resors, if Chinese opposed withdrawal they would be prepared to try to
find a suit- able Chinese manager to take charge, though this wouldlimit
the scale of operations possible. Only staff whom they might be prepared
hereafter to send is would be Chinese volunteers of Shanghai origin.
3.
(a)
(b)
Three factors which influence Bank in taking this position now ave;
absence of official British representation in Shanghai;
imposition of controls on Bank of China staff in London puts tha: in
such the same position as F.K, bank staff in Shanghai;
(0)
their belief that Mr. Self's retention now is a political act.
Mr. Saunders hopes that you would be prepared to includo his bzak staff,
or at least the wives and children, within the scope of any negotiation:
for evacuation of Charge'u staff. Secondly could lir. Self be
confidentially told Bank's position? If he wore then to recousand
overtly withor & with- drawal or the other possible course of action in
parti, 2 above, Bank would respond, but they do not wish to risk
damaging Self'u position by volunteerir; this to him on open telephone
line or by letter (they are still in touch by telephone). Mr. Saunders
asked if any method existed by which we could convey their views
confidentially to Mr. Self. I have said that I could premise nothing but
would refer to you.
5.
I have not spoken to Chartered Bank who may hold similar viors. Their
manager is not here at prosect, but in any case their head office to in
London.
ASC2
D1 BE, CS, DCS, PA, APA, DSB(2), BLO, HARG, DoʻI.
wah
CONFIDENTIAL
31-8-6-7
SCR 1/1167/55 VI
H
+
40
October 4th, 1967.
FC574.
I enclose a copy
a memorandum about the position of the Hong Kong Bank's staff in
Shanghai which Jake Saunders passod to Michael Wilford at the end of
August. It formed the basis of our telegram No. 1321′ of August 29th to
the Foreign Office, of which I also encloss a copy
2.
In fact Saunders raised two issues. The first, that his bank staff, or
at least their wives and children, should be included within the scope
of any negotiations for the evacuation of your staff, has I think been
covered by the terms of the Secretary of State'a communication to Chen
Yi of August 30th. But I am not quite clear what the situation is about
the second point. The question is whether it would at any time be
possible for you to get a confidential message to self on the lines of
paragraph 2 of our telegram 1321, suggesting that he might then overtly
recommend to the bank either a withdrawal or, as a last resort, the
appointment of a suitable Chinese manager in Shanghai.
35
30
I had not raised this question before aš te were told flatly by the
Office, in their telegrần No. 1817 of September 1st, that there was no
confidential mʊans of communication with Self, and I judged that the
situation was too tense to bother you on the point. But it seems
possible that things may now have relaxed sufficiently to make the idea
of getting a message to Self by some reliable intermediary not entirely
fantastic; and it would be helpful to have your views about the whole
problem.
4.
I as sending a copy of this letter to James Hurray in Far Eastern
"epartment.
D.C, Hopson, Esq., OMG, DSO, MO, TD,
H.M. Charge d'Affaires,
PRKING.
(T.A.K. Elliott)
1.
PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL
Rester. (Wista
THE HONGKONG AND SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
8.
MEMORANDUM
PART I
HEAD OFFICE HONG KONG
←
The object of this memorandum is to request the support of H.M.G. in the
evacuation of our British staff and their families from Shanghai.
The delays in the granting of visas and the departure of the British
Consulate from Shanghai have added additional anxieties to what has
always been a difficult situation. Our Manager, D. N. H. Self, and his
wife have been trying to leave since May last. Self's relief, D. G.
Lachlan, - a bachelor, arrived in Shanghai in May, the application for
his visa to enter China having been submitted in September 1966, T. R.
K. Crozier, who has a wife and baby, is also overdue for relief.
It is our understanding that before the present situation arose the
British Government had no objection in principle to the closure of our
Shanghai office and this we now seek to achieve, This does not mean that
{} we propose to cease financing China trade we shall continue to do so
trom || Hong Kong and elsewhere,
-
We also request the assistance of H.M.G. in informing Self of our aim to
close the office and evacuate the British staff. We do not wish to write
or telephone this to Self since by doing so we may prejudice his
immediate departure, If on the other hand he would welcome such instruc-
tions we would issue them forthwith, since they emanate from a desire to
protect the staff in the absence of any British Government establishment
in Shanghai.
PART II
In the event of the Chinese authorities refusing to allow the evacuation
of all our British staff unless we continued to operate the office under
a Chinese manager, such a condition would be accepted as a last resort.
In such circumstances the amount of business directed to our Shanghai
office would inevitably have to be reduced as we cannot envisage the
employment of an acceptable local man of sufficient calibre to run the
office on its present scale. The diminution of business might offend the
Chinese authorities, who we think particularly want us to remain in
operation because they are aware that certain overseas firms wish to buy
Chinese exports through non-communist banks.
PART III
For the first time, Chinese bank employees in London find themselves In
roughly the same situation as our British staff in Shanghai.
We are satisfied that Self's detention is now a political matter since
he answered his so-called crimes by letter and was fully interrogated on
July 12th, He has heard nothing since, He has just been told that his
wife's exit visa, granted on June 14th and now expired, cannot be
extended but must be re-processed despite the fact that she is ill,
12...
+
2
-
9.
10.
11.
Part III (contd)
It is assumed that eventually there will have to be some form of
compromise between the present British and Chinese attitudes and it is
hoped that when this occurs the position of our expatriate staff in
Shanghai will be borne in mind and their evacuation arranged, or at
least that of their wives and children.
Although it was proposed to send in a relief for Crozier, and
application was made for this in the name of S. Robertson in December
1966, I do not now consider that such a move should be made even if a
visa were granted. I feel that all efforts should be concentrated on
evacuating British staff from China and if these are unsuccessful there
should be no replacements.
I can only envisage sending in replacements if Chinese nationals of
Shanghal origin should volunteer to go from here,
سهل
under
J. A. H. Saunders
29th August, 1967.
CONFIDENTIAL
FOREIGN OFFICE, 8.W.1.
29 September, 1967.
30
(BC 5/4)
ad
ا؟
1.91
In your letter 1115/67 of 17 July you mentioned two "charges" made
against the Hong Kong Bank, which the Chinese had put to Self, apart
from the I.C.I. Money. These involved payments made in Hong Kong by
H.M.G. to Mr. Padilla a Filipino still resident in Shanghai and Mr.
Meany, a British subject who lived in Shanghai until his death in 1963.
2. We have been unable to trace any payment to Padilla in 1961, or any
record of his employment by H.I.G. in Shanghai at that time.
3. The records on Mesny's case are, however almost complete. In 1955 he
lodged a claim for £2,537. 10. -d. to cover the total loss of 30 Chinese
tenement houses, numbers 3-55 (odd numbers only) Urgs Road in the
Eastern District of the International Settlement own as Doang Loh Lee,
The destruction occurred during and as a result of the Sino-Japanese
hostilities, 7 July 1937 8 December 1941. H.N.G. took the claim up with
the Japanese Government, and in 1961 Hosny accepted the sum of £1,015.
-8. -d. in final and complete settlement. He expressed the wish that the
money be paid into the Hong Kong Bank in Hong Kong and, although we have
no record of where it was actually paid, there is no reason to doubt
that Meany's wishes were complied with,
4. I agree that you should not try to inform Self of the details of
these, and any other similar cases. It is less confusing for him, and
probably less con- promising as well, if he receives all his
instructions from the Bank in Hong Kong, We should be most interested to
know anything you may hear about the progress of Belf's case,
particularly if there are any develop- ments which throw light on how
much longer he will be forced to remain in Shanghai.
T. Peters Enq., C.X.G.,
PEKING.
(J. B. Denson)
CONFIDENTIAL
B4. (3746)
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
CONFIDENTIAL
Registry No.
FC 5/4
DRAFT
Letter
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
To:-
Top Secret.
Secret.
Restricted.
ConfidentialEJS
T. Peters Esq., Peking.
C.M. C,
Unclassified.
PRIVACY MARKING
IL - HI
In Confidence
Type 1 +
From
J. B. Denson
Telephone No. & Ext.
Department
1
Flag R
Flag A
Flag B
In your letter reference-1115/67 of 17 July
you mentioned two "charges" made against the Hong Kong Bank, which the
Chinese had put to Self,
apart from the I.C.I money. These involved
payments made in Hong Kong by H.M.G. to Mr. Padille a Filipino still
resident in Shanghai and Mr.
Mesny, a British subject who lived in Shanghai
until his death in 1963.
2. We have been unable to trace any payment
to Padilla in 1961, or any record of his emply
webwit
ment by H.M.G." in Shang at that time.
4.
3. The records on Mesny's case are, however
almost complete. In 1955 he lodged a claim for
£2,537. 10s. -d. to cover the total loss of 30
Chinese tenement houses, numbers 3-55 (odd numbers
only) Urga Road in the Eastern District of the
International Settlebent known as Doang Loh Lee.
The destruction occurred during and as a result of
8 the Sino-Japanese hostilities, 7 July 1937 December 1941. f... took
the claim up with the
Japanese Government, and in 1961 H. Mesny
Mz
accepted the sum of £1,ɖ15. -s. -d. in final and
complete settlement. He expressed the wish that
the money be paid into the Hong Kong Bank in Hong Kong and, although we
have no record of where it
/wes
CONFIDENTIAL
was actually paid, there is no reason to doubt
that "leany's wishes were complied with.
4. I agree wit
I agree with your view that you should not
try to inform Self of the details of these, and
any other similar cases. It is less confusing
for him, and probably less compromising as well,
if he receives all is instructions from the
Bank in Hong Kong. We should be most interested
to know anything you may hear about the progress
of Kam Self's case, particularly if there are
any developments which throw light on how much
longer he will be forced to remain in Shgnahi.
за
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
!
RK
Reference. WiH (39)
Fly H
F
Mr. Brigh
+
4+2
Висал
My liter lette.
A
Krafti ugly from your.
Ozv. to issue
A baland
ร
%
¡
*
Ed (1626)
Kr. Denson
Reference.
Fes/4+ (w: 38
Flag A 3 Flag B
F23/3/184
Please see Washington telegram No. 3044
and our telegram No. 813 to Peking.
2. I attach a draft letter from you to Mr. Wilford.
+
4. tharland
(E. J. Sharland) 20 October, 1967
Ofr wism.
23
CONFIDENTIAL
RECEIVED IN
¡ARCHIVES No.31
25 SEP 1967
38
14
CYPHER CAT A
PRIORITY WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NO 3044
CONFIDENTIAL.
YOUR TEL NO 813 TO PEKING.
PERSONAL FOR BOLLAND FROM WILFORD.
TO FOREIGN OFFICE
23RD SEPTEMBER 1967.
TO FED. 299.
??
AS | RECOLLECT IN A COMUNICATION WHICH I SENT FROM HONG KONG I REPORTED
THAT SAUNDERS OF HONG KONG AND SHANGHAI BANK HAD MADE IT CLEAR TO ME
THAT HE WAS NO LONGER INTERESTED IN SENDING ANY NEW EXPATRIATE STAFF
INTO SHANGHAI. I AM THEREFORE SURPRISED TO SEE REFERENCE TO ROBERTSON'S
APPLICATION FOR ENTRY VISA UNLESS THERE HAVE BEEN DEVELOPMENTS SINCE MY
DEPARTURE OF WHICH I AM UNAWARE.
SIR P DEAN.
FILES
R.V.
F.E.D.
DESP.
RECD.
1851Z
23 SEPTEMBER 1967.
1852Z
23 SEPTEMBER 1967.
CONFIDENTIAL
Reference............
RFIVED IN
YES No.31
Flag J
Flag
+
Mr. Denson
FS4,SÉPH967
Fes/4
Please see Hong Kong telegram No. 1321 attached and the copy of the
message from the Manager of the Hong Kong Bank in Hong Kong, which
produced it.
2. I have spoken to Mr. Stewart of the Hong Kong Bank and Mr. Lane of
the Chartered Bank here in London and obtained the following views. The
Hong Kong Bank has bgreed to close its office in Shanghai and withdraw
its European staff but would be prepared if the Chinese would not accept
that, to keep the Office in Shanghai open under the control of a Chinese
manager.
3. The Chartered Bank on the other hand,even after being informed of the
gist of the relevant passage in the Secretary of State's message to
Ch'en Yi, have decided to keep their Shanghai Branch open with a British
manager. They would however like us to bear in mind the name of the
Manager's wife, Mrs. Johnson, whom they would like to be included in any
evacuation plans.
4. I attach a draft telegram to Hong Kong inbruing them of the action
taken here.
Te aminted, on
Sharlant
(E. J. SHarland) 31 August. 1967.
message has already gone
teser A
h
Hay Kry.
Jom Denm 15
Tel. Lime.
of Shalal Y
с
NE
JG LANE 4385
PLEASE NOTE OUS NEW TELEPHONE NUMBER: 01-623-4365
36
The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation.
FINCORPORATED IN HONG KONG WITH LIMITED LIABILITY)
2. Gravechurch Street,
London, E.,6.3
RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No.31
- 4 SEP 1967
Dear Mr. Sharland,
F25/4
30th August, 1967,
As arranged, I enclose copy
of a telegram I have received from Saunders in
Hong Kong.
Yours sincerely,
linh
(G.O.W. Stewart) (Manager for Europe)
E. J. Sharland, Esq.,
Far Eastern Department,
Foreign Office,
Downing Street,
S.W.1.
H
TELEGRAMS RECEIVED,
Euesday 29th August, 1967.
W
SPEEDKET
r
+
| No
HỤNGACNG 29th Code
Stewart from Saunders
Following is text of
memorandum handed to Political Adviser to Hongkong
| Government today (stop) Please inform Pullen gist
of parts one and three (stop) Paragraph three is
bit overstated but is based on your conversation
with a Peking Official in London some months ago
(begins) Private and Confidential.
I
Part Üne paragraph one the object of this memorandjan
is to request the support of H.M.G. in the evacuation
of our British Staff and their families from Shanghai
paragraph two the delays in the granting of visas und
the departure of the British Consulate from Shanghai
have added additional anxiety to what has always been
a difficult situation (stop) Our Manager D.M.H. Belf
i and his wife have been trying to leave since May last
: (stop) D.X.A. Self's relief D.G. Lachlan a bachelor
arrived in Shanghai in May the application for his visa
to enter into China having been submitted in Joptopber
1966 (stop) T.R.X. Crozień who has a wife and baby
is also overdue for relief paragraph three it is our
understanding that before the present situation arbse
the British Government had no objection in principle
to the closure of our Shanghai Office and this we pow
sesk to achieve (stop) This does not mean that
1 propose to cease financing China Trade - we shall
sontinue to do so from Hongkong and elsewhere
(contd)
SPEEDISTT
No 190
TELEGRAMS RECEIVED
Tuesday 29th August, 1967
HONGKONG conté.
paragraph four we also request the assistance of Hik.G.
in informing D.1.0. Self of our aim to close the office
and evacuata the British Staff (stop) We do not wish
to write er telephone this to D.X.H. Self since by doing
so we may prejudice his immediɛte departure (stop)
If on the other hand he would welcome such instructions
¦we would issue then forthwith sines they emanate from
a desire to protect the Staff in the absence of aný
British Government Establishment in Shanghai (stop)
Part 2 paragraph five in the event of the Chinese
| authorities refusing to allow the evacuation of ali
our British Staff xt unless we continued to operate the
joffice under a Chinese Nanager such a condition would
be accepted as a last resort (stop) Paragraph six
¡ in such circumstances the amount of business directed
İto our Shanghai Office would inevitably have to be
(reduced as we cannot envisage the employment of an
acceptable local man of sufficient ai calibre to rún
| the office on its present scale (stop) The diminution
|of business might offend the Chinese authoritis whe |we think
particularly want us to remain in operation
|
because they are aware that certain overseas firms
wish to buy Chinese export through non-Communist
Banka (stop) Part 3 paragraph seven for the first [time Chinese Bank
employees in London find themselves
(2)
(contd.)
I
SPEEDISET
·
|
I
No 190
TELEGRAMS RECEIVED
Tuesday 29th August, 1967
HONGKONG 29th -contd.
in roughly the same situation as our British Staff
(3)
in Shanghai Paragraph sight we are satisfied that
D.X.H. Self's detention is now a political matter since
he answered his so-called CRIMES by letter and was
fully interrogated sa 12th July (stop) He has heard
nothing since (stop) He has just been told his
wife's EXIT visa granted on 14th June and now expired cannot be extended
but must be re-processed despite
the a fact that she is ill Paragraph nine it is
assumed eventually there will have to be some formi
of con; ronize between the present British and Chinese
attitude and it is hoped that when this occurs the
position of our XXPATRIATE Staff in Shanghai will
be borne in mind and their evacuation arranged or
least that of their wives and children Paragraph
ten although it was proposed to send in a relief for T.ñ.L. Crosiet and
application was made for this
in the name of 5. Robertson in December 1966 I
do not now consider that such a move should be made
ven if a visa were granted (step) I feel that
· all efforts should be concentrated ʊn evacuating
·
British Staff from China and if these are unsuccessful
| there should be no replacements
Paragraph eleven
I can only envisage sending in replacements if
|Chinese Nationals of Shanghai origin should volunteer
to go from here (:top) Signed J.A.H.Saunders
CYPHER/CAT A
CONFIDENTIAL
PRIORITY COMMONTEALTH OFFICE TO HONG KONG
TEL. 0. 1817
TOP
(D.T.D.)
:D IN
35
1 SEPTEMBER, 1967
(F.E.DEPT.)
VES No.3
SEN 1967
CONFIDENTIAL.
YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 1321: BANKS IN SHANGHAI,
F(Fes/44
WE HAVE BEEN IN TOUCH WITH BOTH THE HONG KONG AND SHANGHAI AND THE
CHARTERED BANKS HERE. THE FORMER HAVE CONFIRMED THEIR DESIRE TO WITHDRAW
FROM SHANGHAI, BUT THE LATTER SAY IT IS THEIR INT-
ENTION TO STAY ON.
2. BOTH BANKS HAVE BEEN INFORMED IN CONFIDENCE OF THE GIST OF THE
PASSAGE IN PARAGRAPH 6 OF THE MESSAGE FROM THE FOREIGN SECRETARY TO THE
CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTER, WHICH DEALTH WITH BRITISH SUBJECTS IN CHINA
(MY TELEGRAM NUMBER 1801).
3. WE HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THAT THERE IS NO GUARANTEE THAT THE CHINESE
WILL ACCEPT SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT. THE MATTER CAN BE CONSIDERED FURTHER
WHEN THE CHINESE REACTION TO THE MESSAGE
IS KNOWN.
4. WE HAVE NO, REPEAT NO, CONFIDENTIAL MEANS OF COMMUNICATING
WITH SELF.
CROSEC
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
F.O. F.E.D.
O.L.A.
O.P.A.
EMERGENCY UNIT
0.0. H.K. & W.I.D. 'C'
I & G DEPT.
CONSULAR DEPT. F.E.P.D.
SENT 0450Z/2 SEPTEMBER
CONFIDENTIAL
4
L
TELEGRAM SECTION Room #4 K.C.S.
Communications Department
Fes
* Please send copies-
ط بنا ۲۰۰
the following telegram__
YTC/1
• Copy/ies of the following telegram has/have been sent
[*delete as applicable
o
Hong Kong 1317 of 1.9.67
TO:
o.b.m. dist.
(Initials)
+
(Signed)
(Department)
(Date)
r
+
Action taken in Communications Department :
દુ
(Date)
3/9/67
AFTER ACTION THIS FORM SHOULD BE SENT TO