2. We were in principle ready to provide (and pay for)
an officer of First Secretary rank from the F.C.0. Chinese
cadre, supported by a P.A. to do the job, if this were
acceptable to the Hong Kong authorities.
3. It seemed to us that the best place from which to đo the
job was the Office of the Political Adviser.
The prestige
of the Political Aiviser's office would assist in developing contacts
with non-official agencies, and the officer concerned could provide a
useful "China-watching" service for the Hong
Kong Government. He could, moreover, assist with the
staffing of that office when one of the two existing members
was on leave.
Alternative locations were open to objection:
were open to objection: the Regional
/ Information
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
Information Office, because this would identify the work
of the "China-watcher" too closely with the propaganda rôle
of the R.1.0.; the Joint Jervices Intelligence Staff, becauB (
too close an association with military intelligence sight
prejudice relations with non-official "China-watching"
institutions; and the British Trade Commission, because the
appointment there of an officer with overt (und they would
have to be overt) political responsibilities might reinforce
the idea that the British Trade Commission was in some sense
a separate political instrument of Thitehall in Hong Kong.
5. The Hong Kong authorities have however represented to
ns that the reinforcement of the Political Advisor's staff
by an extra officer would be bound to attract attention in
Hong Kong and might lead to undesirable speculation partiou-
larly among unofficial members of the Executive and Legislative
Councils and from local journalists about the whole function
of the Political Adviser's Offics.
6. Then we first went into the matter in 1968 we thought
that the Political Adviser hinsself and the Assistant Political
Adviser (a member of the F.C.0. Chinese cadre) were both too
ocoupled with the regular work of the office to undertake this
additional responsibility. Now that the situation is quieter
in Hong Kong this may no longer be the ease.
7. Te night therefore ask the Governor if he would be
prepared to enjoin on to the Political Adviser, for a trial period, the
additional responsibility of collating information
CONFIDENTIAL
2
/ available
CONFIDENTIAL
available in Hong Kong about affairs in China and reporting
to him periodically, copying his reports as appropriate to
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
8. After a period of, say, six months, a review could be
undertaken in consultation with the Political Adviser about
the usefulness of the task, and what it involved. Kenewed
considertation could if necessary be given then to the
reinforcement of the Political Adviser's staff, or other
seans of coping with the matter.
Far Eastern Departaent,
25 November, 1969
CONFIDENTIAL
- 3 -
CYPHER/CAT A
IMMEDIATE SEOUL
TELEGRAM NUMBER 169
CONFIDENTIAL
TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
11 NOVEMBER 1969
CONFIDENTIAL
STAFF IN CONFIDENCE.
ADDRESSED TO FCO TEL NO 169 OF 11 NOV.
FOR LT COL. GRIFFITH.
YOUR TEL NO. 139 REPLACEMENT OF DEFENCE ATTACHE.
P
ON HIS RECORD OF SERVICE THE OFFICER CONCERNED SEEMS
SUITABLE. BUT VERY MUCH HOPE THAT I SHALL NOT REPEAT
NOT BE ASKED TO ACCEPT HIM IF FOR MUCH ( I SUSPECT THE
GREATER PART) OF HIS TOUR HE WILL BE UNACCOMPANIED.
LETTER FOLLOWS BY NEXT NON CONFIDENTIAL BAG,
MR. TRENCH
FILES:
MIL.ADVISER F.EASTERN D.
ADVANCE COPIES SENT
COPY TO:
MSSB, M.O.D., STANMORE.
DDDDD
CONFIDENTIAL
L
CS. 41A
2600077
5,000-2/69-870130
CONFIDENTIAL
24
Este @
COLONIAL SECRETARIAT LOWER ALBERT ROAD
HONG KON
RIF. SCR 2/4841/69
Dear Wilson
Fr
R
ENOV 1759
辰
FEC 13/13
China Watching in Hong Kong
29 October, 1969.
Thank you for your letter FEC 13/13 of 17
October about the possibility of sending a Diplomatic Service officer to
Hong Kong to study China.
2.
We discussed this subject with Sir Leslie Monson on 24 October. He will
be letting you know his views. He asked me to set out in writing two
points which we made to him.
23
3.
The first is that in our view there is no chance of the appointment of a
China Watcher to the Political Adviser's office being kept secret From
the Unofficial Members of the Executive and Legislative Councils or from
the local journalists. The Political Adviser's office is an unusual part
of the Hong Kong Government machinery. Many people, including the local
communists, take an interest in it, because they suspect the Political
Adviser is in direct touch with Whitehall and may be used as an agent of
the U.K. Government. arrival of another First Secretary from the
Diplomatic Service, raising the size of the Political Adviser's office
by 50% would, we think, not be overlooked.
4.
The
The second point concerns the posting of a political officer in à Trade
Commissioner's office. In Hong Kong it would not be a new development to
have a political officer in a Trade Commission.
The Australians
and Canadians already follow that practice. The head man comes from the
Department of Industry and Trade whilst the Department of External
Affairs has to be content with having the No.3 place in the hierarchy.
There is no secret about the fact that these External Affairs
representatives are engaged in political and not trade activities and
that the political activities are mainly China Watching.
5.
Admittedly the British Trade Commission is not the same as the
Australian and Canadian Trade Commissions. There might be some objection
to the expansion of the
C. Wilson, Esq.,
Far Eastern Department,
Foreign & Commonwealth office,
LONDON, S.W.1.
CONFIDENTIAL
/contd...
IL
CONFIDENTIAL
I
British Trade Commission but that is a point that could be put to the
Governor if you decide that the Trade Commission is the best place for
the China Watcher. From the point of view of the Hong Kong Government it
is easier to accept than the addition of a China Watcher to the
Political Adviser's office.
6.
The above does not represent the whole of our discussion with Leslie
Monson but just the two points he asked me to set down.
Your
ever
Aother Mach
(A.F. Maddocks)
Dofera wis
In Lemme Homon's
He commbadation
exclusion
f
मे
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On te slike
hoala ا
stał presswaj the Public Adison officer Trade Commission (= $.5.15.
воле
Mr
M.. Mumay My bid fare
we statedfechas
our Chise butter in
sting
высла роза кад
Hunt 13
S think it in the Unofficial Members' reactions [2ut" worry Hong Kong
most and of there is a real danger thod-this posting wandet comproment
the Martin of the PA's fu
in Thame Sagrer
we must die for to the objection vanid.
eyez
12m
154 12/10
CONFIDENTIAL
A.A
FEC 13/13
PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
(23
espatched
хора
17 October, 1969.
17/0
AR
You will remember your long drawn-out correspondence with James Murray
about the question of establishing
■ China-watching unit in Hong kong, which rests with your letter SCR
2/4841/69 of 27 May,
2. Personnel Department have now agreed in principle to the
establishment of such a post in Hong Kong and we have therefore decided
to have another look at the question. This letter is by way of a warning
that Sir Leslie Monson will probably raise it with Sir Hugh
Norman-Walker during his visit next week. We have provided him with a
note on the history of the proposal, setting out the measure of
agreement which was reached amongst those concerned on the purpose auch
a unit would serve, the size of the establishment required and the
problem of its location. If Sir Leslie obtains a favourable reaction we
would hope to discuss it further with the Governor when he comes into
the Office for talks later during his leave.
(0. Wilson)
Far Eastern Department
A. F. Maddooks, Esq.,
Office of the Political Adviser,
HONG KONG,
PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
р.
Puze! 13
+
PERSONAL & SECRET
Depadany
17/10
17 October, 1969.
22
Br.
China-watching in Hong Kong
You will remember that Far Eastern Department promised to let you have a
background note on the question of establishing a China- watching unit
in Hong Kong. This is attached. You had kindly agreed to raise this
matter with Sir Hugh Norman-Walker during your visit. But it was felt
that until Personnel Department had given their approval in principle
for the establishment of the post it would be premature to raise the
matter. They have now done 80. 2. We realise that Sir Hugh will probably
wish to discuss the proposal with the Governor before making a final
decision but wo hope that he can be persuaded to take a favourable view
of it and to brief the Governor accordingly so that we can discuss it
with him when he comes to the office for discussions later during his
leave.
3. In arguing the case with Bir Hugh Bunny Carter has suggested that the
points in paragraphs 5 (c) and (4) in the background note are likely to
carry the most weight with the Hong Kong Government, provided of course
that the general question of principle can be resolved, In
correspondence with the Political Adviser, Arthur Maddocks, we have
never obtained a precise statement of their objections to the idea
although we believe that paragraphs 6 and 7 of the background note are a
fairly accurate interpretation of Maddocks' feeling of "embarrassment",
It will be useful for our later discussions with the Governor if you
could get them to spell out any objections in greater detail.
14. I should perhaps add that this matter has only been presented to me
in detail with the arrival of this letter in draft. I mat therefore
admit to you that I am not yet wholly convinced that there is a real
need for a China watcher of the kind proposed or, if there is, that the
task can be carried out by one officer. an I wholly convinced that the
Secretariat would be the right place Nor for his. In this perhaps my own
experience leads me to take Kadlocks' expressed objections more
seriously than does everyone else. However it is obviously right that we
should take advantage of your presence in Hong Kong to discuss the issue
with the Colonial Secretary with a view to getting at least a statement
of no objection from him to the proposal that the man should be put in
the Secretariat if that is what we ultimately decide is the right
solution.
Bir Leslie Monson, KCMG, CB,
c/o Government House,
Hot foun
:
(K.M. Wilford)
PERSONA
(ORD) DA. 371999 1,500 2/69 H..
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
t
Registry No.
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
DRAFT
*
To:-
Top Secret.
TE
Secret.
16/10
CodfricaTLEL
Restricted.
Unclassified.
PRIVACY MARKING
-----ו-יזוי
In Confidence
PERSONAL
SECRET
Sir Leslie Monson, K.C.M.G.,
c/o Government House,
HONG KONG,
C.B.,
Type 1 +
From
Mr. Wilford
Telephone No. & Ext.
Department
China-watching in Hong Kong
You will remember that Far Eastern Department
promised to let you have a background note on the
question of establishing a China-watching unit in
{ This is attached.)
Hong Kong. You had kindly agreed to raise this
matter with Sir Hugh Norman-Walker during your visit.
But it was felt that until Personnel Department had
given their approval in principle for the establishment
of the post it would be premature to raise the matter. They have now
$-0.
This be may best obtinet and I should be grateful
therefore if you wouli speck to Siz Hugh on the lines
of the enclosed. background note.
2. We realise that Sir Hugh will probably wish to
discuss the proposal with the Governor before making a Cinal decision,
but, we hope that he can be persuaded to take a farmaskóla visio je k
accordingly)
fair wind, and to brief the Governor/so that
we can discuss it with him when he comes to the Office
for discussions later during his leave.
3. In arguing the case with Sir Hugh Bunny Carter in Hong Kong Apartment
has suggested that the pointa 5 (c) and (d) in the background note are
likely to carry
mart weight with the Hong Kong Government, provided of course that the
general question of principle can be
PERSONAL
SECRET
/ resolved
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
PERSONAL
SECRET
resolved. In corres ondence with the
Artis
Political Adviser,
Kaddocks, we have never
obtained a precise statement of their objection:
to the idea although we believe that paragraphs
6 and 7 of the background note are a fairly
accurate interpretation of Maddock's feeling
It will be useful for our
of "embarrassment".
later discussions with the Governor if you
could get them to spell out any objections in
greater detail.
My mom
In this perhaps
Therefore ritme leass me to take Maddock's' exprene $bjections }
seriously then doco every me aloe.
J 4.
should
ра
this matter
perhaps add that
mly been presented to
in detail with the arrived of this better
} manet
in traff. Hay-f
Hal- there is
therefore admit to you
not yet wholly conniced
scal
need for
A.
China watcher of the kind propect or, if
there is, that the tank c
Tack con
Nova
be cond
mimolly
the Secretariat would
mt by one Sfficer. At convinced that
be the
the right place for him. (Stowered
are should
it is obviously right Hat take advantage of your presence in Hong Kong
to discuss the issue with the Colonial Secretory with a new
getting h
at least a
min
to
that the
Af me objection from
the man should be put in the
if that is what we
Secretariat if that is
ultimately decide is the right solutio
Mw/x
21
SECRET
Background Note
CHINA-WATCHING IN HONG KONG
Problem
To establish a China-watching unit in Hong Kong
preferably attached to the Political Adviser's Office.
Background
2. The proposal to establish a China-watching unit in
Hong Kong has been under discussion for almost a year and
a wide measure of agreement has been reached between Peking,
the Political Adviser'in Hong Kong and FCO Departments
concerned as to the purpose such a unit would serve and
the size of the establishment required. The following
are our general observations and conclusions.
(a) The importance of obtaining accurate information on
developments in China in view of our interests in the
Far Eastern and South-East Asian area and in particular
because of our position in Hong Kong.
(b) The need to keep under review our methods of information-
gathering to ensure that they are adequatü and
comprehensive.
(0) The importance of Hong Kong as the best source of
information about China outside the Mission in Peking;
an importance enhanced by the shortage of source
SECRET
1.
/ material
+
4
material obtainable in Peking.
(a) The fragmentation and lack of co-ordination in our
China-watching effort in Hong Kong.
(●) Peking, the Political Adviser in Hong Kong and
ourselves are agreed that there is a requirenent to
collate and co-ordinate information from official sources
as well as non-governmental organisations, specialist
foreign journalists and foreign missions concerned with
China-watching in Hong Kong. Its purpose would be to
complement rather than duplicate the work of our Mission
in Peking.
(f) The establishment of an officer of First Secretary rank
from the 700 Chinese cadre supported by a P.A. should be
sufficient to do the job.
(g) Personnel Department have given their agreement in
principle to tay qutablishment of the post.
Argument
3. The one outstanding problem is to decide upon the location
of the unit. There are four possible locations:-
(a) the Regional Information Office (RIO) which is
administered by Information Research Department of the
PCO and is concerned with distributing information
material on China;
(b) J.S.I.s. (Joint Services Intelligence Staff) run by
the Kinistry of Defence and concerned primarily with the
cellation of intelligence about China through the
/ interrogation
T
SECRET
2
I
ان الاثبات
interrogation of refugees;
(c) the British Trađe Commission principally concerned
with the promotion of British exports to Hong Kong;
(d) the Political Adviser's Office.
Our main objection to (a) was that it would be inappropriate
to identify the work of the unit too closely with the
information and propaganda role of the RIO. As for (b) there
is a danger that the unit would become political advisers to
the military in Hong Kong. We also fear that too close an
agaociation with military intelligence might prejudice their
relations with non-official China-watching institutions. In
the case of (o) we consider that to put a political analyst
in a trade office might seem odd to outsiders and suggest
that it was a cover for another kind of operation. There
are also problems of space and security storage in the case
of (a) and (0) although no domat thyse could be overcome.
5. We conoluded that the Politicu! Adviser's Office was the
best location for the following reasons:-
(a) it is not linked with any of the existing specialist
China-watching units in Hong Kong;
(b) the prestige of the Political Adviser's Office would
assist in developing contacts with non-official agencies;
(c) it would provide a useful (and much needed) Ching-watching
service for the Hong Kong Government;
(d) it would assist with the staffing of that office when
one of the two existing members is on leave.
3
SECRET
3 -
I
/ 6.
In
6. In opposition to this proposal Mr. Maddocks has argued
that it would be embarrassing for him to have within the
Hong Long Government an officer working for the U.X.
Government over whom the Governor had no control.
recognise that there is a problem here and do not wish to
arouse suspicions of U.K. intervention in the local adminis-
tration of Hong Kong. In order to meet Mr. Maddocks*
objections we proposed that the officer should be seconded,
like himself, to the Hong Kong Government (thus overcoming
the constitutional problem), that his reports on China would
be available to the Hong Kong Government (thus overcoming
the arguement that he is only working for London) and that
HMG should meet the financial cost of the unit. We pointed
out that we had agreed to not too dissimilar arrangements
whereby officers representing the interests of Hong Kong were
posted to our missions overseas. This has turned out to be
not altogether a good argument since in practice relations
between the Hong Kong representatives and our missions in
one instance have not run smoothly. Mr. Maddocks and his
colleagues in the Hong Kong Government remain unhappy with
our proposals and have suggested dropping the whole idea of
a China-watching unit for the time being.
7. We still feel there is a requirement for such a unit
and that our proposals do provide the basis for a satisfactory
arrangement with the Hong Kong Government. In establishing
the unit it would seem important to ensure that any
:
SECRET
/ arrangement
arrangement should not embarrass the position of the
Diplomatic Service officers staffing the Folitical Adviser's
Office on secondment or raise suspicions in the minds of the
unofficial members of the Governor's Councils that it
represents a form of U.K. intervention in Hong Kong affairs.
+
Far Eastern Department,
16 October, 1969.
SECRET
5-
P
[
Mr. Wilford
SECRET
20
Flag A
11
Flag B &
Flag C
선
CHINA-WATCHING IN HONG KONG
In my submission of 10 October I promised to prepare
a background note on the question of establishing a China-
watching unit in Hong Kong for use by Sir Leslie Konson
during his visit to Hong Kong. Unfortunately it was not
possible tó give it to him before he left but there is
still time to send it to him in Hong Kong before he leaves
on 25 October. There is a classified bag to Hong Kong
on Saturday, 18 October, arriving on Wednesday 22 October.
The question is not unfamiliar to 3ir Leslie since he has
already discussed it with Mr. Murray and Mr. Carter. In
the background note attached I have not spelled out in