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RECEIVED
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Mr. Rodgers
FC3/20
Restrictions on the Chinese
I agree that we should make the first,
unilateral gesture.
2. Intellectually one has a preference for Course B in paragraph 10 of
Mr. Muttay's minute. It would be satisfactory to say to the Chinese that
we would be prepared unilaterally to go back to their pre-August
procedures. But I agree with the Department in thinking that the
Chinese, with a perverse logic, would argue that the equivalent of their
pre-August procedures in Peking would be our pre-August procedures in
London. Like the Department I am less confident than Mr. Hopson that
this offer will produce results, but I think we must take some action in
the slightly more favourable climate that has ensued, and I would hope
Ministers would feel that Course C would be sufficiently defensible in
the circumstances.
3.
I therefore support the recommendation in favour of Course C.
I dicklin by P.v.5. and diged
(P.H. Gore-Booth) 3 November, 1967
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д
SECRETARY OF STATE
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I agree that we should take a chance and
that any gesture should be significant.
We can
hold it in Parliament and elsewhere if:
(1) we don't make a fuss about it (and
ensure that the Home Office don't
do so either);
(ii)
we make it clear, if pressed, that we
shall impose restrictions again if
there is no response from Peking or
more trouble there;
(111) we don't appear to become complacent
about Grey. It would be reassuring
if Mr. Hopson turned his mind to his
plight and came up with some suggestions.
While appreciating the morale problem, it
wouldn't look too good if the staff of
the Mission were living it up on week-end
/trips
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2
DO
trips to the Great Wall while Grey
languishes and perhaps goes quietly
out of his mind.
pp. Kgasense
William Rodgers
6 November, 1967.
Copied to:
Permanent Under-Secretary Mr. de la Mare Mr. James Murray
Shope
bonday
18 right about this.
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Sir B. Frand thought the bast
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by raising this in
Cabuust
he thought Mt Brown should sand
Buck frost
The war day.
minute to that
P.M. Explanning the proposal and suggesting that he
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inform
inform his
Cabnist Mangues on Thursday,
смотрият
the P.M. har
140
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This has been done.
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RECEIVED N
•RCHIVES No 31
Co
kr. de la Karš~
FC3/201
CHINA: RELAXATION OF RESTRICTIONS
Problem
The Chargé d'Affaires in Peking has recommended that
it is time for a unilateral relaxation of the restrictions
on the Chinese Lission here, and that such relaxation, if it
is to be effective in securing some reciprocal relief for
our kission in Peking, must be substantial. The problem is
to decide if Mr. Hopson's assessment is correct and if so
what form our relaxation should take.
Recommendations
2.
I recommend that
(a) the time has now come for a unilateral relaxation;
(b) relaxation should take the form of lifting the
travel restrictions (and the accompanying surveillance)
imposed on the Chinese kission last August and a
return to the 35-mile travel limit with effect from
12 November.
(c) Kr. Hopson should inform the Chinese one week in
advance and express the hope that this indication
of our willingness to work back to a more normal
state of relations will be matched from the Chinese
side.
Background and Argument
3.
Before the sacking of our office, the treatment accorded
to the respective Missions was this:
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/(a)
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2
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(a) Chinese regulations and practice required
-
advance permission (difficult to obtain
and frequently refused) for travel beyond 121
miles (except to certain historical sites);
exit permits.
(b) British regulations and practice required
advance notification for travel beyond 35 miles,
and permission rarely refused;
no exit permits.
Thus the reciprocity was by no means exact.
4.
Consequent upon the sacking we imposed additional restric-
and the Chinese (who even before the
tions on the Chinese;
sacking of the Mission had in effect instituted the exit "freeze"
by claiming that there were no available seats in transport out
of Peking) riposted by a further tightening of restrictions on
our Mission to the point of making its work practically
impossible. The present position is this:
(a) British regulations and practice involve
-
advance notification for travel beyond 5 miles,
enforced by police surveillance;
exit permits.
(b) Chinese regulations and practice involve
- advance permission (sometimes refused) for travel
beyond the area of the Mission's dwellings and
temporary offices;
- refusal of exit permits (except for some school-
children and two pregnant wives).
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15.
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Flag A
5.
Mr. Hsueh, Deputy Head of the West European Department
of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has indicated to
Mr. Hopson that there can be no easing of their present
restrictions i.e. in practice no exit visas
-
until we
have lifted our August restrictions (Peking telegram No. 166).
They thus completely disregard the reason for cur additional
restrictions, the sacking of the Office, and argue that since
we were the first to impose additional restrictions in August,
we must be the first to relax them. This is of course an
infuriating half-truth, but rational argument is not going to
dislodge the Chinese from this position.
Flags B & C 6. In his telegrame No. 193 and No. 194 (prompted by Foreign
FLAG D Office telegram No. 916), Mr. Hopson himself strongly sustains
the view that there is no prospect of relief for the Mission
until we have taken the initiative in making a unilateral
relaxation of the restrictions. He thinks that the present
is a good time for a move towards a mutual dismantling of
restrictions: the "moderates" seem to be gaining control in
the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Chinese would
presumably welcome some show of a return to normality in time
for the Canton Trade Fair due this month. He seems convinced,
on the basis of his conversation with Mr. Hsueh, that the
Chinese have as good as indicated that if we were to take the
initiative in starting the process of relaxation, the Chinese
would match our action. He argues, however, that this
favourable situation may not laat and that we must take
advantage of it now. His tone suggests that he is somewhat
/concerned
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concerned at the state of morale in the kission in the face
of our continued failure to make any progress towards more
normal conditions. He is sure that the Chinese could never
be brought to negotiate a procedure of reciprocal relaxations;
but he considers that if we were to decide on the first step
and give the Chinese advance notification, they would
if our
action was substantial enough
part.
-
respond with action on their
7. I would not wish to take serious issue with the main lines
of Kr. Hopson's argument. Our restrictions are not, and cannot
be, of such severity and effectiveness as to force a change of
policy on the Chinese. They could sit things out indefinitely.
We cannot. I share kr. Hopson's view that we must now get
things moving, and that only a unilateral relaxation will
achieve this. I am perhaps less confident than he appears to
be that such a step on our part would be matched on the Chinese
side; but he has had the advantage of direct contact with the
Chinese authorities on this.
8. What should be the scope of our relaxation? We cannot
dispose of the requirement for exit permits. We must now, and
in the foreseeable future, have powers to prevent Chinese
officials from leaving the country if we wish to do so even
taking account of the bolt-hole through southern Ireland.
Any
relaxation must therefore relate to travel restrictions.
9. (Surveillance presents a special problem. It is not a
it is a means of enforcing restrictions. There
seems little doubt that the Chinese would accept that less
/intensive
restriction
-
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intensive surveillance would be a significant gesture on our
part; but they would not, I am sure, accept that it was in any
way to be regarded as a relaxation of the restrictions we
imposed in August. If we extend the travel limit beyond the
present 5 miles, the Home Office would expect us to dispense
with surveillance and to return to the system in operation
when the 35-mile limit was in force, i.e. to rebuke the Chinese
Chargé d'Affaires if any breaches of the notification procedure
came to our notice. I think that we should accept this.)
10. Any relaxation of travel restrictions could be in respect
either of the categories of officials to whom the restrictions
apply or of the distance. But there are only three practical
possibilities:
(a) We might lift the travel restrictions in respect of
the Chinese commercial and banking officials only,
leaving it in force for the "political" members of
the Mission and the staff of the New China News
Agency. This is open to the objection that we
would appear to be moved by purely commercial con-
siderations and not by the welfare of our kission
and of the remaining British community in China as
a whole. Moreover, it would be difficult for the
Chinese to devise a reciprocal move; it might mean
that they would grant exit permits for members of
our Commercial Section only, which could be
embarrassing.
(b) We might increase the limit to 12 miles, plus
certain historic sites, the pre-August limit in
/Peking
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11.
Peking. We could justify this figure as
establishing exact reciprocity with the normal
Chinese regulations in Peking. The Chinese
might well reject this as unsatisfactory, in
that it was not a return to the status quo
ante. They might imply that we were not sincere
in our protestations of wishing to return to
normality in that we had used the events of last
August to impose additional permanent restrictions.
(c) We might return to the pre-August limit of 35 miles.
of these three courses, the objections to (a) seem to me
to be conclusive. The choice between (b) and (c) is not easy.
Course (b) has considerable advantages. Reciprocity is a good
position on which to take a public stand.
Moreover, it gives
us some flexibility in that if the Chinese go some way but not
far enough in their first response, we have something left in
reserve. Also it might be easier to justify to people with
doubts about the prudence of removing completely the August
travel restrictions until we have had some response from the
Chinese side. However Kr. Hopson, whom we consulted, thinks
that only (c) will elicit a full response from the Chinese,
and that there is little point in prejudicing the success of
the operation by taking it in two stages. (Foreign Office
Flags E & F telegram No. 942 and Peking telegram No. 208.) I agree with
him that course (c) holds out the best hope of a speedy improve-
ment in the conditions of the Mission. My choice is therefore (c). I
fully recognise that it is an act of faith (in which
/Mr. Hopson's
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.7
Mr. Hopson's faith is possibly stronger than ours) to expect
the Chinese to respond to our action; but their possible
failure to do so is a risk that I think we shall have to
accept unless we are to remain indefinitely in the present
deadlock.
12.
Would such a relaxation be interpreted as a sign of
weakness and lack of resolution which would encourage the
Chinese to increase the pressure on other fronts? I doubt it.
Mr. Hopson argues that the Chinese have as good as told us
that in the matter of Missions they would like to revert to
normal. He argues that the questions of Mr. Grey (a hostage
for the N.C.N.A. journalists in Hong Kong) and Inspector Knight
(a lever in border negotiations with the Hong Kong authorities)
are and must be kept separate. (I think that this is possibly
But we may
in accord with the Chinese view of the situation.
have difficulty in persuading public opinion here that action
with regard to restrictions on the Chinese in London is unlikely
to affect the fate of Mr. Grey or Inspector Knight one way or
the other.)
13. Indeed the strongest practical objection to the course
recommended is perhaps the difficulty of presenting it in
convincing terms to the public here. I agree with Mr. Hopson
that there should be no public announcement of any decision
to relax the restrictions; but it is bound to come to public
attention almost immediately. Our line with the press and in
Parliament might then be that we had seen indications in
Peking of a desire on the part of the Chinese to return to a
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/more
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more normal state of affairs in their dealings with foreign
countries. The decision to hold the Canton Trade Fair and
in particular the invitations to British business firms,
were further evidence of this. Our additional restrictions
were imposed at a time when there was complete uncertainty
about the future well-being of our Mission. By keeping them
in force for almost three months, we had shown our concern at
the unhappy events of last August. We now thought it time to
demonstrate our readiness to return to a more normal state of
affairs.
14. A consideration that is relevant but not, in my view,
in any sense determining is the desire of the Home Office for
early relief of the present burden on the police.
81 officers,
uniformed and plain clothes, are at present engaged in the
enforcement of our present restrictions, a burden which the
Commissioner of Police is claiming to the Home Office is
intolerable.
مسلمة
Даши Наму
(James Murray)
2 November, 1967
Copies to:
P.U.S.
Sir D. Allen
Mr. Rodgers
I agree with this recommendation.
It is an act of faith,
for our only evidence that the Chinese will respond with
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/equivalent
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FLAG B
equivalent relaxation is a hint given to Mr. Hopson by a
Chinese official. We must also be very careful not to give
the public impression that we are more concerned with the
welfare of our officials than with that of non-official British
subjects held by the Chinese. I therefore do not agree with
the suggestion in paragraph 3 of Mr. Hopson's telegram 193 that
the question of relaxation of restrictions against officials
can be dealt with entirely separately from that of other
British subjects. Mr. Hopson also has his facts wrong in
paragraph 2(b) of that telegram. I have sent him a private
message putting the record straight.
2. But if we are to attempt to get our relations with Chine
back to something like normal one side must be prepared to take
the first step and it seems clear that the Chinese will not.
We must therefore do so. As long as we keep the restriction
that the Chinese concerned cannot leave this country without
an exit visa we can without damage to ourselves lift the police
surveillance and restore the limit of their free travel from
five miles from Marble Arch to thirty-five, as it was before
the sacking of our Mission in Peking. If we start the process
of relaxation, and the Chinese reciprocate, we shall have
created a better atmosphere in which to try to secure the release
of Mr. Grey and others. If the Chinese do not reciprocate we
shall not have lost anything of substance and our public
position will have improved, for we will have shown without any
possible doubt that we are willing to be sensible and that it
/is the
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is the Chinese who are unwilling.
3.
You may wish to discuss this with Mr. Murray and myself.
We are at your disposal.
3. John Lohman
(A.J. de la Mare)
3 November, 1967
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Ar. Rodgers.
I ajith
F
En Clair
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IMMEDIATE PEKING TO FOREIGN OFFICE
Telno 239 14 November, 1967
RECEIVED IN [ARCHIVES No.31 1.NOV 1967
110
TOTO ABPY
UNCLASSIFIED
[F21/14 (210)
Your tele grams Nos. 972 [Relations with China] and 974 [Restrictions on
the Chinese Mission]
Instructions carried out today.
(106,
Mr. Hopson
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION ADVANCE COPIES SENT
F.O. F.E.D.
S.E.A.D.
News Dept
J.I.R.D.
DSAO Personnel Dept
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pa.
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Our reference:
Your reference!
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HOME OFFICE
PRISON DEPARTMENT
Horseferry House, Dean Ryle Street, LONDON S.W.1
RET&tphonet Victoria 6655, ext.
RCHIVES No 31 14 NOV 1967
10th November, 1967
104
109
Dear Murray,
Thank you for your letter of 9th November reporting the Prime Minister's
agreement to police surveillance of Chinese officials ending on 21st
November.
I can confirm that the Home Secretary greatly welcomes this. The
Commissioner
of Police of the Metropolis has been informed and gu soon as we have his
views on
what you say in paragraph 6 of your letter, I will write to you again.
We fully
agree with the line proposed in paragraph 5 as regarda publicity and our
press
office is being told about this.
As you know, the Home Office has a separate interest (i.e. not a police
interest) ip the exit permit requirements.
We may have to get in touch with you
later about the difficulties these requirements raise for us.
Yours sincerely,
R.A. James.
J. Murray, Esq.
We shall have to be from colour. the exit sement quants.
The de lave 10/11
le
По
Ms Wife
Mri
from May
to Not.
No further action
at the moment
ar
ра
Please address any reply to
THE SECRETARY
quote: our référence:
Our Ref:
FC 3/20 38779/67
H.M. CUSTOMS AND EXCISE
King's Beam House, Mark Lane, London Ę.Cig
Telex: 262861
Telephone: MANsion House 1515, ext.
Ipt reply
20. 9821
2.134