Therefor
3. Ihad some time ago) suggested to
Ministers that the policy we should aim at in-relation to the Chinase
was reciprocity by
relaxation rather than by escalation, but although this was accepted as
a general
principle it was thought too early to put it into practice in the light
of the Grey, Watt (and Knight)cases and of the stringent
now
restrictions still placed upon you and your
staff.
4.
I am considering advising that the matter
* be reviewed. A possible straw in the
wind on the Chinese side is that after a
long-silence they are now letting it be known
to certain United Kingdom business firma that
they will be welcome at the Canton Fair (full- details of this as soon
as available wil""
be telegraphed to you). Although this can
hardly be construed as a Chinese relaxation
it could be used as the occasion for us to
show a little "give". We cannot yet show.
/this
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
013004 Gp.25.1
+
consider
going
this to the commercial members of the mission
proper but we could withdraw pelic surveillance
مدله
on the Bank of China officials and at the
same time-let them know that any applications
by them to travel outside the five mile
radius would be sympathetically considered,
We should have of course to maintain the visa
requirement for exit from this country.
A
5. If Ministers are prepared to proceed "
with this how do you think that we should put
it to the Chinese? One possibility is simply
to remove the police restrictions and say
nothing.
Another is to tell the Chinese.
to
*
will
that we are doing so,, explain that we can go
further it
no sleuing, ub they show some sign
reaprouty
of willin mese to relax their own restri
G
o
F
tione, and repeat the offer which I have already
Λ
made on several occasions to the Chinese
mission here to discuss the diamantling of restrictions in general Eas
6.
I am not in favour of the first
alternative because I think that the Chinese
would simply take the concession as a right
I am by no and give us no credit for it.
means sure that they will give us any credit even if we adopt the second
alternative. But I think at least that we should try to
get the thought into the Chinese offici ? mind that we are prepared to
be Bensible and
that if they want to be sensible too we ein
make some headway, vde mutual retraži
7.
ve
If Qizving testdod ta withdr
the Bank of Thing af
were to say anything to the Chinese do you think it better to say it
here or in Feking?
:
1710 71.2~
/The
1
PHL033009 (36.843
C
C
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
The problem about saying it here is as you
know that it has so far been impossible to
have any rational business discussion with
Shen P'ing. Do you think that you night
fare better at your end?
8 If all this is agreed, and you will
understand that it is subject to ministerial
approval, I would not propose to make any public announcement, although
the fact that we
had withdrawn our surveillance on the Bank
of China would almost immediately become
public knowledge. Our objective would be not,
repeat not, to give too open an impression
that we were trying to capitalise on the
concession we had made, but at the same time
but
in answer to questions, whather in the prees cast qualismanty to inject
the thought that the matching of a little sense on one side
Could
with
a little sense on the other or did up
to a lot of sense in the end.
h
27/10
-
1
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NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
Registry No.
DEPARTMENT
FE. FE3/201
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION PRIORITY MARKINGS
Top Secret
(Date).......
• Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should
reach addressec(a)
Despatched
Confidential
Priority
Unaided
HE
100
PRIVACY MARKING
In Confidence
EXLITH.
4
Cypher
Draft Telegram to:-
PEKING
No...
916
ation]
[Sect
'Security classification -if any
[ Privacy marking
-if any
[Codeword-if any]..
Addressed to
telegram No.
And to
LILIITTI
יד
]
1
MILI
11/20
PILIJJILL.
-----
CONFIDENTIAL
.....
LPEKING
(date)
IIJJLI ----. 11 TROPI
IL-LILI
(Date) 27/10 repeated for information to
And to:-
LIILI LII LIII TIL
..
1170-
------------
POLILL-
H-LINI LII
ZITII.--I---------drama-------ILIIN Lapto▬
-----
IPLIJIO‒‒‒----+
Saving to....
. | POSS.. ----
Repeat to:-
Saving to:-
Your telegram 166.
Following from de la Mare.
at official level
We have for some time been considering the
us
possibility of a quiet unabateret lifting of the
restrictions against the Chinese in London.
Your
unilaterally
letter of 20 October also refers. There is ♣
thimic no question of our being able to get agreement
to relax the restrictions on the mission proper
on NCNA, evenit:
Distribution:- Files
Mu de la Mare FE.D.
Copies to:-
steveż we wished
this which 1 a... 1
"not prepared to do a
(see porn 3 below)
the mos
7 But the Home Office have been
representing to us the cost t
(manpower) ir
maintaining surveillance over all the official
are
Chinese here and we have been considering the
possibility of taking those surveillance off
the members of the Bank of Chinasboth at timpang ga
EXAMINED AT /3400/27/10 residence in Hampstent ant at the office.
1720777192
SIGNATURE
/would
This
Tof
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
DL033009 Gr.343
would release about a quarter of the total
police force now engaged on these duties.
2. Our reason for picking the Bank of China
Dèfficials as our first possible step in
Jí
palexation is that we consider them to be on a
rather different footing from the mission
proper and the NCNA in that They have shown
no overt sign of animosity, have made no
trouble, and give the appearance of wanting
to be left in peace to get on with their
legitimate business (eetivities) Our own
business interests have been representing
to us to pee that we should ease
the restrictions on them.
3.
Therefore
I//some time ago suggested to
Kinisters, that the policy we should aim at
in-relation to the Chinese was reciprocity by
relaxation rather than by escalation, but
although this was accepted as a general
principle it was thought too early to put it
into practice in the light of the Grey, Watt
and Knight) cases and of the stringent restrictions still placed upon
you and your
staff.
I am considering advising that the matter
be reviewed. A possible straw in the
wind on the Chinese aide is that top t
long silence they are now letting it be known
to certain United Kingdom business firms that
they will be welcome at the Canton Fair (full
details of this as soon as available will
be telegraphed to you).
Although this can
17907?7102
hardly be construed as a Chinese relaxation
it could be used as the occasion for us to
show a little "give".
We cannot yet show /thie
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
17A 71-3=
04.033009 G6363
Insider going
this to the commercial members of the mission
proper but we could withdraw pali surveillance
also
on the Bank of China officials and at the
sume time-let them know that any applicatione
by them to travel outside the five mile
would
radius w be aympathetically considered.
Glit
We should have of course to maintain the visa
requirement for exit from this country,
5. If Ministers are prepared to proceed
with this how do you think that we should put
it to the Chinese? One possibility is simply
to remove the police restrictions and say
nothing. Another is to tell the Chinese will
to
A
that we are doing so,,explain that we on SO
further it
"en" ddeung, w they show some sign
reciprocity
of willinfnene to palax their om rastrie
siese, and repeat the offer which I have already
made on several occasions to the Chinese
mission here to discuss the dismantling of restrictions in general, Emb
6.
I am not in favour of the first
alternative because I think that the Chinese
would simply take the concession as a right
and give us no credit for it. I am by no
means sure that they will give us any credit
even if we adopt the second alternative.
But I think at least that we should try to
get the thought into the Chinese s
mini that we are prepared to be sensible and
that if they want to be sensible too we can
our mutual relationes)
If Дhaving decided to w
make some headway, Em
7.
-on the Bank of
A
were to say anything to the Chinese do you
think it better to say it here or in Peking?
/The
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
DL133009 GA.143
The problem about saying it here is as you
know that it has so far been impossible to
have any rational business discussion with
Shen P'ing. Do you think that you might
fare better at your end?
8 If all this is agreed, and you will
understand that it is subject to ministerial
approval, I would not propose to make any
ic announcement, although the fact that we
had withdrawn our surveillance on the Bank
of China would almost immediately become
public knowledge. Our objective would be not,
repeat not, to give to open an impression
that we were trying to capitalise on the
concession we had made,but at the same time
in answer to questions, whether in the grees
pandiamanty to inject the thought that
be matching of a little sense on one side with
could be a little sense on the other hat 311 up
to a lot of sense in the end.
Files Xerox + 9
hin
27/10
FED
K. De és Have
1
เ
I the Badlig
1 Rug SADR
1
F2.3/20/89
CONFIDENTIAL
AMENDED DISTRIBUTION
31 OCTOBER,
1967
Cypher/Cat A
PRIORITY FOREIGN OFFICE TO PEKING
Telno 916 27 October, 1967 (F.E.)
CONFIDENTIAL
Your telegram No. 166.
Following from de la Mare.
We have for some time been considering at official level the possibility
of a quiet lifting of the restrictions against the Chinese in London.
Your letter of 20 October also refers. There is no question of our being
able to get agreement unilaterally to relax the restrictions on the
mission proper or on NCNA, (see paragraph 3 below). But the Home Office
have been representing to us the manpower cost of maintaining
surveillance over all the official Chinese here and we are considering
the possib..... ility of taking surveillance off the members of the Bank
of China. This would release about a quarter of the total police force
now engaged on these duties.
2.
Our reason for picking the Bank of China is that we consider them to be
on a rather different footing from the mission proper and the NCNA. They
have shown no overt sign of animosity, have made no trouble, and give
the appearance of wanting to be left in peace to get on with their
legitimate business. Our own business interests have been representing
to us that we should ease the restrictions on them,
3. I therefore suggested to Ministers some time ago that the policy we
should aim at was reciprocity by relaxation rather than by escalation,
but although this was accepted as a general principle it was thought too
early to put it into practice in the light of the Grey, Watt (and now
Knight) cases and of the stringent restrictions still placed upon you
and your staff.
4. I am considering advising that the matter be reviewed. ▲ possible
straw in the wind on the Chinese side is that they are now letting it be
known to certain United Kingdom business firms that they will be welcome
at the Canton Fair (full details of this as soon as available will be
tale- graphed to you). Although this can hardly be construed as à
Chinese relaxation it could be used as the occasion for us to show a
little "give". We cannot yet show this to the commercial members of the
mission proper but we bould withdraw surveillance on the Bank of China
officials and
CONFIDENTIAL
/also
CONFIDENTIAL
Foreign Office telegram No. 916 to Peking
-2-
also let them know that any applications by them to travel outside the
five mile radius would be sympathetically considered. We would have of
course to maintain the exit visa requirement.
5. If Ministers are prepared to proceed with this how do you think that
we should put it to the Chinese? One possibility is simply to remove the
police restrictions and say nothing.
Another is to tell the Chinese that we are doing so, to explain that we
will consider going further if they show some sign of reciprocity and to
repeat the offer which I have already made on several occasions to the
Chinese mission here to discuss the dis- mantling of restrictions in
general.
6. I am not in favour of the first alternative because I think that the
Chinese would simply take the concession as a right and give us no
credit for it. I am by no means sure that they will give us any credit
even if we adopt the second alternative. But I think at least that we
should try to get the thought into the Chinese mind that we are prepared
to be sensible and that if they want to be sensible too we can make some
headway.
7. If we were to say anything to the Chinese do you think it better to
say it here or in Peking? The problem about saying it here is as you
know that it has so far been impossible to have any rational business
discussions with Shon P'ing. Do you think that you might fare better at
your end?
8. If all this is agreed, and you will understand that it is subject to
ministerial approval, I would not propose to make any publio
announcement, although the fact that we had withdrawn our surveillance
on the Bank of China would almost immediately become publio knowledge.
Our objective would be not, repeat not, to give too open an impression
that we were trying to capitalise on the concession we had made, but at
the same time, in answer to questions, to inject the thought that the
matching of a little sense on one side with a little sense on the other
could add up to a lot of sense in the end.
SOSRA
FILES
F.0. Head F.E.D.
Sir D.Allen
P.S.
P.8.D.
P.U.S.
bbbbb
Hr.de la Mare Sir.C.Crowe
Mr.M.E.Allen
P.U.8.9.(Mr.Rodgers) Head Personnel Dept
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFILLATIAL
(FC 3/20)
7
ද
20/10
ро
POREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.
20 October, 1967.
pa the
You wrote to de la Mare on 11 October about an approach which Frank
Kearton of Courtaulda had made on the possible desirability of relaxing
our restraints on the Chinese ia London.
a
2. On Learton's instructions, Savill and Lambert, two senior members of
the Courtaulės group, called on me on 17 Cetobar to discuss the problem.
They made very much the same points cearton had made to you. They put
the possible extent of Courtaulda' business in fibres and chemicals with
China et about 13 millions for next year. They were, however, rather
more specific than Kearton about their anxieties. They reported that
their Chinese guests at luncheon had said that as a result of our
restraints it had become impossible for the Chinese Gʻrice to do
business; and that so long as it remained impossible to do business they
could not negotiate Courtaulds' business for next year. Javill said that
the Chinese were particularly irked by what they regarded as the "seige"
of their office in Portland Pluce. He went on to question whether our
five-mile limit was in any sense en effective sanction. He naked
whether, even if we retained it, it was still necessary to have police
surveillance on the present scale. He suggested that, since our policy
of restraints was not producing satis- factory results, we might
consider whether a relaxation on our part would bring some corresponding
relaxation by the Chinese. He was, however, honest snough to admit that
at no time in their conversation had the Chinese given any firm
indication that this would be the case.
3. In the course of a fairly long and detailed conversation I made the
following principal points:
(a) H.M.G. were most enxious that there should be no unnecessary
impediments in the way of Anglo-Chinese trade and that conditions should
be brought back to normal as soon as possible. We understood Courtaulds'
concern about thei: business which was valuable n.t only to them but
also as a contribution to our export figures. But Anglo-Chinese trade
was only one aspect of Anglo-Chinese relations. The problem of
restraints had to be viewed in the context also of the treatment of our
Mission in sking and the situation in Kong Kong.
/(6)
G. J. NeoMahon, Esq., C.B., C.M.O.,
Board of Trade,
↑ Victoria Street, 8.W.1.
CONFIDENTIAL
Alen
a
26/0
•
CONFIDENTIAL.
- 2 -
(b) Conditions for our Mission remained intolerable. They were subject
to restraints of a severity in no sense comparable to the restraints we
imposed on the Chinese. Koreover a number of exit visas, applied for on
medionl grounds, were being withheld. There was also the matter of Gray,
the Reuters correspondent in detention in Peking. had only a very
limited armoury with which to try to induce the Chinese to behave more
correctly. Restraints on the Chinese kission were the only available
sanction directly related to the treatment of our Mission in Peking.
It was understandable that we should wish to have reasonable grounde for
expecting some relief for our Mission before we could contemplate
removing the restraints on the Chinese Mission here.
(o) No doubt the Chinese found our surveillance at Fortland Place
irksoze, and were determined to extract the naximm propaganda value from
it. On the other hand I felt sure that for many people in this country
the surveillance was welcome as evidence that we were not acquiescing in
the treatment being meted out to our kission in Peking.
(d) If the five-mile limit were to be effective it had to be enforced;
and we had good reason for believing that if they were not under
surveillance, the Chinese would dis- regard it.
(e) Once restrictions had been relaxed it would be difficult to reimpose
them even if there had been no Chinese response. Reisposition would be
described by the Chinese as a new provocation and inke the situation
worse than before.
די
(f) Chinese behaviour certainly did not facilitate our making
concessions. Public opinion would, for example, find it difficult to
understand any announcement of relaxation in restraints just after we
had had to complain to the Chinese about the abduction of a British
police inspector in Hong Kong.
(a) e accepted that our policy of restraints would not result in a
public climb-down by the Chinese. But they had only to indicata by
sysading up the grant of exit visas that they wanted a return to a more
normal state of affairs, and we would be quick to respond. I hoped that
when the Chinese complained to British businesssen about our
restrictions, british businessmen would point out how easily the
situation could be remedied.
(h) Our policy of restraints was under constant review in relation to
the objects we wished to achieve.
Since Savill played up the warmth of the welcome which had been granted
to their technicians who had recently gone to Lanchow, I thought it
right to tell him that a British
/engineer
CLAYIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
3
engineer from another firm was at present under arrest in Lanchow and
that we had been refused either information about him or consular
acoses. (Lambert interrupted to say that he had heard about the trouble
Viokers-Zinner were having.) I remarked that Courtaulds' approach to us
right have been on different lines if they had bad the misfortune to
have one of their engineers arrested and kept incommunicado for what was
possibly no more than indiscretion. Savill emið that he fully understood
this.
5. The whole conversation was cordial and I hope that I successfully
steered a middle course, without on the one hand appearing to
underestimate the importance of our trade, and in particular Courtaulds'
trade, with China, and on the other under-playing the other aspects of
which H... had to take account. (I admit however to a little irritation
at one point at the implication that there was no need for undue concern
about the treatment of our staff in Peking since this was an
occupational hazard!) I expressed the hope that Savill and Lambert would
assure Kearton that we were fully aware of the importance of their
problem and ware constantly seeking ways out of the present impasse in
our relations with China.
asked that they keep us in close touch with any developments in their
own dealings with the Chinese Office here.
(Jansa Kurray) fur Zestern Lesartzent
CONFIDENTIAL
C
¡
I
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31
27 OCT 1967