PRACTICAL SUPPORT OR ENCOURAGEMENT FROM PEKING BEYOND NEWSPAPER
ARTICLES AND BROADCASTS. ALL-OUT PEKING SUPPORT, OR INDEED
INSPIRATION, OF DISORDERS FOLLOWING ON REJECTION OF THEIR PRESENT
OVERTURES WOULD CAUSE PROBLEMS OF A VERY DIFFERENT MAGNITUDE.
5. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND I AM CONCERNED ABOUT THE PROGRAMME
CONTAINED IN YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 39 FOR RE-CONSIDERATION BY THE
BOARD OF REVIEW OF SENTENCES. WE HAVE ALREADY PASSED THE SPRING
FESTIVAL DATE, BUT COULD THE BOARD NOT GET DOWN TO BUSINESS /FORT!WITH
2
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FORTHWITH WITHOUT VIOLATING YOUR CRITERIA OF RELEASES AT OUR OWN
RACE AND FOR OUR OWN DELIBERATE AND EXPLAINABLE REASONS? IF THEY
DID I WOULD HOPE THAT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE FOR YOU TO TAKE
DECISIONS WITHIN THE NEXT MONTH, WHICH WOULD EFFECT THE RELEASE
OF AS MANY AS POSSIBLE OF THE 24 YOU MENTION AS BEING UNDER
CONSIDERATION BECAUSE THEIR SENTENCES MAY HAVE INCLUDED AN
EXEMPLARY ASPECT, PLUS PERHAPS THE FEMALE PRISONERS, PLUS THE ONE OR TWO
WHO ARE DUE OUT ANYHOW. I HOPE THAT TAKING INTO ACCOUNT
PARAGRAPH 4 ABOVE YOU WILL FEEL ABLE TO ACHIEVE THIS. THE CHINESE
WILL BE LOOKING CLOSELY AT OUR ACTIONS AND THE ABSENCE OF ANY
RESPONSE BY US AT THE TIME OF THE SPRING FESTIVAL MIGHT WELL MAKE
IT HARDER FOR THE CALMER COUNSELS AT PRESENT IN EVIDENCE IN PEKING
TO PREVAIL. YOU MIGHT PERHAPS SEE ADVANTAGE IN ARRANGING YOUR
REVIEW PROCEDURE IN SUCH A WAY THAT PRISONERS WOULD BE RELEASED
IN A STEADY STREAM AS THEIR CASES WERE DEALT WITH BY THE BOARD.
THIS WOULD HELP US TO PLAY THE CHINESE ALONG, AND TO KEEP THE
TEMPERATURE DOWN, AND GIVE TIME FOR FULLER CONSIDERATION OF THE
FUTURE PROGRAMME OF RELEASES.
6. | RECOGNISE THAT YOU MAY FEEL THAT YOU WILL HAVE TO TAKE YOUR
EXECUTIVE COUNCIL WITH YOU ON THIS, BUT I WOULD HOPE THAT BY USING
MY ARGUMENTS YOU WOULD BE ABLE TO CONVINCE THEM THAT THE ACTION
I PROPOSE WOULD IN THE LONG-TERM AND WIDER CONTEXT BE OF GREATER
VALUE TO THE COLONY THAN KEEPING THESE PEOPLE LOCKED UP.
DOUGLAS-HOME
FILES
FED
HKD
PRIVATE SECRETARY
SIR L MONSON
SIR S TOMLINSON
MR WILFORD
PS TO MR ROYLE FS TO PUS
3
CONFIDEFTI, AL
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Registry No.
DEPARTMENT
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION. PRIORITY MARKINGS
Top Secret
Secret
Restricted Unafasified
fair.
En Clair. Obde
Cypher
Draft Telegram to:-
HONG KONG
No..
(Date)
And to:-
82.
* Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should
reach addressee(s)
(Date)
Despatched
Emergency Immediate j
Routine
24/1/21
6137:
Security classification | CONFIDENTIAL 8 11002
-if any
[Codeword-if any).
Addressed to HONG KONG (Immediate)
.....(date).............
יו
.....
L...
telegram No..
28/1
And to.......
repeated for information to
PEKING (Personal for Denson)
-4
-...
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
Saving to.......
...
- L
TILL
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Repeat to:-
PEKING
Saving to:-
Distribution:-
Flex FED H.K.D.
SSL.Main
Sa Sīmlen
Copies to: -
P.S.
P.S, KM: Rayle PS. KP.U.S.
1.
Personal for Governor,
CONFRONTATION PRISONERS.
On my return from Singapore I have been able
to re-consider this question on the basis of the
valuable advice contained in your telegrams Nos. 13,
17 and 36 and Peking telegram No. 42. I should
like you to be in no doubt that I do not see Sino-
British relations in isolation from the interests
of Hong Kong and that it was primarily my estimate
of the long-term interest of Hong Kong which prompted
my telegram No. 24. I should also like to assure
you that there is no question whatever of our being
under some sort of an obligation to the Chinese to
do a deal about the confrontation prisoners. The
Chinese have persistently sought to connect this
issue with the release of British subjects detained
in China. Fe have, however, retained and still do
retain complete freedom of action.
2. Our assessment of the present attitude of the
Chinese Government is based on evidence from a
variety of sources and is reinforced by Mr. Denson's
telegram No. 42. There can be no certainty in
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/these
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these matters, but there is a real risk that if there is no sign
of movement in regard to the confrontation prisoners the Chinese
Government will sooner or later (and probably sooner) begin to
cause trouble and in this context trouble means in the first
place trouble for Hong Kong. At the same time, the indications are
that the Chinese Government want to liquidate this issue rather
than to make public capital out of it and are therefore unlikely to
crow unduly about it and perhaps even to discourage their adherents
in Hong Kong from doing so if we do decide that it is in our own
best interest to go some way to meet them. This is borne out by
the unobtrusive way in which they have made their representations in
Hong xong, coupled with the manner in which they have spoken to us
both here and in Peking.
3. I am
I am, of course, giving the most serious consideration to the
views which you have urged upon me about the danger to the security of
the Colony and the strength of feeling of "all strata of public
opinion" if you were to pursue the course set out in my telegram
No. 24.
1.
At the same time I cannot but be concerned about the threat
which the Chinese could, and in my view might well, pose to the
Colony if we show that we are unwilling to move other than at a
very slow pace. You say in paragraph 2 of your telegram No. 17
that "our only real defence has always been to show clearly that the
Communiste cannot usurp our essential authority except by the use
of a degree of violence which will ruin Hong Kong's usefulness to
then" But must we not recognise that the Chinese Government could
+
put Hong Kong to a very considerable degree of inconvenience without
necessarily taking matters to extremes?
We must also remember
that in 1967/68 the Hon. Kong Government benefitted from the fact
that the trouble-makers enjoyed little practical support or
encouragement from Peking beyond newspaper articles and broadcasts.
All-out Peking support, or indeed inspiration, of disorders following on
rejection of their present overtures would cause
problems of
ery different magnitude.
offvery
15.
IDAS $.$
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5. Against this background I am concerned about
the programme contained in your telegram No. 30
for re-consideration by the Board of Review of
sentences. We have already passed the Spring
Festival date, but could the Board not get down
to business forthwith without violating your
criteria of releases at our own pace and for our
own deliberate and explainable reasons? If they
did I would hope that it might be possible for
you to take decisions within the next month,
which would effect the release of as many as pos8- ible of the 24 you
mention as being under conside
ration because their sentences may have included
an exemplary aspect, plus perhaps the female
prisoners, plus the one or two who are due out
anyhow. If this could be acipleved I would hop
that we would thereafter be able to maintain the
resentus of Récelonated releases. I very much
hope that taking into account paragraph 4 above
you will feel able to achieve this. The Chinese
will be looking closely at our actions and the
absence of any response by us at the time of the
Spring Festival might well make it harder for the
calmer counsels at present in evidence in Peking
to prevail. You might perhaps see advantage
in arranging your Review Procedure in such a way
that prisoners would be released in a steady
stream as their cases were dealt with by the Board. This would help us
to play the Chinese along, and
to keep the temperature down, and give time for fuller consideration of
the futura programme if releases 6. I recognise that you may feel that
you will have to take your Executive Council with you on this, but I
would hope that by using my arguments you would be able to convince them
that the
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action I propose would in the long-term and wider
context be of greater value to the Colony than
keeping these people locked up.
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
Far Eastern Department
SECRET
FED
239 19
pw.
interpa
SM
261
Hong Kong Prisoners
The Secretary of State has minuted on Peking telegram No. 42 of 16
January as follows:
2.
"I would like a word about this in the Office. I am inclined to think
that the balance of interest lies in releasing some prisoners now.
A.D.H. 23/1"
I believe that a submission is on its way to the Secretary of State
about this. Provisionally we could have a meeting at 4.15 p.m. on
Wednesday, 27 January. I should be grateful if recipients of this minute
could attend in the Secretary of State's room at the House of Commons.
c.c.
P.S. to Mr. Royle P.U.S.,
Sir S. Tomlinson
Sir L. Monson
Grall
(J. A. N. Graham)
25 January, 1971
pla
Mr. Wilford
Mr. Leahy
Hong Kong Department
I submit two draft telegrams in the light of the Secretary of State's
meeting. They have been agreed with Sir L Konson, Sir S Tomlinson and Mr
Morgan.
Kim halford
K M Wilford
27 January 1971
Telegrams 1/28/1
sayed
Mr. Legen Private Secretary
Copies to:
PUS
SECRET
Sir S Tomlinson Sir L Monson Mr Leahy
Mr Morgan (FED)
Hong Kong Dept
FRIORITY
CYPHER CAT A
P HONG KONG 262913Z
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10P COPY
من
CONFIDENTIAL
FEH 14/1
TO PRIORITY F.C.0. TELNO. 54 OF 26 JANUARY 1971
ROUTINE INFO PEKING
PEKING TELEGRAM NO. 58 TO YOU.
19
CONFRONTATION PRISONERS: LUNAR NEW YEAR.
pl.
A SECOND LETTER FROM '* FAMILY REPRESENTATIVES OF PATRIOTIC
COMPATRIOTS IN JAIL? WAS DELIVERED AS UNOBTRUSIVELY AS THE FIRST (KY
TELEGRAM NO. 89% OF 1972) AT THE COLONIAL SECRETARIAT ON
25 JANUARY. IT ASKS FOR THE 'RELEASE OF CUR KIN STILL IN PRISON SO THAT
THEY MAY RE-UNITE WITH THEIR FAMILIES TO CELEBRATE THE FESTIVAL.''
2. THE PRESS HERE HAVE GOT WIND CF ENQUIRIES MADE BY PROBATION OFFICERS
ABOUT THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF CONFRONTATION PRISONERS BEING
CONSIDERED FOR RELEASE. TODAY'S UNDERLINE NEXT THREE WORDS
HONG KONG STANDARD REPORTS THAT TWO DOZEN CASES WILL BE SURVITTED
TO THE PRISONS BOARD OF REVIEW NEXT MONTH. THE LOCAL COMMUNISTS WILL
PROBABLY DEDUCE CORRECTLY FROM THIS, AND MAY REPORT TO PEKING,
THAT SOMETHING IS MOVING BUT THAT RELEASES CANNOT BE EXPECTED
BEFORE LUNAR NEW YEAR WHICH IS CELEBRATED ON 27 JANUARY.
TRENCH
FILES
FED
HKD
GIPD
IRD
PUSD
NEWS DEPT
FRIVATE SECRETARY
PUS
PS TO MR ROYLE
SIR S TOMLINSON.
STR L MONSON MR WILFORD
FFFFF
REPEATED AS REQUESTED_7
CONFIDENTIAL
L
IMEDIATE
SECRET
17
CYPHER CAT A
TOP COPY
FM PEKING 2263267.
SECRET
TO IMMEDIATE F C O TELNO 58 OF 22 JANUARY INFO PRIORITY HONG
KONG (PERSONAL FOR GOVERNOR).
HONG KONG TELNO 36 TO F C 0.
کا
AT A RECEPTION LAST NIGHT I WAS TACKLED BY T'ANG HAI-
KUANG ABOUT HONG KONG PRISONERS. HE SAID THAT THE CHINESE
GOVERNMENT HOPED THAT WE WOULD FIND IT POSSIBLE FOR SOME OF THEM
TO BE REUNITED WITH THEIR FAMILIES FOR CHINESE NEW YEAR, 1 MADE
A NONCOMMITAL RESPONSE AND SOUGHT TO TERMINATE THE CONVERSATION.
BUT T'ANG PURSUED THE QUESTION WITH CONSIDERABLE TENACITY AND
IT WAS CLEAR THAT WHAT HE WISHED TO CONVEY WAS THAT WE SHOULD
MATCH THE CHINESE GESTURE OF RELEASING JOHNSTON BEFORE CHRISTMAS
WITH SOME GESTURE IN HONG KONG, AS I HAVE SAID BEFORE, THERE
MAY WELL BE DIFFERENCES WITHIN THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT ABOUT THE
CONDUCT OF RELATIONS WITH US IN PARTICULAR OVER HONG KONG AND THAT
THOSE WHO FAVOUR A POLICY OF DETENTE MAY BE UNDER PRESSURE FROM
THOSE WHO WANT GREATER TOUGHNESS. T'ANG'S INITIATIVE SEEMS
TO SUPPORT THIS VIEW, AND ARGUES IN FAVOUR OF A POLICY OF
GRADUATED RELAXATION.
DENSON
7ILES:
\TED AS REQUESTED).
FED
HKD
GIPD
IRD.
FUSD
NEWS DETT
PS
IR G. ORAL FORD PS/R. ROYLE
SIR S. TOMLINSON
MIR L. NONSON
MR. WILFORD
SECRET
26/
Kr Wilford
Sir S Tomlingón
Sir L Mopson
Mr Løg an
Priv
Private Secretary
COVERING SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFRONTATION PRISONERS IN HONG KONG
enterpa
SM
28.1
+19(16
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C & DCS
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سلام
1. The Governor's reactions to the Secretary of State's
telegram No 24 have now been received (Hong Kong Teb Nos 13,
17 and 36). We also have the views of Peking
(Peking Tel No 42).
2. This Department's considered assessment remains, now
firmly supported by Mr Denson, as in the Secretary of State's
telegram (my submission of 31 December) that it is in the long-
term interests of Hong Kong for a gesture now to be made to
the Chinese. From Hong Kong Tel No 30 it appears that the
moves the Governor contemplates taking would not constitute an
adequate gesture. Indeed from his figures it seems that there
would be only 2 "exemplary" cases who would qualify for more
than a few months' remission. The Chinese have made it clear
that an "adequate" gesture would be the release of 41 of the
remaining 73.
3. The Governor clearly needs some reassurance that the
action we have suggested is based on our assessment of the
long-term interests of Hong Kong and that we do not see
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A
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Sino-British relations in isolation from those interests.
4.
The Governor has asked for consultation and I recommend
that we discover what he has in mind. I have misgivings
about this proposal as it could result in further speculation
about "rifts" between HMG and the Hong Kong Government.
5. I recommend that we accept the Governor's general
conclusion (paragraph 5 of his Tel No 36) that we should
"aim for releases at our own pace and for our own deliberate
and explainable reasons". I would hope nevertheless that
the Secretary of State would agree to express the hope that
the careful scrutiny the Governor is personally giving would
result in the numbers eligible for release being nearer to
those the Secretary of State mentioned in his original
telegram.
6. A draft telegram in this sense is submitted.
await the Secretary of State's return.
It can
شا
SALMugen
J AL Morgan
Far Eastern Department K 255
19 January 1971
Copy to: Hong Kong Dept (Mr Laird)
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- 2.
-
/The Governor's
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1. The Governor's telegrams Nos. 13 and 17, the latter in
particular, use some extremely strong language. I am, however,
very loath to accept his argumentation, particularly in view of
the reiterated position of Mr. Denson, which supports the views
expressed by the Secretary of State in FCO telegram No. 24. If
the Governor gets his way the result is almost certain to be that
virtually none of the prisoners in jail will be released more
than a month or two ahead of their normal release date if they
earn full remission. We shall get no credit for this from the
Chinese and there remains the serious risk that the Chinese will
stir up trouble of some kind in Hong Kong. Once that occurs it
will be much more difficult to arrange accelerated releases.
2. I agree therefore with Mr. Morgan that we should go back to
the Governor, but I have prepared a rather longer draft telegram
than the one originally submitted by him. He has seen this and
the text is agreed between us.
him. hiffão
K.M. Wilford
To Cousinson
"25/1
22 January 1971
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A.
I.
The Private Secretary has said the Secretary of State
wishes to discuss this subject at 4.15 p.m. on Wednesday, 27th.
2. I supported the general proposition behind the Secretary of
State's telegram No.24 that a substantial gesture to the Chinese
in these matters was in the long-term interests of Hong Kong and
I had hoped that by private consultation with the Governor we
could bring him to see that.
3. As things have developed since however I have grave doubts
whether such a gesture still remains in the long-term interests of
the Colony. I refer to the ill-timed Press speculation on the
subject and the self-generated mood of apprehension and opposition
that have been created in Hong Kong by this speculation. In the
circumstances wholesale releases could easily turn apprehension
into panic and in that event it is almost inconceivable that the
C.P.G. would not stir up the troubled pot to secure what must be
their most desirable policy aim to reduce Hong Kong to the
same state of puppet-like impotenõe ав Масао. It is one thing
for the Hong Kong security forces to contain communist disturbances
(as they did in 1967) when the population has rallied behind them:
it would be quite a different matter if the population were in
a state of panic and anxiously hedging their bets.
4. If however this view is not accepted, I do not think that
the revised draft is calculated to bring the Governor round to the
contrary view: there is much in it which he will with greater
or less reason resent
-
especially the statement that the question
of confrontation prisoners must be dealt with with the framework
of Britain's relations with China. It must be remembered that
he has been "conditioned"
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5.
(1) by ten years' experience as a Colonial Governor in
which he has been accustomed to exercise the delegated power of pardon
"in his own deliberate judgment" against the background of the general
policy, stated in Parliament in 1947 and followed since that "inter-
vention by Her Majesty on the advice of the Secretary of State... would
seriously impair the administration of justice in the Colonies" (Mr.
Creach Jones in the Commons 11 August 1947); and
(11)
by his own views as to the responsibilities of a Governor of Hong Kong
in briefing us on the qualities
-
of a Governor against the background of choosing a successor to himself
he set high on the list of priorities that a Governor should be seen to
be
defending the interests of Hong Kong against all-corners including and
perhaps specially the United Kingdom,
I would prefer to see something on the lines of the original
draft sent with a view to influencing the Governor's judgment towards
more and more speedy releases. It could be strengthened by the
arguments in the revised draft to the effect that we cannot rely on
the Chinese taking a rebuff lying down and therefore a situation very
different from 1967 is on the cards. But on the other hand the draft
does not take account of the weakness in our position caused by the
reaction to the Press speculation.
6. In short my assessment is that whatever we do we run a risk of
serious trouble but our chances of containing it are that much
better if the bulk of the people of Hong Kong reckon we are standing
firm and have not persuaded themselves that we shall give way to
pressure.
I do not believe that there is any significant "middle
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ground" of opinion that can be rallied to us. The bulk of the
people will back whom they think is the winner and are likely
in that case to determine the issue of the conflict.
25 January 1971
Copies to:
wind 7 mem