-
though any reply to
Mr. Long must make a specific reservation about (a).
Moreover a detailed reply would have to take account of
Mr. Long's remark that he "cannot believe that anyone would
be prepared to contemplate Mr. Grey's detention until that
date" [1.e. February 1971_7. I personally agree with
Mr. Long and would hope that if Mr. Grey has not been released
by next September when 10 of the 11 newsworkers are due for
release, the Governor will simultaneously commute the sentence
of the 11th. But the Governor is not yet prepared to commit
/ himself
TOP SECRET
4
TOP SECRET
Flag J
Flag
himself to this (Hong Kong telegram No. 131 of 10 February).
It would be preferable therefore if our views could be
conveyed personally to Mr. Long either by the Secretary
of State or by Lord Shepherd. But it would be better to
delay this until, possibly after a further meeting between
Mr. Cater and his contact, we are in a better position to
form a view of future prospects. Mr. Long's early
departure is, however, a complication.
When I spoke to
him yesterday I told him that I would be recommending that
he should see a Minister but that in view of the Secretary
of State's preoccupations this week I doubted if it could
be fitted in before his departure. He said that he quite
understood this. I suggest, therefore, that the best way
to proceed might be to send him an interim reply proposing
a meeting on his return from abroad and telling him that
meantime I have been instructed to bring him into the
picture on recent developments in Hong Kong.
9.. Mr. Long's letter of 24 February was occasioned by a
piece of imaginative journalism in the "Daily Express" on
21 February.
Copy to: Mr. Carter
Jan Way.
(James Murray)
26 February, 1969.
I agree, tubject to the shight drafting amendments I
have suggested.
TOP SECRET
5-
Behandlin
27/2
And then
17. Bok
CYPHER/CAT A
PRIORITY HONG KONG
TELEGRAM NO. 185
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
JAL
COPY NO:
TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
25 FEBRUARY 1969
Me wilso have seen.
Brünn Tels what
ADDRESSED FCO TELNO 185 OF 25 FEBRUARY RFI PEKING dcused swith
MY TELEGRAM 184.
340
I HAVE THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS ON THESE EXCHANGES:-
with hand shepher
pa je vou
E
(A) THERE APPEARS TO BE A NEW NOTE OF URGENCY ON THE CHINESE SIDE
BUT THIS MAY BE PURELY TACTICAL, I.E. THE DESIRE TO TRY HARD FOR
A VICTORY LONG BEFORE SEPTEMBER WHEN ITS VALUE WOULD BE MUCH LESS.
(B) THERE IS SOME EFFORT TO APPEAL TO LONDON BY HOLDING OUT
THE POSSIBILITY OF THE RELEASE OF BRITISH SUBJECTS AND IMPROVED TRADE
WITH BRITAIN.
(C) THERE IS A TENDENCY TO THINK THAT OUR JANUARY PROPOSAL
INDICATES A READINESS TO MAKE FURTHER MOVES, AND POSSIBLY AN
UNDERESTIMATION OF THE DIFFICULTIES FOR US OF RELEASING PRISONERS
IN HONG KONG.
2. I THINK OUR ONLY COURSE IN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS IS TO HOPE
THAT SOME PROGRESS CAN BE MADE ON THE BASIS OF OUR JANUARY
PROPOSALS. WE HAVE DONE AIL WE CAN TO MAKE THEM AS PALATABLE
AS POSSIBLE BUT WE HAVE NOT YET SEEN ANY WILLINGNESS OM THE
CHINESE SIDE TO TAKE THEM SERIOUSLY.
CFCO PLS PASS TO DEKING)
SIR D.TRENCH
[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]
FILES
F.E.D.
H.K.D.
P.U.S.D.
MR. MORETON
SIR A.GALSWORTHY
SIR J.JOHNSTON
P.S. TO LORD SHEPHERD PRIVATE SECRETARY
-TOP SECRET
COPY NO.
390
CYPHER/CAT A
PRIORITY HONG KONG
TOP SECRET
'TO POREIGN AND COMMONWELATH OFFICE
TELEGRAM NO. 184
TOP SECRET
25 FEBRUARY 1969
AUDRESSED FCO TELNO 184 OF 25 FEBRUARY RFI PEKING
MY TELEGRAM 156: GREY.
376
the Wilson has seen.
pa for 26/2
CATER SAW CONTACT AGAIN ON 21 FEBRUARY.
CONTACT SAID THAT DURING
THE PRECEDING WECK, WHICH INCLUDED THE NEW YEAR HOLIDAY, HE
HAD RECEIVED A MESSAGE FROM CHOU EN LAI AND HAD TOW DISCUSSIONS
WITH LO CHO-CHIH AND A FOUR AND A HALF HOUR DISCUSSION WITH
LEUNG VAI LAN, THE DIRECTOR N.C.N.A.
+
·
2. THE HESSAGE FROM CHOU A LEGEDLY SAID THAT CHOU APPRECIATED
THE DIFFICULT SITUATION FACING THE HONG KONG GOVERNMENT OVER
RELEASING THE NEVSVORKERS IN HONG KONG, BUT PEKING WOULD HELP
AS FAR AS POSSIBLE AND WOULD GUARANTEE NO PULLICITY OR
PROPAGANDA ABOUT A VICTORY BEING SCORED. CHOU ALLEGEDLY ARGUED
THAT, WHILST IT WOULD BE A BIG PRICE FOR THE HONG KONG GOVERNMENT
TO PAY, IT WAS A SMALL PRICE FOR THE IMPROVED SINO/BRITISH
RELATIONS WHICH WOULD FOLLOW. THE GREY AFFAIR WAS A KNOT,
THE UNTYING OF WHICH WOULD LEAD TO AN IMPROVEMENT IN RELATIONS.
THE FAILURE TO UNTIE IT WAS DELAYING THE FINAL AND FULL SOLUTION
OF THE HONG KONG PROBLEM. CHOU HAD NOT BEEN SPECIFIC ABOUT
THE DETAILED IMPROVEMENTS WHICH WOULD FOLLOW A SETTLEMENT
BUT LI CHO-CRTH HAD ALLEGENLY SUGGESTED TO CONTACT THAT IT WOULD
INCLUDE THE RELEASE OF SOME OTHER BRITISH SUBJECTS IN CHERA AND
IMPROVED TRADE BETVEEN BRITAIN AND CHINA. CHOU IS ALSO ALLEGED
TO HAVE SAID IT WAS NOT (KPOSSIBLE FOR THE HONG KONG GOVERNMENT
TO RELEASE THE NEWSWORKERS IN HONG KONG BEFORE THE EXPIRY OF THEIR
PRISON SENTENCE. CHOU IS ALSO ALLEGED TO HAVE EMPHASISED THE
NEED FOR AN EARLY SOLUTION,
E
ACCORDING TO CONTACT, BOTH LI CHO CHIH
13.
AND LEUNG WAI LAM ALSO EMPHASISED THE NEED FOR AN EARLY SOLUTION AS TIME
WAS GETTING SHORT.
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TOP SECRET - 2 -
3. LEUNG WAI LANKS REMARKS APPARENTLY ADDED LITTLE TO THIS.
CONTACT BELIEVES THAT LEUNG KNOWS OF HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH CATER
BUT SAYS THAT NEITHER HE NOR LEUNG REFERRED TO THEM EXPLICITLY,
LEUNG^S ONLY ADDITIONAL POINT WAS HIS CLAIM THAT HE HAD SEEN
CHOU EN LAT HIMSELF IN PEKING AND DIOU HAD CLAIMED THAT HE HAD
SPENT FIVE DAYS TRYING TO CONVINCE CHAIRMAN HAO OF THE CORRECTNESS
OF HIS POLICY TOWARDS HONG KONG.
4. CATER GAVE AN ACOUNT OF THIS DISCUSSION TO ME, CRADOCK AND
DENSON ON 21 FEBRUAPY. WE CONSIDERED THAT THE CHINESE APPEAR TO
BE COMING TO THE INCORRECT VIEW THAT OUR PROPOSALS IN
JANUARY C MY TELEGRAM 87) REPRESENTED A REAL BREAK THROUGH FOR
THE CHINESE AND THAT A LITTLE MORE PRESSURE WOULD INDUCE US TO
AGREE TO RELEASE THE NEWSWORKERS IN HONG KONG. WE DECIDED THAT
CATER SHOULD DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO CONVINCE CONTACT THAT FOR
US THERE 13 ALL THE DIFF RENCE IN THE WORLD BETWEEN RELEASING
IN HONG KONG AND RELEASING TO CHINA AND THAT HE SHOULD EXPLORE
FURTHER THE CHANCES OF MAKING OUR JANUARY PROPOSALS ACCEPTASLE
TO THE CHINESE.
5. CATEÂ SAY CONTACT FOR A SECOND TIME OF 21 FEBRUARY AND SPOKE ON
THOSE LINES. IN PARTICULAR HE EMPHASISED THE POSSIBILITY OF
RELEASING THE NEWSWORKERS TO MACAO. IN REPLY TO A QUESTION
FROM CONTACT, HE SAID HAT THE STATEMENT OF WILLINGNESS TO LEAVE
HONG KONG WHICH WE WANT FROM THE PRISONERS WOULD NOT HAVE TO BE
IN WRITING. WE COULD ACCEPT AN ORAL STATEMENT IN FRONT OF A
PRISON OFFICER AND ONE OTHER WITNESS.
1
16.
TOP SECRET
F
HONG KONG TELNO 184 TO FCO
L
TOP SECRET
- 3 -
6.CATER. SAW CONTACT AGAIN ON 22 FEBRUARY TO CONFIRM THAT THE POINTS
ABOUT RELEASE TO MACAO AND AN ORAL STATEMENT HAD MY APPROVAL.
HE EMPHASISED ONCE AGAIN THAT THERE COULD BE NO QUESTION OF RE EASING
THE PRISONERS IN HONG KONG BEFORE THEIR SENTENCES EXPIRED AND THAT IF
THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT WERE SERIOUS IN WANTING
AN EAFLY SOLUTION THEY SHOULD TAKE UP OUR JANAUFY,OFFER. CATER ASKED WHY
THE CHINESE NOW SEEM TO BE IN SUCH A HURRY. CONTACT SUGGESTED THAT IT
MIGHT BE CONNECTED WITH CHOU EN LAI^S POSITION IN PEKING AND THAT IF A
SETTLEKENT YERE NOT FOUND IN THE NEXT FEW MONTHS THE JALACE OF POWER
HIGHT SHIFT AND A TOUGHER LINE DE ADOPTED OVER GREY.
7. CONTACT THEN ADDED THAT LI CHO CHIH HAD SAID TO HIM THAT SOMEBODY HAD
SUGGESTED TO LI THAT THE BRITISH TACTICS WOULD BE TO WAIT UNTIL
SEPTEMBER WHEN 10 OF THE NEWSWORKERS WOULD BE PELEASED AND THEN TO TRY
TO SWOP GREY FOR WONG CHAK, THE ONLY PRISONER THEN REMAINING, ACCORDING
TO LI, SUCH ACTION WOULD
NOT BE ACCEPTABLE. THOSE TACTICS WOULD BE CHILD'S PLAY.
8. CONTACT ALSO SAID HE HAD A DEFINITE IMPRESSION THAT
GREY'S CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT HAD BEEN MUCH IMPROVED SINCE NOVEMBER.
9. SEE MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM.
FCO PLEASE PASS TO PEKING,
SIR D. TRENCH
FILES
F. EASTERN D.
H.K.D.
P.U.S.D.
MR. MORETON
/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/
SIR A. GALSWORTHY
SIR.J. JOHNSTON
P.S. TO LORD SHEPHERD
PRIVATE SECRETARY
TOP SECRET
+
TOP SECRET
388
P.
Mr. James Murray
Lord Shepherd has seen telegram No. 87 of
5 February from Peking about Grey and has commented as follows:-
2.
"May I see the department - I am not
very happy with this advice?"
Perhaps you and Mr. Carter (to whom I am copying this minute) can spare
a few moments to talk this over with Lord Shepherd, perhaps tomorrow
morning at 10.30 or some time tomorrow afternoon.
RECEIVED IN
ARC
L
2.
#4
(C H. Godden)
6 February, 1969
Mo Carter and I discussed this with Lad
Shef hand this morning.
Be slobe ausent subnetting a draft fel. refly to Mo Castool.
бев
По
Caution line
with the
ssirgem
Storquetity
Me broddock looth
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Cose
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Comexid=
TOP SHORET Hallowing for Commerce
formand to
Lord Steptand
20/2.
TOP SHORET
1
with. of Creduak's
agree
office of the British Chargé
Paragraph 6.
farson 19/2
отрител PERSCHA M. Boyd prom Новод To Moreton
I to
Weyhe
d'Affaires,
Peking
6 February, 1969
O.R.K the fore of panta FEC
Mr. Momoy
bear James,
1
of Grey.
2.
+
690 87 ** JEONS
NI G...
Thank you for your letter of 30 January on the subject
I was not disappointed by FCO telegram number 67′ and your letter helpɛ
me to understand its background. In any event the telegram agreed on the
essential point that we should go ahead with the presert exercise. I am
rather more hopeful about its success than I was a little while ago, It
might just work. Certainly we cannot afford to let such a chance slin,
3.
On the question of September, I entirely agree with you that we should
fight to keep that option open and, if the present exercise fails,
should do our best to obtain release of the 11th men in September. It
may be the best we can do.
It.
On your paragraph 2, I am afraid I cannot entirely agree with you that
it is better to have a ransom paid reluctantly and with fuss than to
have a ransom paid on demand, though I would prefer to put it as a
choice between
(a) a concession obviously wrung out of us by public pressure and
(b) a concession made without strong public pressure and at a
time of our choosing.
The second can always be presented as a deliberate act of statesmanship
and as oroceeding in part from a wish on our side to improve relations,
whereas the first is patently a collapse, showing us to be both weak and
hostile. But this now may be something of an academic point since I
agree with you about September.
5.
Your paragraph 5 raises an interesting question, namely the effect of my
press conference in Hong Kong and the related meetings at the time. Your
suggestion is that the Chinese were perhaps moved by this press
conference to show Grey in "lenie conditions of detention. A similar
suggestion occurs, though (30 in rather less pleasant form, in Hong Kong
telegram number 27 (paragraph 3) and again in the Hong Kong parer on
Grey (paragraph 19). There the thought seems to be that the Chinese were
ready to let Grey go quietly after Hauch P'ing's release but changed
their line after certain events in Hong Kong, according to the telegram
my press conference, our meeting and the discussion with NONA. I shall
confine myself with dealing with this last suggestion though many of the
arguments apply equally to that in your letter.
6.
I should certainly be very concerned at the thought that any remarks of
mine in Hong Kong, even at a conference the general
James Hurray, Esq., C.M.G.
Par Patern Pepartment.
1.
TOP SECRET
1
L
TOP SECRET
outlines of which had been earlier agreed with you and with the
Governor, might have injured Grey's chances. However, an examination of
the evidence suggests that this theory will not hold and that the press
conference almost certainly did not have n decisive effect one way or
another.
(x)
I think it inherently improbable that the Chinese in pique over some
predictable remarks at a press conference should make such a major
charge of line as that suggested by Hong Kong i.e. a shift from
readiness to free Grey without any price to a derand for the release of
11 men,
The (b) The press conference was on the evening of 30 October.
telephone request from NCWA for a meeting to discuss another round of
special visits was on the morning of 1 November. The request for special
visits was a concerted operation
It seems to me involving action in Peking and Hong Kong. almost
impossible for the Chinese to have decided or and corcerted such a
change within the space of 24 hours.
(c) There is, in any event, no need to postulate this since there
wan another sufficient reason for the approach by Peking and NONA at
that time, namely the need to blur the effect of the forthcoming release
of Hauch P'ing and emphasize the
The link between Grey and newsworkers still in prisor. timing of the
approach seems to have been dictated by that and I would imagine it was
worked out some considerable time beforehand.
(a) The rain lines of Chinese policy seem to have been
consistent throughout. The link with newsworkers in arison dates back to
April. Suggestions by the Chinese vis covert channels that Grey might be
exchanged for newaworkers occurred both before (e.g. on 24 September)
and after the press conference.
(e) Encouraging Chinese statements on the theme that the release of Grey
would not affect the struggle in Hong Kong algo preceded and followed
the press conference. November (paragraph 15 of the Hong Kong paner).
7.
e.g. 21
The press conference and subaement publicity certainly nettled and
embarrassed the Chinese. What surprised and upset them more was the
degree of wublicity over the November visit to orey, which contrasted
with the relatively little publicity
At the same time, as I the subject had received in April. have suggested
elsewhere, they were probably bewildered by our Our blowing hot and cold
over the early release of prisorers. first offer on this subject related
only to Hsueh but was mede I think they At a time when Houch was already
virtually free, read it es en indication from our side that prisoners
were negotiable. They took some time to come back with their suggestion
but when they did so in November and gave their counter-offer of an
exchange for newsworkers, we surprised them
Publicity by saying that early relcase was out of the question. was alao
blowing up about this time.
8.
This to the best re-construction of vents I can offer though, as you
rightly say, it must all be a matter of speculatior.
The SPCRET
J
TOP SECRET
9.
Thank you also for your manuscript letter and its enclosures. The latter
were good for my education on the realities of the situation in the
Office.
Jour
رحبا
Клеваком
(Percy Cradock)
TOP SECRET
Ap
Tsx 4/68
Enter TS snizegment hy
more of the 18
Top SECRET The detailed card
political Adviser
way in which the Cater but are
context.
3
See minuli
376
prefusal to
He later intemler 62. pajanja
In spite of the
he
As you are aware, I arranged to meet 1. Jay at 3 p.n. yesterday, 27th
January. importance of the meeting, or perhaps because of it, this was
one of the shortest meetings which I have had with him: was brisk and
businesslike, and directly he appreciated that I had something of
substance to say to him he asked whether I would object to his taking
notes of the discussion: I readily agreed to this.
2.
I started by informing him that the message I had to pass to him
concerned a decision of the British Government which had been reached
with the mvice and concurrence of H.2. the Governor. I then proceeded to
make the following pointa: Jay noted then down in writing. For the first
time he allowed se to complete what I had to say without interruption or
comment of any kind: -...
(1)
(2)
RECEIVED IN
ARVES NË 24
1.3 1303
EC Heli
Referring to our discussion of 7th January concerning the possible
release of newsworkers
I emphasised that release in Hong Kong was quite out of the question.
Kaking reference to the comment by LI Cho-chih passed on on 7th January,
that it was up to the f.A.0. to find a way round the probless involved
in releasing the newsworkers, I said that this matter had now received
very considerable consideration in depth: that although it had seldom
happened in the past nevertheless there vere precedents for prisoners
being released to their own country at their own request. I emphasised
that any such release had to be at the request of the prisoner. I also
mentioned in passing that the H.K.G. had under consideration at this
moment a request from a Filipino presently in Laichikok Female Prison
who wished to return to the Philippines.
(3) I said that the British Government and H.s. were
prepared to consider commuting sentences of any of the"newsworkers who
formally expressed willingness to be released to China and whom the
Chinese authorities undertook to accept. Later, in discussing this
point, the question of numbers to be offered initially arossi it will be
remembered that Jay's original advice had been that we should not offer
all 11 at first. I said that it was our opinion that there was little to
be gained in this type of bargaining and that X*x*x*x*** apámánoblotx
the proposal stood a better chance of acceptance if it were left at the
simple proposition that we were prepared to consider commuting
sentences, etc. of any of the newsworkers who fomally expressed
willingness to be released to China. Later in discussion Jay enquired
whether it was the intention that those newsworkers who requested
release to China night be permitted to return to liong Long:
liong Long: I said that the proposition
/contd...
TOP SECRET
(4)
(5)
тор
SECRET
- 2
was that such people requesting release to China would not be allowed
back into Hong Kong.
Referring to our conversation of 7th January Jay said that the
possibility had been discussed of these people being allowed back into
Hong Kong after expiry of sentence. I said that this point would
certainly raise grave difficulties: that if the Chinese were to make a
firm proposal on this H.B. might be prepared to consider it but very
obviously any such arrangement could only refer to expiration of full
sentence and not sentence after remission. Jay rather surprisingly
voloed the opinion that the Chinese were in any event likely to accept
the proposition as it stood, 1.8. that prisoners asking for release to
China would not be permitted back into Hong Kong.
opri
If the above were agreed, then we would expect appropriate assurances
about the release of Anthony Gray. I suggested that it would probably be
enbarrassing to both sides if Grey were released simultaneously or
immediately after the release of the newsworkers but that once agrement
were reached on the release of Grey for the newsworkers we would require
that Grey should be informed at once that he would soon be released, As
for the time between the release of the nevsworkers and that of Anthony
Grey, I suggested this was a matter for discussion but that our present
feeling van that a period of about two weeks was about right. I said
that whilst the timing of the releaze of the newsworkers would have to
be left to the H.K.G., nevertheless it would be necessary to have
discussions and obtain advios from the Chinese as to precisely how much
notice they would need in order to make arrange- ments to receive the
nevsvorkers, etc., eto. But these were details, I suggested, which,
along with many others, would have to be worked out once agreement in
principle had been reached. I also said that one further requirement in
regard to Grey would be that his living conditions should be improved
directly agreement on release was reached.
Referring back to the conversation of 7th January, I noted the Chinese
undertaking that there would be no propaganda whatsoever about this
matter: we would expect them to stand by this undertaking. I said that
for our part, if asked, we should deny that any bargain had been made
with the Chinese authorities on the release of Grey: however, it would
have to be understood that neither the H.k.G. nor the British Government
had control over press comment which might well speculate that
negotiations had taken place. Whilst the H.K.G. would not be making an
immediate press release on the release of the newsworkers, nevertheless
it would be necessary for the press and the public to be told within a
day or two of release: the precise form of vorde had not, of course, yet
been decided but they would probably be along the lines that the
newsworkers had "asked to be released to China om compassionate
grounds".
Top SECRET
/oontd...
3.
(6)
Top SECRET
3
Referring back to points made in sub-paragrapha 2 and 3 above, I said
that if some of the newsworkers refused to express villingness to be
released to China, this would be a problem for the Chinese to resolve,
not the H.K.G. We would be prepared to release all who stated they
wished to go, provided the Chinese give an assurance that Grey vill be
released: In other words, the proposal is not necessarily 11 - 1. If,
say, three were to refuse to go to China, then we should expect that the
Chinese would still release Grey even though only eight newsworkers vere
released. Jay thoroughly understood this point and indeed later in the
discussion suggested that perhaps it would be better if we were to ask
for the release of Grey before we released the newsworkers. I said that
this had indeed been considered but it was felt that the pro- posal, nov
sade stood a better chance of acceptance. Jay suggested that whilst he
would certainly transmit this proposition as it was put to him,
nevertheless on a purely personal basis he felt that it would be
reasonable for him to suggest that, as a response to the British/H.K.G.
proposals, the Chinese sight be prepared to release Grey first. I said
that quite frankly I saw little chance of the Chinese responding in this
way but if they were to do so then clearly this would be a matter for
consideration.
I emphasised to Jay that it was my personal opinion that the proposals
nov made were as good as anybody could expect: if they were not
accepted, then I saw no other possible solution: indeed, non-acceptance
would probably mean a complete breakdown of indeed, non-acceptance
negotiations. I saw the proposition as a solution to the major problems
involved:-
(a)
it provided an acceptable solution to the problema involved in the
axereise of the Royal Prerogative;
(D)
from the Chinese viewpoint it avoided use of the word and the mot of
"deportation"; and
(0)
it did not throw doubt on the right of Chinese to live in Hong Kong - a
point which I was svare the Chinese regarded most seriously.
I discussed with Jay the transmission of the message to Peking: he said
that he would certainly be passing the message through LI Cho-ahih but
at the same time would be reporting personally and directly to CHOU In
Lai's personal office.
in He would emphasise the need for a quick decision in this matter.
5.
in commenting generally on the proposal, Jay thought it sxsellent,
indeed "rather better" than he had expected. discussed briefly with me
the possibility which he had mentioned
/contd...
TOP SECRET
Top
SECRET
on 7th January that perhaps the proposal should be seen as coming from
his originally rather than officially from the he H.K.G., but after
reflection max/agreed that it was much better that this should be seen
as a straightforward
proposal from the British side. He thought that the pressure ôn CHOU Ba
Lai to agree to the proposal would be very strong: CHOU for a long time
had been preaching the need for improved relationships with Hong Kong
and Britain and he would not wish to appear to be going against his om
advice. Jay felt that a positive move of this type could only be for
In any event, the good, that even if the Chinese were to reject the
proposal the position would then be that it was for then to make the
next move.
28th January, 1969.
(J. Cater)
2
of the
Very interesting.
pressal
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the perind
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one
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Mr. Seg
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ink
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and
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