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COVERING CONFIDENTIAL
BRITISH EMBASSY
FEXING
7 August 1972
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1. I enclose under cover of this letter two copies of the full record of
the Ambassador's meeting on 27 July with Assistant Minister Chang
Wen-chin. The substance of Chang's remarks on international issues us
transuitted on 28 July in our telegrams 752-757 inclusive.
2. I am sorry to say that copying facilities here remain virtually
non-existent and that I must ask you again to kindly undertake both
local and, where appropriate, overseas distribution.
(T H Preston)
COVERING CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
2D OF A MEETING AT THE "IZISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
IRSDAY, 27 JULY 1972, AT 9.30 a.E.
HM Ambassador
Mr H Morgan
Fresent:
Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs Er Chang Wen-chin
Kr Wang Fen-chou
Mr T H Preston
Mr Chang I-chlin
Mr Yeh Wei-hsin
1. The Assistant Minister said that he had seen a report of the recent
meeting between Er Royle and the Chinese Ambassador, Mr Sung. They
appeared to have had an interesting discussion, continuing the talks
begun during Mr Royle's visit to China. Mr Royle had made a number of
positive proposals which the Chinese side were now studying. Mr Chang
added that he had just seen a Hsinhua report of a meeting the previous
day between Mr Sung and the Secretary of State and Xr Davies. The
Embassy's report of this meeting had not yet been received in the
Foreign Ministry, but presumably it had been in the nature of a courtesy
call by Mr Sung, in which case discussion would have centred on
bilateral matters.
2.
The Ambassador said that he proposed, with Mr Chang's agreement, to
leave bilateral matters for discussion on a separate occasion with Mr
Yang Tung, and to use the present occasion to continue the exchange of
views on international matters begun during r Royle's visit. In the two
months since Kr Royle's visit there had been interesting and important
developments in a number of countries: in Korea, the Joint North-South
Announcement of 4 July; in Japan, the formation of a new government; in
the Sub-Continent, the Simla Agreement; in the Mediterranean, the very
importent amouncement by President Sadat of the expulsion from Egypt of
Soviet advisers and technicians; and finally, from Europe, the visits to
China of Schumann and Dr Schroeder.
CONFIDENTIAL
/KORKA
CONFIDENTIAL
2.
N
I
KOREA
3. Kr Addis reminded Mr Chang that on the day of the publication of the
Joint Agreement (4 July) the British Government had issued a statement
welcoming the successful outcome of the talks between North and South
Korea as a most important development. Hr Addis said that he took a
close personal interest in the Korean question. After leaving China in
1950 he had worked for nearly four years in the Foreign Office as an
assistant in the Department dealing with China and Korea. He had
regretted, in 1953, after the signing of the Armistice, that it had not
been possible to move on to the political conference to which the terms
of the Armistice had looked forward. Again, in 1954, it had been a
matter of regret to him, as a member of the British delegation to the
Geneva Conference on Korea, that it had not been possible for that
Conference to achieve a successful outcome. The news, after nearly 20
years, that the two parts of divided Korea had now got together and
taken the first step towards an agreement between themselves was,
therefore, particularly welcome. It seemed however that this was only a
first step in what would necessarily be a long process. Britain of
course knew the southern part of the country better than the north;
nonetheless she was aware that on both sides misgivings and fears
existed that could only be overcome slowly. However, the Joint Agreement
was a first step, and Britain was glad that it had been taken.
4. Er Chang said that the Chinese Government also welcomed the Joint
Agreement. Their attitude to it he been indicated, first, in an article
in the Feople's Daily and, subsequently, in the speech delivered by
Prime Minister Chou En-lai on 9 July at the banquet in honour of the
visiting South Yemeni government delegation. It appeared to be a feeling
common to both China and Britain that the inability of the two parts of
Korea, after so long a period of division and war and even after the
signing of an Armistice, to agree to maintain contact with one another
and move forward towards unity was regrettable. The Ambassador would
remember well the policy of Er Dulles, which had been to obstruct even
the most minor agreement between North and South. This was the reason
why no useful result had been achieved at the Geneva Conference. At
last, however, even the United States had come to see that Mr Dulles's
policies towards China and the Far East in general were divorced from
reality. The desire of the Korean people for national unity and to shake
off outside interference was now growing more and more powerful This was
a good thing, but it was only the first stage in a very long process.
CONFIDENT IAL
15.
CONFIDENTIAL
5.
-
3 -
Er Chang said that, in general, foreign reaction to the developments in
Korea had been favourable. Efforts towards reconciliation between North
and South would have to depend mainly on the Korean people themselves,
but other countries should, wherever possible, help the process, and not
obstract it. He recalled that Vice-Minister Ch'iao Kuan-hua had
suggested to Hr Royle that Great Britain and China should consider
together what they could do to help forward the process of Korean
reconciliation. We should now look forward to the handling of the Korean
issue at this year's UN General Assembly. The Chinese Government held
the view that the Korean question should be discussed this year.
Thirteen countries, led by Algeria, had already tabled a resolution
supporting the inclusion of the Korean question on this year's General
Assembly agenda. The Chinese Government welcomed this. Mr Royle had said
that he would report the views of the Chinese Government on the Korean
question to the British Government. Had the British Government yet
formed a view, or was the question still under consideration? Er Aliis
replied that as far as he was aware the question was still under
consideration. He then sked Mr Chang if what he had just said meant that
the Chinese Government supported the 13-nation Algerian resolution. Mr
Chang said it did. Mr Addis remarked that this appeared to represent a
new development. He would sec that it was reported to his Government.
5. Er Addie, said, in conclusion, that 1 8.ened to him that the Koreans
were setting about the next ste, tovaris reconciliation in the right
way, concentrating on extending the talks between the two Red Cross
Organisations so as to facilitate the exchange of messages between
families, etc. Mr Clang relied that he shared the Ambassador's view.
+
CONFIDENTIAL
JAPAN
CONFIDENTIAL
-4
JAFAN
7. Hr Adiis said that, while he himself had little to say about the
formation of the new government in Japan, he would be grateful for Er
Chang's views on the appointment of Er Tanaka and Kr Öhira. Mỵ Chan;
reminded the Ambassador that Tanaka's, like Sato's before it, 798 a
Liberal Democratic Party government. It had stetel that its general
policy would remain unchangol. Nonetheless, Tanaka seemed to have
recognised that tincs ka? changed and that new steps were necessary. On
policy towards China he differed from Sato in that he appeared to be
taking an "active attitude". He had stated on several occasions that he
hoped to realise the normalisation of relations between the two
countries as soon as possible. The views of the new Government had been
reflected to some extent by recent Japanese visitors to Feking, though
these latter did not represent the Japanese Government. Similarly, from
the Chinese side, contact had recently been made in Tokyo both with the
new Foreign Minister, Ohira, and with the new
Minister-Without-Portfolio, iki, but these contacts too had been
non-governmental. They might help to promote the normalisation of
relations between Japan and China, but they were no substitute for
contacts between the two governments. Whether and when these took place
would depend on how the situation developed. It was apparent that the
extreme right- wing in Japan did not welcome the momentum of the Tanaka
Government towards normalisation, and extremists in the Liberal
Democratic Party, including men like Kishi and Kaya, had been making a
major effort to sabotage the trend towards normalisation. China for her
part welcome the desire of the Japanese Jovernment to normalise
relations; but the latter so far had taken no concrete steps. Their
attitude wa B positive, but at the ange time prudent and careful; Tanaka
had to maintain a balance between the verious points of view. It had
been reported that he would meet President Nixon in Hawaii in late
August or early September. According to the foreign press the main
subjects to be discussed were economic relations between Japan and the
US and the normalisation of relations between Japan and China. These
foreign press reports were probably well based. Japan was still very
closely allied to the United States, whose agreement would be nogled
before any major move could be mr.de At the same time Japan was also
preparing for talks with the Soviet Union it: a view to concluding a
Peace Treaty. Thus, as could be seen, Japan was now engaged in
simultaneous activities in a number of directions. Hr Addis commented
that Vice-Minister Ch'iao Kuan- hua had said to Kr Royle that Japan now
stood at the crossroads.
CONFIDENTIAL
/Developments
CONFIDENTIAL
- 5 -
Developments since thst meeting had seemed to reinforce
this view. Hr
Mr Chang sai that he agreed. Hr Addis said that as far as relations
between Japan and China were concerned the next move seemed to be the
establishment of official contact between the two rovernments. Nr Cheng
agreed that this was the "trend". Er Addis referred to newspaper reports
that Er Tanaka or r Ohira or both might visit Peking before the end of
September. Er Chang said that he had not seen these reports, but thought
a decision on this could not be taken before Tanaka peceived the
agreement of the Americane in Hawaii. He might be wrong about this, but
it was what he felt. Kr is said his own impression was that Japan was
capable of making her own decisions without first obtaining the
permission of the United States. Mr Chang replied that Japan's relations
with the United States vere so deep that she could not break free. The
"overhead diplomacy" of the United States last year had led some people
in Japan to suggest that Japan should engage in the same sort of thing,
but in his, Mr Chang's, opinion the Japanese would lack the courage to
do this, because they knew the United States would only go over their
heads once again. Ir Addis said that it was right to recognise that
Japan's relations with the United Sates were very deep and would
continue to be so even though Japan might adjust its position with
regard to China. Mr Chang commented that he understood Mr Heath would be
going to Japan in September. Mr Addis confirmed that this
was 80.
CONFIDENTIAL
/SUB-CONTINENT
CONFIDENTIAL
- 6 -
SUB-CONTINENT
8.
Kr Addis said that he wished to make a short statement on the Simla
Agreement. As in the case of Korea, the British Government welcomed the
improvement in relations between India and Pakistan. They regarded the
Simla Agreement as the first step and as laying a helpful foundation for
further progress towards a general settlement. A particular merit of the
Simla Agreement was that it separated the problems of Kashmir and the
West from other issues, such as that of the FO75, which also affected
Bangladesh and were thus of a tripartite nature. A start had been made
on bilateral issues between India and Pakistan. It was to be hoped that
this would be followed by progress on trips rtite issues, Recognition of
Bangladesh by Pakistan would help forward discussion of tripartite
matters. The holding of an eventual tripartite summit meeting was some
thing to be looked forward to.
9. Ir Chang thanked the Ambassador for this account of the British
Government's view of recent events in the Sub-Continent. He id the
Chinese Government also saw the Simla Agreement as first ste, towards a
relaxation in relations between India and Pakistan ani believe it
deserved welcome, especially since agreement had been reached that
troops on the India/West Fakist n border should be drawn back. This
would help towards a relaxation of tension. The Chinese Govement had
noted that Fresident Bhutto had adhered to the principles upon which he
had always insisted, while at the same time making efforts towards
relaxation.
10. Ir Chang said that the Chinese Government for their part supported
the relevant UN resolution. Vice-Minister Ch'ião Kuan-hua had made this
point during his talks with Mr Royle. The most important aspect of the
UN resolution was the demand that troops should be withdrawn from
occupied territories. Nothing had yet happened on this. Indin still
detained several hundred thousand Pakistani POWs. This was entirely
unreasonable. Fossibly the Indians were attempting in this way to
Hackmail Pakistan. If so, it was a tactic China opposed. Relations
between Pakistan and East Bengal were a matter for Pakistan alone. China
would not intervene. China had not recognised Bangladesh, nor had she
considered doing so. How could she when Rangladesh had not yet been
recognised by Pakistan? The Chinese Government adhered to last year's UN
resolution. Until Indian troops were withdrawn from occupied territory
and until such questions as that of the F078 were settled, it would be
/impossible
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENT IAL
- 7 -
impossible for China to adopt any other stond. The reason for this was
very simple. Last year China bad raised her hand in support of the UN
resolution. If within a year she were simply to abandon it, her
membership of UN would lack all significance. One did not support a
resolution today and then refuse to recognise it tomorrow. The fact that
over 70 countries had now recognised Bangladesh made no difference to
the policy adopted by China. In conclusion, Ir Chang remarked that India
and Pakistan had now held bilateral talks; the problems between Pakistan
and East Bengal should equally be settled between the two parties. Nr
Addis said he entirely agreed.
CONFIDENTIAL
/HIDDLE EAST
CONFIDENTIAL
t
8
KIDDLE EAST
11.
Vr Aldis said that he wished to say something about President Sadat's
decision to invite the Soviet Union to withdraw its military advisers
from Ecypt. The British Government had known for some time pest of the
increasing strain in relations between Egypt and the Soviet Union, for
which there seemed to be three main reasons: dissatisfaction in Egypt
with the failure of the Soviet Union to supply important offensive
weapons; a rather more gener 1 sense of frustration at the lack of
forward movement with regard to the Arab-Israeli dispute; and, in the
higher ranks of the Egyptian armed forces, a widespread dislike of the
Joviet militery advisers. Against this general background of political
relations between the two countries there must have been pressure on
Fresident 3adat from within the armed forces to ask the Russians to
withdraw. At the same time Fresident Sadat was also perhaps trying to
buy time for the survival of his régime.
12. Mr Addis said that, as the British Government understood it, there
were three categories of Soviet military presence in Egypt: Soviet
training staff and advisers attached to the three Services; Soviet
personnel involved in Egyptian air defence; and autonomous Soviet
military units, e.g. fighter squadrons, the maritize air squadron and
Soviet naval personnel at Egyptian ports. If President Sadat's statement
was taken at its face value that all Soviet experts and advisers were to
be withdrawn, this would mean about 7,000 out of a total Soviet military
presence in Egypt of between 15-20,000. There had, however, been some
reports suggesting that only the advisers were to be withdraw and that
the instructors would remain. In that event the effect would be much
less. It was not yet clear whether the President's announcement should
be considered as the prelude to a request for the withdrawal of the
autonomous units. It was clear, however, that it is important for both
the Egyptian and Soviet Governments that they should reach some sort of
agreement between themselves. It was to be expected, therefore, that
import int negotiations would take place between them. It was possible
that Fresident Sadat had deliberately taken the present tough stand in
order to strengthen his bargaining position. There were thus still many
uncertainties, but plainly the Soviet Union hal suffered a severe
setback which would have imlications for their policy in the Middle East
gencrally. As to the possibility of a furtier Arab-Israeli war, it
scemed on the whole that the effect of the 1resident's statement would
be to make the resumption of fighting leas likely. It was bound to
increase strains ithin the country. It would be welcome to the High
Command and to the middle classes, but not to the radical elements or to
the younger officers of the armed forces.
/13.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
· 9-
13. Mr Chang said that what the Ambassador had said in the earlier part
of his remarks coincided more or less with the appreciation of the
Chinese Government. The Chinese Government saw the affair as an
expression of the discontent felt by the Egyptian people and Government
at the role of the Soviet Union in their country. China had long pointed
out that while Egypt might have been accepting aid from the Soviet Union
for the purpose of safeguarding her independence and sovereignty and
resisting Israeli aggression, the Soviet Union was sure to try to
exploit the opportunity to exercise control over Egyptian affairs. It
had been impossible to imagine that Egypt would accept such control in
exchange for help in countering aggression from Israel. It had therefore
been entirely predictable that something of the present sort would
happen. The Chinese Government of course had had some personal
experience of the character of Soviet aid, although they had never
received it on the same large scale. But they could well imagine the
reactions of the Egyptians. President Sadat had
·
teken a very brave decision which might entail certain difficulties, but
no matter how wide the effect of his decision to ask for the withdrawal
of Soviet military personnel, the direction of his move was correct.
What he had done was in the interests of the Egyptian people; the
Egyptian people had therefore welcomed it. The Chinese Government were
aware of this from their contacts with friends in the area. As far as
future developments were concerned, Egypt was far from China and China
was less familiar with the Kiddle East than Britain; the points made by
the Ambassador were therefore most helpful. It seemed, however, that
neither the Soviet Union nor Egypt wanted the latest step to be
irrevocable. Meanwhile the United States seemed to be adopting the
prudent attitude of making no comment. The British and French
Governments seemed to be taking a similar prudent line. The attitude of
Israel was less clear. The Egyptians claimed to have shot down an
intruding Israeli aircraft, but the Israelis denied this, and there had
been no repercussions. It looked as though the situation would remain
calm.
CONFIDENTIAL
/GERMANY
CONFIDENTIAL
-
- 10 -
GERVAITY
14. Er AMia commented that there was no need for him to say anything, or
to ask puestions, about the recent visit to China of Schumann. Nr Chang
would know that the British had been in close touch over this with their
French friends. Dr Schroeder's visit, however, was a rather different
matter, since there was course no permanent West German representative
in Feting. Kr Addis sail that he was aware that Dr Schroeder's visit had
been an unofficial one and that he had come to China with no mandate to
speal for the West. German Government. Nevertheless he would appreciate
Mr Chang's comments, in the light of the visit, on the state of
Sino-West German relations and on China's attitude to the question of
German representation at the UN.
15. Mr Chang said that Dr Schroeder had visited China in his capacity as
Chairman of the Bundestag Foreign Affairs Committee. His visit had not
been authorised by the West German Government. Nevertheless, the
question which clearly had most interested him had been that of the
establishment of formal relations between the two countries. He had
wanted to know whether China desired the establishment of relations and,
if so, on what terms. There had of course been no question of
negotiating with Dr Schroeder, but he had been told that China's terms
for recognition of Test Germany were the same as for all other
countries, namely acceptance of the Five Principles of Peaceful
Co-existence. Otherwise, so far as China 798 concerned, there was no
barrier. Dr. Schroeder had remarked that there was equally no barrier on
the West German side, since the Federal Government neither had relations
with, nor recognised, Taiwan.
Now it
16. Mr Chang said that the speed with which relations between the two
countries were established depended upon the West German Government. In
the past they had said that they were in no hurry to adjust relations
with China before the readjustment of their relations with the Soviet
Union. was the general election which was making their intention
difficult to divine However, China, for her part, was in no hurry. Mr
Chang commented that Dr Schroeder had scened to understand the Chinese
position, and had promised to make efforts on his return to Germany in
favour of improved relations. This was an attitude to be welcomed.
CONFIDENTIAL
/17.
4
CONFIDENTIAL
-
11
17. Hr Chang said that due to the very little contact there had been
between China and Test Germany, the t÷lks with Dr Schroeder had gone on
for rather a long time. Both sides had needed to acquaint the other with
their positions on various questions. The question of representation of
the tvo Germanies at the United Nations had been among the matters
discussed. China's attitude to this was very simple. In reality there
were two Germanies; both should therefore be represanted.
/VISITS AND TRAVEL IN CHINA
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
12
VISITS AND TRAVEL IN CHINA
13. Fr A lis said there was one more question of a rather different
nature which he wished to take the opportunity to raise. This my the
question of visits and travel in Ching by himself and members of his
staff.
It was unnecessary to argue with Mr Chang the importance of Embassy
staff getting to know China: it was common ground between Kr Chang and
himself that this was an important aspect of the Embassy's work. In
practice however members of the Embassy found themselves in an
under-rivileged position. Unofficial, short-tera visitors to China, even
those from Great Britain, secmed to be allowed to visit places and
institutions to which members of the Embassy were not permitted ucceвs.
His Philippinend American friends came here on unofficial visits and
were granted facilities that were denied to the Embassy. For example, he
had himself suggested visiting the North-East but was told it was not
possible. Yet a Philippine friend was able to visit Shenyang and other
places. Again, Trofessor Jerome Cohen told Ir Addis of his visit to
Peking University, while
r Addis's own request to visit the University was outstanding for nearly
six months. He mentioned these two examples merely by way of
illustrations. Again, making the comparison with his own and Mr Morgan's
experience 15 years ago, the present situation was much less favourable
and the restrictions much greater. For example, in the period between
1954-1957 he had himself made extensive tours in the North-East, in
Central China and in the South-West. Other British colleagues had
visited these and other areas. During the last six months before his
departure from China in 1957 he had visited a total of 18 universities
or institutes of higher education. Against this he had been in China now
for six months and apart from one brief visit with Mr Royle to Tsinghua
University had not been able to visit any universities. It was not his
wish to waste the time of Mr Chang on the details of the matter, but he
did wish to raise the general question of access and visits. If a
general instruction could be issued that requests should be met in so
far as circumstances permitted, this would be most helpful.
19. Mr Cheng said that he fully understood the Ambassador's dosire to
know more about China. It was 18o right that the Ambassador had brought
out the point that it had been possible to travel more widely 15 years
ago than it was now. In recent years, of course, the Cultural Revolution
d taken place and many departments and institutions were still
undergoing
As a result their capacity and ability to
reorg: nisation.
+
CONFIDENTIAL
/receive
CONFIDENTIAL
13
receive foreign guests was limited. However, this state of affairs would
probably not continue much longer. There would be a gradual expansion of
the number of places and institutions open to foreigners. For example,
this year's diplomatic tour had included Loyang and Tachai, whereas last
year's tour had not. It was right of course that diplomats should go to
more places. But efforts had also to be made to enable short-term
visitors to Bee 58 much 19 possible of China and it had perhaps been
assumed that because diplomats remainel in Peking a long time they could
afford to be more patient. When asked by the Ambassador how long this
patience was expected to last, Mr Chang replied thot it was difficult
for him to give a precise answer. Access had already been expanded, and
special access had occasionally been allowed in special circumst.nces.
For instance, the Canadian Ambassador, who hil been born in Kunming, had
wished to re-visit that city. He had been allowed to do so. A further
consideration was that the Diplomatic Corps had now grown quite large.
However he was willing to admit that not enough was being one in respect
of access for diplomats and since the Ambassador had raised the question
he would try and see that more was done. Mr Addis said that it sometimes
seemed that there was discrimination against resident diplomats. Ir
Chang said that it was not the policy of the Chinese Government to
refuse diplomats access to places and institutions. He imagined the
problem was that the departments concerned thought it better to try and
receive then at a later date. The intention was to gradually expand
access, but it was impossible to say definitely when a particular place
or institution would be opened or, in general, how wide this expansion
of access would be. There were difficulties about issuing a general
direction in concrete terms, but as far as specific visits were
concerned contact could be made with the department concerned to see
what might be done. Er Addis thanked Er Chang for allowing him to make
his point and sai that having made it he would not pursue it further.
CONFIDENTIAL
/CONCLUSION
P
CONFIDENTIAL
- 14 -
CONCLUSION
20. Kr Chang remarked that the questions raised by the Ambassador during
the course of their conversation were major questions of interest to
both Britain and China. As he was not well prepared he did not propose
to take advantage of the present opportunity to raise any questions of
his own. He would like to propose instead that he and the Ambassador
should have a further conversation on another occasion. Kir Addig said
he would find it very valuable to continue with Mr Chang their
discussion of international matters.
21. "r Chang said he thought it right that the Ambassador should discuss
bilateral matters with Er Wang. He explained that West European and
American Department was soon to be divided with Mr Yang becoming
Director of the new West European Department. Once he had had an
opportunity to study the outcome of the recent discussions between Mr
Royle and Ambassador Sung, Mr Wand would be happy to meet the Ambassador
to lacuse outstanding bilateral issues. Some of these bilateral issues
might be settled quickly; others would need further discussion.
+
COFFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
COR OF A FISTIKO AT THE MIDISTRY
ON THURSDAY. 27 JULY 1972. AT 9.30 8.1.
PORZION APPAIRS
H I Ambassador
Mr I H Morgan
Present:
Assistant Kinister for Foreign Affairs Mr Chang Wen-chin
Er Wang Pen-shou
HrTH Preston
Mr Chang I-chün
Ir Yeh Tei-hain
1.
The Assistant Minister said that he had seen a report of the recent
meeting between Mr Royle and the Chinese Ambassador, Mr Sung. They
appeared to have had an interesting discussion, contiming the talks
begun during Ir Royle's visit to China. Er Royle had made a number of
positive proposals which the Chinese side were now studying. Mr Chang
added that ke had just seen a Hsinkus report of a meeting the previous
day between Ir Sung and the Secretary of State and Ir Davies. Tha
Kubassy's report of this meeting had not yet been received in the
Foreign Ministry, but presumably it had been in the nature of a courtesy
call by Ir Sung, in which case discussion would have centred on
bilateral matters.
2.
The Ambassador said that he proposed, with Mr Chang's agreement, to
leave bilateral matters for discussion on a separate occasion with Ir
Wang Tung, and to use the present occasion to continue the exchange of
views on international matters begun during Vr Royle's visit. In the two
months sinoe Ir Royle's visit there had been interesting and important
developments in a number of countries: in Korea, the Joint North-South
Announcement of 4 July; in Japan, the formation of a new government; in
the Sub-Continent, the Simla Agreement; in the Mediterranean, the very
important amouncement by President Sadat of the expulsion from Egypt of
Soviet advisers and technicians; and finally, from Europe, the visits to
China of I Sohumaa and Dr Schroeder.
CONFIDENTIAL
/KOREA
CONFIDENTIAL
-2
KORRA
3. Kr Addis roninded Mr Chang that on the day of the publication of the
Joint Agreement (į July) the British Government had issued a statement
welcoming the successful outcome of the talks between North and South
Korea as a most important development. Mr Addis said that he took a
close personal interest in the Korean question. After leaving China in
1950 he had worked for nearly four years in the Foreign office as an
assistant in the Department dealing with China and Korea. He had
regretted, in 1953, after the signing of the Armistice, that it had not
been possible to move on to the political conference to which the terms
of the Armistics had looked forward. Again, in 1954, it had been a
matter of regret to him, as a member of the British delegation to the
Geneva Conference on Korea, that it had not been possible for that
Conference to achieve a successful outcome.
The news, after nearly 20 years, that the two parts of divided Korea had
now got together and taken the first step towards an agreement between
themselves was, therefore, particularly welcome. It seemed however that
this was only a first step in what would necessarily be a long process.
Britain of course knew the southern part of the country better than the
north; nonetheless she was aware that on both sides alsgivings and fears
existed that could only be overcome slowly. However, the Joint Agreement
was a first step, and Britain was glad that it had been täken.
4. Mr Chang said that the Chinese Goverment also welcomed the Joint
Agreement. Their attitude to it had been indicated, first, in an article
in the People's Daily ́nd, subsequently, in the speech delivered by
Prime Minister Chou Enlai on 9 July at the banquet in honour of the
visiting South Yemeni government delegation. It appeared to be a feeling
common to both China and Britain that the inability of the two parts of
Korea, after so long a period of division and war and even after the
signing of an Armistice, to agree to maintain contact with one another
and move forward towards uni ty was regrettable. The Ambassador would
remember well the policy of Ir Dulles, which had been to obstract even
the most minor agreement between North and South. This was the reason
why no useful result had been achieved at the Geneva Conference. At
last, however, even the United States had come to me that Ir Dulios'
policies towards China and the Far East in general were divorced from
reality. The desire of the Korean people for national unity and to shake
off outside interbrence was now growing more and more powerful. This was
a good thing, but it was only the first stage in a very long proo838.
process.
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Er Chang said that, in general, foreign reaction to the developments in
Korea had been favourable. Efforts towards reconciliation between North
and South would haYS to depend mainly on the Korem people themselves,
but other countries should, wherever possible, help the process, and not
obstruct it. He recalled that Vice-Kinister Ch'iao Kuan-hua had
suggested to Hr Royle that Great Britain and China should consider
together what they could do to help forward the process of Korean
reconciliation. We should now look forward to the handling of the Korean
issue at this year's UN General Assembly." The Chinese Government held
the view that the Korean question should be discussed this year.
Thirteen countries, led by Algeria, had already tabled a resolution
supporting the inclusion of the Korean question on this year's General
Assembly agenda. The Chinese Government welcomed this. Er Royle had said
Er Royle had said that he would report the views of the Chinese
Government on the Korean question to the British Government. Had the
British Government yet formed a view, or was the question still under
consideration? Er Addis replied that as far sé he was aware the question
ms still under consideration. He then asked Ir Chang if what he had just
said meant that the Chinese Government supported the 13-nation Algerian
resolution. Er Chang said it did. Mr Addis remarked that this appeared
to represent a new development. He would see that it was reported to his
Government.
6. Nr Addis said, in conclusion, that it seemed to him that the Koreans
were setting about the next step towards reconciliation in the right
way, concentrating on extending the talks between the two Red Cross
Organisations so as to facilitate the exchange of messages between
families, etc. Hn Chang replied that he shared the Ambassador's view.
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JAPAN
7. No Addin said that, while be himself had little to say about the
formation of the new government in Japan, he would be grateful for Mr
Chang's views on the appointment of Ir Tanaka and Mr Ohira. He Chang
reminded the Ambassador that Tanaka's, like Sato's before it, was a
Liberal Democratic Party government. It had stated that its general
policy would remain unchanged. Nonetheless, Tanaka seemed to have
recognised that times had changed and that new steps were necessary. On
policy towards China he differed from Sato in that he appeared to be
taking an "active attitude". He had stated on several occasions that he
hoped to realise the nomalisation of relations between the two countries
as soon as possible. The views of the new Government had been reflected
to some extent by recent Japanese visitors to Peking, though these
latter did not represent the Japanese Government. 8imilarly, from the
Chinese side, contact had recently been made in Tokyo both with the new
Foreign Minister, Ohira, md with the new Minister-Without-Portfolio,
Wiki, but these contacts too had been non-governmental, They might help
to promote the normalisation of relations between Japan and China, but
they were no substitute for contacts between the two governments.
Whether and when these took plaos would depend on how the situation
developed. It was apparent that the extreme right- wing in Japan did not
welcome the momentum of the Tanaka Government towards normalisation, and
extremists in the Liberal Democratic Party, including men like Kishi and
Kaya, had been making a major effort to sabotage the trend towards
normalisation. China for her part welcomed the desire of the Japanese
Government to normalise relations; but the latter so far had taken no
conarete steps. Their attitude was positive, but at the same time
prudent and careful; Tanaka had to maintain a balance between the
various points of view. It had been reported that he would met President
Nixon in Hawaii in late August or early September. According to the
foreign press the sain subjects to be discussed were economie relations
between Japan and the US and the normalisation of relations between
Japan and China. These foreign press reports were probably well based.
Japan was still very closely allied to the United States, whose
agreement would be needed before any major move could be made. At the
same time Japan was also preparing for talks with the Soviet Union with
a view to concluding a Pence Treaty. Thus, as could be seen, Japan was
now engaged in simultaneous activities in a number of directions. Ir
Addde comented that Vice-Minister Ch'iao Kuan- hua had said to ir Royle
that Japan now stood at the crossroads.
At
Alloy so that
/Developments
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Developments since that meeting had seemed to reinforce this view. Mr
Chang said that he agreed, Mr Addis said that as far as relations
between Japan and China were concerned the next nove acemed to be the
establishment of official contact between the two covernments. Mr Chang
agreed that this was the "trend". Kp Addis referred to neways jer
reports that Ir Tanaka or Hr Ohira or both sight visit Paking before the
end of September. Kr Chang said that he had not seen these reporte, but
thought a decision on this could not be taken before Tanaka received the
agreement of the Americans in Hawaii. He might be wrong about this, but
it was what he felt. Mr Adpis said his om impression was that Japan was
capable of making her own decisions without first obtaining the
permission of the United States. Mr Chang replied that Japan's relations
with the United States were so deep that she could not break free. The
"overhead diplomacy" of the United States last year had led some people
in Japan to suggest that Japan should engage in the same sort of thing,
but in his, Ir Chang's, opinion the Japanese would lack the courage do
this, because they knew the United States would only go Over their heads
once again. Er Addis said that it was right to recognise that Japan's
relations with the United Sates were very deep and would continue to be
so even though Japan night adjust its position with regard to China. My
Chang commented that he understood Mr Heath would be
going to Japan in September. Ir Addig confirmed that this
TRS 80.
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GUB-CONTINENT
8.
Mr Addia said that he wished to make a short statement on the Simla
Agreement. As in the case of Korea, the British Goverment welcomed the
improvement in relations between India and Pakistan. They regarded the
Simla Agreement as the first step and as laying a helpful foundation for
further progress tomrds a general settlement. A particular merit of the
Simla Agreement was that it separated the problems of Kashmir and the
West from other issues, sich as that of the POWs, which also affected
Bangladesh and were thus of a tripartite nature. A start had been made
on bilateral issues between India and Pakistan. It was to be hoped that
this would be followed by progress on tripartita issues. Recognition of
Bangladesh by Pakistan would help forward discussion of tripartite
mattere, The holding of an eventual tripartite sumit meeting was
something to be looked forward to.
9. Ir Chang thanked the Ambassador for this account of the British
Government's view of recent events in the Sub-Contiment. He said the
Chinese Government also saw the Simla Agreement as a first step towards
a relaxation in relations between India and Pakistan and believed it
deserved welcome, especially since agreement had been reached that
troops on the Inaia/west Pakistɔn border should be drawn back. This
would help towards a relaxation of tension. The Chinese Government had
noted that President Bhutto had adhered to the principles upon which he
had always insisted, while at the same time making efforts towards
relaxation.
10. Mr Chang ssid that the Chinese Government for their part supported
the relevant UN resolution. Vice-Minister Ch'iao Kuan-kun had made this
point during his talks with Mr Royle. The most important aspect of the
UK resolution was the demand that troops should be withdrawn from
occupied territories. Nothing had yet happened on this. India still
detained several hundred thousand Pakistani POWs, This was entirely
unreasonable. Possibly the Indians were attempting in this way to
Buckmail Pakistan. If so, it was a tactic China opposed. Relations
between Pakistan and East Bengal were a matter for Pakistan alone. China
would not intervene. China had not recognised Bangladesh, nor had the
considered doing so. How could she when Bangladesh had not yet been
recognised by Pakistan? The Chinese Government adhered to last year's UN
resolution. Until Indian troops were withdrawn from occupied territory
and until such questions as that of the POWs were settled, it would be
/impossible
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One did
impossible for China to adopt any other stand. The reason for this was
very simple. Last year China had raised her hand in support of the UN
resolution. If within a year she were simply to abandon it, her
membership of UI would lack all significanos. not support a resolution
today and then refuse to recognise it tomorrow, The fact that over 70
countries had now recognised Bangladesh nado no difference to the policy
adopted by China. In conelusion, Kr Chang
Hi remarked that India and Pakistan had now held bilateral talks; the
problems between Pakistan and Bast Bengal should equally be settled
between the two parties. Er Addip said he entirely agreed.
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