ן
China's activities divide between the cultivati:n of
relations and the prevision of oil to countries who they
recognise, the developront of trade and occasional gestures
of assistance to those whom they do not, and the enc...urage-
nent perally el materially of rev-lutionary :: vorents in
certain c.untries whose govern ents they disapprove of. The
second and thir? type of cetivity occasionally coincide as in
the case of Malaysia and Thailand.
18.
Since the favourable vote in the United Nations last
Nove bor, Chinc has donc quite well in securing recognition
fro Third World ecuntri-5: Ethiopia, Nigeris, Caroroon,
Chile, luwait and Equatorial Guinea have poned relations
while Libya has rade a leclaration of intent. China has
mended fences with some African countries, notably Mali, and
launched her rost arbitious forcign aid project, the
י
US$400 million Tenzor: railway.
In 1970 alone the Chinese
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signed economic and militery aid agreements valued et well over a
billion US dollars, involving an annual disbursement of sever 1
hundred.illion dollars which is consider ble for
In the Third World and else- a country in China's position.
where, notably Romania as well as in Albania, North Vietnam and
Fakistan, China has shown promptness and generosity in
This prying out, particularly at times of special need. has also applied
to contributions for relief in case of disasters, for example in
Malaysia and Turkey with which Chine has no relations. China can still
never compete as an aid giver with the Soviet Union let alone the West,
but by selectivo gener-sity and the careful husbanding of resources,
including modest living standards for Chinese workers and experts abroad
which is beneficial als: for other reasons, the Chinese contrive to make
an i-pact; in cert in countries, for exemple Tanzania and in a different
way Nepal, the political dividends can be great.
19.
and
is a nodel for developucnt, economic, social and
Though politic:1, China's success cannot be rated high. recovery from;
the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution will have restored China's
prestige as a well-organised country, fow could hope to emulate the
Chinese model which demands unrelenting hard work, iron discipline and a
dedicated and
Most Third World countries will incorrupt bureaucracy.
prefer to admiro and do otherwise,
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Thus the opportunities
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for China to undermine the position of the West and the
Soviet Union by this eans are slight. What Chine can do is
to reap public political dividends in the forr. of the condemnation of
"imperialis::" and exploitation from.
countries which continue to enjoy the benefit of Western
assistancc and investment.
20.
The present trend in Chinese dipl:recy, in
particular the invitation to President Nixon, has ro-
awokonać doubts which are alrendy being voiced by colleagues
here about how firm and all-embracing is the Chinese co mit-
ment to support revolutirnary ...ve? ents everywhore.
In fact
the Chinese have always buen selective in their support, and their
treatment of developments in East Pakistan and Ceylon show that when
state rolations are consifcred of
+
overriding ipertence reveluti nury reverents of demonstrable legitimacy
can be writton eff, though in the case of East Pakistan the Chinese have
kept their optins open by silence. Chinese frilure to recognise the rcv
lutionary verent in Chad, where gevermont ondervours at suppression are
being assisted by the French, is a lesser but significant example.
Whatever accomodations the Chinese may roko, the principle of support
for revolution is so fundamental to their positi ́n within the Communist
world, deriving as it does from their own experionce in China which they
have clov ted to a universal level, that it could not be abandon. 1,
even after
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What the Chinese could do is to be mora select-
ive about the revolutionary Levements they publicise and
support. There will still be ., wy in frica and Latin .nerica which they
c-n espouse without risk to any of their other intercats. There may be
eases such as Thailand which will be difficult to resolve oven fter en
-storic:n withdrawal from Vietner, and the Chinese may try to have it
both ways, as they now do in Laos, by having relations and supporting
revolutionary movements. This is another dilemma they will
have to face. Iz the Middle East they are so firmly anchored to the
revolutionary event that it is hard to see how they could disengage even
if they wished to, though by their extrorisu they alicnate influenti:l
Arab countries
end allow the Soviet Union to increase their influence,
Undoubtedly particularly with the United Arab Republic.
the Ching so are worthier champions of revolution than the Russians. The
question is the extent to which. it will benefit then, now or in the
future, to be the national advocate of all power "sprin, ing from the
ber el of a gun". ..lrealy they have drawn back in the esse of
hi-jacking. Their position on political kidnapping and urben guerrillas
is unclear. ..pperently the number of guns and calibro
count. ..s China becomes increasingly ruspcctable
internationally, this problem: may loon larger.
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China and the Super-powers
21. Over the past year the Chinese have increasingly cest
themselves in the role of the champion of small and redium
sized powers in their efforts to resist the imposition of
heger.ory by the United States and the Boviet Unir, as the
Chinese chose to portray it. The Chinese profess never to
wish to become a super-p-wor.
In view of the distance they
lng behind, this ray be only a sensible rati ́nalis¬tion of the
inevitable. ..t the sac tinc their orneaytion of
their own world role would not permit then either to sido with one of
the super-pcware, or son to accept e subordinate status to either,
leaving aside the particular problems this would involve. Though they
will so the prospect of - greater measure of détente with on: to unnerve
the other
-
In the
the Russians have nade clear thèi apprehenson about President's Kixon's
visit there vill bo e linit beyond which they will not go. The Chinese
moito much of their independence (and self-reliance) and connend this
policy to others. Third World it takes the form of calls for concric
independence, including greater benefit from foreign exploita- Her
Western cruntries are tion of natural rezcurces og oil. lumped together
with the United States and the contest takes on Nerth versus South,
character.
* mitosial vators is
another problur: which can be turn to useful account se
both the United States and the viet Union have najer
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1
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fisheries interests.
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The Chinese position is to support
the right of my country to clain whatever extent of
territorial waters and seabed it chooses. What their
reaction would be if an unfriendly nation mado a claim
which encroached on what they regard as Chinese waters would be
instructive. They hav: certainly been prompt in neking
the caximr claim for islands in the China pea, including
JĈ
the Senkakus which on sone Chinese maps is not shown as Chincsc. This
particular policy has an obvious appeal in Latin merica, but if the
Chinese bocene involved in serious discussion et, for exaple, a future
conference on the law e the sea, they ray find it less easy to maintain.
22.
On a more general level, the Chinese commend all demonstrations of
national independence vis-a-vis the
United States and the Soviet Union.
They champion the righ"
of all countries (except West Germany and Japan) to have nuclear
weapons, and they oppose the non-proliferation treaty. The national
position adopted by General de Gaulle was their hodel for a "good"
Western European country. They see the Comion Narket as an assertion of
economic and political independence from the United States and
exaggerate the extent to which this will crode bilateral relations
between the norbers and the United States, on the rno fund,
For obviouɛ reasons, and the Soviet Union on the ether. relations
betweon the super-powers and smaller countries
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in the world are too importent for these countries to Luke then lightly,
and the Chinese :bition to establish a special position by leading a
united front gainst ther.
cannot be oasily realised.
But there is probably sufficient
disquiet in a variety of countries at the prospect of their destiny
being decided, over their heads, by the supcr-p: wers for the Chinose to
pick up scne divide ds.
China and the United hutions
23.
To enter the United Nations cannot be called an ein of Chinese foreign
policy; it is in any case now inevitable But the Chinese desire to
tolong socner rather than later. to the organisation has narkedly
increased since the Culturel Revoluti‹n died down. In the past the
organisati, n was conderned as the suprene example of super-power
hogatony - Th: Chinese have presumably now decided that their policios
will be better served inside than outside.
Furthercro
Mo
If in the
they could hardly refuse the seat if it is offered. Chineso had said in
private that they will behave reasczablj in the United Nations and play
by the rules. United Nations contex. they pursue vigorously the various
ai:s which I havo discussed, they are likely to be awkward customers,
particularly for example on colonial questi vis,
The United Nations will po^cu-keeping and disarma cent.
however be unfamiliar ground for then and they nay fin it
difficult at first to make the rapid tactical adjustme: te
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necessary to thrive in that unique environment.
They will
of course have no public cpini:n to worry about at hore but
if they are seen to make too many compromises with thei
principal enonier it could drags their image as the lender
My
of world revolution and the champion of the unter-isg.
guess is that they will behave quictly et cny rate at first,
and despite their attitude to the super-powers will not be
keen to see the structure of the organisation tapered with,
in particular any change in the composition of the Secu ity
Council.
Conclusions
24.
-
In the pursuit of their ains the Chinese c. n sh w
sonic success in improving their national sucurity thoug
they will remain pre-occupied with it. In Asia, choy ave
nade sorte pains, in the Commist World fow. They may have.
sone further success in the Third World against th、 Wern
and the Sovit Union, but their resources will rensin
lirited and rest countries will wish to be en good ter s
with all sides and take the rxirur. help from ther. By the
same token China's stand as a champion against th: super-
powers will not have a univers: 1 ppeal.
25.
The fact that the Chinese are able to con.uct bing ng
diplomacy in its normal and strate spheric victi.s
demonstrates the confince the lership in China's
ability to stop cut into the world and take a more act ve
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22
part in world politics.
CONFITET TIL
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It also shows that there must be
reasonable cohesion within the leadership and agreement on
foreign policy ains between Mao Tsetung hinself, Chou En-lai
and the army.
The invitation to Frosident Nixon was a
striking example of a new flexibility and imagination in Chinese
tactics. We must be prepared for other examples
in the future. merican interest in improving relations
with Chine will cause the recognition band-wagen to roll faster. In
cases here recognition is ruled out for any reason the Chinese can be
expected to encourage further commercial relations and to intcneify
"popular" diplomacy. They nay at times run into difficulties over
support for revolutionary nevonents but they can be expected strongly to
maintain the principle, because an important part of their international
raison d'etre is their clain to be the leader of world evolution. The
new Chinese posture should on the whole facilitate the pursuit of their
foreign policy aims and make the Chinese harder to doel with, though:
casier
ut the suo time, the to talk to, than in the past.
Chinese have a large number of balls in the air and the
I
number may increase.
Thɔugh juggling is a very encient
skill in this country the long absence of the Chinese
from the international stag: ..cans that they lack experience
in certain fields.
Incvitably sore of the balls will drop ·
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from time to time and it will be up to the West to see how
they can bost be fielded.
26.
I ar sending a copy of this despatch to H M Inbassadors at Washington,
Moscow, Paris, Tokyo, Seoul, Ulan Bator, Bangl:ok,
the British High Saigon, Vientianc and Phnom Fonh;
Commissioners at Canberra, Wellington, New Delhi and
Rawalpindi; the Governor Hong Kong and to E M Consul at Tamsui.
I have the honour to be Šir
Your obedient Servant
John Denson
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!
2017
A
Sir S Tomlinson
Mr Logan
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На Стоговом
Наш
Any other similes
L
A.R
.R.
CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY
Ec 2
1. I think you will be interested to see the attached
letter from our Embassy in Paris enclosing the record of a
conversation between the Canadian and Chinese Assistant
Military Attachés there.
..
4
2. As you will see, the Chinese position as regards
relations with the United States in the light of the
announcement of President Nixon's visit remains uncompromising.
28 July 1971
1.1. Luan.
RB Crowson
Far Eastern Department
Tomlinson
Copied to:
Mr Drinkall WED
Mr Overton North America Department
Xr Stratton UN (Pol) Department
Mir Cradock Planning Staff
Mr Daunt
подать
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2/59
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British Embassy
Paris
23 July 1971
RB Crowson Esq
Far Eastern Department
Dear Cumiem.
CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY
FEL R
You may be interested to see the enclosed copy of a minute by our
Defence Attaché reporting a conversation with his Canadian colleague
about an approach made by the Chinese to the Canadians here in Paris.
The minute speaks for itself. I would add, however, that the fact that
this approach was made here might reflect the fact that the Chinese
Embassy in Paris, headed as it is by a member of the Central Committee,
remains one of the most important points of contact the Chinese have
with the western world. We would be interested to hear whether you
receive reports of the same operation having taken place here in Paris
with respect to other western Embassies, or of the same sort of thing
happening in other capitals.
Copies to "
Chanceries: Peking
Washington Ottawa
Tokyo
Saigon
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Yuna
ext,
43
Nicholas Sparkly
JNT Spreckley
Alo 1828
Returence
PAR/S1205/Air
H of C
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You may like to know that this morning the Assistant Military attaché,
Peoples Republic of China, asited for and was given an immediate
appointment with the Assistant Canadian Armed Forces Attaché. His
interview lasted 1hr 20 mins, in the course of which he carefully
rehearsed, calmly and without polemics, the Chinese position with regard
to her differences with the US, The Attaché spoke from written notes and
covered all the well-known problems. He said he had been instructed to
make clear to China's Canadian friends what she hoped to gain by opening
a dialogue with the US, starting with President Nixon's visit. As the
Canadiand were among the more important nations to have recognised the
Peoples Republic and to have estab- lished full diplomatic relations
with them, they wished them to understand fully the implications of the
recent developments in Chinese relations with the US.
There was no bacic change in China's position but it was clear that
there could be no advance in the struggle to achieve what China wanted
without substantive discussions with the Americans. She would enter
these discussions in good faith but it had to be clearly understood that
there would be no compromise on the following issues:
C.
The total withdrawal of all US Armed Forces from the Far East.
The return of Formosa to the Peoples Republic.
China wanted to take her place in UNO but would not do so whilst
Nationalist China was represented there,
All the foregoing was recounted to me by my Canadian colleague, Colonel
Power. I said that I thought it strange for the Chinese to make their
point to the military side of the Canadian Embassy and at Assistant
Attaché level. He agreed but said that in his dealings with the Chinese
Embassy he had noticed thet they do not observe the strict division
between purely diplomatic and military activities that is so charact-
eristic of Western Embassies, As to the level, this was simply a
question of language. The Chinese Military Attaché, Pang Ten, does not
himself speak French and rather than get into the protocol diffi-
culties of an assistant asking for an appointment with an Attaché so
much senior, they had opted for the method described.
/Finally
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Reference
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Finally, Colonel Power gave it as his opinion that whatever reason the
Chinese gave for having made their demarche, the real reason was to
ensure that what they, the Chinese, had had to say would be passed on to
other Western missions including the American. He said that he thought a
similar exercise would be going on in other capitals as part of a
world-wide operation.
22nd July 1971
NE HOAD Air Care D & AA
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W
L..
FEC 2/1
J B Denson Esq OBE
PEKING
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42
Despatched
20 July 1971
2017
नंदर
34
CHINESE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
You might like to know that Mr Royle commented on your despatch of 29
June
"An absorbing report our Mission have done well with their research".
COMFIDENTIAL
J A L Morgan
Far Eastern Department
RU
J
501
21 JUL 1971
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enter of
Pl.cater to the Diff
(Min
was worth by the
4
ole Now's wort)
ANGLO-GERMAN POLITICAL CONSULTATION
16 JULY 1971
BACKGROUND BRIEF ITEM I
{
'CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY
17/213
FED
1. During recent months the trend towards more moderate
and conciliatory policies in China's conduct of her
This has
relations with other countries has continued.
been accompanied by a number of well-publicised gestures
designed to underline China's more accommodating attitude
towards the West. Examples are the adroit use made by the
Chinese of recent visits by ping-pong teams from the
United States, the United Kingdom and Australia, friendly
references by Chinese leaders to the "American people" and
the statement by Mao Tse Tung that he would be prepared to
receive President Nixon in China. Despite these tactical
shifts basic Chinese policies remain unchanged. Peking
has been careful to differentiate between governmental
exchanges and "people-to-people" contacts. As long as the
question of Taiwan remains unsolved there is unlikely to
be any response on the Chinese side to overtures from the
US Government. Similarly China is unlikely to relax her
hostility to the Soviet Union as the other super-power and
her rival for the leadership of the world communist
movement.
2. The objectives of recent Chinese diplomacy appear to
be 4-fold
-
to repair the harm caused to China's prestige
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by the Cultural Revolution, to intensify her campaign to
achieve wider diplomatic recognition, to further her
efforts to gain admission to the United Nations and to
reduce Soviet and US influence in Asia and elsewhere in
the "Third World". China's return to a more traditional
approach to foreign policy has already begun to pay off.
Since October 1970 ten countries, including Canada, Italy
and Austria, have agreed to establish diplomatic relations
with Peking. It now seems probable that the People's
Republic of China will occupy the China seat in the United
Nations this year.
3. We believe that it is right that Peking should occupy
the Chine seat in all the organs of the UN. This is why
we have voted for the Substantive Resolution, the so-called
Albanian Resolution which calls for the seating of Peking
and the expulsion of Taiwan, every year since it was first
tabled in 1961. In our view the absence of a country
containing a quarter of the world's population is bound to
detract from the effectiveness of a worldwide organisation
and to make the solution of many pressing problems all the
more difficult. There are a number of issues of fundamen-
tal importance such as disarmament, the seabed, population
control etc where through membership of the UN the Chinese
Government could play an important role and indeed nake a
helpful contribution if they so wished. It is clearly in
our interest to encourage them to do so.
2.
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♫ . When the Substantive Resolution obtained a simple
majority for the first time last year a new situation
was created We have been reviewing our policy in the
light of this and the imporvement in our relations with
China since the end of last year. As the West German
and other friendly Governments have been informed in
strict confidence we have sought agrément from the
Chinese for a named Ambassador to Peking. In doing so we
have informed the Chinese that we no longer intend to
support the "Important Question" Resolution in the United
Nations nor any procedural initiative which might have the
effect of delaying the seating of Peking. We have also
said that on recept of a favourable response from the
Chinese we will take steps to remove our official repre-
sentation on Taiwan. In taking this action it has not of
course been our intention to seek to influence any
government's attitude towards voting in the United Nations.
3.
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FEC
Despatcher
J B Denson Esq OF: FAKING
9 July 1971
917
AR
CHIJËSE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
1. We greatly enjoyed your despatch and Gordon Burras memorandum on the
inner workings of the Chinese Foreign. Ministry. I am sure that the
China-watching community here will find it compelling reading. We have
given the despatch wide circulation in Whitehall.
2. It is reassuring to find that, as one would expect, foreign policy
issues are now being discussed rationally and pragmatically in the
Foreign Ministry. This is aleurly
But we at the root of their present conciliatory line. too have fouma
that, despite their obvious sophistication in comparison with their less
widely-travelled colleagues, the Chinese here still have difficulty in
understanding how the British system operates. This applies particularly
to the workings of the press and public opinion.
3. We were rather surprised to read Asigaard's account of his talk with
Ch'i Peng-fei about Chinese preparations for the United Nations (your
telegram No 604). I would have expected the Chinese to 'have made more
of an effort to train a cadre of United Nations experts but, as your
despatch shows, they are obviously under-staffed through- out the
Ministry.
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J AL Morgan
Far Eastern Department
017
915
лужбове
Mr Wilford
Sir S Tomlinson
Mr Logan
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Lette entropa
SM
197