however that the only measures which the Chinese have in mind are
connected with confrontation prisoners. It is highly unlikely that they
expect us to release a large number at once; what they are probably
looking for is some movement which would enable them to justify to local
communist sympathizers in Hong Kong further relaxations, including the
release of detained British subjects. It is possible that some clements
in the leadership, including Chou En-lai, are keener than others to see
an end to confron- tation problems in the interests of better relations
with us.
2. The Chinese may well have expected that after Kr. Grey's release
there would be steady progress towards the release of confrontation
prisoners or possibly a negotiated settlement of all outstanding
problems. They were therefore rrepared to release five other British
subjects as an earnest of good will. They have probably now concluded
that further progress is unlikely. They are no doubt also displeased
because, except in the commercial field, we have made no particular
effort to court them. On the contrary, there have been very strong
rrotests about l'rs. Kartin and Kr. Fc3ain: increased publicity about
the treatment of British subjects now released, as well as those still
detained; this Fission has continued the policy of resisting
unreasonable Chinese demands in the administrative field, protesting
ebout Chinese discourtesy and so on; and Reuters have decided to suspend
their operations.
3. The Chinese have indicated their displeasure by a concentration of
anti-British articles in the Chinese press following up the long article
of 26 December on our economic difficulties (reported in my telegram No.
771 of 31 December 1969). In the period 9
In the period 9 - 26 January
/there
OCTFIDN'TIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
I
there have been fourteen substantive anti-British items on a variety of
domestic and external topics, as well as numerous incidental references.
From our experience of the Chinese treat- ment of other countries, it is
clear that such a concentration could not be accidental. Furthermore,
the Chinese have been totally unco-operative in granting rmission to
travel to members of the Hission, whereas members of other Kissions have
been allowed to do so.
The Situation in Hong Kong
LeComme
4. The situation is at present quiet. Local communists appear to be
engaged in a slow rebuilding of their position but are under
instructions not to cause trouble. The Prisons Board of Review has
completed its vork and has not
ed at rem 88 1 7 † According to sentences on any further confrontation
prisoners. the Chinese, there are still 134 left (earlier Hong Kong
informa- tion had predicted 125 at the end of 1969 - see the paper
forwarded by the Political Adviser under reference 3CR6/2621/67 of 30
October, 1969). The criteria in accordance with which the Review Board
work
If this is so, we sug est that further remissions are unlikely. shall
have to wait until the end of 1974 before the total of prisoners is down
to 7 and by the e
iin
ere w
The question of an amnesty for confrontation prisoner's has been ruled
out by the Governor. At the meeting with officials in London on 25
November, the Governor agreed that he would consult in advance before
any new measures were taken against communist sympathizers. He was urged
to exercise restraint in the interests of British subjects detained and
the functioning of this Hission, but gave no undertaking to do so. The
possibility remains that certain confrontation prisoners for whom
warrants are still out- standing might be arrested and if the sentences
they receive are comparable with those in 1967 (e.g. 5-8 years) the list
of long- term prisoners could lengthen.
Prospects
5. The Chinese would probably like to improve relations with us both as
part of the general process of normalization in external relations and
because they wish to maintain their lines to the West in the event of
increased difficulties, or even hostilities, with the Soviet Union. At
the same time, relations are in many respects already satisfactory from
their point of view in that trade in and through Hong Kong is being
maintained, and they are able to increase their trade with the United
Kingdom in so far as they wish, despite the political difficulties. They
know that no effective sanctions
ill be taken against them in the interests of British subjects; indeed
it is difficult to see that any form of sanctions is feasible. For these
reasons, I do not think that there is any pressure on the Chinese to be
helpful towards us in the political field in the absence of movement on
our side.
CONFIDENTIAL
/6.
1
CONFIDENTIA
fire
lai
thi
6.
The following is my assessment of the probable results of the position
we have reached:-
(a) There is little chance of early release of the remaining Pritish
subjects detained except (1) on grounds of health, which might apply
particularly to Er. McBain; (ii) if the Chinese became convinced they
were gaining j nothing by a hostage policy, and that their international
image was being adversely affected by the publicity given to it; (111)
in the unlikely event of their wishing at some time in the future to
make a gesture towards us. (1) seems the best hope, and (ii) just
possible.
(b) There will be no remission for 'r. Watt. (Unless, as seems just
possible from his letters, he becomes BO brain-washed or mentally
unstable that the Chinese decide to deport him.) In the normal course of
events, he should be released in September this year but the Chinese
might keep him until Farch 1971, as, though he was arrested in Ceptember
1967, he was not sentenced until Karch 1968.
(c) There may be less administrative co-operation by the Chinese with
this Mission, which could among other things affect the rebuilding of
the Chancery.
(a) Travel by members of the Kission may continue to be curtailed.
(e) The Chinese may continue the ban on ritish businessmen in Hong Kong
attending the Gunton Trade "airs, and not extend the list of United
Kingdom businessmen whom they allow to go.
-
(f) The Chinese might discriminate against us commercially by choosing
to buy certain items of comparable rice and quality such as machinery,
lorries etc. from our competitors. This could seriously affect our
export figures if, as we think, Chinese purchases of non-ferrous metals
from the London l'etal Market fall off in the coming years.
+
(g) It will become increasingly difficult to make effective
representations about British subjects in China and thus to sustain to
Ferliamentary and public opinion the credibility of our efforts to help
them.
(h) It will be very difficult if not impossible to conduct a dialogue
with the Chinese on any general political subject. Though it would be
unrealistic to suppose that a "Yestern country,or indeed any
country,could have a real influence on Chinese policy, there might be
advantage at a time when the Chinese are beginning to enlarge their
diplomatic
/contacts
CONFEDITIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
L
.
Ive
contacts, when there is the prospect of diplomatic relations being
opened with other "estern countries, and when the Chinese have renewed
talks with the Americana, in their hearing a European voice other than
the French, and to a lesser extent the Forwegian.
Conclusions and Recommendations
7. If the situation over prisoners in Hong Kong rusaing unchanged, I
think re must be prepared for a
in our political relations. As prisoners are gradually released the
Chinese may release "ritish subjects one by one and after a number of
years they might decide that the remainder are an encumbrance and
release them also, while tacitly accepting the continued imprisonment of
a small number of their sympathizers in Hong Kong. This could well take
some time as even by the end of 1972 there will still be 44 prisoners
left (plus the two with life sentences).
8. My recon, endations are:
(a) Te again put to the Chinese the proposal that confrontation
prisoners should be "returned to China". The chance of their acceptance
is slight but the attempt should be made.
(b) Publicity about remaining British subjects detained should be
maintained at as high a level as possible.
(c) The Governor should be pressed to continue the len movies of
sentences. If there are any
Or compassionate grounds to
the opportunity should be taken
(d) Every opportunity should be taken to emphasize to the Governor the
need for restraint in action against communist sympathizers and for full
consultation in advance of action.
i
COLVI
212
CS. 41A
2600077
5,000-2/69-170130
REF. SCR 4/3571/62 III
CONFIDENTIAL
¡
Pipi please
Dear Janes,
COLONIAL SECRETARIAT
LOWER ALBERT ROAD HONG KONG
5 January, 1970.
о
int for coquent in consultantin with
+
1.K. Deft
По Анверси
Jug 16 Fe
a
FEN 1/1
Thank you very much for your letter of 5 December enclosing a copy of
the paper dated 21 November on Sino- British relations in the context of
Hong Kong and a copy of the note of your discussion with the Governor on
25 November. I have read them with great interest.
2.
In paragraph 3 of your letter you ask for some account of the recent
activities of the Prisons Board of Reviev. The last report which you had
in mind was, I think, our tele- gram No. 562 of 14 July in which we said
that the attorney. General vas going away on leave and duty for eight
veeks and the Board would not meet again until approximately the end of
September.
3.
The Board has in fact met since then only on 25 September and 4
December. The Board are, of course, working within the terms of the old
Colonial Office Circular No. 577/60 (C.0. ref: SSA 197/04) of 26 May
1960 which guides them in their deliberations, and it would be a matter
of very consider- able difficulty to suggest they should apply any
different criteria to confrontation prisoners.
4.
The Board vorks under Prison Rule 69A, a copy of which you have but for
the sake of convenience I attach another copy.
5.
At the meeting on 25 September the Board considered only routine cases.
It considered none of the special reviev cases which arose from the
Governor's initiative reported in his telegram No. 212 of 10 March. The
majority of the cases revieved on 25 September (YOL
and dangerous drugs but there vere 11 cases of young confronta- tion
prisoners whose sentences came up for a routine review in accordance
with Rule 69A(2)(iv). The Board recommended no change in the sentences
of these 11 prisoners which had in any case already been reviewed as
part of the special review of confrontatjangrisoners sarlier in thezuar.
The Governor accepted this advice.
J. Murray, Esq., CMG,
Far Eastern Department,
Foreign & Commonwealth Office,
LONDON, S.W.1.
/Contd...
ONFIDENTIAL
2
1
Also
6.
At the meeting on 4 December there was a similar batch containing
"ordinary prisoners" and five young confrontation prisoners who had
already been revieved, and vhose sentences were not recommended for any
change. on 4 December the Board examined the last batch of confrontation
prisoners whose sentences had not previously been revieved this year.
This batch numbered 22 confronta- tion prisoners all serving long
sentences for offences involving live bombs or revolver snatching. The
Board concluded that there were no grounds for recommending a change in
the sentences of any of these 22 prisoners. The Acting Governor accepted
this advice. This brings to an end the special review of confrontation
prisoners arising from the Governor's decision of last March,
7.
The Board's recommendation on this last batch of 22 prisoners followed
from their earlier decision that remission should not normally be
recommended vhere personal violence was used by the accused, where he
was in possession of explosives or in the company of someone in
possession of explosives or where he vas on premises containing
explosives or offensive weapons.
8.
This therefore concludes the special review by the Board of Reviev.
Although it will continue its normal work it is unlikely that its
recommendations will have any significant effect in bringing forward the
date of the release of the remaining confrontation prisoners.
9.
I am sending a copy of this letter to John Denson.
You
eve
Auther
(A.F. Maddocks)
CONFIDENTIAL
PRISON RULE 69A
69A. (1) The Commissioner shall submit to the Governor for review the
case of any prisoner of any category specified in the first column of
paragraph (2) at the intervals specified in relation thereto in the
second column of paragraph (2).
(2)
(i)
First Column
Imprisoned for a term exceeding six years (other than (ii)).
(ii) Imprisoned for life.
(iii) Detained during Her Majesty's Pleasure.
(iv) Under 21 at the date
of the offence for which imprisoned.
Second Column
After four years and every two years thereafter.
After four years and every two years thereafter.
After two years and every two years thereafter.
After one year and
every year thereafter.
(3) Nothing in this rule shall prevent the Governor, in his discretion,
from reviewing the case of any prisoner at any time.
(4) When the case of any prisoner falls to be dealt with under this
rule, reports shall be submitted
(a) by the Medical Officer, on the mental and physical
condition of the prisoner and whether or not, in his opinion,
imprisonment has had or is likely to have an injurious effect on the
prisoner's health;
(b) by the Superintendent, on the conduct and industry
of the prisoner in prison and on any matter which might, in his opinion,
be relevant to the review.