should be grateful for any elucidation you or John Boyd, to whom I am
copying this letter, can provide.
2. We were particularly struck by the reference to the Chinese "probing
around the edges of the trade question for over a year", and the hint
that some carefully placed but "spectacular" trade deals with the US
might be in the offing. Prima facie this suggests something on a larger
scale than us engines in Berliet or Perlini trucks; we should
in periieter be grateful for John Boyd's views, and any information he
can provide.
3.
You asked in paragraph 3 of your letter if we could make available any
JIC assessment of recent developments in China. I attach a copy of the
latest agreed JIO contribution. We would have no obještion to this being
released to HATO in the usual way.
Copy to:
JD I Boyd Beq Washington
CONFIDENTIAL
JA L Morgan
Far Eastern Department
+
2+
(1918) 04 737490-750M 1 Ha
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
Registry No.
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
Top Secret. Secret.
DRAFT
To:-
CONFIDENTIAL
Confidential Restricted. Unclassified.
PRIVACY MARKING
In Confidence
A E Davidson Esq
UKDEL NATO
Gopy to
J DI Boyd Esq Washington
Type 1 +
From
JA L Morgan
Telephone No. & Ext.
Department
M
2814
CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY
1. Thank you for your letter of 20 April enclosing
a copy of a US Noé on "Peking's People's Diplomacy".
This has been pead with interest here, although we
were a little mystified by the last paragraph.
We should be grateful for any elucidation you or
John Boyd, to whom I am copying this letter, can
stomak
provide. 2 We were particularly interested by the
reference to the Chinese "probing around the edges of the trade question
for over a year", and hint that /some carefully placed but "spectacular"
trade deals with
he might be in the offing. Prima facie this suggests
something on a larger scale than US engines in
Berliet Bernite or Perlini trucks, wer
With evelove
Тураў раст
воль
не добера
Ad
boule
John Boyd's news
my from whomerun 3. You asked in paragraph 3 of your letter if we
could make available any JIC assessment of recent
developments in China. I attach a copy of the latest
agreed JIC contribution. We would have no objection
to this being released to NATO in the usual way.
5.M
274
CHINA: PUBLIC RSLATIONS DIPLOMACY
1.
The Chinese have recently adopted a number of calculated
public relations gambits to refurbish their inage in the
outside world, and to demonstrate a reasonable attitude towards
western countries. These developments included invitations to
the American and British table tennis teams and attendant
journalists to visit China and Chou En-lai's studiously friendly
public references to the "American people". The gestures are
a further indication of the growing tactical flexibility
shown by the Chinese in foreign relations, though fundamental
Chinese policies, including hostility towards the us
Government, have not changed.
2.
Chinese objectives appear to be to repair the damage to
Chinese prestige caused by the excesses of the Cultural
Revolution, to strengthen their drive to achieve wider
diplomatic recognition and to further their prospects for
gaining admission to the United Nations. The recent moves were
probably intended to influence current American deliberations
over policy towards China by appealing to middle-of-the-road
Us public opinion over the heads of the US Government,
President Nixon has responded positively to the Chinese gestures
by authorising various measures to ease trade and travel
contacts with China. Some increase in Sino-American trade,
and visits by delegations, may well follow.
well follow. The chances of a
resumption of the Sino-American Ambassadorial talks in Warsaw
may have been improved, but the Chinese have been careful to
distinguish in their publio statements between people-to-people
contacts and governmental exchanges. A further Chinese sin
CONFIDENTIAL
4
CONFIDENTIAL
vas presumably to play upon Soviet suspicions of a Bino- American
rapprochement so as to complicate Soviet-American exchanges over major
world issuO E, The Chinese may additionally have hoped that a relaxation
of Sino-American relations will
encourage Asian countries to improve their own relations with
According to some reports, the North Vietnamese reacted with disapproval
to the Chinese moves.
China.
CONFIDENTAL
ياجاتي
CHINA : PUBLIC RELATIONS DIPLOMACY
1. The Chinese have recently adopted a number of calculated
public relations gambits to refurbish their image in the
outside world, and to demonstrate a reasonable attitude towards
developmento
western countries. These words included invitations to the
American and British table tennis teams and attendant
journalists to visit China and Chou En-lai's studiously friendly
public references to the "American people". The gestures are
a further stndifing indication of the growing tactical flexibility
shown by the Chinese in foreign relations, though fundamental
Chinese policies, including hostility towards the US
Government, have not changed.
2.
Chinese objectives appear to be to repair the damage to
Chinese prestige caused by the excesses of the Cultural
Revolution, to strengthen their drive to achieve wider
diplomatic recognition and to further their prospects for
gaining admission to the United Nations. The recent moves were
probably Kap intended to influence current American
deliberations over policy towards China by appealing to
middle-of-the-road US public opinion over the heads of the
US Government. President Nixon has responded positively to
Sino-American
the Chinese gestures, Some increase in Sino-American trade,
and visits by delegations, may well follow. The chances of a
resumption of the assadorial talks in Warsaw may have been
on their peublée Statements improved, but the Chinese have been careful
to distinguish
Contucts
between people-to-people palks and governmental exchanges.
A further Chinese aim was presumably to play upon Soviot
suspicions of a Sino-American rapprochement so as to complicate
authorising
case
contacão
Trande cute traver
with
Chanel. CONFIDENTIAL
:
|
-
(3)
viet-American exchanges over major world issues. The Chinese
may additionally have hoped that a relaxation of Sino-American
nourey with
relations will encourage Asian countries to remourey
Some ட
China. According to reports from fast European sources, the North
Vietnamese reacted with disapproval to the Chinese moves,
redictable line for such sources to take,
though-thi
J
2.
CONFIDENTIAL
#
i
CONFIDENTIAL COVERING SECRET
Ax6
UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION TO NATO
1110 BRUSSELS
Ente
J A L Morgan Esq
Far Eastern Department Foreign and Commonwealth London SW 1
R
20 April 1971
REIVED IN
7
TYN O
1
In Hemery
For dift up
Fürcht
uffyc
SM
21.4
Dear John,
CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY
FEC 2/1
1. At the weekly meeting of the Political Committee today the US
representative circulated a paper of which I enclose a copy. He said
that he would welcome contributions from other delegations on this
subject.
2. I pointed out that the Far Eastern experts will be here during the
week after next and will no doubt pay particular attention to recent
developments in Chinese foreign policy. The Committee accepted that this
would be a good opportunity for discussion.
3. I should however add that the report which you and your fellow
experts will produce will not be available until some time after your
meeting, and that the circulation in the meantime of shorter analyses
will be helpful to those of our allies who are less well informed about
China. If, for example, the JIC produce an assessment I hope that we can
count on this being "released to NATO" in the usual way.
محمد
You wou
Alan
A E Davidson
Applegant time
неда Арт костой,
cc with enc, to Chancery
ENC
WASHINGTON
CONFIDENTIAL COVERING SECRET
2074
L
NATO SECRET
"FEKING'S PEOPLE'S DIPLOMACY"
U.S. Delegation April 19, 1971
i
Chou Ph-Lai made it clear to the U.S. table tennis delegation today that
in inviting them and several U.B. journalists, Peking had opened a "new
page" in-Sino-American relations. This move toward
This move toward "People's Diplomacy" alters Peking's longstanding
policy of refusing to accept American visitors and revives the more
flexible policy toward the U.S. inaugurated in late 1969 but broken off
at the time of the Cambodian incursion. There seems little question that
the shift was timed to influence opinion in the U.3. and other countries
to press for China policy changes favorable to Peking. The visits may be
followed by a moderate level of trade as U.S. restrictions are eased,
but Peking will probably be more cautious in trade than in travel.
Peking's most immediate consideration in adopting "People's Diplomacy"
toward the U.S. is presumably a belief that a show of reasonableness
will fuel ita current drive for international recognition and improve
prospects for allo- cation of the China seat in the United Nations to
the FRC this fall. But the more flexible approach will also enhance
Peking's ability to affect the merging four-power inter-relationship in
East Asia, The impact on Moscow of PRC gestures to the U.S. was
obviously quite strong last winter and the present steps must have been
designed in part for their effect in both Moscow and Tokyo. In addition,
Peking presumably hopes that Taipei's predictably anguished re- action
will contribute to the PRC's long-standing and strikingly unsuccessful
effort to undermine morale on Taivan and cause the Nationalist
government to collapse. It is less clear whether Peking, by responding
to swiftly to the removal of U.S. travel restrictions hopes to encourage
further U.S. moves.
--
++
Peking has not employed "People's Diplomacy" with the U.S. since the mid
and late 1950'a when it sought agreement in the Sino-American talks for
an ex- change of newsben, resumption of trade, and general cultural
exchange. The Chinese characterized their strategy during that period as
"creating favorable conditions for the settlement of fundamental issues
(1.e. the Taiwan question). After Washington rebuffed these approad es,
Peking changed its policy and announced in September 1960 that "there
was no need...to waste time on minor question" at the Warsaw talks.
Later U.S. exchange proposals were repeatedly rejected and virtually all
American citizens who applied for visas were turned AWAY. Only Edgar
Snow, a special case, and a few other Chinese Communist sympathizers
vere aduitted,
+
The "People's Diplomacy" approach is designed to enhange Peking's image
in the U.S. on the assumption that this will eventually bring changes in
the govern- ment's China policy. This objective will be reflected in
carefully considered invitations to selected groups. Although Peking may
feel obliged to show some hospitality to ideologically congenial groups,
ita invitations thus far indicate that the Chinese effort to project
"reasonableness" will lead to emphasis on visitors who represent the
middle range of American public opinion.
NATO SECRET
1
1
:
I
I
NATO SECRET
2.
Through people of this type, Paking will hope to win propaganda benefits
while avoiding the tough aubatantive issues which would inevitably arise
in governmental discussions or visits by high-level 1.5. personages.
To maintain the momentum at least through this year's U.N. vote on
Chinese representation, Peking may selectively invite more prominent
Americans, quite possibly including members of Congress. Permitting
Chinese groups such as a table tennie team to visit the U.S. would be
another way of main- taining momentum and Chou hinted such a visit may
well be in the ofring.
Trade with the U.S. could also fall under the rubric of "People's
Diplomacy. And it would have some of the same attraction for Peking as
visitor exchanges. Indeed, the Chinese have been probing around the
edges of the trade question for over a year. However, even though a few
carefully paced, but fairly spectacular, trade deals might be made with
American companies to whet business appetities and upset Tokyo, Moscow
and Taipei, any large volume of The Chinese may regard Sino-American
trade still seems a distant prospect. trade as involving considerably
more commitment than visitor exchanges and as an important counter in
any future negotiations over the question of Taiwan. They would be
reluctant to increase trade very much merely to add to the atmospherica
of "People's Diplomacy." Any response to specific partial re- laxations
of U.S. trade restrictions would also be inhibited by continuing
questions of equality and reciprocity.
+
NATO SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
TOP COPY
IMMEDIATE
CYPHER CAT A
F!! PEKING 190325Z
CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY 190900Z
RIG
FEC 2/1
TO INMEDIATE FCO 363 OF 19 APRIL INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
AND UKMIS NEW YORK INFO PRIORITY HONG KONG MOSCOW AND PARIS
KIPT
a
FEE 3/30 40/1
OTHER POINTS MADE BY CH'I ARE AS FOLLOWS:
COMMON MARKET
1. IN WHAT ONE WEST EUROPEAN COLLEAGUE DESCRIBED AS THE MOST
POSITIVE CHINESE INDICATION OF APPROVAL HE HAD HEARD, CH'I
SAID THAT THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT FAVOUR WEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
GETTING TOGETHER IN AN ENLA GED COMMON MARKET.
-
PAKISTAN
2. CH'I CRITICISED INDIA AND THE SOVIET UNION ON PREDICTABLE
LINES. HE COMMENTED THAT THE UNITED STATES AND UNITED KINGDOM
HAD SEEN WISER.
NUCLEAR POWERS MEETING
3. THE CHINESE CRITICISED SOVIET PROPOSAL AT CPSU CONGRESS
FOR MEETING OF THE FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS, MAINTAINING THAT ALL
STATES SHOULD TAKE PART IN SUCH A MEETING.
@
of 2014
CONFIDENTIAL
·
CONFIDENTIAL
4.
SUBSTANCE OF THESE TWO TELEGRAMS MAY BE PASSED IN
STRICT CONFIDENCE TO THE AMERICANS.
FCO PASS INMEDIATE TO WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK PRIORITY
TO MOSCOW AND PARIS
DENSON
[REPEATED AS REQUESTED)
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
FED
NAM D
KD
IRD
F-USD
GRD
NEVS D
BESD
EID
ECTU
SAD
STD
RESEARCH DEPT
(F E SECT)
AMER SECT) (SOV SECT) MOD · INTERNAL
FFFFF
CONFIDENTIAL
!
T
+
Mp wilford
辰
TEE 2/1
RECOGNITION OF TH? CHINESE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC
The fellowing is a list of the sight sountrie áve recognised the Chinese
People's Republie sines Osteber last your, the dates of reosgnition and
the of these oemntries in last year's General Assembly debate
the precedural så substantive Resolutions on chinese
sentation. Canada, Iquatorial Quinon and Italy mined Peking before the
vote which took plass
20 November 1970.
Country
Date of Recognition
Italy all
Procedural cubstantive Resolution Resolution
Canada
13.10.1970
(quaserini
Quinea
20.10.1970
Against
Italy
6.11.1970
POP
Ethiopia
Bh.11.1970
Against
Chile
5. 1.1971
Againes
Figeria
10. 2.1971
Against
Per
Kuwait
22. 3.1971
Against •
Aba tained
Cameroon
2. 4.1971
Abstained • Abstained
2.
Represente abunge of voting in 1970
The change from this if all ver Peking line in the next Assembly would
against the procedural resolutio substantive resolution.
straig
support a sti Layes more
nore for the
7 April 1972
Copy to:
Ke ParsaNS
J & L Borgnos
Pap Lastemu Deparins
Up Stratton (United Fations (Political) Department)
Mp
Mr Logan
Sip & Tem 11mm
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
cc. the Parsons
Registry No.
For Secret.
Meeree
Curtidential
Unelmasifed.
DRAFT CLUB MINUTE
Type 1 +
From
To:-
JA L Fórgan
Mr Wilford
Telephone No. & Ext
Dopajiment
RECOGNITION OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC
1.
The following is a list of the countries which
have recognised the Chinese/People's Republic
since October last year, the dates of recog-
nition and the votes of those countries in last
year's @eneral assembly/debate on the procedural
and substantive Resolutions on Chinese representa- tion S
Canada Equatorial Guinea and Italy all recognise
the
Teking
before the vote mtager, which took
place on 20 November 1970.
Country
Canada
Equatorial
Date of
Procedural
Substantive
Regog gnition Resolution Resolution
17.10.1970
For
For *
Guinea
/20.10.1970
Against
For *
Italy
6.11.1970
For
For *
Ethiopia
24.11.1970
Against
For
Chile
5. 1.1971
Nigeria
10. 2.1971
Against *
Against
For *
For
Kuwait
22. 3.1971
Against *
Abstain-
ed
2. 4.1971
Abatained *
Abstain-
ed"
fur Stratton UNCPU) Age Cameroon
Mr-logan Sirs Tarlinton.
* Represents a change voting in 1970.
12
From the the change if all were
Straight Pakking line in the
to suppert
meet Assembly and he thuse more
against the procedunch relation
for the substantivic
and two more
resolution.
ایک
74.
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
X
LV Appleyard Esq
Far Eastern Department
FCO
My Dear her,
RECOGNITION OF CHINA
RESTRICTED
OFFICE OF THE BRITISH CHARGE D'AFFAIRES
PEKING
4 March 1971
твоих? Бласл
Any comments on x? Entre
Cappy to NED, LAD
1
FEC2 EESD (har Bans) to see para $ 24.
1. Last week, in reply to a question from the Finnish Ambassador, Han
Hsu (the deputy-director of Protocol) said that he expected Lebanon and
Peru would be the next countries to recognise China. Negotiations with
Lebanon were nearly complete and were underway with Peru,
2. On 1 March Gavris, the Rumanian First Secretary, told me that Rumania
had been instrumental in getting talks started between Turkey and China.
According to an Ankara datelined P despatch of 23 February, which
reached here after I had scen Gavris, the Turkish Government is
interested in setting up a consulate in Hong Kong and is reconsidering
its policy towards China. The despatch also reported that the Rumanians
had been in touch with the Turks on the question of lending rights for
the Chinese. We would be grateful for any confirmation (or refutation)
which you or Ankara may have of these reports.
3. Gavris also claimed that the Rumanians were putting the Iranians and
the Chinese in touch, but he did not expect a speedy result from these
talks. (See alsó Drace-Francis' letter 2/23 to Makinson of 15 December
1970).
4. The Burmese and Bulgarian Embassies bere have told us that Chinese
Ambassadors will shortly be leaving for their respective capitals. The
Mongolians claim that they are still waiting for the Chinese to make the
first move in restoring Ambassadorial relations. The Czechs say that the
Chinese have still not sought agrément for an Ambassador to Prague.
You
Gordon S Barrass
- 1.
RESTRICTED
0
CONFIDENTIAL
Hr Vilfert
Sir § Tomlinson
CHINESH
GELEESH RELATIONS VITU HALATUIA AND IEDOWEDIA
1.