They are alleged
and we believe
the Chinese will settle these cases according to the
particular circumstances.
This is not to say that solution
of the Grey case would not improve the atmosphere of Sino-
British relations and consequently enhance the chances for
the other British subjects; but even so it is not to be
expected that solution of the Grey problem would lead directly
to the release of the remainder. As far as trade is concerned
there are few indications that the state of our relationa
with the Chinese has been reflected in the field of trade.
Our exports to China for January 1969 were the best for three
yeara
15. Balancing the benefits offered in the message from Chou
En-lai, the Chinese have also made two veiled threats.
First,
if we do not encourage the "moderates" in Peking by an early
concession, they may be unable to hold the line against the
"radicals" regarding policy towards Hong Kong. We do not
know of course what precisely is happening in the echelons of
the top leadership in Peking at present. There are some
indications of serious policy differences. However, since
the beginning of 1968, even at moments of extreme internal
agitation, there has been no indication that the leaders were
prepared again to jeopardise their chances of recovering
/their
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7
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their following in Hong Kong or, more important, their large
foreign exchange earnings from the Colony, by further radical
initiatives.
We do not suppose they would take such a risk
now. The threat now presented to us appears to be a play-
back of speculation about the relative strength of factions in
Peking carried in the Western press in recent months and one
which the Chinese may therefore calculate would appeal to us.
16. The second Chinese threat concerns likely British tactics
in September 1969. At this point ten of the remaining
newsworkers will be due for release (with remission) from
prison. The eleventh is due out only in February 1971.
The Chinese must be aware that September will bring us the
best opportunity, assuming we are prepared to commute the
sentence of the eleventh newsworker, of settling the Grey
problem in a reasonable time and with minimum political
damage in Hong Kong. For obvious reasons the Chinese would
wish to steer us away from any such course; they want an
earlier and much bigger concession. In any case we are not
tempted to adopt precisely the tactics the Chinese imply to
be in our minds, i.e. to release the ten and try and bargain
for Mr. Grey with the remaining one. As far as we can
anticipate events at this stage, we should find it much more
convenient in September to release the eleven as a group and
throw the ball firmly into the Chinese court.
17. As I have suggested above, it is our view that the
present negotiations are not necessarily over. It is
important that we go back to the Chinese making it clear to
/them
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.
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them that the premature release in Hong Kong of the eleven
newsworkers is ruled out. If we can convince them of our
determination on this point it is just possible that they will
retreat from their present intransigence. It is the view of
the Governor of Hong Kong that we must wait a few weeks to
see if the affair develops this way. We share the Governor's
view and think that a period of about three weeks would be
appropriate.
Possible Failure of the Negotiations
18. If at the end of this period we find that the present
negotiations are a definite failure we shall have to consider
once again the alternatives.
It will then be for
consideration whether we should concede to Chinese pressure
and release all eleven newsworkers in the near future or
whether we should continue to resist.
way are clear.
The dangers of giving
The Governor of Hong Kong has throughout
opposed the premature release of convicted prisoners in Hong
Kong. We agree with the Governor that such a move would
damage public confidence in the Colony; would be interpreted
by the communists as a sign that we lacked firmness; and
by providing a precedent of willingness to disregard the courts
in a flagrant manner and for a political purpose impair the
future credibility of the sanction of imprisonment. The
likely encouragement to the Chinese to adopt a similar policy
again, if they now succeed, must also be taken into account.
We remain therefore of the view that the premature release of
al eleven newsworkers, particularly so soon after we had been
/ pressed
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- 9 -
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pressed openly by the Chinese to do so, would be highly
damaging.
19. An extreme alternative is to wait until the release of
the last newsworker in February 1971. This alternative is
highly objectionable on humanitarian grounds and would be
difficult to justify in public.
20.
Our preferred alternative is to wait until September 1969
and, when ten of the newsworkers are released in the normal
way, to throw in the eleventh. We have already put this
proposal informally to the Governor of Hong Kong by personal
telegram. Understandably, he has refused to commit himself
at this stage. It may be objected that by throwing in the
eleventh newsworker we should be breaching the principle of
the sanctity of the courts, which we had striven all along to
maintain. There is an element of truth in this. But from
the political point of view there is a wide difference in
degree between the release of eleven and the release of one.
Having made the other ten serve out their sentences the
Governor would, in commuting the sentence of the eleventh, be
acting from a position of strength, or one that could be
presented as such.
21 It may also be argued that the release at any stage of
the eleven newsworkers will not automatically secure the
release of Mr. Grey. This is of course true. However, the
Chinese are on public record as justifying their continued
detention of Mr. Grey by reference to the "persecuted
patriotic newsworkers",
While there has been some variation
/ over
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-10-
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over numbers, the Chinese have always justified their
detention of Mr. Grey exclusively in the context of the
treatment of their newsworkers in Hong Kong. We do not
believe that they would start after the release of the
newsworkers to hold him against a wholely different category
of prisoner.
22. The feasibility of the September timetable must of course
depend on what we learn about the condition of Mr. Grey and,
closely related to this, the evolution of public and
parliamentary opinion in this country. The first point is
one which we continue to watch very carefully. At present,
although Mr. Grey's conditions of detention remain highly
unpleasant, we are not unduly concerned about his mental
equilibrium. Careful medical examination by Chinese doctors
in December appear to have relieved his mind about his
physical health; and his recent letters to his mother have
been relatively cheerful and extremely balanced.
I am
23. Whether or not public and parliamentary opinion can
continue to be contained depends largely on Reuters.
due to see Mr. Long this afternoon and hope to have permission
to inform him in general terms about our present negotiations
on Mr. Grey's behalf. This should help to convince him
that we are doing all we reasonably can.
24. We have another card up our sleeves. For tactical
reasons we have not wished to stimulate indignation against
the Chinese, since we were reluctant to be pushed into
unhelpful measures against them in this country. We have
/ therefore
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11
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If
therefore refrained from deploying fully the strong arguments
for resisting Chinese "blackmail" in Hong Kong. We have
however a good case and can deploy it when necessary.
the need arises it is open to us to make public their
continued refusal to entertain the idea of a reasonable
solution through deportation of the newsworkers to China.
The fact that the Chinese cannot persuade their own adherents
to return to the mainland would be particularly damaging to
them.
25. Two forms of objection may well be advanced in
opposition to the views outlined above.
a)
b)
It may be felt that undue stress has been placed on
the need to maintain public confidence in Hong Kong.
It is always difficult to pronounce with certainty on
the likely effect of any particular action in Hong Kong.
Nevertheless it remains the judgment of the Departments
concerned that in cases of doubt we must leave ourselves
a margin of error, since any action which led the
inhabitants of Hong Kong to conclude that we had lost
our nerve could be very quickly disastrous.
In any
case we must listen carefully to the arguments of the
Governor of Hong Kong who is better placed than we to
pass judgment.
It may be argued that the eleven remaining newsworkers
are a declining asset, that their value to the Chinese
diminishes as September approaches and that their
release at that time will therefore be regarded by the
/ Chinese
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12-
[
[
I
TOP SECRET
Chinese as of practically no value.
There is an
element of truth in this although our experience of
the Chinese suggests that they will not be at a loss
as to how to present the release of the eleven, whenever
it comes, as a "victory". They will have prevailed to
the extent of having held on to Mr. Grey until we
"stopped the persecution of patriotic newsworkers in Hong
Kong". But the nub of the argument really lies elsewhere.
It is unfortunately true that while the value of these
men to the Chinese may decline as time goes by, the
damage to ourselves caused by their release at any point
between the present and September is likely to remain
fairly constant.
2
James may
(James Murray)
28 February, 1969.
+
Copies to: Mr. Godden
Sir J. Johnston
Sir A. Galsworthy
Mr. Carter
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-
13 -
Mr. Mu
Murray
Mr. Cradock asked me to send you a copy of this letter
21/2/69
Ален
вило
With the Compliments of the
Political Adviser
Hang rộng
Ref. +84/68
cuter.
Jumpe
ра 4m
11
い
4
+
404
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PERSONAL
ہیں یا نہانے کے
TOP SECRET
Office of the British Chargé
'Affaires
PERSONAL
K
Peking
7 February. 1969
!A•
辰
!
30th
bear Arthur,
83
102
7.x 1/64:
There is a suggestion in Hong Kong telegram number 27 (paragraph 3) and
again in the paner on Grey (paragraph 19) m which rather disturbs me.
The suggestion seems to be that the Chinese were ready to let Grey go
quietly after Hsueh p'ing's release but changed their line to a demand
for the newsworkers as a result of certain events in Hong Kong, namely
my press conference, the meetin8 with you and Jamca Murray and the
meeting with NCNA. I should like to let you have some comment on this in
order to nail what might develop into an unfortunate myth. I am writing
in similar terms to James Kurray.
2.
*
I should certainly be very concerned at the thought that any remarks of
mine in Hong Kong, even at a conference the general outlines of which
had been earlier agreed with the Foreign Office and with the Governor,
might have injured Grey'à chances. However, a fair examination of the
evidence suggests that this theory will not hold and that the press
conference almost certainly did not have a decisive effect one way or
another,
(a) I think it inherently improbable that the Chinese in pique
over some remarks at a press conference would make such a major change
of line as that suggested i.e. a shift from readiness to free Grey
without any price to a demand for the release of 13 men.
(b) The press conference was on the evening of 30 October.
The telephone remiest from NCNA for a meeting to discusa another round
of speciel visits was on the morning of " 1 November. The request for
special visita was a concerted oneration involving action in Peking and
Hong Kong. It seems to me almost impossible for the Chinese to have
decided on and concerted such a change within the space of 24 hours.
(c) There is, in any event, no need to postulate this since there
was another sufficient reason for the approach by Peking and NOWA at
that time, namely the need to blur the effect of the forthcoming release
of Hsueh P'ing and emphasize the link between Grey and newsworkers still
in prison. The timing of the annroach seems to have been dictated by
that and I should imagine it was worked out some considerable time
beforehand.
+
(a) The main lines of Chinese policy seem to have been consistent
throughout. The link with newsworkers in prison dates back to April.
Surgestions by the Chinese vir covert channels that Grey might be
exchanged for newaworkers occurred both before (8.6. on 2 September) and
after the resa corference. A.F. Waddocks, Req.,
Hont Kong,
79 TOOPSEEBRET
+
+
+
-
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PERSONAL
I
+
(e) Encouraging Chinese statements on the theme that the release of Grey
would not affect the struggle in Hong Kong also preceded and followed
the nrega conference. November (paragraph-15 of the paper on Grey.)
3.
e.g. 21
The press conference and subsequent publicity certainly nettled and
embarrassed the Chinese, "hat surprised and upset them more was the
degree of publicity over the November visit to Gre", which contrasted
with the relatively, little publicity the subject had received in April.
At the same time, as. I have suggested elsewhere, they were probably
bewildered by our blowing hot and cold over the release of prisoners.
Our first offer on this subject related only to Hauch but was made at a
time when Hsueh was already virtually free. I think they; read it as an
indication from our side that prisoners were negotiable. They took some
time to come back with their suggestion, but when they did so in
November and gave their counter-offer of an exchange for newsworkers, we
surprised them by saying that early release was out of the question.
Publicity was also blowing up about this time.
1
4.
This is the best re-construction of events I can offer. It must all be a
matter of speculation. But the theory that all was going swimmingly unt
the press conference does not bear
examination.
Yours
мась
лоз
(Percy Cradock)
:
TOP
No.
CHET
78.5 Date 154669
KONG
+
COVERNMENT
ECR
MONG
TOP SECRET TOP SECRET
SECRET
+
3.45pm
Secretary of Stati
Lord Shepherd wishes to talk to you for
for 10-15
minutes about Hong Kong.
The subject is set out in the attached submission
KOB 2/2
27/
4435
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Если
Mpa 24/3 (401 will the befored d. aft.
STS 1
прял
the
و لمسها سلام
Sir J. Johnston
Johnston
Mr. Godden
Private Secretary
less cantneed that am
Lecce
fuerent
Mey will than the sealane of very.
lad I shall have an
Hitem, & lakken,
Прий
of lakken, this gyfer will.
Fm.day 20th
た
MR. ANTHONY GREY OF REUTERS
By du
314
4
PROBLEM
Flag A
Flag B
(307)
In his letter of 17 February to the Secretary of State,
Mr. Long, the General Manager of Reuters, requests that the
Chinese newspaper workers imprisoned in Hong Kong should be
released in order to secure Mr. Grey's freedom. In his
311 letter of 24 February he refers to a recent newspaper report
that the Chinese intend to bargain with us about accommodation
for our respective missions in London and Peking.
Mr. Long
is due to go abroad on 2 March, returning on 29 March.
RECOMMENDATION
RECEIV
NARCHIV
Flag C
.31
b)
2.
I recommend that:-
at
The Secretary of State should offer to see Mr. Long
when the latter returns from his forthcoming trip.
I should be authorised to inform Mr. Long when I see
him on 28 February in general terms of the progress of
the present exchanges with the Chinese through covert
channels in Hong Kong.
c)
An interim reply be sent to Mr. Long on the lines of
the attached draft.
BACKGROUND
3. In essence Er. Long's proposals differ only slightly
from those made in his letter to the Secretary of State of
/ 23 July, 1968.
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Flage
D & E
Flexis (102
Flag F
23 July, 1968.
(22) 0 /2 13/13
氏
On that occasion he seemed to advocate a
somewhat broader amnesty for prisoners in Hong Kong. On
the other hand, the tone of the present letter is decidedly
more impatient. The difficulties raised by proposals of
this kind were dealt with in the Secretary of State's letters
to Mr. Long of 26 July and 28 August. In addition I saw
Mr. Long on 17 October, 1968, and went in some detail through
the moves which had been made in Hong Kong to try to discover
Chinese intentions towards Mr. Grey. On 12 November the
Secretary of State discussed the problem with Mr. Long.
Subsequently Far Eastern Department have maintained close
contact with Er. Long and his colleagues at Reuters on the
developments outlined in his present letter.
4 I have not taken Mr. Long fully into my confidence
about the latest covert probe in Hong Kong of Chinese
intentions, although I have indicated to Mr. Chipp, the
Editor of Reuters, in general terms that we are exploring
the matter once again on the lines of Mr. George Brown's
letter to Ch'en Yi in 1967. (On that occasion the Chinese
were told that if they gave an assurance that they would
agree to allow all British subjects in China, including
Mr. Grey, who wished to leave, to do so, Mr. Brown might be
able to arrange the departure from Hong Kong of the Chinese
newspaper men and news agency personnel in prison there.)
I am, however, myself seeing Mr. Long on 28 February as a
result of an arrangement made a fortnight ago before my
departure on leave and had in any case intended to seek
/ authority
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2.
-
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Flags
G & H
340 341
authority to bring him into the picture about the latest
covert exchanges in Hong Kong.
5. Meanwhile this latest probe of Chinese intentions has
been carried forward in two further meetings between
The
Mr. Cater, the representative of the Hong Kong Government,
and his contact on 21 and 22 February (Hong Kong telegrams
Nos. 184 and 185 of 25 February). The salient feature is
an alleged message from Chou En-lai to the effect that while
the release of the newsworkers might be a big price for the
Hong Kong Government to pay it was a small price for the
improved Sino-British relations which would follow.
Governor detects in the latest round of exchanges a new note
of urgency on the Chinese side which, however, he thinks may
be purely tactical. He considers that our only course in
the next few weeks is to hope that some progress can be made
on the basis of our January proposals (i.e. the return of
the news men to China). I think this is right; but I am
submitting separately with detailed argument.
ARGUMENT
6. It remains very important that we should continue to
carry Reuters with us. We have had a number of indications
recently that Mr. Long is not entirely happy about the way
we are handling the matter. In particular Mr. Long has
been strongly critical in private of our refusal to release
the newsworkers in Hong Kong. This was confirmed by a
Flag I report from Mr. Wilford in our Embassy in Washington of a
conversation which he had with Mr. Long recently.
TOP SECRET
- 3-
-
/7.
7. There
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7. There are two principal aspects in which Mr. Long's
analysis of the problem is superficial:-
a)
b)
8.
He skates very lightly over the risks for the longterm
in Hong Kong of releasing the newsworkers in Hong Kong,
referring only to the possibility that it would be seen
as "an act of weakness and might encourage the enemies
of British rule to foment further disorders". He omits
any reference to the effect it would have on the future
value of prison sentences as a deterrent or the
encouragement that it might give the Chinese towards
further hostage-taking in future.
He proceeds on the assumption that the release of the
11 newsworkers would certainly result in the release of
Mr. Grey.
I personally believe this to be the case;
but the Governor of Hong Kong would certainly not agree
that this is a foregone conclusion.
I would be reluctant, however, to become involved in
argument with Reuters on these points