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CONFIDENTIAL

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1:1300 19987

RELATIONS WITH CHINA

FE:3/22

78

PROBLEM

After the burning of our Office in Peking on 22 August

certain restrictions were placed on the Chinese Mission in

London. In retaliation, restrictions on our Mission in Peking

were made more stringent.

Since then, though the atmosphere

in Peking has improved a little, the restrictions remain and no progress
has been made in evacuating women and children or other members of the
staff in need of medical attention.

All members of the staff and their families, with the exception

of five schoolchildren on holiday, who have been allowed to leave, are
in effect being held as hostages. We have to decide whether and at what
stage action ahould be taken to

try to break the impasse. The immediate problem is whether to tighten
restrictions on the Chinese in London, to relax

them, or to leave them as they are.

RECOMMENDATION

2.

I recommend:-

(a) It would be premature to take a decision now on changing the
restrictions on the Chinese in London. If present trenda continue, the
matter

should be brought up for review in the week

beginning 23 October.

(b) In view of our failure to gain access to Mr.

Anthony Grey, the Reuters Correspondent under

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/house

rn?

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2

house arrest in Peking, the agreement of the

should

Hong Kong Government/be sought to suspend

further visits to members of the New China

News Agency (N.C.N.A.) in prison in Hong Kong.

ARGUMENT AND BACKGROUND

Restrictions

There has

3. The annexe to this submission gives details of the

measures in force against British subjects in China and

against the Chinese in London, together with possible methoda

of tightening or relaxing pressure on the Chinese.

been some improvement in our position in Peking in that

Queen's Messengers have been allowed in and out without

difficulty, and mail addressed to the Mission through the

open post is arriving. Restriction on movement, however,

remains very severe and the Chinese are deliberately dis-

criminating in this against Mr. Hopson. In general, life

remains extremely unpleasant and our staff in Peking are far

worse off than the Chinese staff in London. Mr. Anthony Grey,

the Reuters Correspondent, remaine incommunicado under house

arrest and persistent efforts to gain consular access to him

have failed. A British engineer, Mr. Watt, who is working on

the Vickers/Zimmer project at Lanchow, has been arrested, charged with
"illegal activities outside the contract" and

is being held at Lanchow.

4. In the wider context, the situation in China seems to

be developing in a direction which may be favourable to us.

The Secretary of State's message to the Chinese Foreign Minister

delivered on 2 September has not been rejected or castigated

/in the

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in the official press and the Chinese have thus so far

avoided making the acceptance of their demands over Hong

Kong a formal condition for an improvement in relations.

There is strong evidence to indicate that the Prime Minister,

Chou En-lai, and Chiang Ch'ing (Mrs. Mao Tse-tung) have both

condemned the burning of our Mission, though their condemnation

may be no more than an ex post facto attempt to dissociate

the Chinese Government from an action, the consequences of

which they have found embarrassing • Chou En-lai has also

reportedly taken direct charge of the running of the Foreign

Ministry and may be exerting some moderating influence on

Chinese policy in general. At the same time, the leaders of

the Cultural Revolution are making strenuous attempts to bring

the campaign under more control. In Hong Kong the situation

has calmed down The Chinese National Day has passed off

without very serious incident; and the Chinese have, in

accordance with their contract, restored the water supply

from the mainland to the Colony. There is good evidence that

an influential section of the local communist leadership,

probably reflecting more rational elements of the leadership

on the mainland, wishes to turn from the present policy of

violence to a longer-term propaganda campaign. If this trend

continues, there is therefore some hope of a gradual improve-

ment in our relations with China.

5. In such circumstances, women and children and those

requiring medical attention, and thereafter the rest of the

staff, might be allowed to leave Peking though there is no

/indication

+

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indication of how long this might take. A tightening of

restrictions on the Chinese in this country or other forms

of pressure against China would be likely to retard rather

than accelerate this process. In any case, action against

the Chinese Mission in London would be unlikely to affect

the Chinese Government except in the direction of making

life for our people in Peking still more unpleasant. Other

forms of pressure, e.g. economic sanctions or the blocking

of Chinese sterling in London, would be very difficult to

carry out and unlikely to be helpful.

6.

The

Admittedly, if further measures were taken against us

in Peking, tougher measures here would become essential.

least objectionable from the point of view of our Mission in

Peking might be to P.N.G. some of the Chinese. The Indonesians

did so, and the Chinese responded by expelling two of the

Indonesian Mission in Peking; but we cannot be sure this

would happen to us.

7. On the other hand, if we are right in our deduction that

the trend, both on the mainland and in Hong Kong, is now more

favourable, a relaxation of restrictions might be better

calculated to secure our most important objective of freedom

of exit for our staff in Peking. It would be very welcome to

the Home Office, since nearly 90 members of the uniformed and Special
Branches are employed on surveillance and allied tasks,

this being the minimum necessary for effective functioning.

We understand that the Home Secretary may shortly approach us

about a reduction in police duties. A relaxation would also

/be

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Flag ▲

be welcome to businessmen. The Chinese have already

claimed (without real justification) that police restric-

tions are making it difficult for their Commercial Office

to function and are implying to British businessmen that a

drop in Sino-British trade would be attributable to this

cause. Any immediate unilateral relaxation of restrictions

would, however, be very difficult to justify in Parliament

and before public opinion. In his letter of 20 September,

Kr. Hopson has argued that we should now tell the Chinese

that we had decided on a relaxation but on the strict under-

standing that reciprocity would be given in Faking. There

is the objection that, if there was no reciprocal relaxation

in Peking, we might even so have difficulty in persuading

the Home Office to agree to a re-imposition of measures.

any case, I consider that relaxation at this time would be

premature. We should first await the result, if any, of

the approach of the Pakistan Minister of Information to the

Chinese leaders about the release of our women and children,

which he is making at the Secretary of State's request; and

we should allow ourselves a little time to see whether the

present trend of events in China and Hong Kong continues.

For this reason it is recommended that, except in the parti-

cular case of Mr. Grey, and in a minor matter concerning Chinese
nationals in this country (discussed below), no

action to tighten or relax restrictions should be taken

pending a further review in about two weeks time.

/Mr. Grey

In

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Mr. Grey

8.

Representations have been made on a number of occasions

to secure consular access to Mr. Grey. The latest followed

a visit to an N.C.N.▲. journalist imprisoned in Hong Kong

by his wife and two colleagues. Mr. Hopson has recommended

that in the absence of any progress over Mr. Grey, future

visits to N.C.N.A. personnel under detention in Hong Kong

should be stopped. This may involve some change in the regu-

lations as, normally, sentenced prisoners are entitled to

monthly visits. We could ask the Hong Kong Goverment to

suspend visits for the time being, but the decision will have

to rest with them in the light of local conditions. Mr. Rodgers

has invited Mr. Grey's mother to call on him on 19 October.

Mr. Chipp of Reuters, who will himself deliver the invitation

to Mrs Grey, will explain the present position and say that

we consider publicity in this country on her son's behalf

might be harmful to him. Mr. Chipp will also speak to the

local newspaper in Norwich (where Mr. Grey used to work) on

the same lines.

Mr. Watt

9. Mr. Hopson has already asked for information and for

consular access to Mr. Watt (paragraph 3 above). Unfortunately,

on past form, it is unlikely that he will obtain either. It

is still not clear why Kr. Watt has been arrested. The most

likely reason is that when his wife left China recently, the

Chinese Custome found in her possession various private letters from
engineers in Lanchow, a report from the leader to the

/firm

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- 7 -

firm, and some photographs of Lanchow Airport. Mr. Deckart,

a German engineer, also working on the project, was arrested

some weeks ago for "suspected espionage". Vickers/Zimmer

are asking the Chinese State Corporation concerned (Techimport)

to intervene with the authorities on behalf of Messrs. Watt

and Deckart. We do not consider that any retaliatory action

against Chinese nationals in this country would be likely to

help Mr. Watt's position. We are, however, asking the Home

Office to request Chief Constables in the course of their

Autumn census of foreign nationals to see how many Chinese

they have on their books, against the possibility of future

action against Chinese nationals as a whole.

Love Murray.

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ANNEX

RELATIONS WITH CHINA

easureb in force against British Subjects in Chipa

(a) The British Office

Our office buildings in Peking were almost totally

destroyed, although it is still possible to use the

diplomatic wireless equipment. The Chargé d'Affaires'

house was also ransacked but some rooms are being

repared for use by the Chinese staff of our Mission.

The Mission itself is now operating from one of the

residential flats in a large diplomatic compound

about a quarter of a mile from the Office buildings.

Our Office compound and buildings in Shanghai have

been acized.

(b) Kovement

The members of our Mission are restricted to

the area of the diplomatic compound and the Office

Block together with the road connecting the two places. To go anywhere
outside this area (including to other foreign diplomatic missions) they
must ask

permission 48 hours in advance.

Some of their

requests have been approved but many others, including social calls on
foreign ambassadors, have been refused. All the members of the Mission
require exit visas from

the Chinese Government before leaving the country. Applications for
visas for all members of the staff (and later for women and children and
for ten individuals on medical grounds) have been made, but

the only exit visas granted since the events of

/22 August

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2

22 August have been for five schoolchildren who vare

spending their holidays in Peking.

(c) Baggage

Since May the Chinese have refused to pack or

transport the belongings of any members of our

Mission. There has, however, been no serious delay

to incoming goods.

(d) Reuters

The Reuters correspondent in Peking has been under

house arrest since 21 July and incommunicado since

19 August. Our Office in Peking have made a number

of requests for accesa, the latest shortly after a

New China News Agency journalist imprisoned in Hong

Kong had been visited by his wife and representatives

of the Agency but there has so far been no reply.

(e) Engineers

One British engineer (Mr. Watt) working for

Vickers, who are building a plant in Lanchow (north-

west China) is being held under arrest by the Chinese

in Lanchow pending investigation into letters and

documents which the Chinese say that his wife was

trying to snuggle out of China. (A German engineer

working on the same Vickers plant is also being held

for alleged "illegal activities".)

(f) Banks

The Shanghai Branch Office of the Hong Kong and

Shanghai Bank has been having difficulties about exit

and entry visas for some time but their problems do

not seem to have worsened recently.

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/2.

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2.

With the exception of exit visas, which the Chinese have

required for many years, the restrictions placed on our Mission

were said by the Chinese to be in retaliation for those which

we placed on the Chinese in London on 22 August. These

restrictions and a generally uncooperative attitude make life

for our Mission in Peking extremely hard, but their station

does not seem to have worsened appreciably since the end of

August. The position of the Reuters correspondent has likewise

remained unchanged for over a month. Mr. Watt's position has,

however, worsened. He was detained in Peking from 7 September;

on 26 September he was taken to Lanchow "under arrest for

illegal activities outside the contract".

Measures in force against the Chinese in London

3. (a) The Chinese Mission

On 22 August the Chinese Charge was told that the

following restrictions would be applied immediately:

(1) No Chinese officials would be allowed to

leave this country without obtaining exit

visas from the Foreign Office.

(11) The movement of Chinese officials would be

restricted to an area of five miles radius

from Karble Arch.

To travel outside this

area it would be necessary to inform the

Foreign Office 48 hours in advance.

(111) The Chinese Mission should cease immediately

using its diplomatic wireless facilities.

(b) N.C.N.A.

All members of the N.C.N.A. office are subjected

to the restrictions at (1) and (11) above.

Since July

/wo

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4.

we have also postponed approval for any new entry

visas for members of the N.C.N.A. office and have also

Those

given no response to applications by three members of

the Office to renew their residence permits.

concerned are, however, still in this country.

(c) Bank of China

Expatriate officials of the Bank of China are also

subjected to the restrictions at (1) and (ii) above.

We have also postponed approval for entry visas for the Manager and
Deputy Manager of the Bank of China (both

of whom were in China on leave) in retaliation for

difficulties created by the Chinese over entry and

exit visas for the Manager and Deputy Manager in

Shanghai of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank.

Enforcement of the restrictions applied against the

Chinese has put a heavy burden on the strained resources of

the Special and the Uniformed Branches of the police.

A total of 88 police and Special Branch officers are employed

full time on watching and protecting the Chinese Office.

New Measures which could be applied against the Chinose

5. The following are some measures which we could apply

against the Chinese if we wished to tighten our restrictions,

together with an indication of the difficulties involved.

(a) Movement

We could either confine the Chinese to their

respective office buildings or to certain specific

streets between their offices and residences, thus

bringing them into line with the restrictions on our

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/people

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people in Peking.

Such restrictions would be no harder

to enforce than the present ones.

(b) Baggage

We could delay indefinitely Customs clearance for

all incoming Chinese baggage. It would be administratively

harder but possible to do the same for outgoing baggage,

although it is unlikely that the Chinese have much of

this.

(c) Buildings

We might be able to evict the Chinese Commercial

department from its office building in retaliation

for their confiscation of our Office in Shanghai.

This building is on Crown lease. All their other

buildings are, however, leased privately from different

landlords and there would be insuperable administrative

and probably legal difficulties in curtailing the leases.

It would also probably be necessary to force an entry

and physically eject the Chinese in order to dispossess

them. To do so would first require a withdrawal by legislative procedure
of the personal immunity ɗ those

of

concerned. Even were this done, the Chinese would not

accept it and a violent incident similar to or worse

than the "Battle of Portland Place" would probably occur.

(d) Expulsion

We could declare P.N.G. some or all of the Chinese

Mission, selecting if necessary the six major culprits

of the "Battle of Portland Place" on 29 August. It is

unlikely that those declared P.N.G. would refuse to go

but, if they did, and took refuge in the Chinese Mission,

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we would be faced with the problem of ather leaving

them there, or removing them by force or expelling them

by force if they ever emerged from the building.

(e)

Harassment of Ordinary Chinese Citizens in the

United Kingdom

There are about 2,500 Chinese in this country with

Chinese People's Republic passports, who are registered

as aliens with the police.

It would be possible to

trace all such persons, to arrange for the police to

call on them and even possibly require them to report

to a police station. The labour involved in tracing

them would be considerable, while calling on them or

requiring them to report at police stations would add

a further burden to police duties. The Home Office

are most reluctant to do any preliminary work unless

we wish to propose some specific move against Chinese

citizens as a whole. They might, however, be prepared

to ask Chief Constables in the course of their annual

autumn census of aliens to see how many Chinese they

have on their books. Action against ordinary Chinese

citizens in this country would be unlikely to influence

the Chinese Government to treat British subjects in

China more reasonably; indeed it might cause them to

be more unpleasant to businessmen and others. For this

reason and because we are likely to encounter strong

Home Office opposition, we do not think that harassment

of the kind referred to would be worthwhile.

(f) Sterling

The Chinese use sterling for much of their foreign

trade,

At present they hold about £10 million in sterling

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in London, but the figure fluctuates and is sometimes

much higher.

Theoretically we could freeze these sterling

holdings, but in practice there are very strong reasons

against doing so. To act against Chinese sterling holders

would affect the confidence of other sterling holders

and also their trade, in sterling with China. It

would require the use of special legislation which the

Treasury are only permitted to call into play when

there is a threat from the country concerned to British

economic interests.

6. An additional and major problem involving all further

restrictions on the Chinese here is the effect this would have

on our Mission in Peking. In almost all cases this would make

their position even worse than it is at present. Realising

this, Mr. Hopson has advised strongly against further restric-

tions. The only exception is (d) which might well cause the

Chinese to act similarly against an equal number of our staff

in Peking. By expelling the Chinese Chargé and another diplomat

from Djakarta, the Indonesians secured the expulsion of their

Charge and a member of his staff from Peking.

Possible Wave of Relaxing Pressure on the Chinese in London

7.

(a) Travel

We could increase the travel limits either to the

direct equivalent of former Chinese practice in Peking,

1.e. 12 miles, or to the previous London limit of

35 miles.

This could also be done selectively by

e.g. first relaxing the restriction on the Bank of China

or N.C.N.A.

(b) Diplomatic wireless

We are now able to use our own diplomatic wireless

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/in

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in Peking again and there is no particular reason why

the theoretical restriction on the Chinese here

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