CONFIDENTIAL
MIDDLE EAST
11. Er Addis said that he wished to say something about President
Sadat's decision to invite the Soviet Union to withdraw its military
advisers from Egypt. The British Government had known for some time past
of the increasing strain in relations between Egyrt and the Soviet
Union, for which there seemed to be three main reasons: dissatisfaction
in Egypt with the failure of the Soviet Union to supply important
offensive wespons; a rather more gener: 1 sense of frustration at the
lack of forward movement with regard to the Arab-Israeli dispute; and,
in the higher ranks of the Egyptian armed forces, a widespread dislike
of the 3oviet military advisers. Against this general background of
political relations between the two countries there must have been
pressure on President Sadat from within the armed forces to ask the
Russians to withdraw. At the same tine President Badat was also perhaps
trying to buy time for the survival of his régime.
12. Mr Addis said that, as the British Government understood it, there
were three categories of Soviet military presence in Egypt: Soviet
training staff and advisers attached to the three Børvices; Boviet
personnel involved in Egyptian air defence; and autonomous Soviet
military units, e.g. fighter squadrons, the maritime air squadron and
Soviet naval personnel at Egyptian ports. If President Sadat's statement
was taken at its face value that all Soviet experts and advisers were to
be withdraw, this would mean about 7,000 out of a total Soviet military
presenos in Egypt of between 15-20,000. There had, however, been some
reports suggesting that only the advisers were to be withdrawn and that
the instructors would remain. In that event the effect would be much
less. It was not yet clear whether the President's announcement should
be considered as the prelude to a request for the withdrawal of the
automomous units. It was clear, however, that it was important for both
the Egyptian and Soviet Governments that they should reach sono sort of
agreement between themselves. It was to be expected, therefore, that
important negotiations would take place between them. It was possible
that President Sadat had deliberately taken the present tough stand in
order to strengthen his bargaining position. There were thus still many
uncertainties, but plainly the Soviet Union had suffered a severe
setback which would have implications for their policy in the Fiddle
East generally. As to the possibility of a further Arab-Israeli it
seemed on the whole that the effect of the resident' statement would be
to make the resumption of fighting lens likely. It was bound to increase
strains within the country. It would be welcome to the High Command and
to the middle classes, but not to the radical elements or to the younger
officers of the armed forces.
/13.
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- 9 -
13. I Un Chạng said that what the Ambassador had said in the earlier
part of his remarks coincided more or less with the appreciation of the
Chinese Government. The Chinese Government saw the affair as an
expression of the discontent felt by the Fgyptian people and Government
at the role of the Soviet Union in their country. Chine had long pointed
out that while Egypt might have been accepting aid from the Soviet Union
for the purpose of safeguarding her independence and sovereignty and
resisting Israeli aggression, the Soviet Union was sure to try to
exploit the opportunity to sœrcise control over Egyptian affairs. It had
been impossible to imagine that Egypt would accept such control in
exchange for help in countering aggression from Israel. It had therefore
been entirely predictable that something of the present sort would
happen. The Chinese Government of course had had some personal
experience of the character of Soviet aid, although they had nover
received it on the same large sdale. But they could well imagine the
reactions of the Egyptians. President Sadat had taken a very brave
decision which might entail certain difficulties, but no matter how wide
the effect of his decision to ask for the withdrawal of Soviet military
personel, the direction of his move was correct. What he had done was in
the interests of the Egyptian people; the Egyptian people had therefore
welcomed it. The Chinese Government were aware of this from their
contacts with friends in the area. As far a future developments were
concerned, Egypt was far from China and China was less familiar with the
Kiddle East than Britain; the points made by the Ambassador were
therefore most helpful. It seemed, however, that neither the Soviet
Union nor Egypt wanted the latest step to be irrevocable. Meanwhile the
United States seemed to be adopting the prudent attitude of making no
comment. The British and French Governments seemed to be taking a
sinflar prudent line. The attitude of Israel was less clear. The
Egyptians claimed to have shot down an intruding Israeli aircraft, but
the Israelis denied this, and there had been no repercussions, It looked
as though the situation would remain calm.
CONFIDENTIAL
/OERMANY
CONFIDENTIAL
· 10 ·
14. Mr Addis commented that there was no need for him to say any king,
or to ask questions, about the recent visit to China of 1 Schuman, Ir
Chang would know that the British had bem in close touch over this with
their French friends. Dr Schroeder'a visit, however, was I rather
different matter, since there was of course no permanent West German
representative in Pexing.
Pexing. Ir Addis said that he was aware that Dr 3chroeder's visit had
been an unofficial one and that he had oose to China with no mandate to
speak for the West German Government. Nevertheless he would appreciate
Er Chang's comments, in the light of the visit on the state of Sino-West
German relations and on China's attitude to the question of German
representation at the UIF.
15. Mr Chang said that Dr Schroader had visited China in his capacity as
Chairman of the Bundestag Foreign Affairs Gommittee. His visit had not
been authorised by the West German Government. Nevertheless, the
question which clearly had most interested him had been that of the
establishment of formal relations between the two countries. He had
wanted to know whether China desired the establishment of relations and,
if so, on what terms, There had of course been no question of
negotiating with Dr Schroeder, but he had been told that China's terms
for recognition of "est Germany were the same as for all other
countries, namely seceptance of the Five Principles of Peaceful
čo-existence. Otherwise, so far as China was concerned, there was no
barrier. Dr. Schroeder had remarked that there was equally no barrier on
the West German side, since the Federal Government neither had relations
with, nor recognised, Taiwan,
16. Mr Chang said that the speed with which relations between the two
countries were established depended upon the Weat German Government, In
the past they had said that they were in no hurry to adjust relations
with China before the readjustment of their relations with the Soviet
Union. Now it was the general election which was mking their intention
difficult to divine. However, China, for her part, vas in no hurry. Mr
Chang commented that Dr Schroeder had seemed to understand the Chinese
position, and had promised to make efforts on his rotum to Germay in
favour of improved. relations. This was an attitude to be welcomed.
CONFIDENTIAL
/17.
CONFIDENTEL
11 - 14
17. Mr Chang seid that due to the very little contact there had been
between China and West Germany, the talks with Dr Schroeder had gone on
for rather a long time. Both sides had needed to acquaint the other with
their positions on various questions. The question of representation of
the two Germanias at the United Nations had been among the matters
discussed, China's attitude to this was very simple. In reality there
were two Germanies; both should therefore be represented.
VISITS AND TRAVEL IN CHIBA
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י
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- 12 -
VISITS AND TRAVEL IN
18. Yr Addis said there was one more question of a rather different
nature which he wished to take the opportunity to raise. This we the
question of visits and travel in China by himself and members of his
staff, It was unnecessary to argue with Mr Chang the importance of
Embassy staff getting to know China: it was common ground between Kr
Chang and himself that this was an important aspect of the Embassy's
work. In practice however members of the Embassy found themselves in an
under-privilegad position. Unofficial, short-term visitors to China,
even those from Great Britain, seemed to be allowed to visit places and
institutions to which members of the Embassy were not permitted a0cess.
His Philippine and American friends came here on unofficial visits and
were granted facilities that were denied to the Embassy. For example, he
had himself suggested visiting the North-East but was told it was not
possible. Yet a Philippine friend was able to visit Shenyang and other
places. Again, Professor Jerome Cohen told Kr Addis of his visit to
Peking University, vhile Mr Addis's own request to visit the University
was outstanding for nearly six months. He mentioned these two examples
merely by way of illustration Again, making the comparison with his om
and Ir Morgan's experiencs 15 years ago, the present situation was much
less favourable and the restrictions much greater. For example, in the
period between 1954-1957 he had himself made extensive tours in the
Nortk-Kaat, in Central China and in the South-West.
the South-West, Other British colleagues had visited these and other
areas. During the last six months before his departure from China in
1957 he had visited a total of 18 universities or institutes of higher
education. Against this he had been in China now for six months and
apart from one brief visit with Mr Royle to Tsinghua University had not
been able to visit any universities. It was not his wish waste the time
of Ir Chang on the details of the matter, but he did wish to raise the
general question of socess and visits. If a general instruction sould be
issued that requests should be met in so far as circumstances permitted,
this would be most helpful.
19. Mr Chạng said that he fully understood the Ambassador's desire to
know more about China. It was also right that the Ambassador had brought
out the point that it had been possibl to travel more widely 15 years
ago than it was now, In recent years, of course, the Cultural Revolution
had taken place and many departments and institutions were still
undergoing reorganisation. As a result their capacity and ability to
/receive
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
13-
receive foreign guests was limited. However, this state of affairs would
probably not contimme much longer. There would be a gradual expansion of
the number of places and institutions open to foreigners. For example,
this year's diplomatic tour had included Loyang and Tachai, whereas last
year's tour had not. It was right of course that diplomats should go to
more places. But efforts had also to be made to enable short-term
visitors to see as much as possible of China and it had perhaps been
assumed that because diplomats remained in Peking a long time they could
afford to be more patient. When asked by the Ambassador how long this
patience was expected to last, Kr Chang replied that it was difficult
for him to give a precise answer. Access had already been expanded, and
special nocess had occasionally been allowed in special circumstances.
For instance, the Canadian Ambassador, who had been born in Kunning, had
wished to re-visit that city. He had been allowed to do so. A further
consideration ms that the Diplomatic Corps had now grow quite large.
However he was willing to admit that not enough was being done in
respect of access for diplomats and since the Ambassador had raised the
question he would try and see that more was done. Me Addis said that it
sometimes seemed that there was discrimination against resident
diplomats. Ir Chang said that it was not the policy of the Chinese
Government to refuse diplomats acosss to places and institutions.
imagined the problem was that the departments concerned thought it
better to try and receive them at a later date. The intention was to
gradually expand access, but it was impossible to say definitely when a
particular place or institution would be opened or, in general, how wide
this expansion of access would be. There were difficulties about issuing
a general direction in concrete terms, but as far as specific visits
were concerned contact could be ma de with the department concerned to
see what might be done. Ir Addig thanked Ir Chang for allowing him to
make his point and said that having made it he would not pursue it
further.
He
CONFIDENTIAL
/CONCLUSION
CONFIDENTIAL
- 14 -
CONCLUSION
20. Ir Chang remarked that the questions raised by the Ambassador during
the course of their conversation were major questions of interest to
both Britain and China. As he was not well prepared he did not propose
to take advantage of the present opportunity to raise my questions of
his owR. He would like to propose instead that he mi the Ambassador
should have a further conversation on another occasion. Ir Addig said he
would find it very valuable to continue with ir Chang their discussion
of international matters.
21. Kr Chang said he thought it right that the Ambassador should discuss
bilateral matters with Ir Wang. He explained that West European and
American Department was soon to be divided with Er Wang becoming
Director of the new Test European Department. Once he had had an
opportunity to study the outcome of the recent discussions between Ir
Royle and Ambassador 8ưng, Ir Wang would be happy to met Ambassador to
discuss outstanding bilateral issues. 8ome of these bilateral issues
might be settled quickly; others would need further discussion.
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TO PRIORITY FCC TELVO 754 OF 28 JULY INFO PRIORITY TOKYOTAND"-
WASHINGTON.
+
MY TELNO 7521 CONVERSATION WITH CHANG WEN-CHIN ASSISTANT MINISTER
FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS: JAPAN,
E4 3/25/8
1. I ASKED FOR CHANG'S VIEW OF MR TANAKA'S APPOINTMENT. CHANG REMARKED
THAT MR TANAKA'S WAS STILL A LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY GOVERNMENT WHICH
HAD STATED THAT ITS GENERAL POLICY REMAINED
UNCHANGED, BUT IT APPEARED TO HAVE RECOGNISED THAT TIMES HAD CHANGED.
ITS POLICY TOWARDS CHINA DIFFERED FROM SATO'S IN THAT IT APPEARED TO BE
TAKING AN ACTIVE ATTITUDE. TANAKA HAD ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS SAID THAT HE
HOPED TO REALISE THE NORMALISATION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO
COUNTRIES AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THIS VIEW HAD BEEN REFLECTED IN VARIOUS
UNOFFICIAL EXCHANGES, WHICH MIGHT HELP TO PROMOTE NORMALISATION OF
RELATIONS BETWEEN JAPAN AND CHINA BUT STILL COULD NOT SERVE AS A
SUBSTITUTE FOR CONTACTS BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS. GOVERNMENT CONTACTS
WOULD DEPEND ON HOW THE SITUATION DEVELOPED. IT WAS APPARENT THAT THE
EXTREME RIGHT WING IN JAPAN DID NOT WELCOME TANAKA'S MOVEMENT TOWARDS
NORMALISATION AND EXTREMISTS IN THE LDP, INCLUDING MR KISHI, HAD BEEN
MAKING A MAJOR EFFORT TO SABOTAGE THIS, CHINA FOR HER PART WELCOMED THE
JAPANESE GOVERNMENT'S DESIRE FOR NORMALISATION THOUGH SO FAR THE
JAPANESE HAD TAKER NO CONCRETE STEPS.
2. WHEN I REMARKED THAT THE NEXT MOVE SEEMED TO BE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
OFFICIAL CONTACT AND ASKED ABOUT REPORTS THAT TANAKA AND/OR CHIRA WERE
PLANNING TO VISIT PEKING BEFORE THE END OF SEPTEMBER, CHANG AGREED THAT
THERE WAS A ''TREND** TOWARDS OFFICIAL CONTACT BUT THOUGHT THAT NO
DECISION ON A VISIT TO CHINA COULD BE REACHED UNTIL MR TANAKA HAD
RECEIVED THE AGREEMENT OF THE AMERICANS AT THE HAWAII MEETING''. HE
BELIEVED THAT JAPAN'S RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES WERE TOO DEEP FOR
HER TO PREAK FREE. SOME JAPANESE WERE REMEMBERING AMERICAN 'OVERHEAD
DIPLOMACY'' LAST YEAR AND THOUGHT THAT JAPAN SHOULD ENGAGE IN THE SAME
GAME, CHANG THOUGHT THAT THE JAPANESE WOULD LACK THE COURAGE TO DO THIS
BECAUSE THE UNITED STATES WOULD ONLY GO OVER THEIR HEADS AGAIN,
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TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 753 OF 28 JULY INFO PRIORITY SEOUL TOK YO
WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK AND SAVING HONG KONG.
MY TELNO 752 CONVERSATION WITH ASSISTANT FOREIGN MINISTER: KOREA
1. CHANG SAID THAT EFFORTS TOWARDS RECONCILIATION BETWEEN NORTH AND
SOUTH KOREA WOULD HAVE TO DEPEND MAINLY ON THE KOREAN PEOPLE THEMSELVES
BUT OTHER COUNTRIES SHOULD HELP RATHER THAN OBSTRUCT THE PROCESS. HE
SAID THAT VICE MINISTER CH'IAD HAD SUGGESTED TO MR ROYLE THAT OUR TWO
COUNTRIES SHOULD CONSIDER TOGETHER WHAT WE COULD DO TO HELP FORWARD THE
PROCESS OF KOREAN RECONCILIATION. WE SHOULD NOW LOOK AT THE QUESTION OF
HOW TO DEAL WITH THE KOREAN ISSUE AT THE UNITED NATIONS. THE CHINESE
GOVERNMENT HELD THE VIEW THAT THE KOREAN QUESTION OUGHT TO BE DISCUSSED
THIS YEAR, THIRTEEN COUNTRIES LED BY ALGERIA HAD ALREADY TABLED A MOTION
SUPPORTING ITS INCLUSION ON THIS YEAR'S AGENDA: THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT
WELCOMED THIS. CHANG ENQUIRED WHETHER THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAD YET
FORMED A VIEW OF THE NEW SITUATION. I SAID THAT IT WAS STILL UNDER
CONSIDERATION AND ASKED WHETHER THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT SUPPORTED THE
ALGERIAN RESOLUTION: CHANG CONFIRMED THAT THEY DID. FCO PSE PASS SAVING
HONG KONG.
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TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 756 OF 28 JULY INFO PRIORITY CAIRO HOSCOW AND
WASHINGTON.
Ө
MY TELEGRAM NO 752: CONVERSATION WITH ASSISTANT FOREIGN MINISTER: EGYPT
AND THE SOVIET UNION.
P
1. I SPOKE ON THE LINES OF YOUR TELEGRAM NO 86 TO NAIROBI AND CHANG SAID
THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT'S APPRECIATION OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN
RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND EGYPT COINCIDED MORE OR LESS WITH
OUR OWN.
2. THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT SAW THESE DEVELOPMENTS AS AN EXPRESSION
OF DISCONTENT FELT BY THE EGYPTIAN PEOPLE AND GOVERNMENT AT
THE ROLE OF THE SOVIET UNION IN THEIR COUNTRY.
CHINA HAD LONG POINTED OUT THAT, WHILE EGYPT MIGHT BE ACCEPTING AID FROM
THE SOVIET UNION FOR THE PURPOSE OF SAFEGUARDING
HER INDEPENDENCE AND SOVEREIGNTY AND RESISTING ISRAEL! AGGRESSION, THE
SOVIET UNION FOR ITS PART WAS SURE TO TRY TO EXPLOIT THE OPPORTUNITY TO
EXERCISE CONTROL OVER EGYPTIAN AFFAIRS.-
IT HAD BEEN IMPOSSIBLE TO IMAGINE THAT EGYPT WOULD ACCEPT SUCH CONTROL
IN EXCHANGE FOR HELP IN COUNTERING AGGRESSION FROM ISRAEL, IT HAD BEEN
ENTIRELY PREDICTABLE THAT SOMETHING OF THE PRESENT SORT WOULD HAPPEN.
THE CHINESE OF COURSE HAD SOME PERSONAL EXPERIENCE OF THE CHARACTER OF
SOVIET AID, ALTHOUGH THEY HAD NEVER RECEIVED IT ON THE SAME LARGE SCALE.
HOWEVER THEY COULD WELL IMAGINE THE REACTIONS OF THE EGYPTIANS.
PRESIDENT SADAT HAD TAKEN A VERY BRAVE DECISION WHICH MIGHT ENTAIL
CERTAIN DIFFICULTIES, BUT NO MATTER HOW WIDE THE EFFECT OF HIS DECISION
TO ASK FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET MILITARY PERSONNEL THE DIRECTION OF
HIS MOVE WAS CORRECT.
WHAT HE HAD DONE WAS IN THE INTERESTS OF THE EGYPTIANS, THE EGYPTIAN
PEOPLE HAD THEREFORE WELCOMED IT.
THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT WERE AWARE OF THIS FROM THEIR CONTACTS WITH
FRIENDS IN THE AREA.
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/ 3. WITH
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3. WITH REGARD TO FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS, CHANG SAID IT SEEMED THAT NEITHER
THE SOVIET UNION NOR EGYPT WANTED THE STEP JUST
TAKEN TO BE IRREVOCABLE.
THE UNITED STATES SEEMED TO BE ADOPTING THE PRUDENT ATTITUDE OF AVOIDING
COMMENT AND THE BRITISH AND FRENCH GOVERNMENTS
SEEMED TO BE TAKING A SIMILAR PRUDENT LINE.
THE ATTITUDE OF ISRAEL WAS LESS CLEAR.
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TO PRIORITY FCO TELEGRAM NO 755 OF 28 JULY INFO PRIORITY DACCA NEW DELHI
ISLAMABAD WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK.
MY TELNO 752. AND DACCA TELNO 793 OF 26 JUNE ( NOT TO ALL): CONVERSATION
WITH ASSISTANT FOREIGN MINISTER: SUB-KONTINENT.
w/re
I OPENED WITH A SHORT STATEMENT OF HIG'S ATTITUDE TO THE SIMLA
AGREEMENT. CHANG. THANKED ME AND COMMENTED THAT THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT
ALSO SAW THE SINLA AGREEMENT AS A FIRST STEP TOWARDS A RELAXATION IN
INDO-PAKISTAN RELATIONS AND BELIEVED IT DESERVED WELCOME. THE AGREEMENT
THAT TROOPS ON THE INDO- WEST PAKISTAN BORDER SHOULD BE WITHDRAWN IN
PARTICULAR WOULD HELP TO RELIEVE TENSION. THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT HAD
NOTED
· THAT BHUTTO HAD ADHERED TO THE PRINCIPLES ON WHICH HE HAD ALWAYS
INSISTED WHILST MAKING EFFORTS TOWARDS RELAXATION.
2. CHANG SAID THAT THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT FOR THEIR PART SUPPORTED THE
RELEVANT UN RESOLUTION, THE MOST IMPORTANT ASPECT OF WHICH WAS THE
DEMAND THAT TROOPS SHOULD BE WITHDRAWN FROM OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.
NOTHING
NOTHINGHAD YET HAPPENED ON THIS. CHINA HAD LAST YEAR SUPPORTED THE UN
RESOLUTION AND COULD NOT ABANDON IT WITHIN A YEAR OF DOING SO IF HER
ENTRY TO THE UN WAS TO HAVE ANY SIGNIFICANCE)
3.
CHANG SAID THAT RELATIONS BETWEEN PAKISTAN AND EAST BENGAL WERE A MATTER
FOR THE TWO PARTIES AND CHINA WOULD NOT INTERVENE.CHINA HAD NETTFER
RECOGNISED BANGLADESH NOR CONSIDERED DOING SO.
HOW COULD SHE WHEN BANGLADESH HAD NOT YET BEEN RECOGNISED BY PAKISTAN?.
CHINA WAS AWARE THAT OVER 70 COUNTRIES HAD NOW RECOGNISED BANGLADESH BUT
THIS HAD NO IMPACT ON HER OWN POLICY. UNTIL INDIAN TROOPS WERE WITHDRAWN
FROM OCCUPIED TERRITORY AND SUCH QUESTIONS' AS THAT OF THE POWS WERE
SETTLED CHINA COULD NOT ADOPT ANY OTHER STAND TOWARDS BATSLADESH.
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I JUDGED IT WISER NOT TO ASK ABOUT CHINA'S ATTITUDE ON THE ADMISSION OF
BANGLADESH TO THE UN BECAUSE TO JUDGE FROM WHAT HAD GONE BEFORE I WOULD
ONLY HAVE GOT A HARSH NAD UNCOMPROMISING ANSWER.
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にと
TO PRIORITY FCO TELEGRAM NO 752 OF 28 JULY INFO PRIORITY TOKYO SEOUL
DACCA NEW DELHI ISLAMABAD BONN BERLIN CAIRO MOSCOW AND
UKMIS NEW YORK.
CONVERSATION WITH ASSISTANT FOREIGN MINISTER,
1. 1 CALLED ON ASSISTANT FOREIGN MINISTER CHANG WEN-CHIN YESTERDAY. 1
SUGGESTED THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF HE AND I MET FROM TIME TO TIME TO
CONTINUE THE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON INTERNATIONAL MATTERS WYICH MR ROYLE
HAD INITIATED HERE AND THAT I SHOULD DISCUSS BILATERAL QUESTIONS WITH
WANG TUNG (WHO WE LEARN IS ABOUT TO BE APPOINTED DIRECTOR OF A NEW WEST
EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT FORMED BY SPLITTING THE FORMER WEST EUROPEAN AND
AMERICAN AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT).
CHANG AGREED AND I SUGGESTED FURTHER THAT WE SHOULD DISCUSS THE AREAS IN
WHICH THERE HAD BEEN IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS SINCE MR ROYLE'S VISIT-
KOREA ( JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT OF 4 JULY) JAPAN ( NEW GOVERNMENT),
SUB-CONTINENT ( SIMLA AGREEMENT), MEDITERRANEAN (EXPULSION OF SOVIET
ADVISERS FROM EGYPT) AND EUROPE ( VISITS TO CHINA OF SCHUMANN AND DR
SCHROEDER).
THIS TOOK UP THE WHOLE OF OUR MEETING AND CHANG WHO CLEARLY HAD SOME
POINT OR POINTS THAT HE WANTED TO RAISE HIMSELF SUGGESTED THAT WE MEET
AGAIN SHORTLY.
2. YOUR TELEGRAM NO 860 TO NAIROBI WAS MOST TIMELY AND USEFUL. IT WOULD
BE A GREAT HELP TO ME IF FROM TIME TO TIME I COULD BE SUPPLIED SIMILAR
BACKGROUND INFORMATION NOT ONLY ON AREAS IN WHICH THE CHINESE ARE NOT
CLOSELY CONCERNED, SUCH AS THE MIDDLE EAST, BUT ALSO ON AREAS WHERE THEY
HAVE A DIRECT INTEREST SUCH AS THE SUB-CONTINENT. IF WE CAN KEEP UP THE
DIALOGUE HERE THERE WILL BE THE DOUBLE ADVANTAGE OF EDUCATING THEM ON
SOME
MATTERS AND LEARNING THEIR VIEWS ON OTHERS. 13. MY IMMEDIATELY
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3. MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAMS, REPEATED APPROPRIATELY,
CONTAIN MAIN POINTS OF DISCUSSIONS. FULL RECORD FOLLOWS BY
BAG.
13
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TO PRIORITY FCO TELEGRAM NO 683 OF 11 JULY INFO ROUTINE PARIS, ROME AND
WASHINGTON.
KY TELMO 6711 M SCHUMANN'S VISIT TO CHIE
1. FITAL MEETING WITH CHI PENC-FEI ON SUNDAY MORNING WAS
CONCERNED WITH RILATERAL MATTERS.
2. SUNDAY EVINING CHOU FR-LAI CAVE A RANQUET FOR M SCHUMANN WITH OʻLY
FRENCH AND CHINESE OFFICIALS PRESENT, WHICH WAS FOLLOWED BY A FORMAL
DISCUSSION.
3.
AFTER ABOUT AN HOUR CHOU EN-LAI SAID THAT HE WAS TAKING M SCHUMANN TO
CALL OF CHAIRMAN MAO AND THAT ACCORDING TO THE CHAIRMAN'S USUAL PRACTICE
HE WOULD RECEIVE M SCHUMANN ALONE.
H SCHUMANN TOLD ME AT THE AIRPORT THIS MORNING THAT BOTH VAO AND CHOU
HAD SHOW. KEEF INTEREST IN THE PRITISH POSITION IN RELATION TO EUROPE.
THE REPEATED QUESTIC WAS
WAS '' IS BRITAIN'S
ENTRY INTO EUROPE AM IRREVOCABLE PROCESS 7
R.E.
"/7
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MOD Form 4A
167
MEMORANDUM
TO H.L. Davies Esay
Fco (Far East Dest)
From MOD
SINO - UK RELATIONS
DIZ (Amen) (A)(1
Ref.
(A) /CHIN 2/3 Date 21-6.72
Tel. 90-7022
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J.-P.124. $6-2365
J603
Ministry of Defence (DI 2)
lain Building
Whitehall
LONDON SW1
KLST
Joint Service Intelligence Staff HONG KONG
British Forces Post Office I
HONG KONG 238111 Ext: 3308
12 June 1972
SINO-UK RELATIONS
1.
Flight Lieutenant R A MI Burr, CSOS HONG KONG, attended the reception
held in the HONG KONG Club on 17 May 72 to mark NORWAY's National Day.
He has reported that various Communist Chinese attending the reception
went out of their way to emphasise the improvement in Sino-UK relations.
2.
While standing with a group which included Mr A O BLISHEN, British Trade
Commissioner, and Mr A BORALE, Consul General of the Arab Republic of
EGYPT, they were joined by the Vice Chairman of the New CHINA News
Agency (NGNA) and an interpreter, and shortly thereafter by the editors
of TA KUNG PAO and Easter Horizons. The conversation turned to recently
published photographe of CHINA and BURR expressed admiration for some of
the views. He was told that the relationship between CHINA and the UK
was improving so rapidly that he might be able to see these views for
himself very shortly.
3.
Having already been introduced as an RAF Officer who was serving in HONG
KONG, he made the point that this would be difficult for him and, in any
case, he had only about a year left to sorve in the Colony. The Vice-
Chairman of HCNA, however, indicated that he thought the fact that BUR
was a serviceman was no drawback and that the opportunity to visit CHINA