service. If a wife cannot be found work for which she is qualified in
the post to which her husband is being sent, she has usually to remain
in Peking. This sometines happens when the wife works in the Ministry
but has a different speciality to her husband. On the other hand, wives
often prefer to remain in Peking with the children and see then through
school. Once again, however, wives of hendis of missions are going
abroad with their husbands nore regularly, even when they have
school-age children. Even in Peking children pose problems. The Ministry
only gives the usual paid caternity leave of 56 days. There is a nursery
boarding school which takes in many MFA children five days and four
nights weck at the cost of 18 yuan a month (compared with a general rate
of 25 yuan a month). Sometimes neighbours look after the very sall
children of working mothers without payment, but at other times it is
necessary to hire a nanny, at a rate of about 25 yuan (£4.25) a month.
Compensations
18. Life at the MPA does, however, have its compensations. Officials
have, and evidently welcome, easy access to the Western press and if
they have the time they can also read Western literature. Contacts with
foreigners provide opportunities for discussion about any things which
cannot otherwide be discussed freely in present-day China. In addition,
officials' social lives are nade rather livelier than those of their
contemporaries as they are increasingly invited to (and are allowed to
attend) functions given by foreign missions, such as film shows,
concerts
7 - CONFIDENTI:L
+
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and dinner parties.
19.
During our long discussions with our Chinese companions, we were often
struck by their skill in putting their case and in defending the
positions which they had taken up. Some of thes had a very Mandarin
quality of mind, though with a Maoist, not Confucian, outlook. Their
experience in debating ideological and theoretical questions helped then
to get out of many tight corners. However, this sane experience
naturally led then to proceed from the general to the specific rather
than the other way round. When we discussed European affairs with then,
we were impressed by their detailed factual knowledge of many Europoan
questions and by a few good insights they had gained from their
long-tern theoretical analysis of the situation; but we were appalled by
their abysmal ignorance of the interrelation between the verious
European problems and the nature of life in Europe. For example, they
found it very difficult to understand that a European accepted that
elliances were necessary and that nutual influence was a natural part of
a system of interdepen-
dence.
20. ccording to our informants, the Chinese diplomatic service remains
nuch the same professional body that it was formerly, despite the
upheavals of the cultural Revolution; it has not been forced to take in
outsiders, other than a few political commissare from the army who do
not seem to interfere ruch in the formulation of policy. Ironically, it
seems that it is the success of Mao's line in foreign policy so far
which is helping to unify the Chinese diplomatic service after the
setbacks it suffered during Mao's Cultural Revolution.
- 8.
CONFIDENTL.L
29 June 1971
1/3
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The Right Honourable
Sir Alec Douglas-Home KT MP
etc etc etc
Office of the British Chargé d'Affaires PEKING
29 June 1971
CHINESE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Sir
1.
It is very rare to have the opportunity to catch a glimpse of
the inner workings of a Chinese government department. This can
never be done at first hand but an opportunity to do so at second
hand occurred during a recent diplomatic tour in China when
Mr G S Barrass and Mr KC Walker, First Secretarics of this Mission,
were in the company of officials of the Chinese Ministry of
Foreign Affairs for prolonged periods and were able to glean somo
information to which I venture to invite your attention. The
Chinese officials concerned were relatively junior, being at desk
officer level, and the picture which they drow may not be
comprehensive, but I am convinced that within its limits it is
correct.
2. I attach a memorandum prepared by Mr Barrass which sets down the
main points which emerged.
3. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs soms to have survived
reasonably well from the turbulence of the Cultural Revolution.
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CONFIENTIAL
The Foreign Minister, Chen Yi, who was severely criticised in 1967
and later, is now said to bo still Foreign Minister and not to be
functioning only because of ill health. One of the main instigators
of disorder in the Ministry, Yao Teng-shan, a former Chargé
d'Affaires in Indonesia, and incidentally the prime mover in the
attack on the British Chancery in 1967 has buen recently exposed to
public criticism and according to varying reports either executed cr
committed to imprisonment. Hu was at the same time the leader of
the faction which is believed to have attacked the Foreign Minister
and the Prime Minister, Chou En-lai. Other officials have
disappeared, apparently permanently, though some may yet re-emerge.
The rest have worked their passage and it is significant that
nearly all of the Ambassadors recently appointed are carcer diplomats
of long standing.
4. There has boon a considerable reduction in the number of
officials working at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This includes
some who have been purged, others who are attending cadre schools in
the country where they engage in physical labour and allegedly
learn from the peasants while others are filling posts in the
increasing number of Chinese diplomatic missions abroad. As a
result those who are at the Ministry are required to work very hard.
In the summer work starts at 8 am and officially ends at 6.00 p m
but according to Mr Barrass's informants many work until after
9.30 pm and cfton work also on Sundays.
Foreign Ministry officials
enjoy some privileges in that they have access to the foreign press and
foreign publications and they receive invitations to official
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functions and have the opportunity to meet foreigners.
Nevertheless they can hardly be called a privileged caste. The
salary of the Director of the Western European and American
Department is ¥200 a month (about £33 sterling) while an experienced
desk officer receives about £18 sterling. These figures are to
Nonetheless
In the junior ranks of the
some extent unrealistic in that accommodation in the shape of a
modest flat can be obtained for not more than 40p a month while
food and varicus services are correspondingly cheap.
living is austere and the gap between the Establishment and the
masses has been sharply narrowed.
Foreign Ministry at least dress is no longer a mark of position
and there seems indeed to be a studied attempt at unsnartness.
Most Foreign Ministry officials drink little and do not hold their
drink well. Their main cutlet is cigarette smoking, the dangers
of lung cancer apparently being unknown.
5. The officials Mr Berrass and Mr Walker talked to and others
whom we have not strike us as intelligent, dedicated and very
hard working. They undoubtedly represent an elite who by Chinese
standards are outgring and cosmopitan.
cosmopitan. But as the menorandun
of
indicates, there are remarkable and potentially alarning gaps
in their knowledge of the utside world. They retain a nandarin
attitude which is Maoist and not Confucian but is above all Sino-
contric. They enquire diligently about life and politics in other
countries but they and the Ministry as a whole have not apparently
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reached the stage where they understand the significance of
consultation in our sense. Possibly by the time that cur informants on
this diplomatic tour have reached positions of real responsibility we
may have been able to educate the Chinese in the facts of international
life; but it is gcing to be an up-hill task and we shall be confronted
by persons of formidable quality armed with the traditional moral
rectitude and self-righteousness of Chinese
officials down the ages.
6. We await with interest any indications of a Plowden or Duncan report
in the Chinese Foreign Service. Meanwhile the memorandum might give food
for thought to th: se who are concerned about our
cwn conditi^ns of service,
7.
I am copying this Despatch to H M Ambassadors at Washington,
the British High Commissioners Mesecw, Tokyo, Paris and Ulan Bator; at
Canberra and Wellington, the United Kingdon Permanent
Representative to the United Nations,
New York;
the Governor
of Hong Kong and the Cheirmar. of the Diplomatic Service Association.
CONFIDENTIAL
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I have the honcur to be Sir
Your bedient Servant
John Denson
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PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL
RE.L..
.N
¡R. GOTRY No.50 2-JUN1971
OFFICE OF THE BRITISH CHARGE D'. ITAIRES PEKING
15 June 1971
2/1
L V Appleyard Esq Far astern Dept 700
My Dear hen,
CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY
FEC 2
Ст
Pla
1. During the "junior" diplomatic tour, which took place from 28 Tay to
9 June, Cuendet (the Swiss Counsellor), LeClercq (the Trench junior
Counsellor), Ken Walker and I had a series of lengthy and interesting
discussions about forcim affairs with Ya Hui-min (head the 3 Chinese LFA
officials accompanying us
-
of section for France, Italy and Switzerland), Chang I-chun (Ccsk
officer for Britain) and T'ao Hsiang-chen (desk officer fcr lost
Germany).
1
2. s you will see below what the Chinese said generally confirms our
reporting, though they often stated their position moro explicitly.
Before going into details of what was said I would like to give you a
thumb nail sketch of our interlocutors and some idea of the atmosphere
in which our discussions took -Lice.
3. Wi, probably in his late 40s, is a graduate of a Jesuit University in
shanghai, The subtlety of his defence does credit to his teachers. He
served in Switzerland for several years and later in Algeria, where he
acems to have westernised his Chinese charm. During the Cultural
Revolution he spent 18 Eonths in physical work at the 7 Kay School for
cadres from the Foreign Ministry. Chang, who is in his late 30s, served
in London for 7 years and has been closely associatcă with Sino- British
affairs for a very long time. Though more dishevilled
The real looking than Yu, Chang shares much of his affability. surprise
for us was T'eo, who seems to be something of a 34 year olá ch'iao
Kuan-hua. He combincs a sophisticated intellectual aprcarance (plus a
keen interest in ancient Chinese poetry and painting) with a good
explanation of why the Cultural Revolution
And he still has not been down to the W28 ncccssary for China.
countryside!
4. Our Chinese companions were in an affable mood and willing to talk
(and drink) late into the night, either in groups or singly. Both sides
usually spoke in a rather detached and
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/ academic
37
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academic way frequently prefacing their remarks with "speaking
personally" or "as I see it."
5. The Chinese were clearly working to a brief. They were to get our
respective views on Britain's entry into the Common Harkot, Anglo-French
relations, the future of nglo-US and US- Conron Market relations, the
future of West Germany and the procent international monetary situation.
In return they were willing to talk in a relaxed way about the same
subjects, life at the Foreign Ministry (about riich I will bewriting
later), and China's views on the US, Japan, revolution, Indochina and
Cigarmament.
L
+
6. hat struck us after these discussions, which on foreign
drs alone went on for more than 30 hours, was that the Chinese had a
detailed knowledge of the facts concerning many Tarczcan/US/Sovict
questions, a few good insights from their long term theoretical analysis
of the situation and an abysmal ignorance of subtle interrelations
between thes: verious
stions. They kept talking in terms of Lurope being under US "hegemony"
and the need for rope to follow France's cxample and ursue an
"independent" policy. They found it very
די
di. cult to understand that European countries, including Tanec now,
accepted that alliances were necessary, and that autugi pressure was a
natural part of a system of interdepend- uncu. Kore specifically,
LeClercq described Yu's thinking on Comy as "stone age" and was
horrified by his totally Harist/
oist and unflattering analysis of French society.
7.
Common Market. The first item on the agenda was the chances of witain
entering the Common Market. Once Clercq had said that he thought
Britains entry was "settled" cur Chinese com-
nions were in an almost cuphoric mood. What they really wanted to know
was how Britain's entry into the Common Farket would afict Inglo-US
relations and uropean-US relations. Chang Broll coherently and precisely
about Britain's changing position and .nglo-US relations, but was
surprised by the cxtent that we and the Common Karket countrics accepted
the problems of inter- dependence.
t
8. Then Yu said that China favoured Lurope for the Europeans, Quenict
quickly interjected "That is what Mr Hitler said in 1941" which gave the
Chinese something to think about! Our Chinese companions constantly
tried to lead us into making anti US statements. Yu suggested to
leClercq that after the Heath- Pouridou talks that Britain and urope
would take a line more indendent of the US. Leclercq, who shares my view
that no one has done more than General de Gaulle to confuse Chinoso
thinking on Europe, felt obliged to remind Yu that President Pompidou
had spoken recently about the need for good relations with both US and
East Europe. France was after all a morber of the stern Alliance and
even the General had not asked for US troops to withdraw from Europe. By
the end of our discussion we got the feeling that the Chinoso believed
that for some time to
/ come
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come the best place fr Soviet and American troops was Durope
Parably the outer fringcs. This would give both the Kastern and Western
European countries a chance to assert more "independence" without
frocing the US and the Soviet Union of their mutual preoccupation with
Europe.
in
I noticed that
the Chou/Ccausescu communique signed on 9 Junc there ms to have been
some decline in Chinese hositility to uropean Security Treaty.
9. Both Yu and T'no spoke at length (and sometimus passionately) About
Just German revanchism. They argued that Germany novor rospected
treaties, that it was already beginning to throw its economic weight
about, that there would be a decline in West Germany's rate of economic
growth which would lead to a russurgence of Nazism and that one day West
Germany would irlement the stated aims of its recent leaders to rounité
Gurmany. After this rousing rendering of Götterdämmerung wo 7ure presscd
for our views on Germany. We replied, almost in unison, thrt European
countries saw the situation vory differently and did not share Chinese
fears. The situation and balance of power in Jurope was now very
different. There was no reason to expect a repetition of history. The
Chinese expressed great interest in this "European" view of Germany.
Inter, however, when I spoke with Ya alone he told me that although
Leclercq and I had carlier spoken with similar voices about Germany his
own impression from talking to the French" was that they feared the
growing strength of Germany and in his view this had contributed to the
improvement of Anglo-
rench relations. The conversation was interrupted before a Tuply was
called for.
·
But
10. hen I discussed the prospects for improved relations with
est fermany with T'ao, he replicd, in the usual sinocentric
that it was up to "est Germany to make the first move. Paul there be any
difficulties, I asked, if fuc Germany was i ng to recognise the PRC as
the "sole lugal government of Tiin. He said that Ching did not accept
the st German 2nd on Berlin. (later ng Yun-yi; the desk officer for Last
Germany, told Cucndet that China supported the East Gurten stand on
Berlin.) T'ho scemed unaware of the fact that
Year.nin had rulations with both parts of Gorman I then
sked him if China would be willing to recognise cst Germany bufere a
settlement of the question of innor-German relations. T'ao hodged by
saying that it as a hypothetical question, but if at Germany "sincerely"
ented relations with China he trought that the problem would not be
insurmountable.
+
L
11. Indochina. In our tour d'horizon it was not surprising that wo
eventually got onto the problems of Indochina. Chang took a hard line.
He said that thort would be no settlement until the
When US thdrew completely and unconditionally from Indochina. I seinted
out that as a Co-Chairman of the Geneva Conference we flv ured the
withdrawal of all foreign forces from South
Wietnam
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I
UK EYES ONLY PERSONAL & CONFIDENT LAL
Vietnam and Laos he retorted that Britain could not hope to play a role
in the settlement of the Indochina question if we had such a "negative
attitude." I asked if he disagreed with ny roposition that there were
other foreign forces in Laos. Po, ho said, there wore North Vietnamese
troops in South Vietnam where they had the right to be. Our discussion
made no progress.
12. t one point in a later discussion when LeClercq said that some some
countries feared that the present situation in Indochina would lead to a
North Victnamusu hegemony, Yi replied that China "understood" this fear,
but would not be drawn on how China would deal with the problem.
13. Subsequently I asked Chrng if the Moo quote ("If anyone among us
should say that we should not help the Vietnamese poole in their
struggle.....that will be betrayal, betrayal of the revolution.") which
Chou In-lai had used in Hanoi on
arch was a recent one or one dating from 1965/66. Chang said that he
"thought" that Kao had made this statement towards the ond of last year,
but that it had not been in connection with a scricus debate within the
leadership or the MF... (A Sovict collunque told me recently that the
Chinese had given them almost the same reply shortly after Chou quoted
Fac's remark). This fits in with our interpretation that Chou quoted
this
Pk to allay North Vietnamese doubts about the firmness of Chincse
support.
1. Our discussions on Indochine led on to Sino-US relations. Despite the
fact that the Chinese were in a relaxed and detached mood they offered
not the slightest hope of a nodus vivendi with the US other than on
their torns. We spent hours with the Chinese individually discussing all
sorts of possibilitics for a Padal casing of tensions and the long-term
settlement of the Toi.an problem, but got nowhere.
15. Janan. The attitude of our Chinese companions towards Japan was
equally uncompromising. They said that they had no hope of an
improvement until after Sato had gone. Even then a now Japanose
government would have to recognise that the PRC as the sole legal
governorth of Ching. (including Taiwan). If Japan adopted the correct
attitude problems like the renuncia- tion of the peace treaty between
Japan and Taiwan could be "s.lvod".
16. Disarmament. In connection with the Chinese views about the
resurgence of Japan wo asked them what attitude they took to nuclear
disarmament. It became clear from what Chang said that China was finding
it difficult to oppose IT because so many countrics favcured it.
Lowever, Chang said that China was very opposed to any schone that would
restrict the spread of nuclear weapons and consolidate the "hegemony" of
the super
/povers
UK TYS ONIY PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL
UK EYES ONLY PERSON L & CONFIDENTIAL
powers. He said that China favoured the spread of nuclear *ns because
this would put an end to nuclear blackmail, (but he had no wish to
discuss cst Germany or Japan in this certuxt). Hc recognised that the
spread of nuclear weapons was not without its risks, but he claimed that
they wore a lops evil than domination by the super powers.
China was rundy, he said, to abolish all muclear weapone if all other
countrica cgrood.
17. Who Dollar "Crisis" te word closely questioned at all
vels on this subject, even by Pu Hao, the Dictor of the eneral Office of
the MPX who this loading the tour. 11though the Chinese had many of the
key figures at their finger-tips they were not all conversant with
complext economic and political relations which cxist within the Western
international
notery system. It took hours to gut across the point that von those
Luropean countrics who disagreed with the US about the position of the
dollar (and understood financial matters) did not wish to see the dollar
pushed into devaluation.
18. China's support for Revolution. I put it to Chang that we found it
very difficult to reconcile China's call for peaceful cocxistence with
its moral and material support for revolutionary movements. At first he
took the line about China's "bounden internationalist duty," but changed
his tack in face of our hostility to his views. Ho then tried to casuïc
us that China would not be as active cs wo foarod. We were not very
convinc cd by his sudden change of mcód and for good measure left him
with the thought that it would be impossible for Ching to enjoy good
relations with Jurope if it actively supported subversive move- ments
abroad.
1 g. You will have noticed that I have given this lotter a very limited
distribution. The reason is that Cucndet, Leclercq, Ken Talker and I
hope to have further such changes in Peking with Fur Chinese companions.
It would be difficult to do this if their namçe and remarks were made
known outside of the Office. Per t'is reason I have prepared a sanitised
version of this luster for you, John Boyd and Chris Howells to pass to
the Imuricans only. Copies of the sanitised letter are also being sont
to cur Chancerics in Koscow, Tokyo, Paris, Erlin, Bonn, aniqui, to
UKDELS in Brussels and Geneva, and t. UKHIS New York.
You
Ext
Soudn
Gordon 8 rrass
Conicd to:
CJ Rowclls, Hong Kong
JDI Boyd, Washington
G Tuff, PUSD, FCO
1
7 Trever CHO, OBE, Rescarch Dept, FCO
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2/1
CONFIDENT ILL
OFFICE OF THE BRITISH CHARGE D'AFFAIRES PIKING
15 June 1971
L Vṛpleyard Esq Par astern Dept TCO
My Dear her,
CHINO FOREIGN POLICY
1.
Please refer to paragraph 19 of my letter 2/1 to you (nct to all) of
today's date.
2.
During the "Junior" diplomatic tour, which took place from 28 ay to 9
June, Ken Walker and had a series of lengthy and intoresting discussions
about foreign affairs with some of the Chinese FFA •fficials
accompanying us.
3. s you will see below what the Chinese said generally confirms our
reporting, though they often stated their position more explicitly. Our
Chinese companions were in an affable mood and willing to talk (and
drink) late into the night, either in groups or singly. Both sides
usually spoke in a rather detached and academic way frequently prefacing
their remarke with "speaking personally" or "as I see it."
The Chinese were clearly working to a brief. They were to get our
respective views on Britain's entry into the Common Harket, Anglo-French
relations, the future of Inglo-US and JS- Common "arket relations, the
future of West Germany and the present international monetary situation.
In return they were willing to talk in a relaxed way about the same
subjects, life at the Toreign Winistry (about which I will be writing
later), and China's views on the US, Japan, Indochina, disarmament and
revolution.
5. That struck us after these discussions, which on foreign afsirs alone
went on for more than 30 hours, was that the Chinese had a detailed
knowledge of the facts concerning many European/ U3/Sovict questions, a
few good insights from their long term theoretical analysis of the
situation and an abysmal ignorance of subtle interrelations between
those various questions. They kopt talking in terms of Europe being
under US "hegemony" and the need for Europe to follow France's example
and pursue an "Incupendent" policy. They found it very difficult to
/understand
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understand that European countries, including France now accepted that
alliances were necessary and that mutual gressure was a natural part of
a system of interdependence. Koro specifically, a European colleague
described our companions' thinking on Germany as "stone age" and was
horrified by their totally Farxist/Maoist and unflattering analysis of
his country's society.
6. Common Market. The first item on the agenda was the
Once a Common chances of Britain entering the Common Market. Kari:et
colleague had said that he thought Britain's entry was "suttled" our
Chinese companions were in an almost euphoric Lood. That they really
wanted to know was how Britain's entry into the Common Market would
affect Anglo-US relations and
One of our Chinese companions spoke Eropean-US relations.
conciently and precisely about Britain's changing position and Anglo-US
relations, but was surprised by the extent that we and the Common Market
countries accopted the problems of intcråcpendence.
7. Then one of the Chinese said that China favoured Europe for the
Luropeans, a European colleague quickly interjected "That is what Ir
Hitler said in 1941" which gave the Chinese Our Chinese companions
constantly 3cm.tling to think about! trico to lead us into making
anti-US statements. They suggested that after the Heath-Pompidou talks
that Britain and Europe would
A Furopean colleague tek. c line more independent of the US. felt
obliged to remind the Chinese that resident Pompidou had spoken recently
about the nood for good relations with both US
nd Last Europe.
France was after all a member of the Western Alliance and even General
de culle had not asked for US troops
By the end of our discussion we got to ithdraw from Europe. the feeling
that the Chinese believed that for some time to come the best place for
Soviet and Imerican troops was Turope
This would give both the preferably the outer fringes. Eastern and
Western Turopean countries a chance to assert more "independence"
without freeing the US and the Soviet Union of
I noticed that in the their mutual preoccupation with Lurope.
Chou/Ceausescu communique signed on 9 June there seems to have bucn some
decline in Chinese hostility to a uropean Security grenty.
1
8. Our Chinese companions spoke at length (and sometimes
++ They argued that passionately) about West German "revanchism."
Curmeny never respected treaties, that it was already beginning to throw
its economic weight about, that there would be a dec.inc in "est
Germany's rate of economic growth which would lund to a ressurgence of
Nazism and that one day lost Germany would implement the stated aims of
its recent leaders to reunite Germany. After this rousing renduring of
cottcräämmerung we
We replied, almost in· voro pressed for our views on Germany. unison,
that European countries saw the situation very differently
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and did not share Chinese fears. The situation and balance
of over in Europe was now very different. There was no reason to expect
a repetition of history. The Chinese capressed great interest in this
"European" view of Germany. Intur, however, when I spoke with one of the
Chinese alone he told me that his own impression from talking to "the
French" as that they feared the growing strength of Germany and in his
view this had contributed to the improvement of Anglo- French relations,
The conversation was interrupted before a roply was called for.
9. Then we discussed the prospects for improved relations with Test
Germany the Chinese caid, in their usual Sinocentric way, that it was up
to West Germany to make the first move. But would there be any
difficulties, I asked, if West Germany was willing to recognise the FRC
as the "sole legal government of Ching." They said that China did not
accopt the West German stand on Berlin. (Later the desk officer for East
Cerny, told us that China supported the East German stand on Berlin). We
then asked if China would be willing to recognisc Fest Germany before a
settlement of the question of inner-German relations. The Chinese hedged
by saying that it was a hy othetical question, but if West Germany
"sincerely" wanted relations with China they thought that the problem
would not be insurmountable.
10. Indochina. In our tour d'horizon it was not surprising that we
eventually got onto the problems of Indochina. One of our Chinese
companions took a hard line. He said that there would bu no settlement
until the US withdrew completely and uncondi- tionally from Indochina.
When I pointed out that as a Co- Chairman of the Geneva Conference we
favoured the withdrawal of all foreign forces from South Vietnam and
Laos he retorted that Ditzin could not hope to play a role in the
settlement of th. Indochina question if we had such a "negative
attitude." I asked if he disagreed with my proposition that there were
other foreign forces in Laos. No, he said, there were forth Victamnese
troops in South Vietnam where they had the right to bc. Our discussion
made no progress.
11...t one point in a Inter discussion when a colleague said that some
countries feared that the present situation in Indochina would lead to a
North Vietnamese hegemony, his Chinese companion replied that China
"understood" this fear, but would not be drawn on how China would deal
with the problem.
12. Subsequently I asked one of our Chinese companions if the Kao quote
("If anyone among us should say that we should not help the Vietnamese
people in their struggle....that will be betrayal, betrayal of the
revolution.") which Chou In-lai had used in Hanoi on 6 Harch was a
recent one or ono dating from 1965/66. He said that he "thought" that
Wao had made this statement towards the end of last year, but that it
had not buon in connection with a scrious debate within the leadership
/ or
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or the PĂ.. (A Soviet colleague told me recently that the Chinese had
given them almost the same reply shortly after Chou quoted Mao's
remark). This fits in with our interpre- tation that Chou quoted this
remark to allay North Vietnamese doubts about the firmness of Chinese
support.
ניז
13. Cur discussions on Indochina led on to Sino-US relations. Despite
the fact that the Chinese were in a relaxed and detached mood they
offered not the slightest hope of a modus vivondi with the US other than
on their terms. "e spent hours with the Chinese individually discussing
all sorts of ¡ossibilities for a gradual casing of tensions and the long
term settlement of the Taiwan problem, but got nowhere.
14. Japan.
The attitude of our Chinese companions towards Japan was equally
uncompromising. They said that they had no hope of an improvement until
after Sato had gone. Even then a now Japanese government would have to
recognise that the PRC as the solo legal government of China (including
Taivan). If Jepen adopted the correct attitude problems like the
renuncia- tion of the peace treaty between Japan and Taiwan could be
"solved,"
15. Disarmament. In connection with the Chinese views about the
:-surgence of Japan we asked them what attitude they took to nuclear
disarmament. It became clear from what the Chinese said that China was
finding it difficult to oppose SALT because so my countrics favoured it.
However, they said that China was very opposed to any scheme that would
restrict the spread of nuclear weapons and consolidate the "hegemony" of
the super novers. One said that China favoured the spread of nuclear
carons because this would put an end to nuclear blackmail, (but he and
no wish to discuss Test Germany or Japan in this oɔntext). He recognised
that the spread of nuclear weapons was not without its risks, but he
claimed that they were a losser evil than douination by the super
powers. Ching was rendy, he said, to abolish all nuclear weapons if all
other countries agreed,
16. The Dollar "Crisis". We were closely questioned at all levels on
this subject. Although the Chinese had many of the Key figures at their
finger-tips they were not all conversant with complex economic and
political relations which exist within the Western international
monetary system. It took hours to get across the point that even those
European countrics who dis:grced with the US about the position of the
dollar (and undstood financial matters) did not wish to sue the dollar
pushed into devaluation.
17. China's support for Revolution. I put it to one of our Chinese
companions that we found it very difficult to reconcile China's call for
peaceful cocxistence with its moral and material surmort for
revolutionary movements. At first he took the line about China's
"bounden internationalist duty", but changed his
/tack
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
tack in face of our hostility to his views. He then tried to assure us
that China would not be as active as we feared. We were not very
convinced by his sudden change of mood and for good measure left him
with the thought that it would be imposs- ible for China to enjoy good
relations with Europe it it actively supported subversive movements
abroad.
18. Ken Walker and I hope to continue these conversation in Peking. We
would be grateful, therefore, if the contents of this lotter are treated
in confidence. We have no objection to copies of this letter being
passed to the Americans in London, Washington and Hong Kong, but would
not like references to be made to those conversations outside of
official channels.
You
fad
Gordon S Parrass
Copied to:
CJ Howells, Hong Kong
JD I Boyd, Washington
G Duff, FUSD, FCO
7 Brower CHO, OBE, Research Dept, FCO
Chancories: Moscow, Tokyo, Paris, Berlin, Bonn, 3aigon UKDELS: Brussels
and Geneva, UNIS New York.
CONFIDENTIAL
ar
LV Appleyard Esq Far Eastern Department
F CO
Wear Appleyard
CHI..A/LATÍ! AMERICA
1.
CONSIDIKTIAL
RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No.50
1
-
FEC 2/1
367
BRITISH EMBASSY
QUIZO
17 June 1971
We were interested in Barrass' letter 3/22 of 4 Lay to you to read that
the Chilean Chargé d'Affaires in Peking believed that Ecuador would soon
make a move to recognise China.
2. Although it is possible that Ecuador would vote for China's being
seated in the UN, we think that, on present evidence, it is very
doubtful whether the present Ecuadorean Government would establish
diplomatic relations with China. They et valuable technical assistance
in the agricultural field from the Taipei Government, which they would
be reluctant to give up without an effective quid pro quo. If there is a
"Two Chinas" solution to the U problem, I can conceive that cuador might
receive a resident Chinese trade mission.
1.
Your rincerely
any ewly
H Lewty
We put Ecandar in the po Pering
cc. Miss K Draycott, Information Research Department, FC
wavered
F Arewer Esq CAG OP, Research Department, FCC noeomment. G Duff Esq,
PUSD, FOO
JDI Boyd, Esq, Washington P Hewitt 8q OBE, Canberra
C J Howells Esq, Hong Kong
A C Ashworth Esq 038, Hong Kong Chanceries: Wellington
Tokyo Lima Santiago