An absorbing
*Pak
2√39
Mission have dan well with their research.
4.R
CHINESE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
1. Mr Denson's despatch provides a fascinating glimpse of
the inner workings of the Chinese Foreign Ministry. I have
not sent the despatch for printing but we are giving it
wide circulation in Whitehall.
to thank him for the despatch.
I have written to Mr Denson
R
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IN
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9 July 1971
1371
यो
1 f=d
SAL Magen
J AL Morgan
Far Eastern Department
it v d'efficult to mperstand how the.
works at all if there is
Copied with despatch to: merely ma
Research Department
PUSD Mr Ritchie
Chief Clerk
only, appearen they, on inter-panty makes other wins chou's hivals
office hands sown directives
pay
Ministe, bandi
merely a series of Vice Murka with
regionad
& functional represibillies. This might have bee
or
all
Ingur if the State Council body on foreign relations (which
beline's mate policy
always
myhow) still existed. But this desparel say,
it doesn't
at Hat it's equivalent
•
is
the International Pet Drept of the Central Comente (a party organ). This
Dept need to teal with Foreign comummist partion as relating between
them at the CCP of was santially
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/ покри
irerlogical bathin
there fore
all the place for
crot
thoughts about
But Kang Pias,
policy. from Brima
wha
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aft at
foreign
I thin retured
cool
my time, is
person, rather wasternised as perhaps
good Secretary General - but not a до
Minister Does this mea
Hat Chow En-lai
how to take all the decisions.?
I rather wonder if we're really got
How of the MYF.A. machinery.
Wiffer
1%
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Jean
No Morgan
would like to
have this put
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Ann
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14/7
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J⠀ Drinkall Esg
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Ith. Retchison
Mr. Stalism
Latern Luropean Department No.50
FOO
by dear John, kar
BALLISH GOVERNMENT CHANGES
1
BRITISH EMBASSY,
STOCKHOLM.
7 July 1971
cc Chy Peking
し
SM 13.7
The news of Torsten Nilsson's retirement last week reached hê on my way
to Scotland and as I only returned yesterday I have not and time to make
many enquiries as to why it happened so suddenly, lie had of course been
expected to be the next to go after Lange but apart from noting that "he
would not leave before the spring" I had made no forecast and frankly
had lost sight of the need to replace this old-timer some day. I think
zont of us here were equally surprised. However, with the benefit of
hindsight one can say that a fainéant Minister for Foreign Affairs,
reluctant to exert himself and prone to bouts of fatigue but unwilling
to retire haa become increasingly out
place and indeed intolerable in view of the situation facing sweden in
connection with the negotiations with the EEC, Sweden's diplomacy in
fact badly needed a new look, What must have precipitated the change is
the prospect of Schumann's visit to Stockholm in a fortnight's time. It
is obvious that Kilsson was incapable of holding discussions of the
greatest significence for Sweden's future relations with the EEC with
the Foreign Minister of France and it would presumably have been
unacceptable to Scaumann, if not galling for Nilsson, for the
discussions to be conducted with Feldt, who though clever, is young,
inexperienced Lac lucking in personality. It la probably also true that
as I suggested in my despatch 6/3 of 23 November 1970 Xilsson was, with
String, a force within the Government opposang Palme's More imaginativo
approach to the EEC and that his departure cleara The way for the
negotiations which Falme must hope will be less of - ficsco than the
"fact finding talks" in Brussels have been,
On a higher political plane Nilsson's departure has made it roosisie, as
perhaps nothing else would have done, for Falme to Rune Johansson back
into the Government. Ever since 1967 i muva regarded this can as a
possible future Frime Minister
remember Falme telling me after the 1970 election how lucky 3 to nave
Johansson as leader of the Social Democratic Party He is just the an
Falme needed not only to bridge the
18 confidence gap between government and industry (he is at the
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moment the government director on the board of the Enskilda Banken!) but
also improve the govemment's image within the Party and in the country
at large. From this point of view I should say that be more than
compensates for Nilsson's departure, and if Falme should have to stand
down later now and the 1973 election Johansson would seem the obvious
successor & Frime Minister,
3. I do not want to speculate too far. The fact remains. thet, whatever
the reason, Nilsson has gone, mourned, apparently, by few outside the
Social Democratic Press, and even they appear to mourn him more as a
good Party man than as a Foreign Minister, As one bourgeois paper put
it, Nilsson was scarcely one of the Felme Government's trump cards, and
the general consensus with which I agree, seems to be that what the
Government has lost in Nilsson's strength in the Party will be more than
made up for by the arrival of the more energetic Wickman at the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs and the return to the Government of Rune Johansson,
also a strong Party man and one, moreover, who enjoys considerable
respect on both sides of the Party line, an undoubted adventage in
dealing with industrial policy. In recent years, particularly Nilsson
has often seened a passenger at the Foreign Kinistry, allowing policy to
be shaped more by the short-term demands of the radical young faction in
the Party, or outside it, than by the Foreign Minister. While he was the
author in 1965 of the staterent that Swedish neutrality is not
ideological (whatever else it is), it is difficult to recall many
statements by Nilsson since then which throw much light on Sweden's
foreign policy: what springs to mind are the concessions to the Left,
the catablishment of missions in Cuba and Hanoi, the rash announcement
of massive aid to Vietnen (later corrected by events) at e Farty
Congress in 1969, the slump in Swedish-American relations. and, lastly,
the rejection of full membership of the EEC as a negotiating gembit.
While the Government no doubt appreciated his services in controlling
the radical Stockholm branch of the Party, of which he was chairman, the
tail often appeared to be wagging the dog, and the fact remains that
while the job should have been virtually incompatible with that of
Foreign Minister, Nilsson nevertheless chose not to relinquish it, It is
also worth noting that he was largely responsible as far as we
understand for adding further conditions (maintenance of social
policies) to Swedish EEC policy in the 1970 Kramfors Election Kanifesto
and consequently in the Swedish memo of 10 November 1970,
4. It must be said at once that ickman'a appointment gives an entirely
new and more up-to-date look to the Govemment and in particular to its
EEC policy, Wickman is much more firmly committed to the "close,
comprehensive and durable relations" of officiel policy and reiterated
this commitment in interviews on his appointment, He is free from the
close ties Nilsson had with Party opinion, and he has a clean slate as
far as earlier statements on foreign policy are concerned. He therefore
represents in many respects a fresh start, although he has of course
been careful to emphasise that his appointment represents
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no change in policy. He has a degree in economics. speaks several
languages and has international negotiating experiences - Swedish
representative in the Group of Ten and the OECD. Although a convinced
Social Democrat, he is a technocrat of the new school, who has risen
through the administration rather than the Party, and, as such, is of a
kind with Palme and Feldt. At time when foreign relations as such are
tending to become moze anu more prerogative of Frime Ministers while
foreign zinistries deal more anú more in matters of trade and aconcaic
policy, Wickman is en obvious choice. There seems no reason to put undue
emphasis on his "failure" at the Ministry of Industry as highlighted by
the row over the State Enterprises (zze Stockholm despatch of the 14th
of April). He was,
He was, after all, creating a new Ministry to implement a new policy,
which had, perhaps, been presented in unduly political terms. He was
also £ newcomer to politics as such and by temperament perhaps inclined
to be impatient, The teething troubles of the Ministry of Industry need
be no reflection on Wickman's ability, which is considerable.
5. The newspapers have noted the emergence of a new forceful troika in
the foreign affairs field in the shape of Palze, Wickman
nd Feldt. Johansson steps directly into another troika in the domcatic
field consisting of himself, Holmquist at the Kinistry of the Interior,
and String at the Ministry of Finance. As much no anything else, their
function will be to hold the Party behind the Government, and the
country behind the Party. More onanger should probably be expected
however. While it will stil11 be necessary to retain a solid block of
trusted figures for llection purposes, it seems likely that, fortified
by his ouccess in surviving the first session of the new Riksdag Palme
will want to re-tailor his Government in a manner more to his own
liking.
5. A curious incident during Wicken's first press conference is worthy
of comments. He was reminded that as Minister of Industry he had been
invited to visit China and was asked whether in his low capacity he
would be carrying out the visit. Ee answered "Yes, Isn't it fun? And I
shall be taking Rune Johansson along too", This unrehearsed and
unguarded remark created some ccnnternation in the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, and two officials have assured my Commercial Counsellor that
they sz. ROS o hii, to get him off this particuler hook on the grounds
that it is inconceivable for a new Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs
To make Peking his first port of call, Wickman'a remark was entirely
spontaneous and of course the Chinese have not been consulted; it was
likely that another invitation to coincide
ith the date of the proposed visit would be engineered and that Rune
Johansson would take his place in China.
7. I enclose copies of the biographical notes released by the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs in connection with the new appointments,
Yours ever,
Arawie Ross.
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AFFAIRS
July, 1971
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RUNE JOHAN.
Xinister of Industry
1
Hr. Johansson was born in Växjë, Småland (south central Swodon) in 1915.
Ey profession a baker (and an azacour football playor in his spare
tima), he soon entered politics, first on the local level. He was a
member of the Kunicipal Board of Ljungby (still his home torm) and of
the Kronoberg County Council. In 1951, he beccze a member of Parliament.
Ha was a member of the board of Sveriges Kreditbank (the Credit Bank of
Sweden) 1955-1957.
In 1957, Rune Johansson was appointed Minister of the In- terior.. He
was responsible for several modical care re- forma, also for industrial
location policy and housing -
He left the Cabinet in 1969 and became President of the Co-operative
Building Organization of the Swedish Trade Vaions. Ho became Chairman of
the Board of the Swedish Waste Conversion Co. in the same year,
When the National Swedish Enterprise Ltd (Statsföretag AB) was formed in
1970, To coordinate government owned in- dustrial enterprises, Mr.
Johansson became Vice Chairman of the Board. In the spring of 1971, he
was named ita Chairman.
Mr. Johanacon was Parliemontery Group Leador for the Social Democrat
Party in the now unicomoral Swedish parliamont during the first half of
1971, or until he was appointed Minister of Industry (July 1, 1971).
*
Eo is married to the former Gulli Kristiansson.
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LI KIVISARY OR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
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July, 1971
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VELN, Minister for Foreign Affairs
Kr. Violasan hus bout e'member of the Swedish Cabines since 1957. He was
born in Stockholm in April, 1924. His father, the lave Johannes
Wieltman, was one of Sweden's most prominent journalists, and for
several years foreign policy columnist in the Liboral defly, Dagens
Nyheter.
Krister Wickman studied law at the University of Stockholm and graduated
in 1943. He did postgraduate work in economica and obtained his advanced
economics degree in 1953. He then
advanoed.écozomics worked as the National Institute of Economic
Research.
In 1959, Mr. Vickman was eppointed Under Secretary in the Ministry of
Pinanco, where he soon gained the reputation of a skilful negotiator and
leader or budgetary work. He became e maxber of the then First Chamber
of the Swedish Parliament in 1906.
Appointed Minister without Portfolio in 1967, Mr. Wickama assumed
special responsibility for internal economic affairs, Among other
things, he introduced the proposal on the State Investment Bank.
When the Ministry of Industry was established in 1969, Mr. Wickman
naturally became its first head' and the spokesman at home and abroad
for the Swedish mixed economy that he pas been so instrumental in
shaping.
Kr. Wickman was appointed Foreign Minister July 1, 1971.
Kr. Fioleman's wide variety of interests may be illustrated by the fact
that he was Chairman of the Swedish Film In- stitute 1963-67.
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Copies to: Chanceries
Oslo Copenhagen Helsinki
UK Delegation Brussels UK Kission Geneva
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1/3
The Right Honourable
Sir Alec Douglas-Home KT MP ctc etc oto
Ec
FE
C
Office of the British Chargé
PEKING
29 June 1971
d'Affaires
- 6 JUL 1971
CHINESE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Sir
1. It is very rare to have the opportunity to catch a glimpse of
the inner workings of a Chinese government department.
This can
never be done at first hand but an opportunity to do so at second hand
occurred during a recent diplomatic tour in China when
The
Mr G S Barrass and Mr K C Walker, First Secretaries of this Mission,
were in the company of officials of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign
Affairs for prolonged periods and wore able to glean some information to
which I venture to invite your attention. Chinese officials concerned
were relatively junior, being at desk officer level, and the picture
which they drew may not be comprehensive, but I am convinced that within
its limits it is
correct.
2. I attach a memorandum prepared by Mr Barrass which sets down the
main points which emerged.
3. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs sucus to have survived
reasonably well from the turbulence of the Cultural Revolution.
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Fontidi
AND
ALIM
- 6 JUL 1971
IT AUG
CONFIENTIAL
The Foreign Minister, Chen Yi, who was severely criticised in 1967 and
later, is now said to be still Foreign Minister and not to be
functioning cnly because of ill health. One of the main instigators of
discrder in the Ministry, Yao Tong-shan, a former Chargé d'Affaires in
Indonesia, and incidentally the prime mover in the attack on the British
Chancery in 1967 has buen recently exposed to public criticism and
according to varying reports either executed or committed to
imprisonmont. He was at the same time the leader of the faction which is
believed to have attacked the Foreign Minister and the Prime Minister,
Chou En-lai. Other officials have
disappeared, apparently permanently, though some may yet re-emerge. The
rest have worked their passage and it is significant that nearly all of
the Ambassadors recently appointed are career diplomats of long
standing.
There has been a considerable reduction in the number of officials
working at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This includes some who have
been purged, others who are attending cadre schools in the country where
they engage in physical labour and allegedly learn from the peasants
while others are filling posts in the increasing number of Chinc se
diplomatic missions abroad. As a result those who are at the Ministry
are required to work very hard. In the summer work starts at 8 am and
officially ends at 6.00 pm but according to Mr Barrass's informants many
work until after 9.30 pm and often work also in Sundays.
Foreign Ministry officials
enjoy some privileges in that they have access to the foreign press and
foreign publications and they receive invitations to official
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functions and have the opportunity to nect foreigners.
Nevertheless they can hardly be called a privileged caste. The
salary of the Director of the Western European and American
Department is ¥200 a month (bout £33 sterling) while an experienced
desk officer receives about £18 sterling. Those figures are to
scne extent unrealistic in that accommodation in the shape of a
nodest flat can be obtained for not more than 40p a month while
food and various services are correspondingly cheap. Nonetholoss
living in austere and the gap between the Establishment and the
masses has been sharply narrowed. In the junior ranks of the
Foreign Ministry at least dress is no longer a mark of position
and there secas indeed to be a studied attempt at unsmartness.
Most Foreign Ministry officials drink little and do not hold their
drink well. Their pain outlet is cigarette sncking, the dangers
of lung cancer apparently being unknown.
5. The officials Mr Barrass and Mr Walker talked to and others
whom we have not strike us as intelligent, dedicated and very
hard working. They uni..ubtedly represent an elite who by Chinese
standards are outgring and cosmopolitan. But as the memorandun
indicates, there are remarkable and potentially alarning gaps
in their knowledge of the outside world. They retain a nandarin
attitude which is Maoist and not Confucian but is above all Sino-
centric. They enquire diligently about life and politics in other
countries but they and the Ministry as a whole have not apparently
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reached the stage where they understand the significance of
consultation in our sense. Possibly by the time that cur informants on
this diplomatic tour have reached positions of real responsibility we
may have been able to educate the Chinese in the facts of international
life; but it is going to be an up-hill tesk and we shall be confronted
by persons of formidable quality arned with the traditional moral
rectitude and self-rightecusness of Chinese
officials down the ages.
6. Wo await with interest any indications of a Plowden or Duncan report
in the Chinese Foreign Service. Moanwhile the memorandum night give ford
for thought to those who are concerned about cur
cwn conditions of service.
7. I an copying this Despatch to H M Ambassadors at Washington,
the British High Commissioners Moscow, Tokyo, Paris and Ulan Bator; at
Canberra and Wellington, the United Kingdon Permanent
Representative to the United Nations,
New York;
the Governcr
of Hong Kong and the Chairman of the Diplomatic Service Association.
I have the honcur to be Sir
Your obedient Servant
John Denson
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1.
LIFE AT THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
The two Chinese officials from the Western European Section of the MFA,
who accompanied Mr Walker and me on the "junior" diplomatic tour from 28
May 9 June, threw interesting light in the course of conversation on
daily life at the Ministry.
Organisation
2.
They told us that China's foreign affairs machine had been
The simplified considerably during the Cultural Revolution.
number of diplomatic officers working in the Ministry was now only half
what it was before the Cultural Revolution. The Foreign Affairs Office
of the State Council, which used to be the co- ordinating body on
foreign policy, had been abolished; several departments within the
Ministry had been merged (eg Consular Depart- ment and Legal Department)
or reduced to the status of sub-sections. The Ministry was moved last
year from what was originally the French Embassy,, a compound with a
number of old, rather rambling buildings to a more functional,
undistinguished multi-storey building in the north-east of the city.
3. One of our companions said that it had been very easy to work with a
reduced staff when China had no foreign policy (ie during the Cultural
Revolution), but now the situation was becoming intolerable. Normal
working hours at the Ministry in summer were from 8 am till 6 pm, six
days a week, but about half the staff were still working at the desks as
late as 9.30 pm. Our companion said that he thought that the Ministry
would soon have to call in more staff and re-establish and expand some
of the old sections which had been abolished or cut back.
Co-ordinating Policy
4.
We were told that important policy decisions are taken only after
consultations between the Ministry and Premier Chou En-lai's Private
Office, unless they relate to inter-Party matters, which are the
responsibility of the International
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Liaison Department of the Central Committee under the former Ambassador
to Albania, Keng Piao. There is no group within the Central Committee
which acts as a foreign affairs "watch-dog", or any other group outside
the Ministry which has the specific task of co-ordinating foreign
policy. Chou En-lai and the Ministry are firmly in command.
5.
Party control in the Ministry, which at the higher levels is staffed
nainly by Party members, is exercised indirectly through an interin
committee nade up largely of senior party members. A new committee has
not been elected since the Cultural Revolution. It does, however,
include two military nen Li Yao-wen and Ma Wen-po who are described as
"leading members" of the Ministry; they are said to be experienced
political conmissars who were transferred to the Ministry in the latter
part of the Cultural Revolution. They are responsible for improving
political work within the Ministry. Although they still wear military
uniform, they appear no longer to have any direct connection with the
army.
6. Party members in the Ministry meet fairly frequently to discuss party
matters, but there are no formal Mao-Thought study classes, They are
expected to study Mao's works in their own time. The aim seens to be not
to hinder then fron getting on with their other work. The Ministry's
militia unit is very substandard because it does not spend enough time
in training. As one of our companions put it, "our militie group is
never likely to be named as a model unit."
The Effect of the Cultural Revolution
7. Our companions claimed to be happy about the impact the Cultural
Revolution had had on the Ministry, despite their initial apprehensions.
One of them adnitted that the Cultural Revolution had come as a complete
shock to him at first. He found it difficult to believe that President
Liu Shao-ch'i had
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really been intriguing for so long against Chairman Mao, but as the
issues were debated during the Cultural Revolution, he had becone
convinced that Liu's policies were leading China along the road to ruin
end that Mao's line was the correct one for China. His own dislike of
the over-emphasis on seniority and position in the Ministry had nade it
easier for him to see what the Cultural Revolution was about.
8. Our companions clained that the Cultural Revolution had cleared away
ruch of the bureaucratic stuffiness in the Ministry and they had now
been given ruch more responsibility. They were called in to brief
Vice-Ministers and even Premier Chou En-lai personally in a way which
would have been inconceivable before the Cultural Revolution. These
days, they said, there was much less minuting and "paper pushing". Oral
briefings rather than written submissions were now standard. Officials
derived much of their information of world affairs from the Western news
agencies and our informants claimed to see all the relevant clippings
each day,
9. This led me to ask if the "struggle" within the Ministry during the
Cultural Revolution had made open discussion on foreign policy
difficult. I was told that there was now plenty of Good discussion
indeed, at times too much. The Cultural Revolution had demonstrated that
Chairman Mao's general line on foreign policy was right what they were
doing now was discussing the best way of implementing it. During the
Cultural Revolution, a tremendous amount of mud had been thrown about in
the Ministry, but those had a 'borrect outlook" had been able to look
after themselves. Epithets of "revisionist" and "bad element" had been
used so indiscriminately during the Cultural Revolution that they were
now something of a joke. My informant had himself been criticised as a
revisionist at one stage, but he was no longer worried about such
things. The leading menbers of the Ministry were much nore interested in
coherent thinking than in none calling. Serious discussion of
professional questions was
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getting easier and easier.
Morale and "Down to the Countryside"
The
10. Our companions gave us the impression that morale within the
Ministry was at present high. Despite the upheavals there during the
Cultural Revolution and subsequent streamlining, relatively few people
had lost their jobs altogether. politically less nimble "reactionaries"
and "ultra-leftists" were purged, sone of the older members of the
service were retired and sone other members were transferred to other
govern- nental work, sonetices in the provinces. Our companions were at
pains to point out that Marshal Ch'en Yi was "still Foreign Minister".
It was only "ill-health" which had prevented hin
Those who had criticised fron playing an stive role since 1967. hin were
ultra-leftists who were really opposed to Mao and their criticism was
largely unjustified.
11.
In the early part of the Cultural Revolution, many of the less
progressive members of the Ministry and almost all the diplomats
recalled fron abroad were sent down to the countryside to be re-educated
by the "nasses". The aim was to rid them of their bureaucratic airs, to
bring hone to then the realities of life in modern China and to prevent
Chinese diplomats from becoming too "foreign".in their ways. This was a
less traumatic
Most were not sent experience than most of them had feared. alone or in
su:311 groups: they went in large groups to special
suall Ministry schools for cadres which had been set up in varicus rural
areas. For a part of the tine they worked on the land with local
peasants and part of the time they studied Meo's philosophy. During the
slack season, they were allowed to study foreign languages and to catch
up on their reading foreign publications. They received their full
salaries throughout. Some enjoyed the scout camp atmosphere of the cadre
schools and the relative pence that this afforded after
Sone the sonetimes acute struggles of the Cultural Revolution. people
only stayed for three or four months, thers got stuck
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mainly of
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for eighteen months or more. Husbands and wives, even if they both
worked in the Ministry, rarely went together to the cadre schools,
partly because it was thought that this would be dis- tracting for then,
but also, in many cases, because someone had to stay in Peking to look
after the children.
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12. Several of the MFA people who had been down to the country- side
seemed fairly confident about their future, because they could now clain
sone knowledge of what the Cultural Revolution was all about. There are
some people including one of our companions who was a fairly
sophisticated intellectual type with a keen and unconcealed interest in
Chinese poetry and the finer things of life who had not been down to the
countryside, even though they had been in the Ministry since the
beginning of the Cultural Revolution. In due course, however, all
members of the Ministry are expected to go down to the countryside on a
rotation basis, but as the demand grows for more staff in the Ministry
and more diplomats are needed abroad, the visits to the countryside are
likely to get shorter.
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Recruitment and Training
The Ministry's
13. In recent years, very few people have been recruited into the
Ministry. The Ministry is now faced with the task of deciding on the
selection and training of new entrants. According to one of our
companions, an extensive debate on the subject is now in full swing and
no definite decisions had been taken. Diplomatic academy is still closed
but he hoped that it would soon be reactivated in one forn or another:
there was an urgent need for an official institution to provide training
in foreign languages and the principles of diplomacy. needed, he
thought, to be more relevant to the work in hand than the old ones had
been, HG himself had been obliged to study Chaucer more then scened
relevant to an understanding of British life and foreign policy. It
should, he thought, also preferably be interspersed with training on the
job in the Ministry. There was also a good deal of argument within the
The new courses
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Ministry about the best way to acquire an understanding of foreign
attitudes and about the extent to which Chinese diplomatsc should be
allowed to acquire such knowledge by immersing then-
selves in foreign ways of life.
Standard of Living
For
14. By Chinese standards, Ministry officials are reasonably well paid,
but cannot be considered a privileged class. instance, a desk officer in
his early thirties who has not previously served abroad earns about
60-70 yuan a month (£10-12); a desk officer in his later thirties who
has served abroad and who speaks English fluently earns over 80 yuan
(£14) a month; a section head dealing with, say, France, Italy and
Switzerland gets about 130 yuan (£22) a month; the head of the American
and Western European Department is believed to get about 200 yuan a
nonth (£33). The real value of their salaries is greater than it scens.
Accommodation, for most members of the Ministry, for example, is
provided in a compound near one of Peking's diplomatic quarters for 1-2
yuan a month. The accomodation is almost as modest as the rent. A couple
without children usually have a one rooned flat (plus snall kitchen and
toilet) and even a fairly senior counsellor with only one child could
not expect to have more than a two roomed flat. Sone of the very senior
officials have small three rouned flats, whereas before the Cultural
Revolution senior officials could have expected something a little more
opulent.
15. The Ministry has a good canteen and nost people eat both lunch and
dinner there. Rice with meat and one vegetable costs about 20 cents (4
np) which is less than what the same would cost at an outside
restaurant. With a few exceptions, the nen
They from the Ministry are neither great nor good drinkers. normally
ease their nervous tensions by smoking. Vice-Minister Ch'iao Kuan-hua
seers to set the pace with about 60 cigarettes a day. Many of his
juniors smoke 25-30 a day, which costs then another 30-50 cents (12-17
np).
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CONFIDENTIAL
Officials do not spend much on their personal appearance. Most of the
juniors now have a studied sloppiness about their dress, which is
usually a rather scrappy assortment of Mao jackets and beggy trousers.
The more senior ones have better cut clothes in better materials, but in
Peking they all wear modern Chinese style clothes, not western ones.
Wives 17. The interests of wives are usually sacrificed to those of the