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2.
solution to the problem of Chinese representation. Sub- sequently,
during the Assembly's consideration of the item, the New Zealand
Permanent Representative, Mr J.V. Scott, raised the question whether the
time had come when we should consider whether there is some fresh
approach we could make which might bring a more constructive response
from the Communist Chinese Government, We cannot be sure that the right
circumstances yet exist. But my Government believes that the present
time is more propitious than any in recent years for a fresh and genuine
attempt to solve the dilemma. These remarks aroused a good deal of
interest and some speculation that New Zealand might be contemplating
some departure from the attitudes which it had fomerly held, Although
New Zealand speakers emphasised in this way their conviction that the
Assembly should abandon its long-standing rigidity on this issue and
make genuine efforts to seek a compromise, there seems little prospect
that this course will be followed at the Twenty-fifth Session.
Communist Chinese Foreign Policy:
H
5. At the time of last year's Assembly it seemed that the return of
relatively stable conditions in China and the apparent ending of the
Cultural Revolution indicated that 2 moderate" faction had established
some degree of ascendancy in Peking. This appeared to be confirmed by
the reappearance of a degree of professionalism in the direction of
China's foreign policy, and by events such as the assignment of Chinese
Ambassadors to posts which had been vacant since 1966, the opening of
border talks with the Soviet Union, and the evident willingness of the
Chinese to continue their negotiations with the Canadiana. It appeared
that the Chinese wished to end their isolation by playing a more
forthcoming international role, and it was hoped that, with policy
apparently being dictated by the "moderate" elements in Peking, this
process would extend even to countries which had previously faced
Peking's hostility. It was regarded as particularly encouraging
that even President Nixon's rather tentative moves towards reducing the
United States' economic boycott of China were received, if without any
degree of warmth or apparent interest, at least without any violently
hostile reaction. In such a climate the remarks of New Zealand's
representative to the Twenty-fourth Session of the General Assembly
(quoted in paragraph 4 above) were not inappropriate.
6. Subsequent events. however, have not borne out this assessment of
China's intentions. It is becoming apparent that, although the Chinese
have shown considerable tactical flexibility and diplomatic skill, there
has been little if any change in their underlying attitudes. It is
doubtful whether in either the border talks with the Soviet Union or the
negotiations with Canada they have shown any willingness to compromise
on issues which they regard as essential.
/ In particular
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3.
In particular they have shown by their reopening and subsequent
indefinite suspension of the Warsaw talks that, while they are willing
to give an appearance of flexibility, their desire to improve relations
with the United States is accorded a much lower priority (if it exists
at all) than that given to anti-United States activities in Asia. It is
significant that China's most notable (and successful) diplomatic
efforts in recent months have been directed bwards objectives which
demonstrate its fundamental militancy and its continuing opposition to
the Western presence in Asia (which, it is well to remember, includes
active supporters of United States intervention such as Australia and
New Zealand). Peking's success in establishing itself since May 1970 as
the leader of an Asian anti- imperialist united front and in asserting
its preeminent role in the anti-United States struggle in Indochina
suggests that it is extremely unlikely to consider improving its
relations with the United States, at least until it sees no further
usefulness in its present anti-United States atand. Peking's continuing
hostility towards the United States is evident in the statement on
Cambodia issued in Mao's name on 20 May 1920. (The full text is attached
as an annex.) This containa intemperate and abusive attacks on the
United States in terms which suggest no interest China's part in
improving its relations with the United States. No degree of flexibility
seems to be implied in statements such as "A new upsurge in the struggle
against US imperialism is now emerging throughout the world the US
aggressor treacherously engineered the reactionary coup d'etat by the
Lon Nol-Sirik Matak clique
While massacring the people in other countries US imperialism 18
slaughtering the white and black people in its own country."
7. The pattern which has become evident in China's foreign policy since
the resumption of international contacts has been basically one of
strengthening friendships with countries which have in the past been
prepared to accept friendship on China's own terms, In recent months
Peking has also been actively seeking new friends, particularly in
Africa and the Middle East, among countries such as the Sudan, Libya,
and Iraq where there exis a possibility of fore- stalling or impeding
the growth of Soviet influence. The degree of warmth evident in China's
relationships with France and Pakistan indicates clearly (as the Chinese
may intend it to do) that Peking is willing to extend its friendship to
virtually any country which does not engage in "anti-Chinese
activities", and which can accept, or at least refrain from
contradicting, Chinese viewpoints on international issues. The Chinese
have also made efforts to re-establish friendly relations with East
European countries, beginning naturally with those which are most eager
to maintain a degree of independence from the Soviet Union.
8.
The expectations of a year ago that the Chinese might be willing to go
further than this and attempt to resolve
/their
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40
their differences with countries with which they have not formerly seen
eye to eye have, however, not been borne out. Even in the case of the
USSR, where an improvement in relations would appear to be very much in
China's interest, there has been no indication that the Chinese are
prepared to compromise on any important issue, or to do more than the
minimum necessary to keep talks in being. Still less have they shown any
desire to negotiate seriously about their differences with countries
such as the United States and India, or to respond to overtures made by,
for example, Thailand and Indonesia. Nor nave they been prepared to
adopt a constructive attitude towards the problems posed by South
Vietnam or South Korea. In such circumstances it must be considered
unrealistic to hope that they will this year be any more willing than
they have been in the past to compromise on their demands for admission
to the United Nations. The situation now seems a good deal less
propitious for any fresh approach to the issue of Chhese representation
than it did last year.
Prospects for the Twenty-fifth Session:
9. Although there are some grounds for believing that the feeling of the
General Assembly is gradually moving in the direction of support for the
admission of Communist China,
there appears at present to be no reason to suppose that the traditional
Western position on this item cannot be held this year.
One factor, however, which even more than last year needs to be taken
into account is that of the efforts made by some countries to seek
better relations with Communist China. Although the voting position of
Canada is probably of the greatest significance, those of Italy and, to
a lesser extent, Belgium and Chile must also be regarded as subject to
some uncertainty. All four of these countries abstained on the Albanian
resolution in 1969, while maintaining their support for the "Important
Question" resolution,
10. It has been suggested that, if the current negotiations between
Canada and Communist China were to result in the establishment of
diplomatic relations, several other nations might be led to reconsider
their United Nations votes in the hope of eventually following suit.
This possibility must be borne in mind, especially as Canada and
Communist China may now be close to Chinese point of view) announcement
of the establishment
viewfreement. A well timed (from the of relations could cause a good
deal of confusion and uncertainty among supporters of the Western
position.
11. At this late stage, however, it is at least open to doubt whether an
agreement between Canada and Communist China would have any marked
effect on voting at this year's Assembly, while in the absence of such a
far-reaching development it is probable that Canada will vote in the
same way as it did last year. (Mr Trudeau, when he visited New Zealand
in May, emphasised to the Prime Minister the
/ Canadian
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5.
Canadian view that the question of China's United Nations representation
should follow, not precede, any results achieved in the field of
bilateral recognition.) Similarly, there is no reason to expect that
Italy or Chile will this year move any further towards the Chinese
position than they have already.
12. The Belgian Government has, however, in a somewhat surprising move,
circulated to some member countries a draft resolution which it proposed
to present to the Assembly, calling for the seating of both Communist
China and the Republic of China as a "temporary measure
temporary measure" on the basis of the territory which they actively
control. Our views on this proposal have been set out in our telegram No
312 to New York. It would be difficult for New Zealand to oppose such a
proposal, but despite its superficial attractiveness the Belgian draft
presents many problems and it is to be hoped that the Belgians can be
persuaded to proceed with it.
13. Voting at the Twenty-fifth Session may also be influenced by the
overtures which the United States has made towards Communist China, and
by the implications of President Nixon's policy of disengagement from
Asia. The effects, if any, of these developments were not apparent,
however, in 1969, and their influence in 1970 is unlikely to be more
than minimal.
This,
14. Voting may also be affected to some degree by developments in
Chinese domestic and foreign policy. The revulsion by many countries
from the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution has now greatly diminished,
and some United Nations members will no doubt be impressed by the
relatively stable and rational evolution of Chinese policy in recent
months, coupled with developments such as the launching of an earth
satellite, the evidence of China's nuclear progress, and the signing of
a substantial aid agreement for the construction of the Tan-Zam railway,
may lead some governments to reassess the value of Peking's friendship.
As China's efforts to renew old friendships and to establish new ones
have for the most part, however, been directed towards countries which
already support its admission to the United Nations along the lines
proposed by the Albanians, they are not likely to gain it many new
votes. Similarly, although about twenty Chinese Ambassadors have now
been assigned to posts, the majority of these are in countries which
already support China. Any lobbying undertaken in these countries is
therefore unlikely to affect the outcome of the United Nations debate.
15. Although no agreement has been announced in the border talks being
held in Peking between Communist China and the USSR, and although it is
clear that their underlying hostility remains, there has been some
reduction of tension along the border in recent months and both sides
are apparently seeking to avoid further military confrontation. It is
unlikely that the situation has improved enough for the USSR to campaign
on China's behalf, at least with any degree of enthusiasm,
/ but the
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6.
but the East European states may be more willing to respond to Chinese
approaches and to support China's admission than their somewhat lukewarm
attitude last year appeared to indicate.
16. It is most unlikely that Italy, in view of its current negotiations
with the Chinese, will reintroduce its "study group" proposal, which was
widely regarded by China's supporters as a Western delaying tactic.
17. There have therefore been no developments since the Twenty-fourth
Session to suggest that the form or the outcome of the debate on Chinese
representation this year will differ significantly from the pattern of
the previous few years. Unless there should be major unforeseen changes
in the situation we expect a satisfactory majority for the Important
Question resolution and adequate, if perhaps slightly reduced,
opposition to the Albanian resolution.
New Zealand Attitude:
18. As the statements made by the Prime Minister and the Permanent
Representative at the Twenty-fourth Session made clear, New Zealand is
aware of the desirability, and even the urgency, of bringing about
Communist China's admission to the United Nations, and in general of
ensuring that that country is encouraged to play its part in settling
the many outstanding international problems which cannot be resolved
without its concurrence. At the same time New Zealand has made clear its
opposition to any proposal or the admission of Communist China which
would mean the exp.lsion or exclusion of the Republic of China and the
denial of United Nations representation to the people of Taiwan.
19.
-
Thus in effect we are committed to a policy based on compromise that is
to say, a two-China or one-China/one Taiwan policy, although we should
naturally not wish to define our position so explicitly in public.
within the se limits we are prepared to he flexible, and we should be
willing to consider (though we should not wish to take the lead in
proposing) any suggestions which may be made for the seating of both
claimants,
20. We recognise, however, that the Assembly is extremely unlikely to
accept any proposal of this kind, and the delegation's instructions,
which are unchanged from last year, accordingly do not lay stress on
this aspect of our policy. Nevertheless, the tone and content of any New
Zealand statement on this issue should be moderately worded and should
reflect the Government's belief that a just solution can be reached only
if both sides are prepared to abandon the rigid lines to which previous
debates have clung and search for a form of compromise which will not
exclude either Communist China or the Republic of China from a place in
the international community.
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7.
21. As in previous years, New Zealand believes that a proposal for a
change in Chinese representation is an important question and should
therefore require a two- thirds' majority vote for its adoption, while
its unwillingness to accept the expulsion of the Republic of China will
again compel it to oppose any resolutions of the Albanian type. We have
therefore agreed once again to co-sponsor the important question
resolution.
Instructions
22.
The delegation should:
(a) be guided in discussion with other delegations by the Government's
stand that, while it would welcome Communist China's participation in
international negotiations, and although it sees advantages in its entry
to the United Nations, New Zealand is not prepared to support its
admission if this means the exclusion of the Republic of China and the
denial of the right of the people of Taiwan to a recognized place in the
international community;
(b)
seek discussions with friendly delegations to compile assessments and
discuss tactics;
(o) report any new procedures or proposed alterations in tactics put
forward by other delegations during the session;
(d) refer to Wellington for instructions prior to consideration of the
item.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, WELLINGTON.
1 September 1970
CONFIDENTIAL
ANNEX
STATEMENT BY HAO TSE TUNG ISSUED ON
20 MAY 1970
A new upsurge in the struggle against U.S. imperialism is now emerging
throughout the world. Ever since World War II, U.S. imperialism and its
followers have been continuously launching wars of aggression and the
people in various countries have been continuously waging revolutionary
wars to defeat the aggressors. The danger of a new World War still
existe, and the people of all countries must get prepared. But
revolution is the main trend in the world today.
Unable to win in Vietnam and Laos, the U.S. aggressor treacherously
engineered the reactionary coup d'etat by the Lon Nol-Sirik Matak
clique, brazenly dispatched their troops to invade Cambodia and resumed
the bombing of North Vietnam, and this has aroused the furious
resistance of the three Indo-Chinese peoples. I warmly support
I warmly support the fighting spirit of Samdech Norodom Sihanouk, head
of state of Cambodia, in opposing U.S. imperialism and its lackeys. I
warmly support the joint declaration of the Summit Conference of the
Indo- chinese peoples. I warmly support the establishment of the Royal
Government of National Union under the leadership of the National United
Front of Kampuchea. Strengthening their unity, supporting each other and
persevering in a protracted people's war, the three Indo-Chinese peoples
will certainly overcome all difficulties and win complete victory.
While massacring the people in other countries, U.S. imperialism is
slaughtering the white and black people in its own country. Nixon's
fascist atrocities have kindled the raging flames of the revolutionary
mass movement in the United States, The Chinese people firmly support
the revolution- ary struggle of the American people. I am convinced that
the American people who are fighting valiantly will ultimately win
victory and that he fascist rule in the United States will inevitably be
defeated.
The Nixon government is beset with troubles internally and externally,
with utter chaos at home and extreme isolation abroad. The mass movement
of protest against U.S. aggression in Cambodia has swept the globe. Less
than ten days after its establishment, the Royal Government of National
Union of Cambodia was recognized by nearly 20 countries. The situation
is getting better and better in the war of resistance against U.S.
aggression and for national salvation waged by the people of Vietnam,
Laos and Cambodia. The revolutionary armed struggles of the people of
the Southeast Asian countries, the struggles of the people of Korea,
Japan and other Asian countries against the revival of Japanese
militarism by the U.S. and Japanese reactionaries, the struggles of the
/ Palestinian
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Palestinian and other Arab peoples against the U.S.-Israeli aggressors,
the national liberation struggles of the Asian, African and Latin
American peoples, and the revolutionary struggles of the peoples of
North America, Europe and Oceania are all developing vigorously. The
Chinese people firmly support the people of the three Indo-Chinese
countries and of other countries of the world in their revolutionary
U.S. struggles against U.S. imperialism and its lackeys. imperialism,
which looks like a huge monster, is in essence a paper tiger, now in the
throes of its death-bed struggle. In the world of today, who actually
fears whom? It is not the Vietnamese people, the Laotian people, the
Cambodian people, the Palestinian people, the Arab people or the people
of other countries who fear U.S. imperialism; it is U.S. imperialism
which fears the people of the world. It becomes panic-stricken at the
mere rustle of leaves in the wind. Innumerable facts prove that a jut
cause enjoys abundant support while an unjust cause finds little
support. A weak nation can defeat a strong, a small nation can defeat a
big. The people of a small country can certainly defeat aggression by a
big country, if only they dare to rise in struggle, take up arms and
grasp in their own hands the destiny of their country.
of history.
This is a law
People of the world, unite and defeat the U.S. aggressors and all their
running dogs!
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Supplementary Item 2
Final Agenda Item No.
TWENTY-FIFTH REGULAR SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
OF THE UNITED NATIONS, 1970
Restoration of the Lawful Rights of the People's Republic of China in
the United Nations.
Documents: A/8043.
A/8043. Request for inscription: letter dated 14 August 1970 from the
representatives of Albania and other Members.
The Twenty-fourth Session:
Although it had been thought that moves by some member nations during
1969 to improve their relations with Communist China might affect the
General Assembly's consideration of Chinese representation, voting at
the Twenty-fourth Session did not vary significantly from the pattern
established at the previous two sessions, although the slight
improvement in the Western position which was evident in 1968 and 1969
did not continue. The procedural resolution declaring that any proposal
to change the representation of China in the United Nations is an
important question was carried by
47
-
a majority of 71 (New Zealand) to 48 with 4 abstentions. This result was
similar to that of the previous year, when the resolution was carried by
73 (New Zealand)
5. Although a number of delegations voted differently in 1969, these
changes tended to cancel one another out.
-
2. On the other hand there was a slight decline in the number of
countries which opposed the Albanian resolution proposing the admission
of Communist China and the explusion of Taiwan. At the Twenty-fourth
Session this resolution once again failed to receive the necessary
two-thirds! majority, being defeated by 48 in favour, 56 against
(including New Zealand) and 21 abstentions. This compares with the
previous year's vote of 44 58 (New Zealand) 23. Belgium, Canada, Chile,
and Italy were among those countries which abstained in 1969.
-
-
3.
The proposal that a study group be set up to explore the question of the
representation of China was not advanced by the Italians in 1969, having
been heavily defeated at the previous session. New Zealand had supported
this move at the three Assembly sessions to which it was introduced, in
the hope that such a study group might be able to introduce a degree of
flexibility into the Assembly's consideration of the item.
4
+
Speaking in the General Debate at the Twenty-fourth session the Prime
Minister stressed the urgent need for a
/ solution
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2.
solution to the problem of Chinese representation. Sub- sequently,
during the Assembly's consideration of the item, the New Zealand
Permanent Representative, Mr J.V. Scott, raised the question whether the
time had come 'when we should consider whether there is some fresh
approach we could make which might bring a more constructive response
from the Communist Chinese Government, We cannot be sure that the right
circumstances yet exist. But my Government believes that the present
time is more propitious than any in recent years for a fresh and genuine
attempt to solve the dilemma. These remarks aroused a good deal of
interest and some speculation that New Zealand might be contemplating
some departure from the attitudes which it had fomerly held. Although
New Zealand speakers emphasised in this way their conviction that the
Assembly should abandon its long-standing rigidity on this issue and
make genuine efforts to seek a compromise, there seems little prospect
that this course will be followed at the Twenty-fifth Session.
Communist Chinese Foreign Policy:
5.
Fr
At the time of last year's Assembly it seemed that the return of
relatively stable conditions in China and the apparent ending of the
Cultural Revolution indicated that A moderate" faction had established
some degree of ascendancy in Peking. This appeared to be confirmed by
the reappearance of a degree of professionalism in the direction of
China's foreign policy, and by events such as the assignment of Chinese
Ambassadors to posts which had been vacant since 1966, the opening of
border talks with the Soviet Union, and the evident willingness of the
Chinese to continue their negotiations with the Canadianí. It appeared
that the Chinese wished to end their isolation by playing a more
forthcoming international role, and it was hoped that, with policy
apparently being dictated by the "moderate" elements in Peking, this
process would extend even to countries which had previously faced
Peking's hostility. It was regarded as particularly encouraging that
even President Nixon's rather tentative moves towards reducing the
United States' economic boycott of China were received, if without any
degree of warmth or apparent interest, at least without any violently
hostile reaction. In such a climate the remarks of New Zealand's
representative to the Twenty-fourth Session of the General Assembly
(quoted in paragraph 4 above) were not inappropriate.
6. Subsequent events, however, have not borne out this assessment of
China's intentions. It is becoming apparent that, although the Chinese
have shown considerable tactical flexibility and diplomatic skill, there
has been little if any change in their underlying attitudes. It is
doubtful whether in either the border talks with the Soviet Union or the
negotiations with Canada they have shown any willingness to compromise
on issues which they regard as essential.
In particular
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3.
In particular they have shown by their reopening and subsequent
indefinite suspension of the Warsaw talks that, while they are willing
to give an appearance of flexibility, their desire to improve relations
with the United States is accorded a much lower priority (if it exists
at all) than that given to anti-United States activities in Asia. It is
significant that China's most notable (and successful) diplomatic
efforts in recent months have been directed bwards objectives which
demonstrate its fundamental militancy and its continuing opposition to
the Western presence in Asia (which, it is well to remember, includes
active supporters of United States intervention such as Australia and
New Zealand). Peking's success in establishing itself since May 1970 as
the leader of an Asian anti- imperialist united front and in asserting
its preeminent role in the anti-United States struggle in Indochina
suggests that it is extremely unlikely to consider improving its
relations with the United States, at least until it sees no further
usefulness in its present anti-United States stand. Peking's continuing
hostility towards the United States is evident in the statement on
Cambodia issued in Mao's name on 20 May 1920. (The full text is attached
as an annex.) This contains intemperate and abusive attacks on the
United States in terms which suggest no interest China's part in
improving ita relations with the United States. No degree of flexibility
seems to be implied in statements such as A new upsurge in the struggle
against US imperialism is now emerging throughout the world the US
aggressor treacherously engineered the reactionary coup d'etat by the
Lon Nol-Sirik Matak clique ..... While massacring the people in other
countries US imperialism is slaughtering the white and black people in
its own country."
7. The pattern which has become evident in China's foreign policy since
the resumption of international contacts has been basically one of
strengthening friendships with countries which have in the past been
prepared to accept friendship on China's own terms, In recent months
Peking has also been actively seeking new friends, particularly in
Africa and the Middle East, among countries such as the Sudan, Libya,
and Iraq where there exis a possibility of fore-
The stalling or impeding the growth of Soviet influence. degree of
warmth evident in China's relationships with France and Pakistan
indicates clearly (as the Chinese may intend it to do) that Peking is
willing to extend its friendship to virtually any country which does not
engage in "anti-Chinese activities", and which can accept, or at least
refrain from contradicting, Chinese viewpoints on international issues.
The Chinese have also made efforts to re-establish friendly relations
with East European countries, beginning naturally with those which are
most eager to maintain a degree of independence from the Soviet Union.
tt
8. The expectations of a year ago that the Chinese might be willing to
go further than this and attempt to resolve
/ their
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40
their differences with countries with which they have not formerly seen
eye to eye have, however, not been borne out. Even in the case of the
USSR, where an improvement in relations would appear to be very much in
China's interest, there has been no indication that the Chinese are
prepared to compromise on any important issue, or to do more than the
minimum necessary to keep talks in being. Still less have they shown any
desire to negotiate seriously about their differences with countries
such as the United States and India, or to respond to overtures made by,
for example, Thailand and Indonesia. Nor have they been prepared to
adopt a constructive attitude towards the problems posed by South
Vietnam or South Korea, In such circumstances it must be considered
unrealistic to hope that they will this year be any more willing than
they have been in the past to compromise on their demands for admission
to the United Nations. The situation now seems a good deal less
propitious for any fresh approach to the issue of Chhe se representation
than it did last year.
Prospects for the Twenty-fifth Session:
9. Although
Although there are some grounds for believing that the feeling of the
General Assembly is gradually moving in the direction of support for the
admission of Communist China,
there appears at present to be no reason to suppose that the traditional
Western position on this item cannot be held this year.
One factor, however, which even more than last year needs to be taken
into account is that of the efforts made by some countries to seek
better relations with Communist China. Although the voting position of
Canada is probably of the greatest significance, those of Italy and, to
a lesser extent, Belgium and Chile must also be regarded as subject to
some uncertainty. All four of these countries abstained on the Albanian
resolution in 1969, while maintaining their support for the "Important
Question" resolution.
10.
It has been suggested that, if the current negotiations between Canada
and Communist China were to result in the establishment of diplomatic
relations, several other nations might be led to reconsider their United
Nations votes in the hope of eventually following suit. This possibility
must be borne in mind, especially as Canada and Communist China may now
be close to agreement. A well timed (from the Chinese point of view)
announcement of the establishment of relations could cause a good deal
of confusion and uncertainty among supporters of the Western position.
11. At this late stage, however, it is at least open to doubt whether an
agreement between Canada and Communist China would have any marked
effect on voting at this year's Assembly, while in the absence of such a
far-reaching development it is probable that Canada will vote in the
same way as it did last year, (Mr Trudeau, when he visited New Zealand
in May, emphasised to the Prime Minister the
/ Canadian
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5.
Canadian view that the question of China's United Nations representation
should follow, not precede, any results achieved in the field of
bilateral recognition,) Similarly, there is no reason to expect that
Italy or Chile will this year move any further towards the Chinese
position than they have already,
11
12. The Belgian Government has, however, in a somewhat surprising move,
circulated to some member countries a draft resolution which it proposed
to present to the Assembly, calling for the seating of both Communist
China and the Republic of China as a temporary measure" on the basis of
the territory which they actively control. Our views on this proposal
have been set out in our telegram No 312 to New York, It would be
difficult for New Zealand to oppose such a proposal, but despite its
superficial attractiveness the Belgian draft presents many
and it is to be
hoped that the Belgians can be problemet proceed with it.
13. Voting at the Twenty-fifth Session may also be influenced by the
overtures which the United States has made towards Communist China, and
by the implications of President Nixon's policy of disengagement from
Asia. The effects, if any, of these developments were not apparent,
however, in 1969, and their influence in 1970 is unlikely to be more
than minimal.
This,
14. Voting may also be affected to some degree by developments in
Chinese domestic and foreign policy. The revulsion by many countries
from the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution has now greatly diminished,
and some United Nations members will no doubt be impressed by the
relatively stable and rational evolution of Chinese policy in recent
months. coupled with developments such as the launching of an earth
satellite, the evidence of China's nuclear progress, and the signing of
a substantial aid agreement for the construction of the Tan-Zam railway,
may lead some governments to reassess the value of Peking's friendship.
As China's efforts to renew old friendships and to establish new ones
have for the most part, however, been directed towards countries which
already support its admission to the United Nations along the lines
proposed by the Albanians, they are not likely to gain it many new
votes. Similarly, although about twenty Chinese Ambassadors have now
been assigned to posts, the majority of
Any these are in countries which already support China. lobbying
undertaken in these countries is therefore unlikely to affect the
outcome of the United Nations debate.
15. Although no agreement has been announced in the border talks being
held in Peking between Communist China and the USSR, and although it is
clear that their underlying hostility remains, there has been some
reduction of tension along the border in recent months and both sides
are apparently seeking to avoid further military confrontation. It is
unlikely that the situation has improved enough for the USSR to campaign
on China's behalf, at least with any degree of enthusiasm,
/ but the
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6.
but the East European states may be more willing to respond to Chinese
approaches and to support China's
admission than their somewhat lukewarm attitude last year appeared to
indicate.
16. It is most unlikely that Italy, in view of its current negotiations
with the Chinese, will reintroduce its "study group" proposal, which was
widely regarded by China's supporters as a Western delaying tactic.
17. There have therefore been no developments since the Twenty-fourth
Session to suggest that the form or the outcome of the debate on Chinese
representation this year will differ significantly from the pattern of
the previous few years. Unless there should be major unforeseen changes
in the situation we expect a satisfactory majority for the Important
Question resolution and adequate, if perhaps slightly reduced,
opposition to the Albanian resolution.
New Zealand Attitude:
18. As the statements made by the Prime Minister and the Permanent
Representative at the Twenty-fourth Session made clear, New Zealand is
aware of the desirability, and even the urgency, of bringing about
Communist China's admission to the United Nations, and in general of
ensuring that that country is encouraged to play its part in settling
the many outstanding international problems which cannot be resolved
without its concurrence. At the same time New Zealand has made clear its
opposition to any proposal or the admission of Communist China which
would mean the exp. 2sion or exclusion of the Republic of China and the
denial of United Nations representation to the people of Taiwan.
19.
Thus in effect we are committed to a policy based on compromise - that
is to say,
that is to say, a two-China or one-China/one Taiwan policy, although we
should naturally not wish to define our position so explicitly in
public. Within these limits we are prepared to be flexible, and we
should be willing to consider (though we should not wish to take the
lead in proposing) any suggestions which may be made for the seating of
both claimants.
20. We recognise, however, that the Assembly is extremely unlikely to
accept any proposal of this kind, and the delegation's instructions,
which are unchanged from last year, accordingly do not lay stress on
this aspect of our policy. Nevertheless, the tone and content of any New
Zealand statement on this issue should be moderately worded and should
reflect the Government's belief that a just solution can be reached only
if both sides are prepared to abandon the rigid lines to which previous
debates have clung and search for a form of compromise which will not
exclude either Communist China or the Republic of China from a place in
the international community.
21. As in
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7.
21. As in previous years, New Zealand believes that a proposal for a
change in Chinese representation is an important question and should
therefore require a two- thirds' majority vote for its adoption, while
its unwillingness to accept the expulsion of the Republic of China will
again compel it to oppose any resolutions of the Albanian type. We have
therefore agreed once again to co-sponsor the important question
resolution.
Instructions
22. The delegation should:
(a) be guided in discussion with other delegations by the Government's
stand that, while it would welcome Communist China's participation in
international negotiations, and although it sees advantages in its entry
to the United Nations, New Zealand is not prepared to support its
admission if this means the exclusion of the Republic of China and the
denial of the right of the people of Taiwan to a recognized place in the
international community;
(b) seek discussions with friendly delegations to compile assessments
and discuss tactics;
(o) report any new procedures or proposed alterations in tactics put
forward by other delegations during the session;
(d) refer to Wellington for instructions prior to consideration of the
item.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, WELLINGTON.
1 September 1970
CONFIDENTIAL
STATEMENT BY MAO TSE TUNG ISSUED ON
20 MAY 1970
ANNEX
A new upsurge in the struggle against U.S. imperialism is now emerging
throughout the world. Ever since World War II, U.S. imperialism and its
followers have been continuously launching wars of aggression and the
people in various countries have been continuously waging revolutionary
wars to defeat the aggressors. The danger of a new World War still
exists, and the people of all countries must get prepared. But
revolution is the main trend in the world today.
Unable to win in Vietnam and Laos, the US, aggressor treacherously
engineered the reactionary coup d'etat by the Lon Nol-Sirik Matak
clique, brazenly dispatched their troops to invade Cambodia and resumed
the bombing of North Vietnam, and this has aroused the furious
resistance of the three Indo-Chinese peoples. I warmly support the
fighting spirit of Samdech Norodom Sihanouk, head of state of Cambodia,
in opposing U.S. imperialism and its lackeys. I warmly support the joint
declaration of the Summit Conference of the Indo- chinese peoples. I
warmly support the establishment of the Royal Government of National
Union under the leadership of the National United Front of Kampuchea.
Strengthening their unity, supporting each other and persevering in a
protracted people's war, the three Indo-Chinese peoples will certainly
overcome all difficulties and win complete victory.
While massacring the people in other countries, U.S. imperialism is
slaughtering the white and black people in its own country. Nixon's
fascist atrocities have kindled the raging flames of the revolutionary
mass movement in the United States, The Chinese people firmly support
the revolution- ary struggle of the American people, I am convinced that
the American people who are fighting valiantly will ultimately win
victory and that be fascist rule in the United States will inevitably be
defeated.
The Nixon government is beset with troubles internally and externally,
with utter chaos at home and extreme isolation abroad. The mass movement
of protest against U.S. aggression in Cambodia has swept the globe. Less
than ten days after its establishment, the Royal Government of National
Union of Cambodia was recognized by nearly 20 countries. The situation
is getting better and better in the war of resistance against U.S.
aggression and for national salvation waged by the people of Vietnam,
Laos and Cambodia. The revolutionary armed struggles of the people of
the Southeast Asian countries, the struggles of the people of Korea,
Japan and other Asian countries against the revival of Japanese
militarism by the U.S. and Japanese reactionaries, the struggles of the
/ Palestinian
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2.
Palestinian and other Arab peoples against the U.S.-Israeli aggressors,
the national liberation struggles of the Asian, African and Latin
American peoples, and the revolutionary struggles of the peoples of
North America, Europe and Oceania are all developing vigorously. The
Chinese people firmly support the people of the three Indo-Chinese
countries and of other countries of the world in their revolutionary
struggles against U.S. imperialism and its lackeys, U.S. imperialism,
which looks like a huge monster, is in essence a paper tiger, now in the
throes of its death-bed struggle. In the world of today, who actually
fears whom? It is not the Vietnamese people, the Laotian people, the
Cambodian people, the Palestinian people, the Arab people or the people
of other countries who fear U.S. imperialism; it is U.S. imperialism
which fears the people of the world. It becomes panic-stricken at the
mere rustle of leaves in the wind. Innumerable facts prove that a just
cause enjoys abundant support while an unjust cause finds little
support. A weak nation can defeat a strong, a small nation can defeat a
big. The people of a small country can certainly defeat aggression by a
big country, if only they dare to rise in struggle, take up arms and
grasp in their own hands the destiny of their country. This is a law of
history.
People of the world, unite and defeat the U.S. aggressors and all their
running dogs!
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EN CLAIR
LASH U K MISSION
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2072
UNCLASSIFIED 251618Z
RE.... IN
(1 No.50)
NEW YORK
FEC 2/4
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TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE 25 SEPTEMBER 1973
Rk
ADDRESSED TO FCO TELNO 2072 OF 25 SEPTEMBER REPEATED FOR GAFORMATION
TO WASHINGTON.