neuroes in Hong Kong,

all sonoerned at the threstoned reduction in the muz,ly information with
the diony;cazones of "Red Buurd" nateri :

A. 7. Nadiosks,

Colonial Secretaría

Lower Albert Real,

wati

forum...

CO. TIDSTIAL

posters and provincial newspapers, This is a serious loss to our
research effort. However, then we examined the sources of information
available in Hong Kong, it was generally agreed that not a great deal
was escaping the net and that most of it was coming fairly quickly to
one or other department in Whitehall. I set out below the position as we
see it and would be grateful for your comments,

5. We receive at the moment information on China colleated in Hong Kong
from travellers, immigrants and various secret sources. It was thought,
however, that the following additional sources might well repay further
scrutiny:-

(a) Publications. Non Communist comment and reports on

Chinese affairs may be of some interest provided they can be summarised
briefly, Our experience in dealing with Chinese Nationalist publications
has been none too happy, however, An examination of Hong Kong Communist
newspapers and other publications may also throw some useful light on
Chinese affairs.

(b) jondonion, and Russialist. Foreign Correspondents.

It would be useful for someone to maintain contact with academics and
research institutes. (The Union Research Institute, China News Analysis,
University Departments, etc.) with a view to reporting any infor- sation
or views of special interest. Specialist correspondents, both foreign
and local, might yield some information.

(c) Hong Kong Boyurament Papartmanta.

Although a number

of Departments may well have information on develop- ments in China, we
feel that this would be of more interest to J.ςB. and have less value
for political work,

(a) Foreim Consulates.

Contacts with members of Consulates

In Hong Lông sharing this rather specialist interest and through them
possibly with foreign visitors to China, would probably yield some
useful reports. We must remember, however, that we are already
exchanging asses5- ment with the Americana, Canadiana and Japanese and
would not want to duplicate this work.

6. These additional sources are not going to yield a great deal of new
information. But clearly there is a useful job to be done scanning all
available information for its political content with a view to letting
us have important items quickly. As Cradock stated in paragraph 3 of his
letter the job would be essentially to liaise with a wide variety of
organisations and to co-ordinate their output, We would not want to
ressive voluminous and detailed assesments since we and other Whitehall
departments concerned have some difficulty in coping with those we
already het.

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CONFIDENTIAI

7. In your letter you suggested that an appropriate size for a China
watching organisation of this kind night be three or four officers. We
are inelized to think that in the first instance at any rate we would
have great difficulty in obtaining apį reval for more than one person
with supporting staff. In earlier discussions with Personnel Department
on the useful employment of the FCO Chinese cadre, we got the impression
that they would look fairly sympɑthetically at a proposal for the
employment of an additional officer in Hong Kỡng" if şie falt there was
a requirement. Naturally they would not wish to see the creation of an
artificial slot for one of our Chinese speakers, but they are anxious to
maintain a strong-cadre of Chinese speakers, and this is the kind of job
which would enable an officer of Mrat Secretary rank to keep his hand
in.

The

8. Provided, ther fore, that our proposal is accepted, we would then
have to decide where he should operate from in Hong Kong. I agree with
Hannan that the Trade Office would be inappropriate. But this really
only leaves the R.1.0. and your own office. R.1.0. offers certain
obvious advantages. It has already developed contacts with a number of
the organisations and groups referred to above, albeit for different
purposes. In addition the 1.1.0. possesses the necessary archive and
biographical material which a "China watcher" would require. However, I
understand that it would be difficult for the R.1.0, to accommo- date
any more staff, Furtherezore, I can see disadvantages in identifying the
officer too closely with the information Image Q the 1.1.0. It is
possible that some of his contacts, e.g. foreign Consulates, would not
be as forthcoming with information if they felt that it might emerge in
one of the 1.1.0.'s publications. Xy fears may be unjustified, but
olearly if this turned out to be the case, it would restrict his
usefulness to us. On these grounds I m inclined to feel that it would be
better to make the officer a member of your own staff. In this way he
would not be waneeted with my existing "Chine-watching" operation in
Hong Kong and there would be less dầnger of crossing wires. On the other
hand, he would enjoy the prestige of your office both within the Hong
Kong Government and "Sutside örganisations. Xo doubt arrangements could
be made for him to draw on the facilities of the Z.I.D.

If you and the recipients of this letter agree with my proposals I would
go into the matter further with E.& 0, and Personnel Departments. I am
sending copies of this letter to Cradook in Peking, and Hannan and
Ashworth in Hong Kong.

CONFIDUITIAL,

(J. MURAY)

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

BENZIE VERWAN

CONFIDENTIAL

Letter

Type 1+1

i

Registry No.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret

CW

Secret.

Confidential 23/1

Restricted. Unclassified.

PRIVACY MARKING

DRAFT

To:- F

Mr. A. Maddocka

In Confidence

From

Mr. J. Murray

Telephone No. & Ext.

Department

FED

4.223/1.

Mo Candiely Packag The Hay, H.K. No Adamantly, W.K

Copes 15.

20.

H.K.

Mr Brewery H.. Steven on 1.0. Lile. Pearse 1.0.0

I am grateful for your interesting letter 93/2 of

7 December in which you put forward proposals for

improving our coverage of developments in China from

Hong Kong, and subsequent correspondence on the subject

from Hannam and Cradock.

2. We looked at this question some time ago when we

vere considering the future of the Kission in Peking.

We were examining specifically the possibility of

establishing an alternative vantage point from which to

observe China and it was agreed then that Hong Kong had

special advantages not shared by other posts. Its

continuing value as a reservoir of information and

expertise on Chinese developments is attested by the fact

that so many foreign governments have chosen to sand

Chinglé batér" to their Consular posts in the Colony.

3.

As your proposals were of interest to a number of

Whitehall Departments, either engaged in studying Chinese

developments or responsible for organisations involved in

badan raflag ung

similar work in Hong Kong, I thought it would be useful

have

we prendly

to sellest their reactions, before sopiying. I refer

Luma Ree

Read befut

particularly to I.R.D. and the Ministry of Defence.

I was particularly concerned to have their views on your

muisti be

suggestion that we are missing opportunities in Hong Kong

and to see whether their organisations in the Colony

could do more to help. These points were discussed at a

Boon

meeting in the Department. It/became clear that most of

these organisations in Hong Kong are fully occupied with

/their

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WEBDL 51-7406

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

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their existing work which follows fairly narrowly

defined requirements laid down by their parent

organisations in London, and it would be difficult to

adapt them to a political reporting role without

redrafting their terms of reference. I appreciate that

your office is in a similar position. Although you may

have had a limited China-watching brief at one stage,

policy questions now take up so much of your time that I

cannot see you being able to take on additional

responsibilities in the foreseeable future without an

increase in staff.

4.

He then took a close look at the information now

zvailable to us from sources in Hong Kong. As you can-

sufpheme

imagine we are all concerned at the threatened

reduction in the supply of information with the

disappearance of "Aed guard material, wall poaters and

provincial newspapers. This is a serious loas to our

research effort. However, when we examined the sources

of information available in Hong Kong, it was generally

agreed that not a great deal was escaping the net and

that most of it was coming fairly quickly to one or

other department in Whiteball. I set out below the

position as we see it and would be grateful for your

commente.

5.

We receive at the moment information on Chira

collected in Hong Kong from travellers, immigrants and

kamna

various secret sources. but it was thought/that the

Sowned

following additional estegories-might well repay further southing

study.

(a) Publications

Non Communist comment and reporta

on Chinese affairs may be of some interest provided they

can be summarised briefly, Our experience in dealing

with Chinese Nationalist publications has been none too

happy, however. An examination of Hong Kong Communist

newspapers and other publications may also throw some

useful light on Chinese affairs.

/(b)

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

WEBL 51-2406

+

CONFIDENTIAL

Inji miner Sprandial ilmest

M

at

all available

information

rate love

would how sunt

duffrandtg Stains wins afferral Ar man then

(b) Academics

and Specioust foreign comerforded's

It would be useful for someone to

maintain contact with academics and research institutes.

(The Union Research Institute, China News Analysis,

University Departments, etc.) with a view to reporting

Specivest any information or views of special interest. Comerfordert's
both foreign cond local rights gird soms information. (e) Hong Kong
Govezieht Departments Although a

yida

number of Departments may well have information on

developments in China, we feel that this would be of

more interest to J.I.B. and have less value for

political work.

(d) Foreiz Consulates

Contacts with members of

Consulates in Hong Kong and through them possibly with

foreign visitors to China, would probably yield some

useful reports. We must remember, however, that we

are already exchanging assessments with the Americans,

Canadians and Japanese and would not want to duplicate

this work,

6. These additional sources are not going to yield

a great deal of new information. But clearly there is a

useful job to be done scanning these and existing

SOLTERA NË "İnformation for their political content with a

view to letting us have important items quickly. ¿A

Cradock stated-in paragraph 3 of his letter the job

would be essentially to liaise with a wide variety of

organisations and to co-ordinate their output. We would

not want to receive me voluminous and detailed

assasaments since we and other Whitehall departments

concerned have some difficulty in coping with those we

get. already reboire.

7. In your letter you suggested that an appropriate

size for a China watching organisation of this kind

might be three or four officers. We are inclined to

Mink

Fool, that in the first instance, there would only bi

enough wopic for one person with supporting staff. In

earlier discussions with Personnel Department on the

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/useful

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

WIEN 51-7405

CONFIDENTIAL

useful employment of the CC Chinese cardes, we got

the impression that they would look fairly

sympathetically at a proposal for the employment of an naditiona

/officer in Hong Kong if he felt there was a

requirement.

دست تان کا

Personnel Department are anxious to

maintain a strong cadre of Chinese speakers.) Naturally

-invention of oveating an artificial slot for

Ond

one of our Chinese speakers hat this is the kind of job

which would enable an officer of First Secretary rank

his Incandes.

to maintain his expirstoo. keq

8.

Provided, therefore, that our proposal is

accepted, we would then have to decide whether he

should operate from Hong Kong. I agree with Hannam

that the Trade Office would be inappropriate. But this

really only leaves the R.I.O. and your own office. The

R.1.0. offers certain obvious advantages.

It has

already developed contacts with a member of the

organisations and groups referred to above,albeit for

different purposes. In addition the R.I.O. possesses

bigophers

the necessary archive and bibliögraphical material

which a China watcher would require. However, I

understand that it would be difficult for the R.1.0.

to accommodate any more staff. Furthermore, I can see

disadvantages in identifying the officer too closely

with the information image of the R.1.0. It is

possible that some of his contacts, e.g. foreign

Consulates, would not be as forthcoming with information

if they felt that it might emerge in one of the R.1.0.'a

publications. My fears may be unjustified,

but clearly if this turned out to be the case, it would

tus.

restrict his usefulness on these grounds ei I am

inclined to feel that it would be better to make the

officer a member of your own staff. In this way he

would not be connected with any existing China-watching

/operation

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NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

WOEL FE7406

CONFIDENTIAL

operation in Hong Kong and there would be less danger of

crossing wires. On the other hand, he would enjoy the

preatige of your office both within the Hong Kong

attuda ngang entire

معلمة

Government and amongst non-Government China-vatehing

organisations. No doubt arrangements could be made for

him to draw on the facilities of the R.1.0.

9.

If you and the recipients of this letter agree with

woeder en into the waithir forth with

my proposals I shall put them to E. & 0. and Personnel

1

Departments.

Crasterly ingloy case)

Arched-Hammer Gree

Forg

A

sending expert (15

Hay Kung.

Мета

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Murray

CONFIDENTIAL

Reference

RECEIVED IN 3

*P. HIVES TIK 31

31 JAN 1969

I

Flog A

!

:

:

I held a meeting of the various Whitehall Departments concerned with
developments in China to discuss this correspondence on improving our
coverage of developments in China from Hong Kong. As you can see it was
generally felt that Kr. Haddocks was exaggerating the amount of new
information available in Hong Kong. In this connection it is information
not views which are likely to be in short supply in the near future. In
the circumstances the size of his suggested China watching establishment
is a bit inflated.

2. I have not discussed this yet with Personnel or E. & 0. Department
but on the last occasion the question was raised with Personnel
Department they made sympathetic noises (see paragraph 11 of our
submission of 30 July, 1968), and I do not foresee that they will raise
difficulties provided the Maddocks agrees our assessment and our fairly
moderate proposal

@ Witsom

(G. Wilson) 24 January 1969

:

Masz Ja

CONFIDENTIAL

31

CONFIDENTIAL

H

3

James,

RECEIVED I ARCHIVES SALO).

1

24 JAN 1969

FE43/13

Office of the British Chargé d'Affaires,

PEKING.

31 December, 1968,

China Watching in Hong Kong

1968 for 3/2.

I have seen a copy of Arthur Maddocks' letter of 2 December to you on
the possibility of developing our China- watching capacity in Hong Kong.
I agree there is a case for this. There is valuable material to be
gained in Hong Kong which we do not at present get, not because it is
not available but because there is no-one to collate it. Our position in
Hong Kong is, from an intelligence point of view, greatly envied by
other China-watching powers and it is certainly a pity that we do not
use it to the full.

2.

This said, I wonder whether the sort of establishment suggested in
paragraph 5 of Maddocks' letter is not rather larger than would be
necessary. It seems to me that one good officer of first or second
secretary rank with Chinese language training supported by a secretary,
could probably do the job, which, after all, would be essentially one of
liaison among all the China watching bodies in Hong Kong. The best
arrangement would seen to be for him to be attached to the Regional
Information Office as suggested by Haddocks in his paragraph 5.

3. I should perhaps anticipate the possible argument that we should not
duplicate our China-watching work in Peking and Hong Kong. The kind of
work we have in mind for an officer in Hong Kong would be complementary
to that we are at present doing in Peking. He would not have to do the
basic work which we do here, but would try to collate in a meaningful
way the useful information and opinion which is available in Hong Kong.
He might also collect for us some of the publications which appear in
Hong Kong and which no-one at present has time to look for. In addition
he would of course have available to him material which for security
reasons we do not see here.

4. I should also stress that I see this post as supplementary to our
establishment here. I could not accept the argument that if we want
someone in Hong Kong we must provide him from our strength in Peking. We
have already greatly reduced our diplomatic strength here; indeed for
the last six months have had to work at well below acceptable levels of
staff. Any further reduction here would make the post scarcely worth
maintaining.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Michael Hannan, Arthur Maddocks
and Ashworth in Hong Kong.

Janes Murray, Esq., C.M.G.,

Far Eastern Department.

Yours wer

Васи касалом

(Percy Cradock)

CONFIDENTIAL

Ο

ference:

You Perence:

93/2

CONFIDENTIAL

BRITISH TRADE COMMISSION IN HONG KONG 7th Floor, Shell House, Queen's
Road, Central, Hong Kong Mail Address: P.O. Box No. 528, Hong Kong Cable
Address: "Uktrade Hongkong"

Ki

{ARCHIV 2024

24 JAN 1969

F243/13

Dear James,

Telephone- 230176

7th December, 1968

Lee.

Mr Wilson for yo 17e Boga.

이고

China Watching in Hong Kong

Arthur Maddocks has sent to me a copy of his letter of 2nd December to
you advocating the stationing in Hong Kong of two or three Diplomatic
Officers to do China watching work.

2. It is not within my province to comment on this suggestion, "but
Haddocks mentioned in para. 5 of his letter that these officers might
perhaps be attached to the Trade Commission. I should perhaps point out
that the Trade Commission at present is not equipped with normal strong
room facilities such as would be needed to house the documents these
officers would handle, nor do we have a home based archivist trained in
handling confidential documents. The comparatively few security graded
letters we handle in my office at the moment are in the care f my
locally employed P.A., but the advent of political officers of the type
suggested would impose too much of a burden on her.

3. You are, of course, aware that the Economic Survey Section are housed
with me, and it may well be that the proposed Diplomatic Service China
watchers could be anal- gamated with them. The Economic Survey Section
has, of course, got strong room facilities, but we would still need an
home based archivist.

4. I am copying this letter to Arthur Maddocks.

J. Murray, Esq., C.M.G.,

Lowes ever Michae

(H.P.V. Hannak ) Principal Trade Commissioner

Head of Far astern Department, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London,
S,W,1.

CONFIDENTIAL

livery ofført u made to ensure that the information gives herein se
secuenta, but no legal responsibility to accepted for any errors an
sione in that information and no responachility la accepted in regsed to
the standing of any firmu, comperim, er individual mentione

SECRET & PERSONAL

4/504/68

RECEIVED IN MIUIDINY

10 DEC1963

OFH 36/157/48

Regional Information Office, 501 Ridley House,

2 Upper Albert Road, PONG KONG.

5 December, 1968.

مد

l03/2

3/2.

You will no doubt be seeing Arthur Maddocks' letter, 'China Watching in
Hong Kong' of 2 December, 1968 to James Murray.

2.

As you will see, he is proposing the setting up of a small establishment
of two or three Diplomatic Officers of 1st or 2nd Secretary rank with
supporting staff for the purpose of sending regular China Watching
reports to London. The idea is that this small unit should collate China
Watching information from the many sources that exist hers.

3.

Personally, I am not entirely convinced of the need for such an
establishment and neither is my friend, However, I shall take the
opportunity of discussing the proposal with Roy Crook during his visit
and will keep you informed of developments at this end.

You a

log Armando

(A.C. Ashworth)

J.L. Stevenson Esq.,

Information Research Department,

Riverwalk House,

Millbank,

LONDON, S.W.1.

fold you

for th

Stevenmoxify

проводов

1.

FD10/12.

Min Dagat?

Wien/ FOD (12/12.

M.

SECRET & PERSONAL

(I sand, we prestigime for a sys

of of Marchwachys butter)

· ·

C.S. 41A. 2600077

REF.

ית

CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31

24 JAN 1969

FECIBLE

Dear Jam

es

L

O?

COLONIAL SECRETARIAT

LOWER ALBERT ROAD

HONG KONG

2nd December, 1968.

saule a

defertorted view

this for discussion with Grondo. Jeft

'China Watching' in Hong Kong

lo que

Mo Wille. The Rap

When you were here in November we discussed briefly the possibility of
doing more China watching in Hong Kong. It seems to me that there are
opportunities here which are not being taken by the Diplomatic Service,
and now that the fund of information from Peking has been reduced we
ought to consider making fuller use of our unique position here. The
main question, which can be decided only in London, is to what extent
China watching is a useful way of using Diplomatic Service manpower.

2.

At the moment there is no China, watching done in Hong apart from Kong
by Her Majesty's Diplomatic Service/ Robin McLaren and I

are on secondment to the Hong Kong Government.

I am in no sense a China watcher and Robin McLaren, who is qualified to
be one, is occupied to a large extent in the regular work of the Hong
Kong Government.

Tony Ash-

worth's

office.

3.

There are, of course, other departments of the U.K. Government with
representatives in Hong Kong who produce information and reports on
China, for example, Joint Services Intelligence. There are also agencies
of the Hong Kong Government, above all Special Branch, who produce
useful information. But these various organisations are producers mainly
of basic intelligence. If they do report on Chinese policy and
developments as a whole, it is usually from a specialized point of view,
e.g. the military. They are not trying to do a Diplomatic Service job.

4.

Hong Kong provides special advantages for China watching. For example,
various departments of the Hong Kong Government such as the Commerce &
Industry Department, the Marine Department and the Railways
administration acquire in the ordinary course of business information
which throws some light on events in China. There are various
semi-academic bodies such as the Union Research Institute. There is also
a body of expert China watchers in some of the Consular missions here,
especially the Americans and the Japanese, and a body of other foreign
observers such as journalists. In addition, there are various residents
of Hong Kong who have useful contacts with China. There is a good deal
of written material in Chinese available, some of it from Taiwan
Bources. At the moment, no one is exploiting these sources with the
interests of the F.C.0. mainly in mind.

/Contd...

J. Murray, Esq., CMG,

Head of Far Eastern Department, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, LONDON,
S.W.1.

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