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CONFIDENTIAL
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[23
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............................In Confidence
Department
RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PERMANENT UNDER ·
SECRETARY AND THE CHINESE AMBASSADOR: 29 DECEMBER 1972
Present:
My Jaunt,
Herewith a draft record), Fly Sing's table with the P.J.S on 29
December. have omitted bilatera questions (which were Covered in FCD N
N° ¡¡76,
attached at Flag 4).
H.L..DAVISS
3/1
Permanent Under-Secretary
HE Mr Sung Chih-Kuang
H L Davies
Mr Chiang En-Chu
1. Sir Denis Greenhill said that we attached
importance to continuing a dialogue with the Chinese
Government on international matters affecting the two
countries, He mentioned in particular the questions of
Vietnam and the South Asian Sub-continent.
VIET NAM
An Davies (FED)
Many thounker. Could you please have this typed fair and distributed as
you
you think fi not forgetting Ministers a...
2. Mr Sung agreed about the desirability of con-
to the tinued discussions. He asked what HMG considered/the
real intention of the United States in Viet Nam.
Sir Denis Greenhill said that he thought that the US
intention was to secure a settlement of an enduring
apponik? character which did not contain the seeds of future
Markwhich
which had arisen Julţ conflict and misunderstanding, of the sort
contained in
earlier agreements. Presumably the US Government did
not feel that the point reached in the negotiations in
/Paris
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gave
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Paris wee of a sufficiently firm basis for a
genuinely lasting settlement. He emphasised that we
Whuth
did not know of the precise points the US Government
Mint Tholly found unsatisfactory but it seemed likely to Involved
the supervisory machinery, the number of North
Viet-flamese troops in the south, and the intentions
of Hanoi towards a separate South Vietnamese Govern-
The
ment. He acknowledged that the Chinese views as
in Persing, expressed to the Secretary of State, e. that a good
agreement does not require supervisory machinery, was
Sensible
in theory correct. Past experience however suggested
the need for some kind of effective supervisory
machinery.
3. Er Sung said he had three points to make.
First
it was his impression that the US had already reached
9 Point
a nine-point agreement with Hanoi and had now re-
tracted. He did not think that the reasons which had
that is that there were been leaked by the Americans, for this
retraction, ise.
problems about supervision and the interpretation of
certain terms, were sufficient to overthrow the entire
9 Pant
nine-point agreement. Even if di sagreements existed
the negotiations should continue.
Secondly, the
wantonness of American bombing of North Viet Nam had
few parallels in history; It was indi
minate and being indixenminately braqubed.
hospitals, schools and populated areas were ineluded.
He did not know how Sir Denis felt but he personally
felt indignant.
Thirdly, if the Americans intended
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to use bombs to force concessions from Hanoi, he did not
think that this would succeed; the North Viet-flame se
would become more resolute.
4. Sir Denis Greenhill agreed that bombing was
deplorable, as we had good reason to know from our
London Blitz.
experience in the war, His view was, however, that the
9 Points
nine points were not a satisfactory basis for peace,
because of the ambiguities they contained,
Although we
did not know the detailed reasoning behind the American
Washington
decision to resume bombing, they must have concluded
that Hanoi was not prepared to make the necessary
9 Pants
the agreement improvements on the nine points to make a binding.
settlement. He was sure that Mr Sung knew that during
the bombing pause the North Viet Namese had not halted
their military activities in the southnor their military
preparations in the north. This could not have given
particular confidence to the Americans. Mr Sung drew
attention to the differing explanations for the resump-
tion of bombing given by Dr Kissinger and, the Pentagon
and frem Saigon. The Pentagon had said there was no
sign that the North was about to launch a big offensive
and Saigon had said military activities were at their
lowest.
SOUTH ASIAN SUB-CONTINENT
15.
Sir Denis Greenhill said that it was his impression
that progress was being made by India and Pakistan/over
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both
/their
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their frontier problems and/general wish to permit a
wider development of relations, but there was little
progress to report between Bangladesh and Pakistan,
help to
We were doing what we could to promote this. kr Sung
that is)
said that China and Britain had the same wish,to see
peace in the Sub-continent.
The crux
lay writte
was the POW
$1471
question and the two UN resolutions/
Sir Denis
asked if Mr Sung had any comments on the Secretary+of+
State's suggestion in Peking that Peking and Delhi
should improve their relations.
6.
Mr Sung said that his interpretation of the
Chinese Government's position was that they wished to
maintain good relations with Pakistan and to establish
good relations with both the Indian Government and the
present Government of Bangladesh.. However, the
Chinese found it difficult to contact the Indians
before the two UN resolutions were carried out and
90,000 POWs were released. In addition, it would be
easier for China to have good relations with India
and Bangladesh when India and Pakistan, and Pakistan
and Bangladesh had normal relations again. It was not
Chinese policy(as alleged by the Indians) to support
Pakistan against India or to play one off against the
other; good relations between Pakistan and India were
also to the benefit of China, As for Bangladesh, the
Chinese position was clear. China wanted good relations
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/with
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with the people of Bangladesh. In the past China's
relaith the people of East Pakistan were more
intimate than those with West Pakistan. China
harboured no animosity for Sheik Mujibur Rahman.
Mr Sung had recently met a Bangale diplomat at a
reception, He had shaken hands with him and told him
that China used to have good relations with the people
of East Pakistan but that until Pakistan and Bangladesh
solved their problems it would be difficult for the
Chinese to make contact with the Bengales. The diplomat
replied that he knew the Chinese position well.
UNITED NATIONS
7.
Sir Denis Greenhill enquired about Chinese reactions
to the first full session of the General Assembly at
which they had been represented.
Kr Sung said that the
thi seigent Chinese had published an editorial/in the People's Daily.
In short, they thought that there had been some
desirable changes in the UN, Member states and had had
a chance to speak up and play a role in the UN; this
was a change from situation where one or two auper
powers monopolised proceedings, But at present the UN
could not actually solve problems. Everybody needed to
make efforts to improve the situation.
RHODESIA
8. Sir Denis Greenhill agreed but said that it was a
member chatts
question of attitud
7
question of/attitude and not of the organisation,
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He
/referred
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referred to the question of Rhodesia. The extreme
attitude of African countries which was divorced from
they were blocking
人
the realities of the situation;p
a solution te
the problem which, although by no means ideal, would
provide great improvements in the position of the
Rhodesian Africans. By stressing their extreme position
the Africans were preventing a practical solution which-
would be a step in the right direction.
KIDDLE EAST
9. Mr Sung said that he had read in the press about
a speech by Hr Harold Wilson suggesting that there had
been a significant change in the British position on
the Middle East. Sir Denis Greenhill said there had
been no change in British policy since the
Secretaryfof/state's Harrogate speech in 1970.
Mr Wilson was referring to our recent vote on the
Egyptian resolution; we considered this entirely con-
morty Come
sistent with/Resolution No.242. HMG had very good
relations with Israel but we believed that the Israeli
Government were mistaken in taking so inflexible an
attitude to negotiations with Egypt. We hoped that
early in the New Year negotiations could be started
at least towards an interim solution. We were afraid
that consistent deferment of a solution would have
the same effect as A deferment of a solution in the
quarrel between Pakistan and India.
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M2/11
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1972
TO PRIORITY PEKING TELNO 1176 OF 29 DECEMBER/INFO GOVERNOR HONG KONG
(PERSONAL) -
MI PT.
1. DURING HIS CALL ON THE PUS ON 29 DECHIBER THE CHINESE AMBASSADOR
ASKED WHAT THE BRITISH SIDE HAD IN MIND FOR THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT of
Sino-BRITISH RELATIONS DURING 1973.
20 GREENKILL MENTIONED FORTICOMING NÎMÏSTERÏAL VISĪTS ÎN BOTH DIRECTIONS
AND OUR HOPE OF INCREASED CONTACTS BOTH COMMERCIAL AND POLITICAL WITH
CHINA, HE EMPHASISED OUR DESIRE TO CONTINUE POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS ON
INTERIATIONAL AFFAIRS,
-
3. AT THE END OF THE GENERAL DISCUSSION HIGH FOLLOWE (AND MICH
CONCENTRATED LARGELY ON HITERIATIONM, MATTERS) SUNG REVERTED TO
BI-LATERAL QUESTIONS. EMPHASISING THAT HE WAS SPEAKING PERSONALLY AND
NOT ON INSTRUCTIONS, HE SAID THAT HE CELIEVED THAT THE CHINESE
GOVERNMENT WAS SATISFIED WITH RECENT ACTIONS BY THE HONG KONG COVERIENT
AGAINST SOVIET AND KMT EPIES. THESE ACTIONS DISPLAYED A FRIENDLY
ATTITUDE TOWARDS CHINA.
+
LJ
L
A SING THEM REFERRED TO THE QUESTION OF CHINESE OFFICIA. REPRESENTATION
IN HONG KONG, HE ENQUIRED MIETHER THERE HAD BEEN MY DEVELOPMENTS SINCE
DISCUSSED MIS QUESTION WITH THE CHINESE PRIME MINISTER AID FOREIGN
MINISTER IN PEKING. HE THOUGHT THE BRITISH SIDE QUOTE DID NOT FULLY
UNDERSTAND AND HAD MISGIVINGS ADOUT CHINESE POLICIES AND WORKING STYLE
UNQUOTE, OFFICIAL CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG COULD ONLY HELP
STABILITY IN HONG KONG AND RELATIONS BETWEEN BRITAIN AND CURA: IT COULD
NOT HAVE A NEGATIVE AFFECT. GREENHILL TOOK NOTH AND TOLD THE MBASSADOR
THAT I WAS GIVING THE MATTER HY PERSONAL CONGIDERATION. HE EMPHASISED,
HOWEVER, THE PROBLEMS MICHI THE PROPOSAL RAISED FOR US AND SAID THAT FOR
THIS REASON CONSIDERATION WOULD HAVE TO DE LONG AND CAREFUL.
+
DOUGLAS-HOME
FILES:
HEAD OF FED
HEAD OF HIKIOD HEAD OF FUSD
PC
PS TO MR. ROYLE
PS TO FUS
SIR E. NORRIS MR. WILFORD BIR D. WATSON
CONFIDENTTAL,
|
CYPHER CAT A
FM F C 0 291841Z
FEC 3/548/8
22
CONFIDENTIAL
TO
1972
TOP COPY
ORITY PEKING TELNO 1176 OF 29 DECEMBER/INFO GOVERNOR HONG KONG
(PERSONAL)
MIPT.
AA
1. DURING HIS CALL ON THE PUS ON 29 DECEMBER THE CHINESE AMBASSADOR
ASKED WHAT THE BRITISH SIDE HAD IN MIND FOR THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF
$1:10-BRITISH RELATIONS DURING 1973.
2. GREENHILL MENTIONED FORTHCOMING MINISTERIAL VISITS IN BOTH DIRECTIONS
AND OUR HOPE OF INCREASED CONTACTS BOTH COMMERCIAL AID POLITICAL WITH
CHINA. HE EMPHASISED OUR DESIRE TO CONTINUE - POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS ON
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS.
3. AT THE END OF THE GENERAL DISCUSSION WHICH FOLLOWING (AND WHICH
CONCENTRATED LARGELY ON INTERNATIONAL MATTERS) SUNG REVERTED TO
BI-LATERAL QUESTIONS. EMPHASISING THAT HE WAS SPEAKING PERSONALLY AND
NOT ON INSTRUCTIONS, HE SAID THAT HE BELIEVED THAT THE CHINESE
GOVERNMENT WAS SATISFIED WITH RECENT ACTIONS BY THE HONG KONG GOVERNMENT
AGAINST SOVIET AND KMT SPIES. THESE ACTIONS DISPLAYED A FRIENDLY
ATTITUDE TOWARDS CHINA.
4. SUNG THEN REFERRED TO THE QUESTION OF CHINESE OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION
IN HONG KONG. HE ENQUIRED WHETHER THERE HAD BEEN ANY DEVELOPMENTS SINCE
1 DISCUSSED THIS QUESTION WITH THE CHINESE PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN
MINISTER IN PEKING. HE THOUGHT THE BRITISH SIDE QUOTE DID NOT FULLY
UNDERSTAND AND HAD MISGIVINGS ABOUT CHINESE POLICIES AND WORKING STYLE
UNQUOTE. OFFICIAL CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG COULD ONLY HELP
STABILITY IN HONG KONG AND RELATIONS BETWEEN BRITAIN AND CHINA: IT COULD
NOT HAVE A NEGATIVE AFFECT. GREENHILL TOOK NOTE AND TOLD THE AMBASSADOR
THAT I WAS GIVING THE MATTER MY PERSONAL CONSIDERATION. HE EMPHASISED,
HOWEVER, THE PROBLEMS WHICH THE PROPOSAL RAISED FOR US AND SAID THAT FOR
THIS REASON CONSIDERATION WOULD HAVE TO BE LONG AND CAREFUL.
DOUGLAS-HOME
FILES:
HEAD OF FED
HEAD OF HKIOD
HEAD OF FUSD PS
PS TO MR. ROYLE
PS TO PUS
SIR E. NORRIS MR. WILFORD
SIR D. WATSON
CONFIDENTIAL
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11/10⋅
(2)
The Evans Rd. To Heavy s.r The Mask 414 You have not, I think, seen
RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN
AND COMIOIMIALTH AFFAIRS AND THE CHINESE VICE FOREIGN MINISTER
AT THE ті
ISED NATIONS HEADQUARTERS AT 4.00 P.M. ON MONDAY 30 OCTOBER 1972
this.
Present:
The Rt Hon Joseph Godber [MP ·
Sir Colin Crowe
Mr M I Goulding
է:
1 Fe
+
Mr Ch'iao Kuan-Hua
Interpreter
Vietnam
1.
After compliments had been exchanged about the Secretary of State's
current visit to Peking, Mr Godber asked Mr Ch'iao how he saw the
prospect for an early agreement in Vietnam. Mr Ch'iao said that both
sides wanted a very early end to the war and had now agreed on the 9
points after four years of negotiations. There therefore seemed no need
for further delay.
2. Mr Godber pointed out that Dr Kissinger had said that there were
still some points to be finalised and went on to say that Mr Waldheim
was anxious that the UN should play a role, e.g. in supervising the
agreement. What was the Chine se attitude to this? Mr Chiao said that Mr
Waldheim had raised this with him too. China however did not favour any
role for the UN in supervising the cease-fire or the subsequent
elections. For years the important problems in the East had been settled
outside the UN (e.g. at Geneva in 1954 and 1961-2). was not impartial
between the parties (for instance there were South Korean troops in
Vietnam and the UN was already involved on one side in Korea) and the
North Vietnamese did not like the idea of UN involvement. Mr Ch'iao had
therefore advised the Secretary General not to involve himself. It would
be better for the two sides to agree on other supervision arrangements.
UN involvement would merely complicate matters.
The UN
3. Mr Godber agreed that it was desirable for the two sides to reach
agreement as soon as possible but wondered whether thereafter the UN
might not be able to help. To that extent he was sympathetic to the
Secretary General's point of view. Mr Ch'iao said that he hoped Mr
Godber would think further about this. The International Control
Commission in Indo-China was not a happy precedent. Mr Godber said that
he was reporting
/ Mr Waldheim's
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Mr Waldheim's approach to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and
would take account of the views Mr Ch'iao had expressed.
Disarmament
4.
Mr Godber then raised the World Disarmament Conference on which he had
set out the British view in his speech to the First Committee. This
seemed to be a matter on which there was agreement between the United
States and China (Mr Ch'iao interjected "you sound like Malik"). HMG
were interested
in the Argentine proposal for a study group on the WDC. Did the Chinese
Government see any merit in this idea? Mr Ch'iao said that the
Argentines had mentioned the idea in general terms but that he was not
yet clear what the actual content of a draft resolution would be. Mr
Godber said that in our view it was essential that all five nuclear
powers should participate. Mr Ch'iao said that this was a point of
fundamental difference between Britain and China. China was prepared to
contemplate the possibility of a study group which would sound out the
views of the various parties but she would find it difficult to accept
that such a study group should include the five nuclear powers, partly
because of the previous Soviet proposal for a conference of the five
nuclear powers.
5.
Mr Ch'iao said that on the whole issue of disarmament there were wide
differences of opinion. It was in everybody's interest to try to bridge
these differences and discussion at the United Nations helped towards
this objective. China had certainly not reached any agreement with the
United States.
Bangladesh
6. Mr Ch'iao went on to ask whether Britain could do anything to
postpone discussion of Bangladesh in the General Assembly. Mr Godber
pointed out that as Bangladesh was a member of the Commonwealth and
Britain had recognised her we had no alternative but to support her
application for membership of the United Nations. Sir Colin Crowe added
that we had told the Yugoslavs /co-sponsor that we would not/support
their resolution, that we did not
want a divisive debate and that we hoped they would postpone discussion
of Bangladesh.
7. Mr Ch'iao said that he had discussed Bangladesh frankly with HM
Ambassador in Peking and had complained that Britain had found it
necessary to co-sponsor the resolution in the Security Council with the
Soviet Union. However that was in the past and he had noted that Britain
had adopted a more conciliatory attitude during the current session of
the General Assembly. Sir Colin Crowe asked whether the Yugoslav
Representative
- 2
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/ had
+
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had shown the Chinese his draft resolution. Mr Ch'iao said that he had
not done so but that the Chinese had obtained from friends a general
idea of what the draft contained. The Chinese position was that if it
came to a debate there would be another quarrel; they were quite
prepared for this but did not see how it would help the cause of peace
and reconciliation in the sub-continent. It would be helpful if Britain
could convey this point to the parties, with all of whom she was on
friendly terms.
8. Mr Godber confirmed that it was our wish to be on friendly terms with
India, Bangladesh and Pakistan, and that we wished to reduce tension.
Feelings however were running high and time was needed for the
bitterness to be eased. Sheikh Mujib needed recognition for the security
of his country and a possibility of agreement seemed to lie in the
return of the prisoners of war in exchange for recognition of
Bangladesh. Mr Ch'iao said that he disagreed on one point of principle.
Pakistan had been defeated in the war and had adopted a conciliatory
attitude. It was wrong in principle for India and Bangladesh to hold the
prisoners of war as hostages. China had not done this in the 1962 war
and had even returned the territory she had occupied.
9. Sir Colin Crowe said that China had made it clear to all concerned
that she would prefer no debate at all. But if there were to be a debate
would she in all circumstances oppose the Yugoslav resolution? The
Yugoslavs hoped that their resolution would make things easier for
Pakistan and China. Mr Ch'iao repeated that he had not yet seen the
Yugoslav draft. But if it contained no mention of the resolutions which
had been passed last year, it would be very difficult for China to
accept it. In conclusion it was agreed that the two delegations should
keep in close touch.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London
- 3-
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Copied to:
Private Secretary
PS/Lady Tweedsmuir PS/Mr Royle
PS/Mr Kershaw
Mr Daunt
Mr Wilford
Mr Rose
FED (to enter)
SEAD
ACDD
SAD
UND
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Chanceries in:
Peking
Saigon
Washington
New Delhi
Islamabad
Dacca
UKMis New York
UKDis Geneva (in New York)
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RECORD OF CONVERSATION AT THE CHINEGE EMBASSY AT 2.30 PM ON 27 OCTOBER
20
l'resent:
HE Kr Sung Chih-kuang
'r Liu Keng-yuan
(First secretary)
ur Chiang En-chu (Interpreter)
1.
Kr MD Butler
(Head of European Integration
Department)
kr H L1 Davies
(Far Eastern Department)
Er Butler outlined the decisions reached at the European