beller that in the restriction of Mr. Grey they are holding
a card which they can use to advantage against us in Hong
Kong. In brutal terms, we should aim to give them the
impression that we had decided to write off Mr. Grey, while
at the same time periodically manipulating public comment
so as to embarrass the Chinese over his continued restriction.
This might produce a rire Chinese proposal which we could
unen consider from a position of greater strength: and would
almost certainly ensure at least that he would be released in
September at the end of the Hong Kong sentences.
Humanitarian considerations make it necessary to consider
a derogation from this "ideal" policy. But the derogation
contemplated nas grave drawbacks. It is difficult to believe
that the Chinese will change their ground on deportation to
Chine, however it is dressed up. And I find the idea of
letting the convicted prisoners spend the rest or their
sentences in China, undergoing re-indoctrination before a
triumphal guaranteed return to the Colony in September (which
is where we seem likely to finish up) little improvement on
releasing them in Hong Kong. Even though the Governor says
/he
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he would go along with this as a last resort, it seems to
me that this risks Peking drawing the conclusion that the
Grey restriction nas been a successful operation which has
kept us on the move over detainees and emergency regulations
and which has finally prized the "newsworkers" out of our
clutches: and we could expect - face the like again.
It would be difficult to abandon the probe at this
point. But the course proposed goes less var than
Mr. Cradock thinks would be necessary to be sure of
Mr. Grey's release (his telegram No.30 at flag F): and too
far, in my view, to prevent a Chinese conclusion that they
have made a successful use of a political hostage. I believe
therefore if we must pursue the probe that we ought to
consider confining the next exchange to the much more
defensible proposition that we would release to China (to
remain there) those of the "newsworkers" who wished to be
so repatriated, provided Grey is released.
-
You will no doubt wish to discuss, in view of the
variant opinions expressed on this most difficult subject.
BB Lakewolin
(J.B. JOHNSTON)
25.1.69.
Copy to:
Sir A. Galsworthy
Mr. Moreton
Kr. J. Kurray
kr. Carter
but Turjadi
Very d
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Mr. Anthony Grey
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31
29 JAN 1969
FECI3/1.
339
pakozall
Mr. Moreton rightly points to the considerable risks involved in the
course now proposed. This is essentially a matter of personal judgment,
not to say guesswork. My own judgment coincides with that
expressed by the Governor in his letter to me of January 7th, at Flag C,
namely that our best way of helping Mr. Grey is to continue to
demonstrate firmly to the Chinese that their attempts to use him as a
lever for political ends will bring them no dividends, combined with a
judicious stimulation/publicity from time to time.
2. I take this view also because I too feel considerable doubt whether
the line proposed in the draft telegram below the submission will in
fact succeed. I would not challenge the view that if we could release in
Hong Kong all 11 of the remaining news workers serving prison sentences
in Hong Kong, the probability is that the Chinese would respond by
releasing Mr. Grey. But I am quite clear in my mind that we could not
pay this price, i.e. release in Hong Kong: the risks to our internal
position there would be too serious and far reaching. The line advocated
in paragraph 5 of the draft telegram is therefore the furthest we can
go, save for the one possible additional concession we would still keep
up our sleeves, namely that we might have to accept back into Hong Kong
after their sentence had run out the people whom we would have released
to China.
3. I believe therefore that this move is unlikely to succeed, and that
we shall then be driven back on the stance which the Governor
feels to be the best.
4. However, I recognise that there are arguments for making now the
attempt advocated in the draft telegram. The advantages of doing so
are
(a) if it should succeed we should have got out Mr. Grey, (b) if it
fails, we shall at least have satisfied ourselves that
we have explored this one avenue which does seem to offer some faint
hope; the price we shall have paid will not be too damaging to our
position in Hong Kong; and it will no doubt be helpful in fending off
further pressure over the next weeks if we are able to say that we have
explored very confidentially the Chinese position and are satisfied that
there is no basis
on which we could do a deal.
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The
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The main disadvantage, as I see it, is that if we do then have to fall
back on the stance advocated by the Governor, as I personally think we
shall, we will then take rather longer to convince the Chinese that they
cannot use Mr. Grey to get further concessions out of us.
5. In short, my own view is that if we feel we must make a further
effort now, the line advocated in the draft telegram is the right one.
But I do not myself believe that it will get Mr. Grey out; I think it
may actually delay his release; and I believe that the better hope lies
in taking the firm line advocated by the Governor in
his letter.
Copies to
-
Mr. J. Murray
Mr. J.O. Moreton Mr. W.S. Carter
ANG.
(A.N. Galsworthy) 21st January, 1969
2571-
170
Lour Shepherd
Sünd. Galsworthy
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r. freton
Theater
que mi
Mr. Anthony Grey
RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No.31
29 JAN 1969
+
338
pako 24/1
PROBLEM
On 28 December the New China News Agency published a report,
datelined Peking, openly linking Mr. Grey with the Communist news
workers (then thirteen, now eleven in number) serving prison
sentences in Hong Kong. The report said that "Since the Hong Kong
British authorities continue to keep the thirteen patriotic Chinese
journalists in jail, the Chinese Government is fully justified in
continuing to restrict Grey's freedom of movement"
2. In the wake of the NCNA report the Chinese have resumed
unofficial contacts on the subject of Mr. Grey through covert
channels in Hong Kong. During the first week of January the
contact who has been used in the past alleged to Mr. Cater, a
Hong Kong official, that the Chinese expected a reply to the NCNA
report which he called "the proposed swap for Grey". The contact
stated that it was desirable that some kind of counter-offer should
be made to Peking at this stage. He reacted enthusiastically to
Kr. Cater's personal speculation that it might be possible to
rele.se some of the news workers to China until the expiry of
their sentences and said he thought it likely that Peking would
accept such a compromise. The Governor of Hong Kong has indicated
that he is prepared to consider a solution involving deportation
of the news workers, subject to certain conditions.
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FLAG A
FLAG B
RECOMMENDATION
3. I recommend that we authorise the Governor of Hong Kong to
proceed on the general lines proposed in his telegrams No. 28 of
10 January and No. 44 of 16 January, with certain modifications.
A draft telegram is attached. Hong Kong Department concur.
ARGUMENT
The NCNA Statement of 28 December
4. The Chargé d'Affaires in Peking has argued that the NONA
statement names an official price for the release of Mr. Grey and
therefore creates a new situation (Peking telegram No. 3 of
2 January). In my commentary of 9 January on Mr. Cradock's
telegram (also attached) I took the view that the statement was in
large part a defensive response by the Chinese to our earlier
publicity campaign and that the Chinese had not in fact named a
specific price for Grey. The Chinese have in my view been very
careful in all their recent utterances on Mr. Grey to avoid
committing themselves to the statement that were the eleven
remaining news workers released Mr. Grey himself would automatically
be released; or to the position that he will necessarily be held
until they are all out. The price remains therefore to some
extent negotiable.
Release of the News Workers in Hong Kong
5. of the eleven news workers remaining in prison in Hong Kong
ten are due to be released (assuming they receive full remission)
in September 1969 and the remaining one in February 1971. In his
2
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FLAG C
telegram No. 3 of 2 January, despatched before the most recent
approuch by our contact in Hong Kong, Mr. Cradock urged the early
release of all eleven. The Governor of Hong Kong has throughout
opposed the premature release of convicted prisoners in Hong Kong
And we share the Governor's view that such a move would damage
public confidence in Hong Kong; be interpreted by the Communists
as a sign that we lacked firmness; and by providing a precedent
of willingness to disregard the Courts for an immediate political
purpose impair the future credibility of the sanction of
imprisonment. While it is the opinion of Far Eastern Department
that the release at this juncture of the remaining eleven convicted
news workers in Hong Kong would in all probability secure the
release of Kr. Grey this remains an opinion and is something
which cannot be proved; and even if it could be proved we remain
opposed to the premature release in the Colony of these prisoners
for the reasons given above. Apart from these negative considera-
tions, it is only fair to add that the Governor has in addition
argued persuasively (his letter of 7 January to Sir Arthur
Galsworthy enclosing a thoughtful study of the Grey case) that
the best way of helping Mr. Grey is to continue to demonstrate
firmly to the Chinese that their attempt to use him as a lever for
political ends will bring no dividende.
Consequences of Mr. Grey's Continued Detention
6. It is of course possible that, if we stood firm, the Chinese,
calculating that not only did they secure no tangible benefit by
continuing to hold Mr. Grey but also that the treatment of him
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continued to damage their reputation in third countries, might
release him. But I see no immediate prospect of this. The
earliest occasion on which we would have good reason to expect
further progress towards his release would be in September 1969
when ten of the remaining eleven news workers will have completed
their sentences. (We could then reasonably expect the Governor
to commute the sentence of the eleventh.) In the meantime, we
may be brought by humanitarian considerations and by pressure of
public opinion in this country which is in its turn directly
related to reports of Er. Grey's health, to considering again
the unwelcome step of releasing the convicted prisoners in Rong
Kong. If, therefore, there is any third way it merits careful
consideration. such a way has now perhaps been provided by the
covert channel.
Release of the News Workers to China
7. During the series of meetings with Mr. Cater at the
beginning of January our contact indicated the following:
(a) The Chinese considered that they had brought their
price for Grey into the open and expected a reaction.
(b) They believed that it was the British side who were
dragging their feet.
(c) The Chinese were embarrassed over Grey and anxious
for a settlement; they were aware of British
difficulties but would still like to see H.M.G.
release the news workers (i.e. release in Hong Kong);
4
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FLAG D
8.
this might be done in batches, the release of all
finally securing Grey's release.
(d) The impossibility of such a course being explained to
the contact, he reacted immediately and with enthusiasm
to the idea of a compromise involving the release of
some of the news workers to China until the expiry of
their sentences.
(e) The contact thought that the Hong Kong Government should
make an initial proposal, that Peking would accept a
compromise and that H.M.G. should negotiate with
care, making a low offer at the outset (Hong Kong
telegram No. 27 of 10 January).
Reviewing these overtures the Governor has commented that
even if the Chinese are still not committing themselves to a firm
offer their suggestions are becoming more specific; and that if
the eleven news workers were released this would probably secure
the release of Mr. Grey. The Governor remains opposed (rightly
in our view) to the premature release of the news workers in Hong
Kong itself. He would like any confrontation prisoners deported
from Hong Kong to go for good and notes the discouraging earlier
refusals by the Chinese to accept such prisoners into China.
However, the Governor points out that if Mr. Grey is in fact of
sufficient embarrassment the Chinese may have come to the point
of reconsidering their earlier attitude. The Governor says he
would therefore be prepared to allow an indication to be given
to the Chinese that we might consider releasing a small number
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FLAG E
FLAG F
of the news workers subject to two conditions:
(a) That they specifically request repatriation, and
(b) that they leave the Colony permanently and willingly.
The Governor proposes to use the covert channel to indicate
an interest in a solution on these lines, while avoiding at this
stage any pore specific proposal than that relayed, we hope
authoritatively, by the contact. (Hong Kong telegram No. 28.)
9. The Chargé d'Affaires in Peking who holds strongly to the
view that the Chinese are anxious to settle the Grey question
and believes that they have as good as named a clear price, is
not over-sanguine about the possibility of securing Mr. Grey's
release by the deportation of the eleven news workers. He has
stressed that settlement through deportation is a second best for
the Chinese compared with the release of the eleven prisoners in
Hong Kong. He points to the discouraging precedents and the
possibility that negotiations through this channel will be
unnecessarily protracted. He makes three recommendations of
substance:
(a) The news workers should be released in Hong Kong (prior
to their departure for China) rather than at the border,.
(b) They should be allowed to return to Hong Kong on expiry
of sentence.
(c) We should be prepared to release all eleven, though
release in batches might be possible.
(Peking telegram No. 30 of 14 January).
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FLAG G
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The Governor has now telegraphed further to meet
(Hong Kong telegram No. 44). He
10.
Mr. Cradock's objections.
points out once again the serious objections to releasing
convicted prisoners in Hong Kong itself and of his consistency
in this view. He points out that permanent deportation is
preferable to the softer sanction of merely requiring the prisoners to
leave Hong Kong for the duration of their sentences over the border, and
provides a better justification locally for his use of the Royal
Prorogative. But he adde perhaps somewhat surprisingly that he would in
the final instance reluctantly
accept the latter.
11.
*
Far Eastern Department are not sanguine about the chances
of success. The Governor remarked during the course of the
1967 "confrontation" that much the best way of solving the
problem of "confrontation" prisoners would have been their deportation.
Regrettably a test case early in 1968 indicated
that the Chinese were not prepared to allow the Hong Kong
authorities to put such persons across the border. In Peking they told
the Chargé d'Affaires officially that such a solution
was ruled out, arguing that since Hong Kong is part of China the
inhabitants of the Colony cannot be deported from one part of
China to another. If the Chinese attitude on this question
has now changed so much the better; but the evidence is as yet
slender. A second difficulty lies in the likely attitude of
It seems at least the imprisoned news workers themselves.
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possible that faced with the reality of China as opposed to the
myth of the Cultural Revolution a number of the news workers might
decline to go there. This would clearly make any solution
difficult to achieve:
we could not force the news workers across
the border against their will; and the Chinese would be most
anxious to avoid bringing things to the point of a public admission
that their news workers did not wish to return to the motherland.
A final difficulty is that of securing any guarantee from the newe
workers that once out of Hong Kong they would stay out.
It is
likely that the majority could prove a right of residence in the
Colony and we should perhaps be on difficult legal ground in
continuing to exclude them against their will after the expiry
of their sentences. In the solution of all these difficulties
we should need the goodwill of the Chinese authorities. This wil1
be forthcoming only if (as remains to be proved) they are genuinely
anxious to end the Grey affair. Nevertheless, since the Governor
and Mr. Cradock are both agreed that an attempt to solve the
case through "deportation" is worth a try, I think we should go
ahead.
Clearly the responsibility for conducting the operation
must lie with the Governor of Hong Kong; and we believe that he
has met Mr. Craddock's points of detail.
Tactica
12. My views on tactics (which differ from what the Governor
proposes in three minor respects set out in (b) below) are these:
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(a) The Governor should instruct Hr. Cater to indicate
to the Chinese through the contact our interest in a
solution based on deportation of the news workers
(described for the purposes of the exercise as "release
to China!).
(b) To avoid giving the potentially disastrous impression
that we are softening under pressure we should indicate
at the outset rather more precisely than the Governor at
present suggests, the limits within which we are
prepared to discuss the Grey case, i.e.
(1) We should make it clear at the start that release
in Hong Kong itself is ruled out for all or any
of the convicted news workers. We should wish thus
to discourage any Chinese attempt to obtain a
H
"mix"
for instance six deportations and five
releases in Hong Kong.
(ii) We should state, also at the start, that we
have no objection to the departure of all eleven
newa workers to China should they give an under-
taking (in writing if possible) to go willingly.
(iii) We should try to avoid arriving at what may be
the crux of the negotiations the issue of
-
subsequent return to Hong Kong at the outset.
Perhaps the best tactics would be for the
Governor to avoid any initial reference to this
8
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1
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possibility; if the Chinese return with a demand
for clarification he could then seek to avoid
commitment (for instance by undertaking to consider
any request for deported news workers to return
to Hong Kong if and when they make such a request);
only in the last resort should the Governor
concede a prior guarantee that they may return
to Hong Kong on the expiry of their sentences,
Our differences with the Governor are however on
questions of tactics. We share very closely his
views on the substance of what we can or cannot
concede.
Other British Subjects
13. In the event that we do secure the release of Mr. Grey by
the means outlined above we shall be confronted with another very
real problem. While we shall no doubt gain some credit for
securing the release of Mr. Grey we are bound at the same time to
be asked why it was necessary to make concessions in the ratio of
eleven to one. We shall be told that we should have attempted to
include other British subjects in any bargain.
This is a very
real difficulty but it is one we shall have to try and deal with
by a statement of the facts. Mr. Grey was detained in reprisal
for action against the Communist press and its employees. Even
though the persons may have changed since June 1967 it is the
category of news workers for which Mr. Grey continues to be held in
reprisal. There has been no official or semi-official attempt by
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the Chinese to link him with prisoners in Hong Kong outside this
field. The Chinese took action against Kr. Grey because they are
extremely sensitive about the continued functioning of their
propaganda machine, their biggest weapon in territories outside
China. They may also be presumed to be anxious to demonstrate
to their correspondents generally that they will in all
circumstances have the full backing of the Chinese Government.
Without demonstrations of this kind they would find it hard to
keep up the morale of their press workers who are often
particularly exposed to hostile attentions particularly in the
countries of South East Asia. By contrast there is little to
indicate that the remaining British subjects are being held
similarly as hostages. They, like the majority of other
foreigners in trouble in China are held for a variety of
reasons, involving alleged misdemeanours on their part. Their
cases will only be solved slowly and with difficulty, and there
is little we can in fact do to help them. We can only hope
that if we secure the release of Mr. Grey this will remove a
major stumbling block in improving Sino-British relations and
somewhat facilitate the solution of the other cases in their
tum. I should wish to recommend most strongly that in undertaking
negotiations for the release of Mr. Grey we resist the
temptation of trying to make the exercise a package deal
involving the cases of other British subjects. I am sure this
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would not help these British subjects - and would immediately
bring the effort for Mr. Grey to a standstill.
Copy to:
Private Secretary Mr. Godden
Sir A. Galsworthy Sir J. Johnston Mr. Carter
од
(James Kurray)
17 January, 1969
2.
(i)
(ii)
There are considerable risks in the course proposed:-
That this degree of "give" in our position will be interpreted by the
Chinese as weakness and lead them to press for more.
That even if the Chinese agree to release Grey on these terms they may
regard the price we have paid as justifying the taking of further
hostages in the future.
(iii) That once we have made the offer we shall not get Grey
for less and that we may, if negotiations break down, in fact be
delaying his release.
i.e. one for
(iv) That if the offer succeeds, Ministers will be under
strong criticism for an "unequal" bargain
eleven.
-
Nevertheless, in view of the arguments in the submission and in
particular since the Governor is willing to go so far, on balance I
support the action recommended.
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عليمية
(J.". Moreton) 17 January 1969.
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
I
* Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should
reach addressco(s) -
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DEPARTMENT
Far Eastern
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