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to 1: LeQuesne, Miss Romwell, Washing FED Nam American Dept. IRD, POSD
Reser. 201. P. Mon Cabiner office.
North
M: Bambuny 4. Adams
The hon J Wilson Esq G West Africa. Department Voreign and Commonwealth
office London S.1
ง
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VLLATICS
7. 1
дови,
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BRITISH HIGH COMMISSION
FREETOWN
6 August 1971
1J/vi..
RECEIVED IN
RG TRY N.50
2mvu 1971
AVU
FEC 2
M
le reported in our telepra ↑ No 285 the are not Sierra Leone had
recognised the 'eople's degradio r the ao countries had agreed to
stablish a rol: bions. At the same time Sierra Leone rocÒ{}
'pople's Reļuolic as we solo legal Government). reprocenting the entire
Chinese people.
I must admit that we ind not expect d tllic re GO CO. SV serly
Kamera-la, lor, tho is, or cou Docrewy Gonoral of the APC as well as
Minist omirsised to me jim verore Lojature wat die ..
or delegation. In suuition, the ratic: "MUSSEXOr nere, Admiral Hoh-Tu
Liu, ind Dean : Sour
...ay or so before the Delepation lout time w
1
+
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io of my inmuiate Pcquition of sted på erefore thought it while the
Delegation mit Mine intentions re discuss the possibility
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diplomatic ruletios, no decision would os wit ter by returned, ad the
amour cement coucou surprise in Freetown. I thought that we huvi tundum
Leon intentions fairly accurately, but tim can y President Nixon tutu
iried to visit dui. Me viole situation. Just beforce lert, ulom. Coin
the Americen Charge d'affaiyos that no cha umĻ
lot the Americ: ne pot shund of Sierra Leone. planation ves given by
Joctor stovus tɔ bu nes unoassauür 1.6. the Ambassador rimli Joe him
vitor the anouncement had u en mue. chat Sjorra Leone expocted a
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recognition of Red Chirn to start rolling and decided to jump on fast
lost they be left behind.
-
-
3 This is douotless the explcation for vao sudden, in but I think that
Sierra Leone must also have outained tangible benefits in exchange for
recognition. Indeed, it appears that Tuci nical and Leonomic, and
Tredo,quo More signed in Peking though no-one here lecst of AN the
inistry of External Afairs knows crything about their contents. The
Nationalist Chinese provide about ca exports on rice: rowing who are
spread in a muwer of Gonoustration faims throughout the country. In
punert. Leir efforts have been successful and have been a rei by the
Sierra Leone Government since rice is th. su do cad one of the important
aims of (gricultural policy i: attain self-sufficiency in rice
production. 01 be interested therefore, to see exactly what are theperi
offered by the led Chinese to replace this assistance,
.
As I said, the main motive for the move by two stor Leoneas seems to be
to avoid being left behia in th
L
octed rush to recognise Communist China and we go 100 we this as a real
step to the left by the Sienn Ivor zovernment. ilovever, it is also
likely to be presunte tensible proof of Sierra Leone's non-lignentkez Me
venefits of the move to a public. A contimin, a for the change to a
republic during the last year has that it would enhance Sierra Leone's
international st nd give roof of her non-aligned status. Also I hov. 15
doubt that Pratt wishes to oulld himself up as a dynuzlo Minister of
external Mfairs and that this is one 3. the process. And indeca the
Ministry of External Aff vore as surprised as anyone else by tins whole
trazes uti and still have no knowledge of the details.
Th
5 The most unpleasant part of the whole oficir in t My the Goverment
have treated the hatialist Chf. voo. he first their ambassador knew
about the affair ve ti He rond the anouncement in the local press. It
was .ome time before lie was able to see the Presium & Vai, interview,
explained that Sierra one did not it w loft child by the Americas. He
did not express AVE
/the mallei
7
C
RESTRICT.
ة.
E
the mumer in which liationalist China had been rentou thanks for the aid
they had given in the prot. The ist Chinese Ambassador is still in
Freetown, having hi orders to pack up but he is awaiting instructiom
čuot ni.. departure. We assume that he will love fairly soon a... that
the various rice growing experts will also be or oral to leave. It is
interosting that "Unity" viich is al supported recognition of Red China
should have ublicis leader deploring the treatment of the Nationalist
Ching o One constantly complains about Unity's Editor, San Hetzger,
ut there are times when he shows courage and fair-minuguuto.n. This
seems to be one of them.
I
J' -
6 The Delegation went on to North Korea viore lanur- Taylor made a
statement that the two Governments intended to raise their diplomatic
relations to Amtessadorial level. This was reported in our telogramm No
288. This was lore categorical than the anouncement about relations
withi Communist China and, es far us we can see, die rot imply the
severing of relations with South Koreź whose Anordni with typical Sierra
Leonean timing visited ruotovil bita before the Delegation's departure
to prosent his craldick. to the resident. We do not know whether South
Korea vona bo willing to acquiese in a "two Koreas" policy, and su are
still awaiting their reaction. Again, the inistry of External Tairs
seems to have had no irkling of what was going to happen nor do they
know anything about t agrements which have beon signed.
T
7 I am sending copies of this letter to J'Deusa in rel and Nigel Trench
in Seoul.
uten
Your
Stephen
S J L Olver
A.STRICTED
ľ
!
SECRET
R
:
Lage A
and C
Nr Le Quesne
CHINA AND SIERRA LEONE
You will have seen kir Olver's letter of 6 August and Freetown telegrams
293 and 294 (copies attached).
2. Er Olver's letter records the reactions in Freetown to the
announcement that Sierra Leone had recognised the Feople's Republic of
China, It seems to have surprised Sierra Leoneans in general and the
Ministry of External Affairs in particular. The shabby treatment of the
Nationalist Chinese has not gone unnoticed
3. Mr Olver reports in paragraph 3 of his letter that Technical,
Economic and Trade agreements were probably signed in Peking at the
same time. His two telegrams go a stage further. The first reports that,
according to a "well placed" but undisclosed source, the Chinese
Government have offered a loan on very easy terms of £60 million to the
Sierra Leone Government to cover the rehabilita-
tion of the railway, agriculture, the supply of gunboats, helicopters,
arms and ammunition and military training. The second telegram comments
on the offer and, assuming the report is true, concludes that the aid
items are plausible. Kr Olver however thinks that the amount said to be
involved is excessive.
4. The question was discussed at some length at a CIG meeting on 10
August when it was established that there had been no confirmation of
this report from any other source. Enquiries will continue. The
Committee agreed that all the suggested aid items were of the kind to
appeal to the Sierra Leoneans and, except for the helicopters, had all
been offered previously by the Chinese to other aid clients. The
Committee also thought that the amount said to be involved seemed
excessive and thought that $60 million would be more in line withi
present Chinese practice.
5. If the report is true, it indicates a further distinct move to the
left by the Sierra Leone Government and a victory for the ruling party's
extremists. It will be an unwelcome development from our point of view
but I do not think it calls for any change in our present policies
towards Sierra Leone, either politically or from the aid aspect.
6. This report is one more piece of evidence to indicate a growing
Chinese interest in West Africa. Four countries in the area have
recently established diplomatic relations with China - Nigeria, the
Cameroons, Equatorial Guinea and now Sierra Leone. Recent announcements
and reports on Chinese offers of aid total over £120 million.
"Substantial" aid to Congo Brazzaville to build a hydro electric power
station and a 200 bed hospital has already becn announced, as has an
offer to Mauritania to build the port at
/Nouakchatt
SECRET
48
SECRET
Nouakchatt at a cost of up to £8 million. We have seen reports of a
Chinese offer of aid to Mali to build the Manantuli Dan (at a cost of
about £50 million), and now there is this report of an offer of £60
million to Sierra Leone. There have also been reports of military
assistance including training to Congo Brazzaville, Mali and Sierra
Leone.
7.
The Chinese are of course already strongly entrenched in East Africa,
both politically and economically, and it appears
The that they are now making a real drive in West Africa. situation
created by President Nixon's plan to go to Feking and the likely
admission of mainland China to the UN this autumn is a favourable one
for a drive of this sort. We will keep a close oye on the situation. It
seems that President Senghor's fears of the encirclement of Senegal by
China (which he has expressed to the Americans and Italians in private
talks) may have some validity, and the French are also, as you know,
concerned.
12 August 1971
ce kr Worgan (FED)✓
FUSD IRD
Kr Le Tocq
Mr Macrae
Research Department Planning Staff
John Wilson
John Wilson
a new tel. (Bedip) has came in frame to Olver this manj
you will
see a copy.
SECRET
5/3
Copy
h Hi Leuuerne, diss Komary, waɔmmyan FED North American Dept, IRD, POSD
· Resson".
2001. P. Moss Caliner free.
M: Bambuny 4. Adams
The Ilon J Wilson Esq ONG West African Department Foreign and
Commonwealth Office London S./1
Dear John.
ELATIONS WITH MIINA
BRITISH HIGH COMMISSION ij.
FREETOWN
6 August 1971
1 Ve reported in our telegram No 285 the tre feet thi Sierra Leone had
recognised the People's Republic of Ch nl the two countries had agreed
to ustąblish diplor ti a Polations. At the same time Sierra Leone
recognised Go l'eople's Republic as the sole legal Government of Chr
representing the entire Chinese people.
+
t
+
4
I must admit that we had not, expected tins recenti uh to CM so early.
Kamara-Taylor, tho is, of course, Secretary General of the APC cs well
as dinistur u omphasised to me just jefore coperture that this wS a
jorty delegation. In addition, the lationlist Ambassador here, Admiral
Hoh-Tu Líu, lui de en estala v t. day or so before the Delegation luft
til teZO WO question of uy immediate ücqnition of Rou. tinerofore
thought that while the Delegation mill 011 Chinore intentions rnd
discuss the possibility or wil, ing: diplomatic rulations, no uecicion
would be to y alter thy returned, and the nouncement caused fi surprise
in Freetown. I thought that we huu analgaon Leonorn intentions fairly
accurately, but the camión by President Mixon that he intended to visit
Chic the wiplo situation. Just veľ'oro o leit, Jolomo Gold the Americṛn
Charge d'Affaires that hó uld not to lot the Americans get ahead of
Sierra Leono. explanation was given by Doctor Stevens to the Chinese
Ambassadör vine: the Ambassador finally MOLE
I GAV, soo him after the amoun.cement had been macio. that Sierra Leque
expected a bendwaggon in favour oï'
tiv
/rucophis
+
ACSTATCTED
1
recognition of led China to start rolling and decided to jump on fast
lest they be left behinkl.
-
+
3 This is doubtless the explantion for the sudden awk,, but I think that
Sierra Leone must also levo odveined a SRU tengible benefits in exchange
for recognition. Indoo it appears that Tecimical and Economic, and
Trado, Agrochéhoz word signed in Peking though no-one herə least of lt
in tho Ministry of External Affairs knows anything abont thoir contents.
The Nationalist Chinese provice avob la equrts on rice growing who are
spread in a mumour of demonstration faims throughout the country. In
general their efforts inve been successful and have been up.ch: by the
Jiorra Leone Goverment since rice is the sun do ci
10 and one of the important aims of agricultural policy ic to autain
self-sufficiency in ice production. o vill bo v intorested therefore, to
see exactly what are theœnoficz: offered by the Red Chinese to replace
this assistanco.
+
+
י.
A As I said, the main motive for the move by the diurs. Iwoners seems to
be to avoid being loft uehind in te apooted rush to recognise Communist
China and we do not seû this as a real step to the left by the Sierra
Leone Goverment. Ilowever, it is also likely to be pitcutle terr;ible
proof of Sierra Leone's non-aligument" cná en una ca the Donorits of the
move to a Republic. A contiming, Patt for the change to a Republic
during the last year ins US Uut it would enhance Sierra Leone's
international strn 3. and givo roof of her non-aligod status. Also I
have 1 doubt that Pratt visios to build himself up es a dyrmic
luister of external Mfairs and thet this is one ate o 1 the process. And
indeed the Ministry of Axtornal Arabia vere as surprised as anyone else
by this whole tractio. end still have no knowledge of the details.
li...
5 The most unpleasant part of the whole affair in way the Govermout have
treated the Rationlist Ohileno. The first their Ambassador knew about
tho azir vos v... he read the announcement in the local pross. It wa It
was como time oefore he was able to see the President vin, interview,
explained timt Sierra Leone did not vert ti loft ochind by the
Americans. He did not express 1
+
PET st
/the mone
+
RESTRICTED
?
-
the ramer in which lationalist Chine had been trontod or thanks for the
aid they had given in the past. The ni and- ist Chinese Ambassador is
still in Freetov, having had orders to pack up out ho is awaiting
instructions Zout ink, acjuture. We assume that he will locva fairly
soon mu out the various rice growing experts will also e ordeal Lo
lonvo. It is interesting that "Unity" which ins l supported recognition
of Red China should inve jublishuu. loader deploring the treatment of
the Natioelist Uhlioco. One constantly complains about Unity's Editor,
Sam Hotspur,
ut thoro are times when he shows courage and fair-minicana This soeurs
to be one of thon.
1
Γ
+
[
| |
6 The Delegation went on to North Korea, vinere Ko P Trylor male a
statement that the two Governments intoxica to raise their diplomatic
relations to Ambassadorial level. Tiris was reported in our tologran No
288. This was loo categorical than the ai nowicement about relations
with Communist China and, as far as vo con soe, did not imply dic
severing of relations with South Korea, whose Ama 30
visited routovn with typical Sierra Leonean timing perore the
Delegation's departure to present his credanti to the President. We do
not know whether South Korea voulo in willing to acquiese in a "two
Koreas" policy, WO o still awaiting their reaction. Again, the iginurg
of External Afairs seems to have had no irking of vint was going to
happen nor do they know anything about the arcoments which have boon
signed.
+
IR
L
I
+
7 I am sending copies of this letter to 'Denson in reki ari Nigol Trench
in Seoul.
Your
Stephen
out en
S J L Olver
NESTAJOVED)
INMEDIATE
CYBER CAT A
1 REETOWN 061115Z
CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY 090900.
CONFIDENTIAL
(AMENDED DISTRIBUTION 9 AUGUST 1971)
TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 293 OF 8 AUGUST
INFO PEKING AND SAVING
TO WASHINGTON DAKAR MONROVIA ACCRA AND LAGOS,
MY TELNO 285: RELATIONS WITH COMMUNIST CHINA,
י
L
ACCORDING TO A WELL PLACED SOURCE, AGREEMENT WAS REACHED, AT THE SAME
TIME AS THE NEGOTIATIONS TO OPEN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BY THE SIERRA
LEONE DELEGATION TO PEKING, ON CHIHESE GOVERNMENT LOAN TO SIERRA LEONE
OF £60 (SIXTY
MILLICH STERLING) REPAYABLE WITHOUT INTEREST AND OVER AN EXTENDED PERIOD
AFTER AN INITIAL GRACE OF TWENTY YEARS,.
2. THE LOAN IS SAID TO COVER:
(A) REHABILITATION OF THE RAILWAY-
(6) AGRICULTURE, INCLUDING TWELVE TRACTORS=
(C) GUIDOATS=
(0) THREEE HELICOPTERS='
(E) ARMS AND AMMUNITION FOR (C) AND (P)
(F) TEN KILITARY EXPERTS TO TRAIN A P C (THE GOVERNMENT PARTY)
SUPPORTERS.
3. SEE MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM.
F C O PASS ROUTINE PEKING AND SAVING TO WASHINGTON DAKAR MONRÒVIA ACCRA
AND LAGOS.
+
•
OLVER
FCO/VIT DISTRIBUTION
H
[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]
WAER D
CONFIDENTIAT,
[
LATEلان
CHER CAT A
IM FREETOVI #81145Z
CONSENTIAL
DESKDY 69390AZ
CONFLUENTIAL
(AMENDED DISTRIBUTION 9 AUGUST 1971)
TO IMMEDIATE F C O TELNO 294 OF 8 AUGUST REPEATED FOR
BIFORMATION TO ROUTINE PEKING AND SAVING TO WASHINGTON
DAKAR HOURVOIA ACCRA AND LAGOS.
MY IP T.
P
ASSUMING A CHINESE DECISION THAT SIERRA LEONE IS WORTH HIVESTING
IN ON THIS SCALE., THE SUGGESTED DETAILS ARE PLAUSIBLE. (^) IMPORTANT
SECTIONS OF A PC HAVE FOR LONG BEEN OPPOSED TO DISHARTLING THE RAILWAY A
DECISION IMPOSED BY I M F= TO QUOTE RESCUE UNQUOTE THE RAILWAY WOULD BE
POLITICALLY
POPULAR AND SOLVE DIFFICULT REDUNDANCY PROBLEMS* AND ́A
STANDARD GAUGE RAILWAY WHICH CHINESE MIGHT HAVE IN MIND
WOULD BE PRESTIGIOUS=
(B) A REPLACEMENT WILL BE NEEDED FOR THE NATIONALIST CHINESE
AGRICULTURAL ASSISTANCE WHICH WILL NOW PRESUMABLY
BE DISMANTLED-
·
(C) GUNBOATS WOULD MINISTER NATIONAL PRESTIGE AND FIT IN WITH THE
CURRENT INVASION HYSTERIA, WITH THE NEW 209 MILE TERRITORIAL LIMIT AND
WITH STEVENS' REQUEST TO ME FOR CUSTOMS LAUNCHES=
(D) HELICOPTERS WOULD BE USED FOR INTERNAL SECURITY AND V 1 P.
TRANSPORT, AND WOULD REPLACE THE ONE AT PRESENT ON LOAN
FROM GUINEA-
(F) THE CHINESE HAVE LONG BEE!! THOUGHT LIKELY TO PROVIDE
TRAINING FOR THE PROPOSED MILITIA AND THIS WOULD SIGNIFY A DECISION TO
PROMOTE THIS SERIOUSLY.
+
2. FACTORS INFLUENCING THE CHINESE DECISION COULD BE... · (1) APPARENT
SIERKA, LEONE BEADINESS TO ACCEPT ONE CHINA, DREAK RELATIONS WITH
NATIONALIST CHINA AND JETTISON HER IN THE UN.
CONFIDENTIAL
/(11)
+
CONFIDENTIAL
+
(11) A CONFIDENT BELIEF THAT GIVE TIME SIERRA LEONE AND GUINCA (AND
PERHAPS POST TUBMAN LIBERIA) CAN BE WELDED TO A CHINESE STRONCHOLD IN
WEST AFRICA BUT THE SIZE OF THE LOA SEEKS OUT OF SCALE. I SHOULD HAVE
THOUGHT (3) TO (F) ABOVE WOULD HAVE BEEN ENOUGH TO BUY SIERRA LEONE. IT
MAY BE THAT (A) WAS A TEITATIVE UNDERTAKING TO LOOK INTO REHABILITATION
AND THAT THE LOAN WAS EXPRESSED
AS AN UNDERTAKING TO SPEND UPTO £63 MILLION
(OR PERHAPS SIXTY MILLION DOLLARS)
3. THE AGREEMENT IS SHREWDLY TAILORED TO THE SIERRA LEONE GOVERNMENT'S
POLITICAL TASTE. THE GOVERNMENT PROBABLY DOES NOT SEE IT AS MORE THAN AN
ASSERTION OF NON ALIGNMENT, AND WITH TYPICAL SIERRA LEONE
OVER-CONFIDENCE AND SHORTSIGHTEDNESS
HAY BELIEVE IT CAN RIDE THE TIGER AND CONTINUE TO HAVE THE
BEST OF BOTH WORLDS.
EVEN AT THAT IT REPRESENTS BOTH POLITICALLY AND ECONOMICALLY A
+
VICTORY FOR THE LESS RESPONSIBLE ELEMENT IN THE GOVERNMENT.
F C O PASS ROUTINE PEKING AND SAVING TO WASHINGTON DAKAR MÓNROVIA
ACCRA AND LAGOS,
OLVER
.
FCO/WHI DISTRIBUTION
W AFR D
[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]
CONFIDENTIAL
·
10%
519
B
D
نما كنت
Sir S Tomlingai
Mr 2
CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY
CONFIDENTIAL
ARV
Fee
4
1. In his minute on my submission of 28 July attaching the
record of a conversation between the Canadian and Chinese
Assistant Military Attachés in Faris, Jr Royle asked whether
we had received any other similar reports.
2. We have seen no further reports but this is no doubt
because the Chinese have made public their demands as regarde
the establishment of diplomatic relations with the United
States. These are reported in paragraph 2 of Peking telegram
no 695.
3.
As regards the part played by the Chinese Embassy in Paris
in re-opening the dialogue between China and the US (Mr Spreckley's
letter of 23 July) you may wish to see Wr Samuel's letter of
27 July, in particular paragraph 5.
4 August 1971
Copied to:
Mr Jaunt
Mr Drinkall WED
Mr Overton N America Department Mr Stratton UN (Pol) Department Hr
Gadock Danning Staff
Mr Hickman SWPD
CONFIDENTIAL
1.B. hum.
RB Crowson
Far Eastern Department
8 13/5
PRIORITY
HER/CAT A
PEKING Ø38748Z
CONFIDENTIAL
TOP
46
CONFIDENTIAL
TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 731 OF 3 AUGUST INFO HONG KONG, WASHINGTON, PARIS,
TOKYO, CANBERRA AND MOSCOW INFO SAVING WELLINGTON.
FEC 10/10
MIPT: CHINESE ARMY DAY EDITORIAL
FOREIGN POLICY.
Ec 2/1
1. THE EDITORIAL CONCENTRATES TO AN UNUSUAL EXTENT ON FOREIGN POLICY FOR
AN ARMY DAY ANNIVERSARY, PROBABLY BECAUSE THIS IS THE MOST SUITABLE
OCCASION SINCE THE CHOU-KISSINGER TALKS FOR A FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW. THE
EDITORIAL REFLECTS THE CONFIDENCE OF THE CHINESE IN THE STRENGTH OF
THEIR PRESENT DIPLOMATIC POSITION,
WHICH IS ATTRIBUTED TO MAO'S QUOTE REVOLUTIONARY DIPLOMATIC LINE
UNQUOTE. THIS IS THE FIRST TIME THAT SUCH A PHRASE HAS BEEN USED AND IT
SETS THE SEAL OF HIGHEST AUTHORITY ON PRESENT POLICIES. MOREOVER, THE
CHINESE HAVE TAKEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO REASSURE THEIR ASIAN ALLIES AND
REVOLUTIONARY SUPPORTERS BY SPELLING OUT THE CHINESE DEMAND THAT THE US
MUST WITHDRAW MOT ONLY FROM INDO- CHINA AND TAIWAN, BUT ALSO FROM JAPAN,
KOREA AND OTHER PARTS OF
ASIA.
2. THE MAIN LINES OF CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY SET OUT IN THE EDITORIAL
(PARA 2(G) OF MIPT) ARE THE SAME IN CONTENT AND PRIORITY AS THOSE SET
OUT BY VICE-CHAIRMAN LIN PIAO IN HIS REPORT TO THE NINTH PARTY CONGRESS
IN APRIL 1969, IN WHICH HE RATED SUPPORT FOR REVO- LUTIONARY MOVEMENTS
HIGHER THAN RELATIONS ON THE BASIS OF PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE. THE LONG
LIST OF QUOTE STRUGGLES UNQUOTE FOR WHICH THE CHINESE DECLARE THEIR
SUPPORT IS ON FAMILIAR LINES. THE CHINESE EMPHASISE THAT THEY WILL
SUPPORT THE WAR IN INDOCHINA
QUOTE TO THE END UNQUOTE. IN THE CASE OF KOREA, HOWEVER, THEY MAKE IT
CLEAR THAT WHAT THEY SUPPORT IS THE QUOTE PEACEFUL UNQUOTE
REUNIFICATION.
3. CONSIDERABLE CRITICISM IS METED OUT TO BOTH THE SOVIET UNION AND THE
US. NO CRITICISM IS MADE OF THE LEADERS BY NAME ALTHOUGH GREAT PLAY IS
MADE OF THE OPPOSITION TO AND LOSS OF CONFIDENCE IN THE ADMINISTRATION
WITHIN THE US. THE EDITORIAL CHARACTERISES THE US AS GROWING
PROGRESSIVELY WEAKER, BUT THE SOVIET UNION IS DEPICTED AS A POWER WHOSE
QUOTE EXPANSIONIST AND AGGRESSIVE
NATURE UNQUOTE STILL GIVES CAUSE FOR CONSIDERABLE CONCERN.
CONFIDENTIAL
the ins
/4.
r
CONFIDENTIAL
4. PASSAGES ON QUOTE IMPERIALISM UNQUOTE NOT CHANGING ITS AGGRESSIVE
NATURE, ON THE AMBITIONS OF THE SUPER-POWERS IN THE QUOTE INTERMEDIATE
ZONE UNQUOTE AND ON THE ABILITY OF IMPERIAL TO QUOTE PLAY EVERY KIND OF
INSIDIOUS TRICK UNQUOTE REFLECT CHINESE UNCERTAINTY ABOUT THE RESULTS
WHICH THEY CAN ACHIEVE FROM NEGOTIATING WITH THE RUSSIANS AND PROBABLY
ALSO SOUND A NOTE
OF CAUTION ABOUT PROSPECTS FOR THE CHOU-NIXON TALKS. THE CRITICISM OF
THE SOVIET/US ATTITUDE TOWARDS DISARMAMENT IS IN LINE WITH THE CHINESE
REJECTION OF THE RECENT SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR A FIVE POWER CONFERENCE.
5. THE OPPORTUNITY IS TAKEN TO RESTATE IN FULL THE CHINESE POSITION THAT
TAIWAN IS AN INALIENABLE PART OF CHINA AND ITS OPPOSITION TO THE QUOTE
FALLACY UNQUOTE THAT ITS STATUS QUOTE REMAINS TO SETTLED UNQUOTE, IT IS
SIGNIFICANT HOWEVER THAT THE SECTION ON TAIWAN FOLLOWS IMMEDIATELY AFTER
THE PASSAGE QUOTE WE WILL NOT ATTACK UNLESS WE ARE ATTACKED...UNQUOTE
AND THAT IT CONTAINS A NEW
FORMULA EXPRESSING CONFIDENCE THAT THE QUOTE COMPATRIOTS IN TAIWAN
UNQUOTE WILL NOT ALLOW THE ISLAND TO BE DETACHED FROM CHINA BY QUOTE
FOREIGN FORCES OF AGGRESSION UNQUOTE. (THE CHINESE WORD USED FOR QUOTE
FORCES UNQUOTE IS QUOTE SHIH-LI UNQUOTE WHICH HAS AN ABSTRACT RATHER
THAN A SPECIFIC MILITARY MEANING), THIS MAY PRESAGE A RESTATEMENT AT
SOME STAGE OF CHOU EN-LAI'S 33 JULY 1955 OFFER OF A QUOTÉ PEACEFUL
UNQUOTE SOLUTION OF THE TAIWAN PROBLEM BY DIRECT NEGOTIATION LINKED TO A
US WITHDRAWAL FROM THE
AREA.
6. ON THE MILITARY SIDE THE EDITORIAL POINTS UP THE STRENGTH OF THE
POSITION OF THE CHINESE ARMY. CONFIDENCE IN ITS PERFORMANCE IS REFLECTED
IN THE REFERENCE TO THE ARMY MAINTAINING QUOTE REMAR- KABLE UNITY
UNQUOTE IN ITS OWN RANKS AS WELL AS WITH THOSE OUTSIDE ITS RANKS. WHILE
THE EDITORIAL REFERS IN CONVENTIONAL TERMS TO THE ARMY'S POLITICAL
ACTIVITIES AND ROLE IN CIVILIAN AFFAIRS, CONSIDERABLE ATTENTION IS
PLACED ON BUILDING UP ITS MILITARY CAPABILITY. THIS PROBABLY REFLECTS A
GRADUAL RETURN TO NORMALITY WITH THE ARMY CONTINUING TO PLAY A ROLE IN
CIVILIAN AFFAIRS, BUT AT A REDUCED LEVEL.
FCO PASS ALL EXCEPT HONG KONG AND SAVING TO WELLINGTON.
DENISON
[REPEATED TO ALL]
2
CONFIDENTIAL
FCO/WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION
FED
*FFFF
+
CONFIDENTIAL
CHINESE FORSIGN POLICY: PING PONG ED AFTER
ALTH OFFICE
- 2 AUG 1971
409 AT 048 RE TION
R
R
YN 10
1971
EC 2/1
1
1
↓
Summary of FAKING Despatch of 27 July 1971
The despatch examines whether the aims and methods of Chinese
foreign policy have changed since the advent of ping pong diplomacy and
the announcerent of President Nixon's visit
to China, noting the traditional Chinese attitude to foreign
affairs.
(Faragraphs 1-2)
·
To the normally defined ains of Chinese foreign policy protection of
national security, dominance in sin, leader- ship of the Communist
World, the replacing of Western and Soviet influence in the Third World,
may now be added the attempt to lead a united front against the
super-powers. Chinese methods include the development of official and
unofficial relations including "popular" diplomacy and