Tha
Fina
Type 1 +
27
From
(
J. B. Denson
Telephone No. & Ext.
Registry F./£o
No.
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
Top Secret.
Secret.
Confidential.
Restricted. Unclassified.
PRIVACY MARKING
CONFIDENTIAL
DRAFT Letter
To:- A.R. Ashford, E. C.M.
Gill, Boqr
H.M. Customs and Excise
Kingsbeam House.
Mark have, E.c.3.
In Confidence
Department
J
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
As I think you know, we are very much
concerned about the harassment by the Chinese
of our Mission in Peking. You have probably
read a good deal about some aspects of this in
ofner the press, but some of the more tiresome minor
forms of harasement have never been mentioned
here. One of these is that Chinese packers (who
are to all intents and purposes Government
officials) refuse to pack and transport the
belongings of the members of our staff (including
the Chargé d'Affaires himself). Another is to leave in Peting the
Chinese are deliberately delaying the all mai pusonant
This means
effect, that, those 3 concerns are voligud! пойдий
14. (740)
pasonal possessomi which they cameN Conting in smiřice
Smirum
Furthermore
clearance of baggage and stores (including food
and other essential supplies) for our Mission.
On occasion, the Chinese have even obliged members of the staff to read
quotations from the works farming, homehow of Mao Tse-tung before
allowing goods through
Customs. We cannot hope, nor would we wish, to
retaliate in like manner against such puerile
But wi the part the Man have to me wh
inputs, brom,
gramap mom,
cmiidium toys.
bhaufour me thisy I do, however, think that it
9 Musique Brosik that they might be persuaded perman tumataliept deter
time Chinese from further action to desin from th Sory of Malasınuit ami
and at the some time de
and puramow
DA
With ove
mu
private mirror
cars. I newth
hawty emphassa the incontin Hum
against ou
De actured from some wrise!
bing to buintein Shemale of our own
and frimmed won whi
(i miwum -
we were able to demonstrate that some
/retaliation
Hesponded to Derent activi
CURFIDENTAL agunt mut
own diplomats
CONFIDENTIAL
retaliation was possible against the Chinese
Mission in London.
2. We are already considering separately a
number of measures which we could take, iz London.
We should like to enlist your co-operation in the
field of Customs examination. Would it be
possible, for instance, to adopt "administrative
delay" to hold up the import and export of
unaccompanied baggage by the Office of the
Chinese Chargé d'Affaires in London? We would
not propose to tell the Chinese that this fas
happening, but we would hope that it could be
done in such a way that they were left in no doubt
accidental.
that such delays were not incidental. I
realise that action of this sort would involve
your Customs Officers in some additional work
and in the normal course of events you might feel
reluctant to act against a diplomatic mission.
Yoney
But I wore that you will agree that the Chinese
in their present mood are a special case and that
anything we can do to counteract their uncivilised
Po Rup m
AM)
treatment of our own people would be in
the
3.
thi
Motole of the latter latter
voy mun
mom
pornstar
in the friskick my and poruchal
you
www
I should be gauteful for your commenta on Apne π passion to hus in song
Wony
would prefer to
in song you
discuss the problem
до до
I should be very glad to see you at any time.
Dangulum
criurns tamu mot
cricum
obrimming wi
Perry word boy
CONFIDENTIAL
प्रभु क
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
Mr. Rodgers
CONFIDENTIAL
KFCEIVED IN
AR. HIVES No.31
22 AUG 1967
표3/20
R23/20
28
Subject to my marginal comment on paragraph 3(a)(ii) I
agree with Mr. Denson's recommendations.
2. On the inclusion of the members of the Bank of China in
the general travel restrictions, on which there is a draft note
to the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires' office, there is the point
that we may very soon be telling the Chinese that the area of
free travel is curtailed from 35 miles to 20 kms. from Marble
Arch, and it may be thought that we should not now draw
official attention to the 35 mile radius when we may be about
to restrict it. I do not think this matters: indeed it
would probably impress the Chinese more if we asked them now
to ensure that the members of the Bank of China observe the
present restrictions and then in a separate note later on
reduce, the free travel radius than if we did the two things
reduce
duce
at the same time.
3. On the question of the ordinary Chinese citizens in this
country (paragraph 3(d)) I think it would be useful to know
the whereabouts of these people so that we could take
administrative action against them at short notice if required.
But you may think that since it is going to be difficult enough to
get Home Office cooperation on those points on which we
urgently require it it would be tactically unwise to press them
now to undertake this extra chore which they are clearly
unwilling to do. If we get their agreement on the things we
/want
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
- 7-
want done urgently we might reopen the question of the
ordinary Chinese citizens with them, basing ourselves on the
argument that if our relations with China deteriorate further
considerations of national security will make it necessary to
keep close tabs on these potential enemy aliens.
Mo de la Mare The Deaso Дере
وع
A.J. de herhan
(A.J. de la Mare) 14 August. 1967
ok. The 2,500 Chinese can writ
Section did not wake-out cooperation
altter! # Hom
on this when 5
had a word with him. We showed them to screws
Litt & Hose Office
His and oth Batters
his
t
层
310 ill
Hong Kong a Parking Setrations wonen, if they do.
I would be inclined to Name all
Loved
lo offers of k
bout to restart them
Wien
they really try to discover whether be can
en five
restrictions
Case ?
CONFIDENTIAL
does it math of be have to power
The letter to Caston? Examine
the civilived of easy gous for
me!
LTR
A
TR 11.8.67 /
Spremne to
in eithe
little
+
+
Spoken to Mr. De in Mare. In the light of
Mr. Rodgus's views
9 have
to me office of the
to nichude QM
an member of the
amentw M
NIT
emmies Marzi d' Assaneni Атаный
Bank of China
in the Hawn notification system, and stiffend the Draft letter to mm
Custoon. The draft telegram
me
dow mon requin amcridment.
ी
Ma Wikim pa.
कु
阬
Notect on
Vi
to Mr. Billa
Bailand
・on 24 Angurr.
عراس
الادو
Kr. de la Xar
1020 Kare minte
CONFIDENTIAL
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31
22 AUG 1967
FC3/20
27
Retaliation against the Chinese in Britain
Flag A
Flag B
Flag C
Problem
I have already submitted separately recommending that
the Secretary of State should minute to the Home Secretary
on the question of the N.C.N.A. London Office and on instituting
a system of exit visas for Chinese officials in this country.
There are various other acts of retaliation against the Chinese
which we should consider.
Recommendation
2.
I recommend that we should:
(a) send a telegram to Peking on the lines of the
attached draft about imposing further travel
restrictions on the Chinese here;
(b) send a note to the Chinese Office pointing out
that officials of the Bank of China are also subject
to the Travel Notification Scheme. A draft is
attached;
(c) write to Custome and Excise asking them to impose
"administrative delays" on Chinese baggage.
Background Argument
3. I held a meeting on 8 August with representatives from
the Home Office, the Board of Trade and Security Services to
discuss retaliation against the Chinese in London. A record Flag of
D
this meeting is attached. I had also asked a representative 18
/from
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
.2
from Customs and Excise to attend but none was able to do so.
Action is proceeding on N.C.N.A. and exit visas. This leaves
action still to be taken on the following points:
(a) Travel Restrictions
(1) The area of free travel allowed to our staff in
Peking is limited to a circle radius 20 km. from the
centre of Peking with extensions on an approved
route to the Valley of the Ming Tombs and the Great
Wall (approximately 50 and 60 km. from Peking
respectively). Our limits in London are much more
generous: 35 miles from Marble Arch. Despite the
imbalance between our two systems we have in the
past thought that further restriction on the Chinese
here would be unproductive and might lead to
retaliation against our Mission in Peking, such as
e.g. prohibiting them from travelling on the two
extensions outside Peking now allowed. Mr. Hopson
has in the past shared our view, but it is clear
that he is now beginning to change his mind. There
would be no difficulty about instituting a system of
direct reciprocity, but I think that we should first
have Peking's views on whether this might lead to
unacceptable retaliation against our Mission.
Laubside the allowed limit (ii) We now rigidly enforce a travel ban on
all members
of the Chinese Mission except when they are on
commercial visits. Mr. Hopson has suggested that
travel by members of the Commercial Office should
also be banned, but not by the resident members of
CONFIDENTIAL
/the
CONFIDENTIAL
- 3-
But the pleasin would hank to be ours: we could not bind ounselors
acceft My packshore's recomend ations jubetta for
Letter in a famsh
an
ассерь
the Trading Corporations.
The Board of Trade
have said that they do not think that a ban on
travel by the Commercial Office would have a
serious effect on trade. This may well be so,
but I am sure that if we do impose such a ban
there will be a strong reaction from British
businessmen encouraged by the Chinese. I do not
think that such a ban would cause the Chinese to
improve conditions for our Mission in Peking,
although it would be of some benefit to staff
morale to know that the position of the Chinese
in London was no better than their own in Peking.
On balance, I believe that we should take no further
action on banning travel by members of the Commercial
Office for the moment. We should, however, discuss
this question with Mr. Maclehose before he goes to
Peking in October, on the understanding that we
would be prepared to institute such a ban if he thought it important
from the point of view of
morale in Peking.
(iii) We have clear information that officials of the
Bank of China in London are disregarding the Travel
Notification Scheme. It appears that they do not
consider themselves to be subject to it rather than
that they are deliberately breaking the rules.
Previous notes to the Chinese Office on this subject
referred to the "ataffs of Chinese commercial enter-
prises
and their householders" and there is no
CONFIDENTIAL
/doubt
CONFIDENTIAL
4
doubt that this should have been taken to include
the Bank of China, which is Government owned and
organised. One problem about the Bank of China
is that there are on its staff six Chinese officials
who worked for the previous K.M.T. Bank and have
been in Britain since before 1949 even though they
now have C.P.G. passports. There are also four
officials who have come direct from China but are
travelling on ordinary passports. The Home Office
have told us that the Foreign Office have no powers
to impose travel restrictions on either category.
The Home Office have the powers but quite clearly
would not use them. We thus have the choice of
sending a disingenuous note to the Chinese referring
to all the staff of the Bank of China and leaving
them to sort out who is exempt or sending a note
referring only to officials of the Bank travelling
on Service (official) passports. I think the latter
course is the better.
(b) Customs Harassment
Custome and Excise were unable to send a representative
to my meeting on 8 August. Since the Chinese have adopted a
number of measures against our Mission, e.g. refusing to pack
or despatch personal effects and making difficulties about
collecting stores, I think we are perfectly justified in trying
to use the only retaliation open to us, harassment through
Customs. Protocol Department and our legal adviser have
/somewhat
CONFIDENT IAL
CONFIDENTIAL
- 5 -
somewhat reluctantly said that we would be justified in
doing so although they have made it clear that the Customs
may not be willing to play. I think we should now try
writing to the Customs at official level.
(c) Shipping
We discussed the possibility of taking action against
Chinese ships or seamen in this country.
It is clear that we
have the ability to do so although both the Board of Trade and
Home Office would in practice be reluctant to act. I do not
think further action is called for until and unless the Chinese
take any further action against British ships in Chinese ports.
(d) Ordinary Chinese Citizens
Mr. Rodgers has suggested that we should ask the Home
Office to locate the 2,500 Chinese on C.P.G. passports in this
country. As you will see from the record of our meeting, the
Home Office have pointed out that the number and whereabouts
of such people varies from day to day and have said that it
would be a considerable administrative task to locate them.
They are prepared to do so, if necessary, but think that it is
not worth the time involved unless we have definite plans to
take action against these people. Since we are not at present
considering such action I think there is force in the Home
Office arguments and recommend that we should take no further
action on this point for the moment.
CONFIDENTIAL
John Denson
(J. B. Denson) 11 August, 1967
/Subject [see-28]
C
Mr. Merry
CONFIDENTIAL
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31
22 AUG 1967
26
FC3/201
Retaliation against the Chinese in Britain
When this matter was discussed with Mr. Rodgers he
asked that we make a submission covering the whole range
of retaliatory measures against the Chinese. There are,
however, a number of points of information on which we still
await confirmation from other Government Departments. In
order not to delay submitting the draft minute from the
Secretary of State to the Home Secretary, I have therefore
dealt in the submission below only with matters which are
of direct Home Office concern, i.e. action against the New
China News Agency and the institution of a system of exit
visas. A further submission will be made tomorrow covering
other retaliatory measures. Mr. Rodgers may feel that this
need not be submitted to the Secretary of State.
John Deman
(J. B. Denbon) 10 August, 1967
कु
CONFIDENTIAL
Fe3/20
CYPHER/CAT,A.
FOREIGN OFFICE TO PEKING
TELNO. 763
25
CONFIDENT IAL
COPY
18 AUGUST 1967 (F. E.D.)
CONFIDENTIAL.
TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS.
WE ARE CONSIDERING REDUCING THE AREA WITHIN WHICH THE CHINESE
MISSION HERE ARE NOW ALLOWED TO TRAVEL FREELY.
2. THERE WOULD BE NO ADMINISTRATIVE DIFFICULTY ABOUT ADOPTING A SYSTEM
OF DIRECT RECIPROCITY. THUS WE COULD SAY THAT THE FREE LIMIT WOULD
EXTEND FOR A RADIUS OF 20 KILOMETERS WITH A SMALL EXTENSION TO COVER
HEATHROW AIRPORT, WE COULD ALSO ARRANGE TWO OTHER QUOTE LEGS UNQUOTE
EQUIVALENT TO THE MING TOMBS AND THE GREAT WALL,
FOR EXAMPLE HENLEY VIA M.4 AND OXFORD VIA A40.
3. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT TIGHTENING RESTRICTIONS HERE WILL SECURE ANY
RELAXATION OF THE RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED ON YOU BUT THERE MIGHT BE SOME
VALUE IN AS MUCH DIRECT RECIPROCITY AS POSSIBLE. APART FROM THE FACT
THAT WE CAN NEVER IN PRACTICE BE SURE OF ENFORCING RESTRICTIONS AS
EFFECTIVELY AS DO THE CHINESE, ONE CONSIDERATION WHICH HAS PREVENTED US
TAKING SUCH ACTION IN THE PAST HAS BEEN THAT IT MIGHT LEAD TO FURTHER
RESTRICTIONS ON YOUR MISSION (THE POINT MADE IN YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER
569). I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR YOUR COMMENTS ON THIS AND ON THE IDEA IN
GENERAL.
SOSFA
BENT 1523 18 AUGUST 1967
FILES:
F.E.D.
D.D.& P.U.S.D.
CONFIDENTIAL
ра
23h
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
Registry No. F3
120.
DEPARTMENT.E.D.
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION PRIORITY MARKINGS
Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified
Flash
Immediace Priority Routine
}
(Date)...
* Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should
reach addressee(s)
Despatched .....
18
PRIVACY MARKING
In Confidence
En Clair
ypher
Draft Telegram to:-
PEKING
No.
(Date)
And to:-
763
[Sect
ation]
Security classification" -if any
[ Privacy marking ]
any
[Codeword-if any)
Addressed to
telegram No.
And to...
CONFIDENTIAL
➖➖.........L-N LIJJOL
VISTIMPIL~---------
Peking
18 repeated for information to
1ו יחח---חוחוי+
(date)