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CYPHER/CAT A
CONFIDENTIAL
RIORITY U K MISSION NEW YORK TELEGRAM NUMBER 2742
CONFIDENTIAL 5213:Z
TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH CFFICE
5 NOVEMBER 1972
ADDRESSED TO FCO TELNO 2742 OF 5 NOVEMBER REFEATED FOR INFORMATION T›
WASHINGTON AND SAVING TO FEKING, MOSCOW, TAMSUI, PARIS, HONG KOTS,
CTTAJA AND ROME.
CHINESE REPRESENTATION AT THE U.N.
THE QUOTE ALBANIAN UNQUOTE DRAFT RESOLUTION HAS NOW BEEN CIRCULATED
(DIQU'EVT A/L.605 OF 2 NOVEMBER). ITS WORDING IS IDENTICAL TO THAT OF
LAST YEAR'S RESOLUTION, AND THE SPONSORS ARE ALSO THE SAME, EXCEPT
FOR THE ADDITION THIS YEAR OF SOMALIA AND YUGOSLAVIA.
2. THE DEBATE IS SCHEDULED TO START IN THE PLENARY ON THURSDAY 12
NOVEMBER. THE SECRETARIAT ENVISACE IT LASTING FOR ABOUT TEN MEETINGS
OVER FIVE OR SIX DAYS, WHICH WOULD MEAN THAT THE VOTE WOULD BE TAKEN
TOWARDS THE END OF THE FOLLOWING WEEK.
3. THE ALGERIANS HAVE GIVEN UP THE ATTEMPT THEY WERE MAKING TO
PRODUCE A QUOTE SARITISED UNQUOTE ALBANIAN RESOLUTION, AND ARE CO-
SPONSORING THE ALBANIAN DRAFT AS USUAL. (WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE QUOTE
SANITISED UNQUOTE DRAFT WOULD HAVE EXCLUDED MENTION OF THE EXPLUSIO":
OF THE QUOTE REPRESENTATIVE OF CHIANG KAI-SHEK UNOVOTE FROM THE
OPERATIVE PARA). THE BELGIANS AND THE ZAMBIANS HAVE ALSO APPARENTLY
ADANDONED THEIR EFFORTS TO FIND A FRESH FORMULA. DESPITE RUMOURS TO
THE CONTRARY THE CANADIANS SAY THEY HAVE NO INTENTION OF COMING
THROUGH WITH ANY NEW RESOLUTION, AND THERE ARE NO INDICATIONS THAT
ANYONE ELSE IS DREAMING UP ANYTHING AT THE MOMENT.
4. WE SHALL SEND ANOTHER VOTING ESTIMATE SEPARATELY.
FCO PASS SAVING TO PEKING, MOSCOW, TAMSUI, PARIS, HONG KONG AND ROME.
SIR C. CROWE
[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
U.3. DEPT.
F.Z.D.
MER. DEFT.
3.2.3.D.
NEWS DEPT.
RESEARCH DEPT.
(F.E. SECT. (SOV. SECT. (AIER. SECT.)
F.:
FEC
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Kc 2/4
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Far Eastern Department
100
Хораке Decopake bed
4/11 AR
4 November, 1970.
Chigage Ropresentation in the United Nations
During my brief visit on 23 October we had a few words about Chiness
representation. I mentioned that in my talka with the State Department
they had raised tentatively the thought that during Mais year's debate
some new proposal to seat Peking might energe, They thought that this
would be more likely to happen if the Albanian Resolution received a
simple majority.
2. I said that I expected the Important Item Resolution to be passed by
a comfortable majority, but that from our calculations the Albanian
Resolution could obtain a small simple majority now guess by one vote,
52-51-20, but there are lots of question
marks.
3. You asked whether we could let you have some contingency briefing in
oase a new proposal is put forward. My own view is that a new move is
most unlikely. ▲ "two Chinas" resolution is the variant which has
hitherto proved attractive to those not primarily concerned, but after
the Belgian experience with their draft resolution your telegram no.
2055), we can probably rule out this gambit. We feel that you should not
go along with any- thing of this kind but would of course like to be
consulted, and give you more considered instructions should a new
variant in fact appear.
4. The basic point is that our Ministers have gone on firm record in
favour of seating Peking. In particular, the Secretary of State, in his
s peech at the United Nations on 24 September, said that without the
presence of Peking in the United Nations it was undoubtedly more
difficult to tackle effectively some of the most pressing and dangerous
problems that trouble the world. you know, only we have consistently
voted for both the Important Question and the Albanian resolutions
(Mauritius did so last year!). Our reasons for this were based on the
sensitivities that existed in Washington in 1961. Since then, most
recently in 1966, Ministers have told the Americans that we should have
great diffi- culty in supporting any other procedural device to exolude
Peking. From my talks with the State Department and the White House last
week it is clear that the present Administration are more relaxed.
K. D. Jamieson, Esq., 0.X.0., VILIS,
NEW YORK.
/Nevertheless
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CONFID #FTIAL
Nevertheless the U.8. Consul-General in Hong Kong mentioned a new ploy
to Michael Wilford then he was there last month, and it is conceivable
that he may have obtained the ear of the State
Department.
Ve may learn more of this next week when Marshall
Green is visiting London for talks on Bast Asia.
5. In these circumstances, our thinking is that this year ve should stie
to existing policy. You should vote for the Important Question
Resolution as usual, but should not be party to any other proposal which
amounted to a device to delay the entry of Peking. There is no objection
to your making this known to other interested delegations. As we have
already made clear to the Americans, but to no one else, we gh:11 want
to take a fresh look at the situation next year, in the light of the
voting in the Assembly this session.
Conies to:
J. D. I. Boyd, Maq., WASHINGTON.
7. B. Denson, Req., 0.3.3., PE Tê.
(J. A. L. Morgan)
C
さ
ка
CHUJA KO PHA INIZIA TIGU
I submit a draft zuply from Mr. Rayle to Pro, Cookson'a
latter of 25 Oetabor.
(8. A. im Morgan)
4 November, 1970
Copied tai
Zambert, (U.K.(Iol.) %partment)
19
17
ட்
Letter
Sybil JosknON A omen's fatamaational Le
fer keson and Freudes, 29 6rest 'Jamos <tre:t, KONTION 7.0.1. # 389.
Mr. Boyle
1
The Frime Kinister has enkod no se reply to
yoɑr Letter of 25 Orbeber
Chinese representstion
in the Maided Txtisas, sinos I am the Hinister in
Foreign, and
for For Zaster affairs.
affios with responsibility
It is true that for many youre ne bays comeles
tently vebed in the United Ústions for rosulntiSALO calling for the
resting of the "ouple's Neublic of
fər
The oạnkáime! ezelusion from the United
X-tions of a comixy of its size må ptysiakin
bonefits kaither she United Zations Reg (Mina.
+
you pointed out in your letter,
if
is to fulfil properly its role
United Intions
internatiɔmž
body in which the views of all nations sen be
repansenbeʻl, it is ̈oloerly illogical that a country
which contains e
arber of the world's population
should mot
Vir Alee Tonglia-lens said
in hi♬ apoook de the United Nations on 24 September that the abonnee of
the People's Repubiis af hinn
makes it all the mɔre di£fiosis for
diffieslt for the UniŠod
Nations do benkla effectively
of the
the most
pressing and dangerous peskians that trochle
world.
+
49 150 samo time, ́ believe that my
ohange in the repremsatation of Minim, which
Perw‐nert Kamber of the Security Jounoil,
lâ(2)
is and "importɑat nestion" under stisie 13(2)
of the Jalted Xabi ng Carber. I də nət
think that it ma pesmaably be denied that
tula matter is que of great 11portunoe, this
particularly in view of the deep division..
of opinion on this isave in the United Taki‚ÆR
itself. It is far these reasons that me vota
cash year for the resolution defining this
109
insua
'Important
(ertion".
+
(27/22/67)
CONFIDENTIAL
UNITED KINGDOM MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS 845 Third Avenue, NEW YORK,
N.Y. 10022
Fac
November, 1970
3r 198
Copied to UN (PU) Hapor Mr. Nason
American Hepr.
Mr. Magan
Azar der. Applepant. Enter
China and the U.N.
SM
3.11
Thank you for your letter of 15 October. I am sorry not to have sent you
another up-to-date head-aount on the likely China vote before this, but
the situation is still very fluid, and, except that the Cambodians will
probably be absent rather than switch to voting against the Albanian
resolution, there is little to add to the assessment in our telegram No.
2238. The U.S. Mission refuse to make any predictions and have told us
that, according to their current estimate, there are 15 delegations
which might, or might not, swing either to an abstention or to an
affirmative vote on the "Albanian" resolution at the last minute. The
Peruvians say that their Government, and several of the other Latin
countries, have still not made up their minds. Italy is also an enigma.
2.
Thus about the only new definite element to report is that the
Secretariat have informed us today that the debate on the China Question
has been scheduled to start on Thursday, 12 November. Since it usually
runs for about five days, the vote would therefore be taken in the
middle of the following week.
Yours
ever
Many Stallard-Dewayne
Нама
(M. B. Stallard-Penoyre)
вела
L. V. Appleyard, Esq.,
CC:
Far Eastern Department,
F.C.O.
J.D.I. Boyd, Esq., WASHINGTON.
C.J. Howells, Esq., HONG KONG
J.P.P. Nason, Esq., U.N.(Pol) Dept., F.C.0. Chancery, TAMSUI
J.N. Allan, Esq., PEKING
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·
I
written #AJKOTE
OCTOBER 1970
FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH
AFFAIRS
Aircraft (Hi-jacking)
76. Sir R. Russell asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs it. in view of the further hi-jackings of aircraft
which have
occurred in recent weeks, he will request an emergency meeting of the
Inter- national Civil Aviation Organisation to consider the draft
convention on the pre- vention of bi-jacking.
Mr. Gadber: The draft Convention on Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, drawn
up by the International Civil Aviation Organisation (1.C.A.O.) earlier
this year. will be considered and tinalised at a Diplomatic Conference
in The Hague in December. To try to change the arrange- ments for this
important Conference would. I fear, not be possible. Our objectives of
rapid conclusion and wide adherence to the Convention have, how- ever,
assumed even greater importance as a result of recent events.
Middle East (United Nations Location)
77. Mr. Rankin asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth
Affairs if he will consider proposing a new location for the United
Nations in the Middle East.
Mr. Godber: No.
United Nations (China) 78. Mr. Rankin asked the Secretary of Stale for
Foreign and Commcawealth Affairs what steps he proposes taking to enable
China to be invited to join the United Nations Organisation.
Mr. Godher: For many years we have voted for the seating of the Chinese
People's Republic and shall do so again this year. As my right hon.
Friend said in his speech in the United Nations on 24th September, the
absence of China from the United Nations makes the solu- tion of many
pressing world problems all the more difficult.
U.N.E.S.C.O. (National Targets) 79. Mr. Willey asked the Secretary of
State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what action he has taken
pursuant
$ € 20
Written Answers
64
to the recommendation of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cul- tural Organisation Conference of Ministers of European Member
States clude in the list of national targets for responsible for
Government Policy to in-
dealing with problems which have priority research a certain number of
subjects importance for the developing countries.
Mr. Wood: The Final Report on the Conference, which was held in Paris
from 22nd to 27th June, was published on 9th October. The
recommendations are now being considered at U.N.E.S.C.O.'s 16th
Government will continue to play their General Conference. Her Majesty's
part in providing aid moneys to support the development of science and
Tech- nology in the developing countries.
European Economic Community (Hong Kong)
Mr. Rankin asked the Secretary of Alfairs whether, in the negotiations
for State for Foreign and Commonwealth
Great Britain to become a member of the European Economic Community, he
will propose that Hong Kong should auto- matically acquire associate
membership: and if he will make a statement on the
matter.
Mr. Rippon: Her Majesty's Govern ment have formally proposed association
for Hong Kong as for other dependent territories under Part IV of the
Treaty of Rome, as a means of making adequate provisions for Hong Kong's
interests. The Community have however said that they will wish the
question of Hong Kong to be discussed separately from that of other
dependent territories. Her Majesty's Government is pursuing the question
of the relationship of Hong Kong with the Community in full consultation
with the Hong Kong Government.
International Organisations (Parliamentary Delegations)
Mr. Pavill asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth
Affairs if he will publish in the OFFICIAL REPORT a list of hon. Members
of the House representing Great Britain at the United Nations and other
international bodies to which Her Majesty's Government appoints
representatives.
I
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DATE 27 OCT To
• Cb3
VOL.
805
(97
Mr. Wilford
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90
CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS
I should like to write to the Delegation in New
York on the lines of the enclosed self-explanatory draft.
American Department and United Nations (Pol.) concur.
2.
SALMorgan
(J. A. L. Morgan)
3 November, 1970
Copied to:
UN (Pol.) Department
American Department
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Sespatebied 30/0
29 October, 1970
ঈ
Chinese Representatim in the United Nations
Many thanks for the full and admirable record enclosed with your letter
of 23 October.
2.
I enclose a copy of the final version together with a copy of my
covering subzission. As I mentioned, it would be very useful if it were
possible to have your assessment before the debate in the Assembly this
year.
J. D. I. Boyd, Luq.,
WASHINGTON.
Colico A
PERIG (Danion)
For YORK (JAMIESON)
เล
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(J. A. L. Morgan)
1
T
Mr. Wilford
fir 3. ToglisSON
Mr. Degat
Bian Pe
OOWFIDENTIAL
in the United !
m ja
Important Iten Resolution
FEC.
Fec. Yo.
In his minute of 25 Septenbar, Mr. Royle agreed that
I should sake a tentative approach to the State Departmen↑
about their likely reactions to a change in our vete
Important Item Lesolution next year. This would be in
light of this year's voting.
I attach a record produced by the Embassy in Tashington
of my talk with the State Department 22 October. át ne
point in my subsequent discussions with the State Department,
the White House and the 0.I.A., was any disquiet expressed
about a possible change by us next year. Indeed, both at
the itate Department and the White Houre those with when
spoke tended to favour the United States itself taking a mér
positive line so secure Peking's entry.
0.1.4. said
categorically "the China lobby is dead",
3.
The State Deparment told me that they had briefed Vino-
President Agnew for his diseosaims with Mr. G. X. Yen,
Vice-President of Taiwan, to say that he should not give any
/ specifie
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(95
C
OOK FIÐRIT JAL
specific assuraness of continued support in the United
Xations.
They were not at that stage elaar what
Vise-President had in foot said.
I have asked the Fabasay to lat įs have their assesomma 1
of the state of current American thinking on China and in
particular how far these with whom I spoke can be regarded
an mosurately reflecting the sort of policy line the United
States would in fact be likely to adopt.
Genies (with enclosure) to:
American Department
U. N. (Pel.) Department
Mr. Boyd, WASHINOTOR
(J. A. L. Morgan) *
29 October, 1970
H
Copies sent to:
IRD
RD
American Dept.
U.N. (Pol) Dept.
Chanceries: Pek
Peking
(Dual Sand
Washington
Office of the Political
Adviser, HONG KONG
NEW YORK (JAMIEZON)
FED
30 October, 1970
CONFIDENTIAL,
Record of a conversation betreen Far. Fastern Department and the Country
for Asian Communist Affairs at the
Department on 22 October
Present:
Mr. J.A.L. Morgan
Mr. A. le S. Jenkina
Mr. J.D.I. Boyd
Mr. W. Brown
Mr. R. Parr
Mr. B.L. Pascos
Kr. Morgan said that he had given an account of his
recent experiences in Peking to the U.S. Consul-General in
Hong Kong and the State Department would no doubt have had
a report from then, He would be glad to fill in any gaps.
Meanwhile it might be of interest if he said some words
about Sino/British relations in general, The Foreign and
Commonwealth office had been looking at this question
following the change of government in the United Kingdom
and in the better atmosphere following the release of
Anthony Grey.
It had seemed desirable to establish whether
the apparent relaxation in Bino/British relations had
underlying substance. Ministers had therefore been con-
sulted under five headings:
(a) The question of the six British subjects still
detained in China and the related question of
confrontation prisoners in Hong Kong;
(b) The policy of H.M.Q. regarding Chinese repre-
sentation in the United Nations;
(a) The level of British representation in Peking;
CONE
ENTIAL
/(a)
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2.
(d) The British official presence on Taiwan
(the Consulate);
(e) H.M.G.'s view of the status of Taiwan,
Ir. Morgan said that (a) naturally had absolute priority.
would Be/ It was howaver a subject of no direct concern to the U.S.
therefore confine himself at this stage to discussion of the
remainder, in reverse order. First, H.M.G. had no intention
This was of changing their view of the status of Taiwan.
still, in their view, undetermined. Second, they had, equally, no
intention of withdrawing the British Consulate from Taiwan
It would maintain or changing its terms of reference.
relations with the provincial Government but with that only. Third,
H.M.G. had no intention of paying a price to the Chinese for a change in
the level of British representation in Peking. The Chinese list of
pre-requisites had never been clearly
defined; it had always had an element of open-endedness. However, the
Chinese had consistently listed three stumbling
blocks:
(a) The U.K. vote on the Important Question
Resolution;
(b) The British official presence on Taivan;
(c) The attitude of H.M.O. to the status of
Taiwan.
H.M.O.'■ criteria for the recognition of states were well
known.
In particular, we took the view that it was
inappropriate to lay down conditions for recognition.
had recognised the Chinese People's Republic in January 1950 and had
told the Chinese at that time that we were ready to
/proceed
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proceed to an exchange of Ambassadors. This offer was still
on the table.
3. Yr. Morgan said that following the review of H.M.G.'
China policy, which he had described, the only slight element
of change was in our thinking on the Important Question
Resolution. Ministers had authorised him to mention the
following to the State Department in a most tentative way, and
against the background of the determination to make no other
changes. Next year, like the United States, we should be
examining the results of this year's vote on Chinese represent-
ation in the United Nations. We should have to take a hard
look at this issue. We should be very happy to discuss the
matter with the State Department when their own views were
clear, and to learn whether the United States would regard as
extremely unwelcome or as tolerable a change in the U.K. vote
on the Important question Resolution.
Kr. Morgan wished to
tress that H.M.O. had at this point taken no firm position on
the matter. Ne should certainly not change our vote at this
Assembly. If however the Important question Resolution, next
year, seemed destined to fail, H.M,G. would be reluctant to
"go down with it". Britain was the only country showing
sufficient flexibility of thought to vote in the affirmative
on both the Albanian Resolution and the Important question
Resolution. But to vote thus at the moment when the C.P.R.
actually gained the China seat would be to invite particular
difficulties in our relations with Peking. Our mission there
sould expect to be put in a particularly exclusive dog house
this price could perhaps be too high,
b. Ir. Farr observed that some other countries planned to
move this year to a position on this question similar to our
/own
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own present position,
The Canadians had so far failed to
reveal precisely how they planned to vote.
5. Mr. Korgan reiterated that what he had said was put
It should be seen in the context
forward most tentatively,
of a re-appraisal which we should all have to make next year.
Noanwhile, we were doing no more than weigh the advantages.
Kr. Jenkins said that he saa relieved to hear this. A change
in our position this year would raise probleme. Mr. Morgan.
said that we had told the Chinese that there would be no
change in our position this year.
The
But
6. Mr. Brown thought that there would be a majority of
12-14 for the Important Question Resolution this year.
Albanian Resolution however would be a hard run thing.
Mr. Morgan thought that the Albanians sight gain a simple
majority. He asked about the position of Bolivia, Mr. Brown
said that Torres had indier ted that Bolivia would not recognise
China, North Vietnam or Cuba. There might be a majority for
the Albanian Resolution of between one and three votes,
the vote could go the other way by the same margin. The
Itslian position was unclear. Before Canadian recognition
of the C.P.R., the Italians had given the impression that they
were in no hurry. Now it seemed more likely that they would
recognise the C.P.R. before this year's vote. Indeed they
might adjust their vote even if they had not recognised the
C.P.R. at the time of the debate.
The U.S.3.2. would no
doubt try to take credit from the outcome.
It was no table
that the Russians had leaned hard on the Belgians to withdraw
their proposal for dual Chinese representation.
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7. Er. Brown said that the U.S. experts had placed question
marks against the following U.X. members, who might éwitch from
a negative to a positive vote on the Albanian Resolution:
Bolivia, Cameroon, C.A.R. (despite recent contacte with Taiwan),
Luxembourg, Colombia, Malaysia and Peru. The following might
Canada,
also switch to a positive vote, from an abstention:
Chile, Equatorial Guinea, Guyana, Italy, Tunisia, Mr. Brown
naked whether, to our knowledge, the Chinese had been exerting