With the Compliments of the
11 Real.
Political Adviser
13 1/3
ärz 13/3.
T3x. 4/68.
Hong rộng Enter T.S. apa
डै
40.
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27/3
I.
This
probably
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Political Adviser
ཅས་.
Mr. K.C. Jay telephoned me on the morning of Sunday, 23rd February to
say that he had arranged to meet with LI Cho- chih that day in order to
pass on the message which I had taken to him the previous day: he was
anxious to know whether there had been any changes in our thinking on
this matter and whether we still wished to proceed with the proposals.
1 vas in somewhat of a quandary as to why Jay should be in doubt on this
matter but nevertheless told him quite firmly that the proposals were
definite and that we should be grateful if he could put them to LI as
soon as possible.
2.
He
Jay telephoned me on the morning of Tuesday, 25th February to say that
he would appreciate a brief meeting with se in order to give me LI's
reactions to the proposals' made on the previous Sunday. Accordingly I
saw Jay at 12.30 p.m. confirmed that LI had undertaken to pass our
proposals through to Peking and that he, Jay, would also be sending the
proposals separately on his own channel. LI's opinion was that our
proposition was unlikely to find favour in Peking but neverthe- less
felt that it was good that such a proposal had been made by the H.I.G.
as it showed that the H.K.G. had given a great deal of thought to the
problem and were keen, so far as possible, to meet the Chinese request :
LI allegedly said that it was becoming certain that, although both sides
had tried to meet the other's requirements, the proposition nevertheless
was impossible of acceptance.
3.
Jay said that LI was due to go to Canton about the beginning of March,
when undoubtedly he would be discussing not only the general Hong Kong
situation but also probably the present proposal. Jay said that he
intended communicating with Peking suggesting that somebody from the
Prime Minister's office might be sent to Canton in order to give
directly Peking's views on the proposal.
4.
In general discussion, Jay reiterated that serious problems faced the
Chinese in this matter: that even if the H.K.G. had found it possible to
release the 11 newsworkers, it would cause serious embarrassment to the
Chinese if it were known publicly that such a deal had been negotiated:
in particular, he said, the trade unions would almost certainly be very
critical of Peking, and it was because of this that Peking had continued
of the pe to support the granting of "strike pay" as a "sweetener" to
the Think and
militant trade union groups.
in any fat that we must
profussent coment for the Common 5.
Referring to a previous discussion, Jay handed to me the attached list
of men who had recently been disaissed by the Bank of China. He said
that this action had caused quite a stir in banking circles and that he
felt that LI had not heard the end of it.
6.
Just as I vas about to leave the office, Jay said that he had had some
indication of the conditions in which Grey was
Tof SECRET Тор
/contd..
462
II.
now being kept.
SECRET
He said that he had the specific information that Grey vas being allowed
to spend 120 J.N.P. a month on food and that he retained the services of
his cook. He had also gained the impression from discussions with LI
that circumstances generally had improved so far as Grey was concerned.
In reply to several questions on this he admitted he had received no
direct information on this but based the assessment on a comment from LI
to the effect that Grey's living conditions vere not now as bad as Jay
had indicated in a recent discussion:
that Grey was in good health although "not free to leave the house". Jay
had not questioned LI further on this statement but said that LI was
quite specific in his comment and he, Jay, assumed that Grey had access
to the rest of his house and possibly the garden.
7.
At about 10 p.m. on the night of 26th February Jay telephoned to say
that he vas extremely concerned about news which LI had just given him
to the effect that there had been a leak "on the British side" and that
"people outside" now knew specific details of recent discussions and
proposals. Jay vas obviously very worried and consequently our
conversation was even more elliptical and confused than usual. Among
other things, be asked me to "plug the leak", but when I suggested that
this was not possible without some detail, be calmed down sufficiently
to say that he would make further enquiries next day: he asked whether I
could see him some time during the afternoon of 27th February. I saw Jay
at about 4.15 p.a. on Thursday, 27th February. Be said that the previous
night LI had telephoned kin and had been most agitated:" LI had claimed
that "outsiders" had come to know of the negotiations now under way and
that he was very anxious to see Jay as soon as possible. In particular,
he wanted Jay to contact me in order that I might be apprised of the
situation as soon as possible. Jay claims that later that night LI
visited hia (COMMENT: I have serious doubts about this as Jay states
that LI had visited the Jay house on Island Road, but Jay was unsure
whether LI had taken a taxi or had "walked": when I asked how LI had
later gone back to his own home Jay, in rather a confused manner, said
that he did not know, in spite of the fact that obviously he would have
seen LI out of his house). When I asked for details of the "leak", Jay
was far from being specific: all be could say was that LI had
information that the negotiations were known to people "outside". I then
suggested that it was quite clear that if there had been any leak
obviously it had been on the communist side and not that of the H,I,G.:
I suggested that possibly the 1.C.F.A. night have thought it in their
interests to leak a little of the story. Jay vehemently denied this,
claiming that the communist security was excellent in such matters and,
by way of explanation, said that LI had called an urgent meeting the
night before and already that day (27th) had held two further top
security meetings. I suggested that this was, if anything, a sure
indication that the leak had probably come from the communist side, but
Jay was not impressed by this. He said that the meetings had been called
of top communists in Hong Kong including bank officials, and that they
had been briefed to keep their ears open as to talk about possible
negotiations. On hearing this I said quite firmly that this did not
impress me at all that the communists were "excellent" in their security
arrangements: that probably the
SECRET
/contd....
14
SECRET
worst thing they could have done would have been to sow doubts and
concern in the minds of such people. After some argusent back and forth
Jay saw the point of my remarks and finally agreed that probably it was
not vise of the communists in these circumstances to have opened up
knowledge of the discussions so videly. He said that he would speak to
LI about this.
8.
I
Jay said that he had been advised by LI that the proposals made the
previous Saturday had already been sent to Peking but that it was LI's
opinion, and he had so warned, that these new proposals, like the
previous attempts, would not be successful, Jay then went on to say that
all along he had advised the H.I.G. not to give in to the Peking
suggestions but now, after very serious reflection, he thought it would
be wise for us to do all that we could possibly do to meet Peking on
this matter. In some exasperation I said to Jay that I thought I had
made it clear in many discussions that release of the newsworkers in
Hong Kong was quite out of the question: this remained the position and
would always remain the position. further said that, whilst we clearly
had been doing all that could to reach an acceptable compromise, it
seemed to me that the Chinese had not noved at all in the situation.
Jay said that he had made this point to LI, who rebutted the argument by
saying that it was quite untrue, for previously the Peking stand had
been that they would "consider" the release of Grey 1f the B.I.G. vere
to release the newsworkers in Hong Kong" . now Peking had said that
definitely they would release Grey if the 11 nevs- workers were first
released in Hong Kong, I commented that this did not appear to me to be
a substantial change, indeed scarcely varranted a mention.
9.
In a lengthy general discussion Jay commented that he vas quite sure now
that Peking would not agree to the proposal nade "the previous Saturday
nor to his "own suggestion": I picked him up on this and asked what this
vas. After some hesitation and a great deal of hedging, he said that on
his own initiative he had proposed to LI that a possible compromise
might be for the H.K.G. to release the 11 newsworkers in Hong Kong on
the strict understanding that the Chinese would keep them incarcerated
in the Bank of China until the expiry of their sentences. I said that it
was just as well that LI had indicated that the Chinese would not find
this proposal acceptable as certainly it would not be acceptable to the
II,Ì.G.
10.
As I was leaving, Jay asked me again to think carefully about the Peking
proposal: he said that clearly the Chinese were anxious to reach
agrement on the whole question of Hong Kong and that he personally had
been impressed by the fact that already they had done much to ease the
situation. I asked him to be a little more specific about this but all
he could remember at that time was the fact that the Chinese claimed to
have quietened down the communist press and particularly the Ta Kung Pao
and, because they had been given prior warning of the visits of several
V.I.P.'s including Admiral Bringle of the U.S. 7th Fleet, they had not
made any propaganda about these visits.
c.c. F.C.o. (Mr. Hurray) (who encl.)
Peking (Mr. Denson)
D.5.8. H./A.R.G. E.S.S.
3rd March, 1969.
SECRET
ев
(J. Cater)
FEC
(HNB-372)
Lx49
TOP SECRET
Japa 2713
25 March, 1969.
I enclose a copy of a letter addressed to Gerald Long of Reuters by
Professor D. R. Lan of Hong Kong. Reuters have enquired whether we have
any comment either on the writer or on his suggestion.
2. We have been unable to trace any mention of Professor Lan in the Hong
Kong Directory and we should be grateful for any information that you
can let us have about his and for your comments on his letter.
3. Among the possibilities are that he is one of Hong Kong's numerous
cranks or that this is a clumsy and naive attempt, inspired by local
communists, to play on Reuters' concern for Grey and get Reuters to put
pressure on us to treat with them on a broad front. On the other hand
Mr. Lan oould be a well-meaning if somewhat woolly-minded gentleman who
is merely reflecting a line that has not, I believe, been without its
advocates in Hong Kong.
A. F. R. Maddocks, Esq.,
HONG KONG.
TOP SECRET
(James Murray)
25/3 he
(LED). DE 391999. 1,300% 2700 Hv.
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
Registry No.
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
Top Secret.
Secret.
Confidential,
Restricted.
Unclassified
PRIVACY MARKING
DRAFT
LETTER
To:-
A. F. R. Maddocks, Esq.,
Political Adviser,
HONG KONG.
In Confidence
Type 1 +
From
V.R.
Telephone No. & Ext.
Department
--rי-וווייחיי
and for your commate on has
Late
a
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I enclose a copy of a letter addressed to Gerald Long of Reuters by
Professor D. R. 1
2 Hàng Trong
Lank
Reuters have enquired whether we have any comment
his
either on the writer or/on is suggestion.
or/on
umable
We have been unable to trace any mention
of Professor Lan in the Hong Kong Directory and
we should be grateful for any information that you
thank
can let us have about him. The suggestion in
scene to bear a vague resemblance to that-
mentioned in paragraph 1(D) of Hong Kong top secret
telegram nø. 2092 of 16-October, 1968.
However,
this may be no more than fanciful thinking on our
Among the possibilities are that
he to
of Hong Kong's
In time, comes
cranks
or that thi
clumsy and
coltempt, inspired by local communists, to
nawe
wlan Reartars
Reuters' concern
on for
for Grey
and get
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put fivensure
them on
a broad front. On the other hand
Mr Lan carted be
ሰ.
Evoolly
minded
well meaning if somewhat-
gentleman who is merely reflecting
I believe,
a line that have not been without its advocates in
Hạng trong ê
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ScAshown.
SCAS
Ачание.
MR. MURRAY (F.C.O.)
166
24 Raul
pa Top the
To Boy Onlin
SEC
Part No Shaded.
Ли
With the Compliments of the
Political Adviser:
Long
Hong rộng
25 MAR 1909
FEC 13C
31
I
1
TOP SECRET
Гов
Political Adviser
Before I left for Bangkok on Sunday, 9th Harch, Mr. K.C. Jay telephoned
asking whether I would contact him issediately on my return to Bong Kong
as he had a message to pass to me which was not very urgent. evening of
17th March, I telephoned Jay next morning, Wednesday, 12h March,
Accordingly, on the and arranged to see kia
2.
Jay said that he had received several enquiries from LI Cho-chih and
also from Peking asking whether Jay had seen me recently and in
particular whether I had any further comments to make on the question of
Anthony Grey and the possibility of an exchange being effected for the
11 newsworkers. Jay said that he had replied briefly to the effect that,
although he had seen me fros time to time, I had made no further comment
on this subject and be assumed therefore that I had nothing new to
suggest.
3.
Jay then went on to say that he had recently spoken on two or more
occasions to r. George Pullen, Chairman of the Chartered Bank. Jay
expressed serious concern that, in his opinion, Pullen vas far too
over-anxious in his dealings with the Chinese communists and in
particular over the question of Johnston. Jay said that Pullen had asked
his to arrange a meeting with LI Cho-chih but that LI had indicated that
he was not at all keen to speak to Pullen: that he would prefer Jay to
put Pullen off, saying something to the effect that LI vas extremely
busy at the present moment and due to leave for Canton at any time. LI
said, however, that if Pullen were insistent then he would reluctantly
be prepared to meet kin. Apparently Pullen vas most insistent and
therefore Jay had arranged for Pullen to see LI later that day. Jay
expressed the opinion that little, probably nothing, would come out of
this meeting and that it would merely encourage the Chinese communists
to believe that in Johnston they had an important hostage and that in
these circunstances they say later even try to start bargaining over
bíu.
4.
Talking generally of visitors, Jay said that LI had been criticized by
Peking for refusing to see John Keswick on the latter's last visit to
Hong Kong. It had been reported to
Peking that the restrictions placed on the Chinese Charge d'Affaires'
staff in London had been lifted the same day that Ieswick and Lane
(Chartered Bank) had been to the Foreign Office
In these to make representations on behalf of the Chinese,
circumstances, Peking assumed that Keswick was a man whose opinion was
not only highly regarded by the British but also acted upon.
Accordingly LI has now been instructed to be wore affable to Keswick
when next he is in Hong Kong and to be prepared to meet hin. Jay then
sentioned in very general teras the question of the 15 yachtsmen. He
said that the view had been expressed to him that itr. David Bailey had
been released as that this vas "a show of good will" on the part of the
chinese: possible because Bailey was British and that if all 15
yachtsmen had been British then they also would have been released by
now. Jay then went on to say that the major problem regarding the
yachtsmen was the fact that they had among the group some Dutch
Тор
Top SECRET
/contd...
445
4
[I.
SECRET
2
people and that Peking felt strongly about the Dutch as a result of the
LIAO incident. I iamediately pointed out to Jay that in fact there were
no Dutchmen among the 15: I also resinded him that yachtsmen going to
Macao over the Lunar New Year period had been in two groups of three
yachts and that among the first group of three was indeed a vessel
belonging to a Dutchman and flying a Dutch flag, but that this group had
been allowed through to Macao allegedly because the Dutchaan in the
group was carrying a portrait of Chairaan MÃO Tse Tung. Jay was
convinced, however, that there vere Dutchmen among the 15 and said quite
firmly that this was the only serious reason which Canton had given for
the detention of the yachtsmen. I assured hia he was wrong but said that
I would re-check for him.
5.
Referring to a previous discussion, Jay said that the Bank of China was
still experiencing troubles as a result of the dismissal of five members
of its staff. The dismissed staff vere nov spreading rumours to the
effect that they had been dismissed on the recommendations of a man
called TSUI who himself was an undesirable character: they had cited as
proof of this the fact that TSUI had formed an undesirable relationship
with a female employee of the Bank of China Jay was certain that this
vas a lie for the female named, according to Jay, was known among the
bank staff as "the plank" and, said that i'SUI would have to be out of
his senses to form any sort of alliance with any such person.
6.
Jay then very briefly mentioned Anthony Grey, consenting that he had
been pleased to see newspaper reports to the effect that Gray was now
receiving better treatment. Jay said that one of the problems exercising
the Chinese communists was that Grey night, on his release, write his
story up for the press of the world and might even write a book. Jay
claims that he took the opportunity of saying undoubtedly no matter what
happened Grey would write his story after release and therefore it was
probably very much in the interests of the Chinese communists to ensure
that his living conditions were improved in the hope that Grey would not
be too critical. Jay holds the opinion that the Chinese will in fact
gradually improve Grey's living conditions along the lines recommended
by hin some three months ago.
7.
On Friday, 14th March Jay telephoned asking whether he could see ne in
order to report on the Pullen visit to LI Cho- chih. Accordingly, I saw
Ì.C. Jay at 12 noon on Saturday, 15t March.
8.
Before the discussions got under way I informed Jay that I had made a
thorough check on the nationalities of the 15 yachtsmen and that he
could be assured that there were no Dutch- laen in the group. Jay seened
genuinely surprised and said that he would pass this information on as a
matter of urgency directly I had left the office. In discussing briefly
the names of the yachtsmen, Jay tried to argue that von Sydow was Dutch
but I was able to assure him that I knew von Sydow personally (he lives
in the same block) and that von Sydow is Swedish, although his wife
retains her American nationality.
SECPET
/contd.
SECRET
Zit
9.
Jay said that he had now heard from both Pullen and LI Cho-chih their
respective accounts of their meeting on Wednesday, 12th March. Jay said
at his worst fears had been realised and that undoubtedly Pullen vas
seriously mistaken in insisting on seeing LI. Jay said that Pullen had
gone to LI's office on his own but had been received by LI, CHAN Hung
and
ne other male employee of the bank: LI and his two henchmen vere dressed
in HÃO uniform and wore soup-plate size HAŬ badges. Jay said that/was in
fact rather unusual for LI to wear HAO unifors but that clearly he had
done this to emphasise the official nature of the interview and to
indicate unequivocally his position in the scheme of things. The
discussion was in English and was taken down by a stenographer. LI was
prepared only to discuss banking matters and these very generally.
Pullen got on to the question of Johnston, LI and his henchmen pretended
at first not to know of Johnston or his whereabouts and only after some
prodding from Pullen ware they prepared to acknowledge that they had
heard of Johnston. Despite repeated requests by Pullen, LI refused to
discuss the Johnston case, saying that be, LI, was a banker and
therefore only competent to discuss banking matters. Although pressed to
do so by Pullen, LI refused to pass on a message tó Péking about
Johnston and the Johnston Family,
then
10.
Jay then spoke at some length about the over-anxiety which Pullen had
shown about Johnston. Pullen seened convinced that the major problem
with the Chinese was to do with deposits frosen in the Chartered Bank,
Singapore, in spite of the fact that Jay did his best to convince him
that this had nothing to do with the matter. Jay says that he tried to
hint to Pullen that there were other reasons for Johnston's detention,
going so far as to suggest that possibly Johnston might have been in
contact with, or had been speaking to, officials when Johnston should
have know that the Chinese would regard it was wrong to contact such
people. He said that Pullen before leaving London had written to one
fone ko, who was known to be in poor standing with Peking. Pullen had
also suggested that possibly Johnston had got himself into difficulties
with the Chinese because he had been in contact with MAN Harg Chang, the
former Minister for Overseas Trade: to Jay this was an indication of
Pullen's lack of political sense Jay said that NAN although he had been
criticized by the Red Guards, had been well regarded by KAŬ and CHOU En
Lai, so much so that after NAN had committed suicide HAO had composed a
poes in praise of NAN and that this poem had been recited by CHOV at the
funeral.
(COMMENT: You will be aware that on several occasions jay has been
critical of the Chartered Bank attitude towards the Chinese over this
question of Johnston. Ubviously Jay feels that the Chartered Bank
officials are being over-anxious and that this attitude can only bring
difficulties in the future. In confirm- ation of this I was told by
Harold LEE a few days ago that one night at dinner with the LEE family
Pullen had persuaded Dick LEE to try and get into contact with Krs.
Johnston in Shanghai
Apparently Dick LEE spent a couple of hours trying to do this but
unsuccessfully.)
18th March, 1969.
c.c.
Itr. Murray (P.C.O. Mr. Denson (Peking)
رفـ
ex
(J. Cater)
D.S.B.
H./A.R.G.
: E.8.8.
Minutes
اچھی ہے
RD (CK) To See
IRD
To see para
11/3
14
Frehim quichey please
し
Лавир
paj 141
26/2
Mr. Murray! (has seen) H.K. Telegrams
Nos. 184
refer.
a
* 185
зде
391
With the Compliments of the
Political Adviser
Hang rộng
paj
14/13
Aois nohy o бавовни ичи
REF.. $x. 4/68.
I
મ
I.
TSECRET
Political Adviser Top SECRET
Тор
Mr. K.C. Jay telephoned on Thursday, 20th February to say that he vas
anxious to see me the following day:
accordingly
I made arrangements to meet him at 11.15 a.m. in his office.
that he
Jay started by saying that there had been a lot of activity on his front
over the Lunar New Year period: had received a short message from CHOU
En Lai: two discussions with LI Cho-chih: lengthy (4 hours) discussion
with LEUNG Wai-lam.
that he had had and that he had had a very
3.
The message from CHOU was very similar to previous messages in that CHOU
allegedly stated his appreciation of the difficult situation which faced
the H.K.G. in this matter of release of the newsworkers in Hong Kong:
but he reiterated that Peking would assist the H.K.G. in this so far as
possible and would guarantee no publicity or propaganda about à v ictory
being scored. CHOU En Lai, whilst realising that it was a big price for
the H.K.G. to pay, nevertheless considered it a small price for the
improved British/Chinese relations which would foliov. CHOU had said
that the Anthony Grey affair was a "knot" which vas holding up
improvement in Sino/British relations as well as delaying the final and
full solution of the "Hong Kong problem". CHOU apparently had not been
specific about the type of improve- ment which could follow a settlement
of this kind but LI Cho-chih, by vay of explanation, suggested that if
the H.K.G. were to release the nevsvorkers in exchange for Anthony Grey,
then some of the present British detainees in China would be released,
that there would be increased trade between China and Britain, that
invitations would be issued to British and Hong Kong-based firms to
attend the Canton Fair. Having given me a glimpse of the bright future
to come, however, Jay at once said that of course it must be understood
that these further benefits and improvements cannot be considered as
part of the deal but were merely indications of the improved situation
to come once the H.K.G. had agreed to Peking's proposal. CHOU is also
alleged to have said that he did not accept the claim that it was
impossible to release the news- vorkers in Hong Kong before the expiry
of their prison sent ence: allegedly he said "if the British wish to do
it, then they can do it". Jay thought this a very important point, that
CHOU had nov given it as his opinion that if the H.K.G. so wished it
could overcome any difficulties, legal or otherwise, involved in
releasing the newsworkers. I replied firmly but tactfully that, whilst
in no circumstances would we vish to offend CHOU En Lai in such a
matter, nevertheless despite the fact that he, from his vantage point,
thought it was possible for us to overcome the difficulties involved, in
practice and from our point of view the situation remained precisely as
it was before and as I had so often stated, i.e. that the release of the
newsvorkers in Hong Kong was quite out of the question.
4.
Jay said that CHOU in his message had impressed on Jay the need for an
early solution to this problem: similarly, in Jay's discussions with LI
and LEUNG, both had made the same point: that time was "getting short"
and that it was in both parties' interests to reach an early solution.
Tóp
/Contd...
TOP SECRET SECRET
+
4
I
I
I
リ
+
+
7
+
C
5.
SEC
2
SECRET
Jay also stated his concern again that certain influential Unofficials
had been, and still are, misleading local communists: he felt that these
people were largely responsible for encouraging members of N.C.N.A.,
communist newspaper editors, etc. to believe that, provided sufficient
pressure is applied, the H.X.G. would be prepared to give way to the
Peking proposals. After some pressure from me, Jay said that in
particular he was referring to Mr. Dick LEE and to Mr. P.C. WOO. He was
particularly anxious that I should keep this information "very secret"
as he regarded himself as a friend of
In regard to these two gentlemen, and especially of Mr. LEE.
Mr. LEE, Jay said that he had been quite militant in his views in recent
weeks and during the New Year holidays had even suggested that it would
be sensible of the Chinese to retain the 15 yachtsmen arrested en route
to Macao as hostages in bringing further pressure
Mention of on the H.K.G. For the release of prisoners locally.
Mr. Dick LEE brought him to discuss the present position of FEI Yi-ming:
Jay said that FEI had been effectively muzzled by Peking and he felt
that it was now highly unlikely that the Ta Kung Pao would cause the
H.K.G. or people of Hong Kong any further serious embarrassment.
6.
In discussing the position of Mr. P.C. WOO, it was Jay's opinion that
WOO had no sinister ulterior motive behind his attempts to become
acceptable to the communists, but nevertheless felt that it would be
unvise for the H.K.G. to entrust WOO with information of a secret or
confidenial nature and which in particular they did not wish the
communists to know about,
7.
Referring to his conversation with LEUNG Wai-lam, Jay said that CHOU En
Lai had impressed on LEUNG that he was taking a very personal interest
in the Hong Kong situation and would be
LEUNG said taking steps to ensure that the matter was resolved. that, by
way of explanation, CHOU claimed that he had taken some five days to
convince Chairman MAO of the correctness of his action in, and attitude
towards, Hong Kong (later, when Jay allegedly recounted this comment to
LI Cho-chih, LI said that he very much doubted whether Hong Kong would
have been discussed for five days by the Prime Minister and the
Chairman, but undoubtedly CHOU would have cleared his policy towards
Hong Kong with Chairman MAO). Jay explained that his lengthy discussion
with LEUNG had been made the more difficult as he was unavare precisely
how much LEUNG knev of the present negotiations "ve therefore talked to
each other in riddles", said Jay. It was apparent, however, that LEUNG
knew something of the negotiations for he said in typical communist
Fashion that it would be, as far as the British were concerned, a test
of sincerity.
II.
8.
You will recall that this interview was discussed at
As a result of the G.H. G. H. at noon on Friday, 21st February.
discussion, when I saw Jay later that day I made the following points:-
ve
(1) We fully appreciated the desire of the Prime Minister (CHOU) to have
improved relations with Hong Kong and Britain: in turn also wished for
improved relations with China.
/contd..
SECRET SECRET
!
+
I
ļ
·
-
C
L
SECRET
SECRET
L
·
:
(2) In spite of what had been said, it was important that Peking and
Prime Minister CHOU should' understand that there can be no question of
releasing the 11 newsworkers in Hong Kong before expiry of sentence.
(3)
It seemed to the H.K.G. that, in spite of Peking's under- taking not to
make propaganda out of this matter, etc. nevertheless they had not moved
in their demand that the newsworkers be released in Hong Kong.
(4) In the circumstances I was to reiterate the offers already
made: briefly they are:-
(a) release to China; and
(b) deportation from Hong Kong to China or Macao or any
other way which the Chinese care to propose.
I further said that I was authorised to say that in either case and at
the expiry of full sentence, consideration would be given on an
individual basis to the possibility of ex- prisoners being permitted to
return to Hong Kong.
(Note:
In reiterating the offers at sub-para. (4) above, I repeated at length
the detailed conditions.)
9.
In discussing this, Jay enquired whether, in regard to (4)(a) above, it