notes with you on Hong Kong when you return.
(SHEPHERD)
PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
/ From: Director of Information Services
Ref. ISD 21/69(CR)
Tel. No.
H-233191
Date 17th October, 1967
EH 0
To: D.C.S.(Special Duties)
2
Future of Special Publicity Unit
The following comments relate to the three draft papers on the future of
the Special Publicity Unit which were prepared by my Deputy while I was
on leave and which have been submitted to your Publicity
Committee for further consideration.
2. I recognise the urgent need for a fresh appraisal of Government's
approach to its problems of information and public image and I welcome
the fact that the disturbances have produced the necessary impetus to
initiate this preliminary appraisal through such a broadly
representative group as your Committee a Committee (and its associated
working sub-unit) which I have recognised as essential from the outset
and have encouraged by instructing that the best of my staff should be
utilised irrespective of the loss of efficiency to less essential
services of my department..
-
3. Having said that, I must however record my concern for the procedure
which has been followed in the preparation and preliminary consideration
of the draft Report. I do not believe that the special problems of
community information, which are being handled so effectively by your
Committee and particularly by my Deputy, can be dealt with
satisfactorily in isolation from other of my departmental problems. But
even if this were possible, I do not think that the Committee should
have sought a policy report of this nature from one of my senior
officers without seeking my approval in writing to such a procedure.
Nevertheless the objectives we are trying to attain are to my mind so
vital to the future of Hong Kong that I am the first to recognise that
delays caused by procedural niceties are not to be tolerated and
personal irritation is a very secondary consideration,
4. I have deliberately restrained myself from commenting on the Report
long enough to ensure that the recommendations which follow reflect my
carefully considered views in the best interests of an overall
government information policy.
5. The type of work now being undertaken by the Special Publicity Unit
is a vital facet of Government's information effort, the importance of
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CONFIDENTIAL
2
of which has been appreciated by me and my senior staff for some
considorable timo but, prior to the disturbancos, my departmental
efforts in this direction have been sporadic and only partially
effective mainly due to lack o central government and inter-departmental
co- orlination and stimulus. Tho listurbances have provi`ed this
essential unifying factor, but it would be foolhardy to suggest that
because of this, the work of the Unit is only rolated to an umoroney
situation. Tho Unit is providing an expanded community information
service which has long boen needed, and will bo nooded increasingly on a
long-term,
continuing basis. I therefore recommend that the Special Publicity Unit
be established as a permanent division of my department and I believe
the proposed title "Community Affairs Information Section"
adequately reflects the type of work it is undertaking and will be
undertaking in the changing pattern of events which must lie ahead.
6. If physical violence declinos, and the battle for hearts and minds
moves loss obviously but with increasing dangers into the shadows,
the broader spectrum of work to be undertaken by the Special Unit must
inevitably become more closely associated with the more routine services
of the central information machine and with the developing information
activities of departments. The effective co-ordinating organisation
which has been applied to Government energency information requirements
will need to be developed to embrace the overall information policy
and services of Government. I do not believe that this can best be
done by breaking up an existing organisation, but rather by modifying
and expanding it.
7.
-
I accept as urgent the need to make available to selected departments
information staff and facilities to enable those departments to operate
their own information units es pert of their departmental policy-making
structures and I agree broadly with the departmental staffing recon-
mendations contained in the Report. Preliminary attempts have been
made by me during the past few years to develop specialised information
services with the ultimate objective of departmental units, but only
limited progress has been made because of lack of senior staff.
8. I have also on a number of occasions in the past attempted to
persunde Government to second senior executive and administrative
personnel to my dopartment to assist in the improvement and expansion of
information
services, but due to staff shortages in the Colonial Secretariat my
requests have hed to be rejected. I support the Report's recommendation
that renowod effort must be made to bring administrative personnel into
the information field, working side by side with trained information
staff.
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I accept also that we must look more to the universities as a source of
future recruitment, and indeed this policy in respect of local
recruitment is already in force in my department and a number of
university graduates without specialised, professional working
experience have already been recruited. But if oxpanding information
services are to take greater account of the value of administrative
o.ficors and univer- sity graduates as a means of developing effective
information teams, carc must be exercised not to build up too largo a
group of policy makers to the exclusion of the craftsmen and
professionals who must be available to carry out the policy. It should
be remembered that all the officers I have seconded to Special Unit
duties are the product of my professional recruitment programme and this
must continue in step with the recruitment of officers with other
backgrounds.
9. I cannot accept the contention that "there is not much sign that any
of them (cxisting Information Services Department staff) have the
potential to act as responsible advisors on public information capable
I
believe we have of exercising any degree of judgement and initiative".
given the encouragement and training
-
now amongst our local officers at least five, who are capable of filling
the departmental S.I.0. appointments, with a very real chance that they
night
be suitable P,T.0. material
in the future. I also believe that the emotional demand for localisation
of the Civil Service is a political factor which cannot lightly be dis-
regarded, and the programme of localisation which has taken place under
my direction during the past four years has contributed greatly to staff
morale and efficiency and has done much to make the departrent more
acceptable to the local press. Continuing effort must be made to exploit
and encourage local talents to come forward and fill the front ranks of
our information services.
10. Departmental information units should be headed by a P.I.0. who, In
initially, ill, in most cases, have to be an expatriate officer. these
circumstances the S.I.0. must be a local officer capable of deputising
for the P.I.0. in direct relations with the public and the
local press.
This may mean that the 5.1.0, will have very little time to ork as a
publicity officer and in addition to the full or part time services of
departmental administrative officers. Some strengthening of the unit
staffs above the basic recommendations in the Report may be necessary.
Also some of the central technical services in the department may have
to be strengthened to meet the demands of the departmental units as the
scheme gets under way e.p、 film, photographic, design and teleprinter
services.
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11. I support the need for a senior administrative officer, of the
calibre of Er. Jordan, to be seconded to I.S.D. to provide effective
departmental stimulus and liaisen, but his interests should extend to my
whole department and to the entire arena of government information and
broadcasting initiative.
12. I see considerable disadvantage in breaking up the existing
Information Services departmental structure into a number of sub-units
under the administrative control of the Secretariat. The principal staff
of an Information Department is of necessity a highly-specialised,
professional team and the ability to utilise these staff talents to the
best advantago of Government's image could be seriously hampered by an
administrative machine which is not attuned to their special needs.
Those needs can better be met by an independent administration rather
than one which is a rigid section of a Colonial Secretariat
administration.
13. If it were practical to decentralise information services without a
large supporting production and distribution machine then it might be
possible to run an Information Service as a segment of the Colonial
Secretariat on the lines of the General Clerical Service, thereby
officers
are sent to departments and absorbed into various departmental adminis-
trations without the need for a central, professional control.
14- In the case of an Information Service not only are central services
essential at the outset, but they must inevitably extend to keep pace
with the groth of departmental information activity. I believe that
professional departmental information officers and their staffs should
become part of the departments to which they are attached and they
should be responsible to the Head of that department. Professional
staff should be recruited initially to the Information Services
Department
who would second them to the departments concerned where they would join
the administrative staff of that department to make up the information
team. This would provide promotion opportunities for the specialist
staff involved in the information programme and would enable outstanding
officers to be moved to more deserving departments. It would also
enable departments, who find they have an officer who fits uncomfortably
into their particular establishment, to seck a suitable replacement.
Such a system would also provide for flexibility in times of intense
departmental activity whereby a mobile unit could be sent from the
eentral unit to support the departmental team.
15. It is true that General Orders are, under present conditions,
restrictive although at one time they were appropriate - but they have
been administered in recent years with common senso and, on my
too
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G.F. 3:3
CONFIDENTIAL
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instructions, have been observed more in the breach than in the
observance. They should be re-drafted, but to suggest that the solution
is to break down existing machinery which has been assembled patiently
and intelligently
over the years is ludicrous.
16. The Director of Information Services is at prosent responsible for
advising the Governor and Government on information policy, and I do not
see that changing him into an Information Scoretary as a Secretariat
official will alter this aspect of his duties. lor do I consider that it
will be a better stimulus to improvod departmental information offort
than we are achieving with the present Publicity Committee - provided
that this Committeo, or another like it, has its scope enlarged to
consider all aspects of information work and is empowered, on behalf
of the Colonial Secretary, to issue information policy guidance to
departments. I suggest that a Committee, under the chairmanship of the
D.C.S.(S.D.), or someone of equal seniority and ability, should be
retained on a permanent basis and the Committee should include on
its membership all those concerned with information policy.
17. The Director of Information Services rould be able to give moro
time to matters of central government information policy if the
directorate staff of his department was strengthened in order to relieve
him of some of the detail of departrental administration. If the Special
Unit is to be established on a permanent basis, as I think it must,
thon D.I.S. should be given two substantive deputics one administrative
to run the departmental administration, and one professional to direct
personally the Community Affairs Information Section and to co-ordinate
the other professional activities of the Department.
18. Otherwise, I agree with the proposed staffing of the S.P.U. but I
suggest the proposed grading of P.1.0. should be changed to C.1.0. with
an equivalent grading to the C.P.0. and C.Pub.0. thus allowing the unit
to compete effectively for the best talents of the other divisions of
my department.
19. Lastly, may I request the Report you are considering in conjunction
with this paper be graded "Confidential".
NJW!/stm
(N.J.V. Vatt)
Director of Information Services
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DRAFT PROPOSAL FOR AN INCREASED LOCAL PUBLIC RELATIONS EFFORT BY
GOVERNMENT
This paper attempts to put in perspective with other considerations, the
need for an increased, organised and well-directed public relations
effort.
The Introduction sets out to justify why such effort is necessary :
the second part is a framework for the actions proposed; the final
section selects one particular field of the public relations effort
which is considered to be of primary importance and gives
recommendations as to how it might be implemented.
1. INTRODICTION
(a)
The 1967 Disturbances have demonstrated that, for the
time being at least and presumably thereafter, Hong Kong
can no longer promote its own prosperity with a passive,
unoffensive China in the background. All people in the
Colony, those who do business with it and all those who know
it, are now conscious that China "holds an ace over Hong
Kong" by virtue of China's strength and close proximity.
Nearly all assume that China can and may destroy, gradually or
suddenly, the British administration of Hong Kong.
(b) This phonomenon of what people now think is the cardinal
fundamental element in Hong Kong's prospects, since it
determines confidence in so many ways to so many people.
The ordinary resident, if not able to emigrate himself, will
certainly aspire to having his children go abroad; usually
this means the loss of educated young people the Colony needs
The buyers think twice about ordering goods.
(c)
here.
investor looks elsewhere.
The
These few examples serve to
illustrate how the earning power of the Government and the
people is critically jeopardised by the threat, real or
assumed, from China.
It is appreciated that nothing can be done immediately
by Hong Kong to remove or diminish this external threat.
It may be kept alive indefinitely by reminders from China from
time to time. It may die quietly to the pre-1967 level
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2
(a)
(e)
and thus permit all apprehensions about it to die. It
may be that it will be possible for Hong Kong to achieve
a working relationship with China whereby it is understood
that Hong Kong can exist as a Chinese/British anomaly
under conditions acceptable to both sides.
These
possibilities are in order of preference as far as Hong Kong
is concerned.
The very
It is appreciated also that, within Hong Kong itself, consent
and support for the Government does exist, and was slowly
being increased up to 1967. It is strongly believed that
the disturbances of this year have augmented and made more
urgent the need to retain and fortify the consent and
support of the local population as a political insurance
against attempts at subversion from within.
nature of communish, the strong appeal of "tung bao" and
the existence of many areas of social activity which lend
themselves as targets for formenting discontent, all these
things importantly supplement the normal objectives of a
government which wishes to serve its population well.
It is a case of adding internal security to altruism as a
reason for affecting improved government.
hile it is a considered view that eliminating the external
threat is the primary need and that this cannot be eliminated
in current circumstances, it is held that within this
limitation (Let's hope temporary limitation) efforts need
to be made to increase and fortify the support of the
population for the Government.
This can be done in two
groups. Firstly by fresh improvements which are
perceptibly beneficial to people without being
transparently cheap political gestures for supports' sake.
Secondly by making sure that past, current and imminent
improvements wrought by Government are part of people's
/consciousness.
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G.F. 323
!
2.
(f)
CONFIDENTIAL
3
consciousness, understood and appreciated.
The first way requires manpower and money in extra
quantities which the Government cannot afford without
savings elsewhere.
Revenue can
Short of borrowing money, which is
not feasible because of the external threat, it may be
possible to reshuffle effort and money to bring about some
of the changes, but certainly not all the changes which
are considered necessary. It is unfortunately a raw
fact that all desired, perhaps essential, changes cannot
be paid for until revenue is increased.
increase only as Hong Kong comes to sound terms with threat
from China. We should therefore swallow hard and accept
this fact, wreak the less costly improvements until the
"threat" is eliminated and make the most of the second way
of increasing the support of the population, which overall
costs less. The second way can be briefly defined as :
PUBLIC RELATIONS
(a)
(b)
Retaining and fostering the allegiance and goodwill of the
population of Hong Kong to the Administration is achieved
by evoking a reciprocal response to the allegiance and
goodwill of the government to the population. The acid
test used by the population for this government's role in this
relationship is "Does the Government make my life and other
people's lives here safer and better?" The acid test used
by the Government for the population's role is "Will people
resist persuasion that an alternative administration is more
advantageous to them?"
It is necessary for Government to take the initiative in
creating positive answers to both questions in the order given.
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(c)
(a)
(e)
4
Public relations is an essential integral part of Government
action and not 'a sauce for the less palatable'. It is the
creation of a posture or image while governing which eteures
that the maximum goodwill is derived from a course of action
or policy. A Public Relations effort can also make
initially less acceptable actions more acceptable.
There
are many diverse facets of a public relations effort and the
paragraphs below set out those which are considered necessary
for the Hong Kong Government.
Objective:
To retain and foster the support of the population for and
allegiance to the policies and actions of the Government.
Theatres:
(3)
The Urban areas.
(ii)
The rural areas.
These two theatres require different emphasis.
(f)
Targets:
Efforts at influencing people will vary with different
groupings and at the outset it is necessary to be conscious
how different groups respond so that different treatment can be given
when appropriate. Different groups are:
(1) Europeans and foreigners.
Those can be sub-divided into businessmen, missionaries,
and teachers, journalists, consulates, government servants.
Also there are the Indians, Portuguese and Eurasians.
(ii) Chinese residents.
These can be sub-divided into income groups, language groups,
age groups, sexes, and by political affiliation.
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G.F. 321
(g)
Themes:
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5.
(1)
(1) Good security of the Colony.
(ii) Progressive nature of government in economic promotion,
social leadership, and provision of services.
(iii) Impartiality and fairness of government.
Tactics:
Where and when Government actions affect or are about to affect
people's lives, it is necessary to promote not merely a
knowledge of these actions but an understanding of and
1
'sympathy for them. A Public Relations effort can be also
used to good effect before a course of action to soften-up
anticipated opposition (e.g. Resettlement Department's
efforts before the clearance of Staunton Creek).
Taction which can be used are
DIRECT: (a) Press releases.
(b) Radio interviews.
(c) T.V. interviews.
(d) Leaflets, circular letters.
(e) Loudspeakers from vehicles.
(f) Verbal conversations with persons involved.
Such diret£ tactics are usually employed when government action
is imminent.
INDIRECT : (a) Release of background information through the press.
(b) Radio discussions.
(c) T.V. discussions.
(d) Briefing and influencing press correspondents
and radio interviewers.
(e) Talking to persons uninvolved in a particular
course of Government action, persuading them of
the merits of the course of action and
encouraging them to talk to those directly
involved in the Government action.
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(i)
(f)
Tools.
6
This tactic can be used to overcome resistance to
persuasion or anticipated hostility_7.
Frank explanation of the reasonableness, progressiveness
and thoughtfulness of Government policies on every
conceivable occasion e.g. when senior officers leave
or arrive in the Colony, informally at clubs, in
speeches at clubs, in conversation at parties.
Agencies which can operate or be used for the public relations
effort :
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Senior Government officers, and from them
Junior Government officers.
Government Information Services.
Radio Hong Kong, Commercial Radio and Rediffusion.
Both T.V. stations.
Leading and respected local leaders in the constitutional,
business, educational, social fields.