ENSURE THAT A DECISION ON A QUESTION WHICH IS IMPORTANT,PER SO,
DOES INDEED REFLECT THE CONSIDERED JUDGMENT OF A SIGNIFICANT
PROPORTION OF THE MEMBERSHIP.MY DEL WILL, THEREFORE, ON THIS OCCASION
VOTE IN FAVOUR OF THE RESLN IN DOCU A/L 599.I WISH TO MAKE IT CLEAR,
HOWEVER, THAT IF, IN OUR JUDGMENT,CONTAINUED SUPPORT OF SUCH A RESLN
COULD IN THE FUTURE FRUSTRATE THE WILL OF THE GA,MY GOVT WILL .
CHANGE IIS POSITION.TEXT ENDS.
RFT 1719032
CONFIDENTIAL
OLS
Reem
non to The Appley and
For Faster Dept.fco
JC3
133
Спи
42/23/4
PRMNY 2153 NOVI7/70
TO OTT EXT GFE
INFO IT WSHDC LDN PARIS TOXYO MKONG CNBRA DE OTT CANDELNATO
MOSCO DELHI DE LDN SIKHM DE HAGUE
BAG JKRTA WLGTN DE LDN ROME BRU COPEN GENEV DE OTT
DISTR OUN
REF OURIEL 2138 NOV17
UNGA XXV:CHINESE REPRESENTATION
та
LATEST HEAD COUNT SUGGESTS POSSIBILITY ALBANIAN RESLN MAY NOT/NOT
IN FACT OBTAIN MAJORITY.FOLLOWING COUNTRIES MAY BE EXPECTED WITH
AT LEAST REASONABLE CONFIDENCE TO SWITCH FROM ABSTENTION TO YES:
CDA ITALY CHILE EQUATORIALGUINEA AUSTRIA.IN SAME WAY FOLLOWING
MAY BE EXPECTED TO SWITCH FROM NO/NO TO ABSTENTION:PERU BOLIVIA
MALAYSIA LUXEMBOURG.FOLLOWING WILL SWITCH FROM YES TO NO/NO:
CAMBODIA.FOLLOWING WILL SWITCH FROM YES AT LEAST TO ABSTENTION:
MAURITIUS.THIS GIVES RESULT OF 51-53-22(FIJI WILL ABSTAIN AND
INDONESIA WILL BE ABSENT).
2.THERE ARE HOWEVER AT LEAST THREE OTHER POSSIBLE SWITCHES FROM
ABSTENTION TO YES:GUYANA JAMAICA TANDT AND AT LEAST TWO POSSIBLE
SWITCHES FROM NO/NO TO ABSTENTION:CHAD AND SENEGAL. IF THESE
SWITCHES OCCURRED RESULT WOULD BE 54-51-23.WE GUESS GUYANA AND
SENEGAL WILL SWITCH GIVING 52-52-22.
3.THESE CALCULATIONS NATURALLY EXLUDE POSSIBLE SURPRISES WHICH
CANNOT/NOT BE ENTIRELY RULED OUT IN PRACTICE.AFTER SEVERAL DAYS
OF DESPONDENCY USA DEL HAS NOW RECOVERED CONFIDENCE. VOTE NOT/NOT
NOW LIKELY BEFORE NOV20.
RFT 1800102
ENCLAIR
ROUTINE UKMIS NEW YORK
TELNO 2911
132
TOP COPY
TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
4418 NOVEMBER 1970
pri
UNCLASSIFIED 190209Z
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TELNO 2911 OF 18
NOVEMBER 1970 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO PEKING, WASHINGTON, TAMSUI AND
SAVING TO PARIS, MOSCOW, HONG KONG, FORT LOUIS.
MY TELEGRAM NO.2960: (NOT TO PORT LOUIS) GENERAL ASSEMBLY: CHINESE
REPRESENTATION.
121
THE DEBATE CONTINUED TODAY WITH STATEMENTS FROM SOUTHERN YEMEN, GHANA,
ZAMBIA, MALAYSIA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO, HAITI, SYRIA,
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO, U.A.R., NIGERIA, NEPAL, MAURITIUS AND
UGANDA.
2.
THE REPRESENTATIVE OF MALAYSIA SAID THAT HIS COUNTRY SUPPORTED THE
ADMISSION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA BUT NOT THE EXPULSION OF
TAIWAN, THEY WOULD THEREFORE
ABSTAIN ON THE ALBANIAN RESOLUTION.
3. THE REPRESENTATIVE OF GHANA SPOKE IN FAVOUR OF A TWO CHINAS SOLUTION.
HIS DELEGATION WOULD NOT VOTE FOR THE IMPORTANT QUESTION RESOLUTION,
THEY WOULD BE PREPARED TO VOTE FOR THE ALBANIAN RESOLUTION BUT WOULD
PREFER THE CO- SPONSORS TO DROP THE CALL FOR THE EXPULSION OF TAIWAN.
THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO ALSO INDICATED SOME SUPPORT FOR THE
CONCEPT OF TWO CHINAS. ON THE OTHER HAND UGANDA AND NEPAL SPOKE
VIGOROUSLY AGAINST A TWO CHINAS SOLUTION,
--
i
+
/4. AFTER
- 2 -
4. AFTER A LONG STATEMENT ON THE VIRTUES OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA, RAMPHUL (MAURITIUS) SAID THAT HIS COUNTRY OPPOSED THE EXPULSION
OF TAIWAN. LAST YEAR. THEY HAD VOTED FOR THE ALBANIAN RESOLUTION TO SHOW
HOW STRONGLY THEY FELT
ON THE QUESTION OF ADMITTING THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC, THIS YEAR THEY WOULD
VOTE AGAINST IT TO SHOW HOW STRONGLY THEY FELT ABOUT THE EXPULSION OF
TAIWAN. THEY WOULD ABSTAIN ON
THE IMPORTANT QUESTION RESOLUTION.
5. THE GENERAL DEBATE WILL END TOMORROW MORNING AND THE
VOTE WILL BE TAKEN ON FRIDAY MORNING,
FCO PLSE PASS ROUTINE TO PEKING, TAMSUI AND SAVING TO PARIS, MOSCOW,
HONG KONG, PORT LOUIS.
SIR C CROVE
[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
FED
UND
AMER DEPT
EESD
RESEARCH DEPT.
(FE SECT)
AFER SECT) (SOV SECT
FFFFF
•
130
TOP COM
EXCLAIR
ROUTINE UK MISSION NEW YORK
TELEGRAM NO. 2938
UNCLASSIFIED 230333Z
FC 2/4
TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
19 NOVEMBER 1978
ADDRESSED TO FCO TELNO. 2938 OF 19 NOVEMBER REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO
PEKING MOSCOW WASHINGTON TAMSUI SAVING TO PARIS AND HONGKONG,
MY TEL. NO. 2911: GENERAL ASSE"PLY: CHINESE REPRESENTATION.
THE GENERAL DEBATE CONCLUDED TODAY WITH STATEMENTS FROM YEMEN, MALI,
THAILAND, AUSTRALIA, USSR, ALGERIA AND CHINA. STATEMENTS IN EXPLANATION
OF VOTE WERE MADE BY TCGO, BURMA, PERU, TURKEY, LIBERIA AND ROMANIA,
2. MALIK (USSR) MAKING HIS FIRST APPEARANCE IN THE PLENARY SINCE THE
CHINA DEBATE STARTED, INTERVENED IN THE DEBATE AT THE LAST MINUTE. THE
USSR HAD NOT BEEN INSCRIBED ON THE SPEAKERS LIST BEFORE THIS WAS CLOSED,
AND THE PRESIDENT ALLOWED HIM TO SPEAK BY COURTESY OF THE ASSEMBLY. HIS
SPEECH LASTED LESS THAN TEN MINUTES (HE SPOKE FOR AN HOUR ON KOREA THIS
AFTERNOON) AND STRESSED THE NEED FOR UNIVERSALITY AND GETTING RID OF THE
TAIWAN CLIQUE'',
ONITTING VIRTUALLY ALL REFERENCE TO PEKING.
3. CHIN (TOGO) SAID HIS DELEGATION WOULD VOTE FOR THE IMPORTANT QUESTION
RESOLUTION, HE SAID THE EXPULSION OF TAIWAN WAS NOT ACCEPTABLE TO HIS
COUNTRY BUT DID NOT MAKE IT CLEAR WHETHER HE WOULD VOTE AGAINST THE
ALBANIAN RESOLUTION AS USUAL OR SWITCH TO AN
ABSTENTION.
4. ALVARADO (FERU) SAID HIS DELEGATION WOULD CHANGE VOTING AGAINST THE
IMPORTANT QUESTION RESOLUTION. HE SPOKE IN FAVOUR OF UNIVER- SALITY AND
IMPLIED, AGAIN WITHOUT SPECIFICALLY COMMITTING HIMSELF, THAT HE WOULD
SWITCH TO AN ABSTENTION ON THE ALBANIAN RESOLUTION, 5. ALL THE OTHER
STATEMENTS HERE OM PREDICTABLE LINES.
FCO PLEASE PASS FEKING MOSCOW TA SUI SAVING TO PARIS AND HONG KONG SIR
COLIN CROWE
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
F.E.D.
[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]
U.N.D.
AMER DEPT.
E.E.S.D.
RES, DEPT.
TI
=
11
(P,E,SECT) (AMER GECT) (SOVIE" SICT)
249
altached
Slagh
(no Imjet
Mached) mm125/11
Enter: please
ivssure that this paper is given the
Same mentment 2.
as the Cabinet
isponet to whale
ir regers.
:: Areeyal
25/1
Mr. Wilford
SECRET
• Miss Deals, 24/11
•. S.S. Combing
4. FED!
Sir S. Tomlingen
Private Secretary
TEC
Mawson h25/ Me Aakeyond 3M
45.11
29939
(& due to how accente te
)
Steamingh 1261711
FC 3/4 2: Listence cright
CHINESE REPRESENTATION AT THE UNITED NATIONS
At the Cabinet Meeting on 13 November the Secretary his recorded an
having
of State/commented
..."It remained to be seen, however, whether the
Chinese People's Republic would now be prepared to
accept entry into the United Nations on a "two China"
basis, a solution which they had hitherto consistently
rejected. If they did, a number of other problems
would arise, including the question which Chinese
régime (if either) should occupy the seat on the
Security Council at present allotted to China",
わ
22/11
This Department's assessment, and U.N. (Pol) Dept. concur,
is that the Peking Government will only take its place at the
Peking
L. United Nations if the representatives of Taiwan are excluded
and Peking given the China seat in the Security Council.
This has consistently been Peking's policy; they are even
less likely to change it now that things seem to be going
their way.
3.
Ministers have made it clear to the Americans in the past
that we could not support any new proposal which amounted to a
device to delay the seating of Peking.
This precludes support
for any "two China" type of resolution.
When the Belgians
floated the idea of a "two China" resolution earlier this year
SECRET
/ we joined
SECRET
we joined in arguing against it on the grounds that it
would be unacceptable both to Peking and Taiwan.
Copies to: Miss Deas
UN (Pol) Dept.
}
SALMogan
(J. A. L. Morgan)
18 November, 1970
I doubt if the Secretary of State
harbours any
the prosibility of
illusions about
"two China""
solutions being acceptable to Peking.
}
expect
What
he wars only expressing
Some people might like to See happen.
by
of
hin wrifa
f comlinson
19/xi
SECRET
2
RESTRICTED
124
British Embassy, Mexico City.
10 November, 19
chinese keɔrescitetion
FC 44.
You may be interested to know that the Under Secretary at the M.F.A.
here responsible for political affairs told the Ambassador a day or two
ago that he doubted whether the present trend towards recognition of the
C.P.R. or to switch notes on C.P.R. admission to the U.N. would change
Mexican policy in the short term. In particular he seemed certain that
Mexico would continue to regard the matter as an important question". is
of this moment therefore, it seems that opinion in the .F.A. is in
favour of sitting tight following previous voting patterns, and seeing
which way the cooky crumbles.
2.
This view seems the more likely in that not so long ago Carrillo Flores
said in public that the U.N. could not go on ignoring the existence of
700 million Chinese. while Rosenzweig Diaz specifically told the
Ambassador that this should not be interpeeted as any kind of indication
of an immediate or even early change in Mexican policy, it did moan
that, in the light of this year's debate and voting on Chinese
representation, the Mexican Government would especially if it looked as
though the trend in favour of admission was going to succeed, be obliged
to review their position with some care, certainly on their U.N. vote
and possibly on relations as well.
3. We ourselves do not think it particularly likely that there is any
anger of Nexico switching her vote thid year. The Mexicans gre not given
to sudden switches of this kind; it is an issue of some moment to the
U... and the new President will want to five solidly based relations
with his northern neighbour during his first year or two in office; and
above all the debate and vote take place very close to the actual
transfer of puter botween Diaz Ordaz and Echeverria,
/ a time when there
A.D. Parsons, Esq., C.".G.,".V.O.,".C.,
U.K.MIS New York.
RESTRICTED.
RESTRICTED
time when there is very little prospect of anyone being
a position to take let alone think about - a decisión
of this magnitude. But we would not be so certɛin about next year.
c.c. American Dept., Far East Dept., Chanceries:
Pekin,
Washington, Paris. Moscow.
(J.L.Y. Sanders)
RESTRICTED
CYPHER/CAT A
PRIORITY VIENNA
RAD NO 460
CONFIDENTIAL
TOP COPY
TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
17 NOVEMBER 1970
୮
RIC
CONFIDENT I AL 170800Z
FED
FEC zlu
ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NÓ 460 OF 17 NOVEMBER REPEATED FOR
INFORMATION TO UKMIS NEW YORK.
GIBBS' LETTER OF 11 NOVEMBER: AUSTRIAN VOTE ON THE SEATING OF
COMMUNIST CHINA IN THE U.N.
THE AUSTRIAN HEA HAVE NOW TOLD US THAT THEIR FOREIGN MINISTER
HAS DECIDED THAT AUSTRIA WILL NOW CHANGE THEIR POSITION ON THIS
QUESTION TO ONE IDENTICAL TO THE U.K.'S. APPROPRIATE INSTRUCTIONS
ARE ACCORDINGLY BEING SENT TO THE AUSTRIAN MISSION IN NEW YORK.
WE HAVE BEEN ASKED TO REGARD THIS INFORMATION AS CONFIDENTIAL UNTIL
THE VOTE IS TAKEN.
FCO PASS TO UKMIS NEW YORK,
SIR P.WILKINSON
FILES
U.N.D.
M.EUR DEPT. SIR P.ADAMS
L
[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]
CONFIDENTIAL
+
128
EN CLAIR
ROUTINE UKMIS NEW YORK
TELNO 2930
TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
17 NOVEMBER 1970
127
TOP LUY
í
EC 2/4
·ASSIFIED 172358Z
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN AND CO'MMONWEALTH OFFICE. TELÑO 2902 OF 17 NOVEMBER
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO PEKING, WASHINGTON, TAMSU! AND SAVING TO
PARIS, MOSCOW, HONG KONG AND SUVA.
MY TELNO 2881 (NOT TO SUVA)
༣
GENERAL ASSEMBLY: CHINESE REPRESENTATION.
THE DEBATE CONTINUED TODAY WITH STATEMENTS FROM CEYLON, GUINEA, ECUADOR,
FIJI, FRANCE, MALAWI, POLAND, GABON, BULGARIA, CUBA, SUDAN, MAURITANIA,
GAMBIA, JAPAN, AND THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC. 2. SIKIVOU (FIJI) SAID HIS
DELEGATION WOULD VOTE FOR THE IMPORTANT QUESTION RESOLUTION. WHILE FIJI
WISHED TO SEE THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA A MEMBER OF THE UN IT WAS
OPPOSED TO THE EXPULSION OF TAIWAN AND WOULD THEREFORE ABSTAIN ON THE
SUBSTANT RESOLUTION.
3. KOSCIUSKO-MORIZET (FRANCE) SAID HIS DELEGATION WOULD AGAIN SUPPORT
THE ALBANIAN RESOLUTION AND VOTE AGAINST THE IMPORTANT QUESTION
RESOLUTION.
4. TSURUOKA (JAPAN) MADE ALMOST EXACTLY THE SAME STATEMENT AS LAST YEAR,
ONLY OMITTING ANY ADVERSE COMMENTS ON THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
5.
ALL OTHER STATEMENTS FOLLOWED THE SAME LINES AS LAST YEAR.
FCO PASS ROUTINE PEKING, TAMSUI, AND SAVING TO PARIS, MOSCOW,
HONG KONG AND SUVA.
SIR C CROWE
DEFARIMEWAAL DISARIBUZION
F.EASA. DEPT.
U.N.J.
7.D.
AMER DEPT.
NEWS DEPT.
RES. DEFT.
+
(F.E.{LOT)
SOVIET SÈCT)
FTI
11
(AliEK DECT)
[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]
L
AMPHER/CAT A
ITY GEORGETOWN
TELEGRAM NO.565
CONFIDENTIAL 1314452.
CONFIDENTIAL-
TO FOPEIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
DATED 13 NOVEMBER 1970
+
126
TOP COPY
RECEIVED IN RO TRY No. 6
1
ADDRESSED TO F CO TELNO. 565 OF 13 NOVEMBER R F TO
WASHINGTON AND UKHIS NEW YORK.
FEER 4
SANKEY'S LETTER 2/37 OF 14 OCTOBER (NOT TO UKHIS).
та
RAMPHAL TOLD MY U.S. COLLEAGUE ON 12 NOVEMBER THAT UNDER
PRESSURE FROM NON-ALICKED COUNTRIES IN NEW YORK GUYANA WAS
LIKELY TO CHANGE ITS VOTE ON THE QUOTE IMPORTANT QUESTION UNQUOTE
RESOLUTION FROM YES TO ABSTAIN.
FCO PASS TO WASHINGTON AND UK IS NEW YORK.
HA. BATES
FILES
U.N.D.
+
[REFENTED AS REQUESTED]
FED.
CONFIDENTIAL
+
70
4
•
.
125,
i mey
thought
1
United Kingdom MISSION to the UniTED NATIONS
845 Third Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10032~
CONFIDENTIAL
my thitz RAZ 16/11
13 November 1970.
LED Ever.
Dear John, Fe 2/4
**
Chinese representation in the Security Council
Van Ussel, the Minister at the Belgian Mission, told Ken Jamieson
recently that he expected the question of Chinese representation to come
up in the Security Council in January and that on his calculation the
new composition of the Council would result in a vote favourable to
Peking on a procedural motion.
2.
We should start giving thought to this possibility particularly since we
shall be President of the Security Council in January.
3.
In fact we do not necessarily agree with van Ussel about the new
composition of the Council if he means that it will be more pro-Peking
than the old one. It can be argued that the new Council will be
virtually the same as the old one on this issue. Finland (pro-Peking) is
replaced by Belgium (still just on the fence). Spain (pro-Taiwan) is
being replaced by Italy (newly pro-Peking). The change of Argentina for
Colombia should make no difference nor the replacement of Zambia by
Somalia. However Nepal (pro-Peking) is being replaced by Japan (firmly
pro-Taiwan). In sum therefore the composition of the new Security
Council could be said to be fractionally less pro-Peking (because of
Belgium's still doubtful position) although this might be offset by a
possible swing by Sierra Leone in the Peking direction.
4.
However, apart from the actual question of theoretical vote counting a
marked swing in favour of the Albanian Resolution in the General
Assembly would well alter the climate in the Council and lead to a
determined move by someone in the New Year against the credentials of
Ambassador Liu.
5.
We should therefore brush up our contingency plans. enclose the relevant
extracts from my Security Council guidebook and would be grateful for
your comments on them. Obviously Annex B needs bringing up to date as
regards U.K. statements in the Assembly. But do you think there are any
changes of substance that we ought to make?
(and in Parliament)
J.H. Lambert, Esq.,
U.N. (Pol.) Dept.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
LONDON, S.W.1.
Copy to:
Chancery, Peking
yours
Tony
us ever
(A.D. Parsons)
CONFIDENTIAL
AMIESE REER E TATION
Our contingency plan for dealing with an attempt to challenge the
presence of the Chinese Representative in the Security Council is
attached. The following paragraphs consider the special problems which
may arise for us if the matter is raised when we hold the Presidency of
the Council.
A challenge is raised to the Chinese credentials or a move is made to
have the matter discussed
Reaction: Invite the views of other members of the Council on the matter
raised (in practice the Americans would certainly react at once).
Assuming objection is raised to the Council taking up the matter of
Chinese credentials
Reaction: Inform the Council that since there would not seem
to be agreement on the proposal, the Council should proceed with the
business in hand unless those favouring consideration of the new matter
raised wish to press the issue, in which case it would have to be
decided by the Council.
If the question of Chinese credentials is pressed
Reaction: Put to the Council the proposition "that the matter raised by
the representative of
should be considered
by the Council in the first instance and that the Council's
consideration of the matter for which it has been summoned should
be deferred until that has been dealt with."
In the unlikely event that the preceding proposition was adopted by the
Council and the Council came to consider the question of Chinese
credentials, the United States would be likely to intro- duce a motion
or resolution to the effect that "the Council decides to take no further
action"
Reaction: Put the U.S. motion or resolution to the vote.
If the U.S. motion fails and the Council comes to vote on the Chinese
credentials
Reaction: Put the challenge to the credentials to the vote.
/If
If at any time in the above proceedings matters seem to be going vrons
and there appears to be a readiness on the part of the Council to
adjourn for consultations
Reaction: Propose an adjournment.
Comment
The main purpose of the series of steps outlined above is to overcome
the difficulty that we would not as President be prepared to give a
ruling that a separate agenda item was necessary to deal with the
Chinese credentials. (The furthest we have been prepared to go on this
is to agree not to vote in favour of a challenge to a Presidential
ruling in this sense.)
Our voting on the various motions as United Kingdom Represen- tative
would continue to be governed by the attached contingency plan.
CONFIDENTIAL
-
CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL
U.K. CONTINGENCY PAPER
Contingency paver against the eventuality of Chinese credentials/
representation being raised in the course of a Security Council meeting
called to deal with another matter
1.
A proposal that an urgent debate should not be interrupted by
consideration of the question of Chinese representation or credentials.
2.
Vote in favour
Explanation of vote as at Annex A
A motion or resolution to the effect that the Council "Decides to take
no further action at this time to consider the
beci credentials of any of its members" (or priority for such a motion
or resolution)
Vote in favour
Explanation of vote as at Annex A.
If there has been any substantial debate of the motion or resolution, it
may also be necessary to use the material in Annex B.
3.
A motion that a decision should be taken on the Chinese credentials
separetely
4.
Abstain
Explanation of vote as at 2 above.
If 2 fails and 3 passes and the question of the Chinese credentials
comes to a vote:
(a) A motion that it is the challenge which is put to the vote
(8)
Vote in favour
Explanation of vote as at Annex C
On the challenge to the Chinese credentials (or on the credentials
themselves, 4 a) having failed)
Abstain
Either make no explanation of vote or speak as at Annex B depending on
the circumstances
CONFIDENTI AL
/ 5.
CONFIDENTIAL
C
5.
A motion that the matter can only be discussed under an agenda iteru
6.
Abstain
Make no explanation of vote
A challenge to a presidential ruling that the matter can only be
discussed under an agenda item provided that the ruling is so worded as
to avoid cate orizing the question as substantive or otherwise
7.
Abstain
Explanation of vote as at Annex A
A motion to add an item on credentials to the arenda before the Council
8.
Abstain
Explanation of vote as at Annex A
(N.B.
This is an abstention on a proposal to add an ites to the agenda
currently before the Council.
The question of a separate debate on another occasion would be another
catter to be decided in the light of the circumstances. The initial line
to take on a proposal of this kind would be that the matter should be
subject in the first instance to the normal informal consultations to be
conducted by the President outside the Council).