must depend but who can have little hope of leaving the
Colony in an emergency, I know that you have not accepted our assessment
of the risks of the premature
/release
release of the newsworkers, But with the
wellbeing of some 34 million people at stake wo
can afford to take no risks in this direction.
You say that you cannot accept that there
is any parallel between the deal made over the
Krogers and the proposed deal with the Chinese
to release the Hong Kong prisoners outside the
Colony. I would agree that the parallel is not
exact; and I would also accept the precise
In
accept
point of difference which you underline. each case, however, we were
prepared to /the
presature release from prison of the persons in
whom the other side was interested. It was my
judgment that the national interest required
that in the case of the Chinese prisoners we
must stipulate that they should net on release
remain in British territory - a stipulation
which was not necessary in the case of the
Krogers. But within this prescribed limit we
have, in my view, shown a good asal of flexá-
bility. Since August 1967, when Mr. George
Brown indicated to the Chinese his readiness to
try to arrange the release to China of the
newsworkers in return for an undertaking that
Grey and other British subjects would be free
to return to the United Kingdom, we have put
variants on this formula to the Chinese on a
number of occasions. Le tried to ease the path
for the Chinese by refraining from insisting
that the newsworkers should go back to China and
by offering them instead the possibility of
release to those and the return to Hong Kong
at a later stage. (You are the only person on
our side outside government who has been taken
into confidence about the details of these
matters). All this the Chinese, in their
intransigence, have refused,
You refer to the question of Grey's
health. He has certainly conducted himself
with great robustness and fortitude, and much
good sense. I readily admit that he has in a
way been penalised for those qualities. He
has been called upon to put up with a great
deal on our behalf; and I assure you that this
is well recognised both here and in Hong Kong.
As you must know, had there been evidence of
a collapse of his physical and mental health,
we should have been faced with very serious
decisions indeed. There might indeed have
been an argument on humanitarian considerations
of the most pressing kind for sacrificing what
I regard as the national interest,
We are,
however, talking here hypothetically; it is
fortunately the one that Grey remains in
reasonably good health and spirits.
In reply finally to the question which
you pose in very human terme at the end of
your letter, I can only sum up. I feel very
deeply for Gray, and I deplore the ordeal to
which he has bean subjected through cireun-
stances entirely beyond his own control. In
efforts to put an end to that ordeal I have
gone as far as sy judgment of my wider
responsibilities would permit ne. But the
terms which the Chinese have been trying to
exact have seemed to me quite unacceptable when
measured against the special circumstances of
Hong Kong and the national interest; and our
efforts to achieve any modification of these
terms have been frustrated by Chinese intransi-
gence. By early October the Chinese terms will
have been met by the release on their due dates,
with remission, of the newsworkers. I am a
confident as it is ever prudent to be when
dealing with the Chinese, that the Chinese will
live up to the assurance given us in May by
thair Chargé d'Affaires here and thereafter
release Gray from detention.
(191201) DA. 391599- 1,500 169 H".
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
Registry EC DRAFT
10.
CURITY CLASSIFICATION
Top Secret. Secret.
Confidential.
Restricted Unclassified
PRIVACY MARKING
In Confidence
To:
LETTER
Gerald Long, Esq., General Manager, Reuters,
85 Fleet Street,
Lonam. E.C.4.
Type 1+ 4 (+) photoshal)
From
later)
Secretary of State
Telephone No. & Ext
Department
about Austury Sung
Thank you for your letter of 25 Julyf
extremely well argued, and indeed moving.
+
I found it
Nevertheless,
it does not cause me to alter my views on the case of
Anthony Grey:
I cannot accept that my announcement regarding
Gerald Brooke has invalidated the approach we have so
far adopted in the Grey affair, he overriding
difference between the two cases, and the one most
closely engaging my responsibilities to which you refer,
is the difference of context. As I said in the House,
there is nothing in the manner of Mr. Brooke's release
that is incompatible with the long term interests of
this country.
continue to hold the view, however,
that the premature release of the newsworkers in
Hong Kong would have damaging consequences for our
position in the Colony. If I may speak frankly, our
position there rests on the confidence of the local
people in our intention and ability to retain our
control of the Colony in the face of Chinese pressures.
Anything that led them to believe that we were no
longer able to maintain our authority could quickly be
In particular it could very quickly affect
disastrous,
the morale of the police and civil service. on whose loyalty we must
depend. but who can have little hope
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
which come weste
WILL SI-2405
of leaving the Colony in an emergency,
H
know that you have not accepted our assessment
of the risks of the premature release of the
newsworkers. But with the wellbeing of some
3 million people at stake we can afford to
take no risks in this direction.
You say that you cannot accept that there
is any parallel between the deal made over the
Krogers and the proposed deal with the Chinese
to release the Hong Kong prisoners outside
Duvet
the Colony. I would seeeet that the parallel
is not exact; and I would also accept the
precise point of difference which you underline
In each case, however, we were prepared for
the premature release from prison of the
persons in whom the other side was interested.
It was my judgement that the national interest
required that in the case of the Chinese
prisoners we must stipulate that they should
not on release remain in British territory
I
stipulation irrelevant in the case of the
Krogers. But within this prescribed limit we
have, in my view, shown a good deal of
flexibility. Since August, 1967, when
Mr. George Brown indicated to the Chinese his
readiness to try to arrange the release to
China of the newsworkers in return for an
undertaking that Grey and other British subjects
would be free to return to the United Kingdon,
we have put variants on this formula to the
Chinese on a number of occasions. We tried
to ease the path for the Chinese by refraining
from insisting that the newsworkers should go
back to China and by offering them instead the
possibility of release to Macao and the return
-
2
1
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
WOL 51-2005
to Hong Kong at a later stage. (You are the
only person on our side outside the government
who has been taken into confidence about the
details of these matters).
All this the
Chinese, in their intransigence, have refused.
You refer to the question of Grey's health.
He has certainly conducted himself with great
robustness and fortitude, and much good sense.
Losang
I readily admit that he has in a safe been
penalised for those qualities,
He has been
called upon to put up with a great deal on
our behalf, and I assure you that this is well
recognised both here and in Hong Kong. As
his
you must know, had there been evidence of a
collapse of Grey's physical and mental health,
we should have been faced with very serious
decisions indeed, There might indeed have been
come argument on humanitarian considerations
of the most pressing kind for sacrificing what
I regard as the national interest.
however, talking here hypothetically;
fortunately the case that Grey remains in
reasonably good health and spirits.
We are
it is
In reply finally to the question which you
pose in very human terms at the end of your
letter, I can only sun up. I feel very deeply
for Grey, and I deplore the ordeal to which he
has been subjected through circumstances
entirely beyond his own control. In efforts
to put an end to that ordeal I have gone as
far as my judgement of my wider responsibilities
would permit me. But the terms which the
Chinese have been trying to exact have seemed
to me quite unacceptable when measured against
the special circumstances of Hong Kong and the
3
WILL ST-FIDE
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
national interest;
and our efforts to achieve
any modification of these terms have been
frustrated by Chinese intransigence.
By early
October the Chinese terms will have been met
by the release on their due dates, with
remission. of the newsworkers. I am as
confident as it is ever prudent to be when
dealing with the Chinese, that the Chinese will
live up to the assurance given us in Kay by
their Chargé d'Affaires here and thereafter
release Grey from detention.
+
4
Sir S. To lingon
SECRET
916
peko 7/8
FEC 130
Flag A
Flag D
7208 Flag I
THE ON Y NO BROOKE CASES:
MA. LONG'S COMPLATET
In a letter to the Secretary of State, Er. Gerald Long,
General Manager of Routers, takes the view that the
announcement in the House of Commons on 24 July concerning
the agreement made with the Russians for the release of
Mr. Gerald Brooke invalidates the arguments we have offered
in recent months for refusing to release in Hong Zong the
eleven imprisoned newsworkers linked by the Chinese with
Mr. Grey.
LEGORGENDATION
1 recommand the despatch of a reply in the terms of
the attached draft.
Hong Kong Department and East European
and Soviet Department agree.
BACKGROUZID AND ARGIDUNA
3. Kr. Long has in recent months argued that to secure
Kr. Grey's release we should immediately pay the Chinese
price and prematurely release the eleven newsworkers in Hong
Kong. His views are set out in letters which he wrote on
17 and 24 February to the secretary of State, who replied
on 26 February. He spoke similarly to the Secretary of
State on 1 April (paragraphs 2 and 8 of my submission of
3 April). However, following on two developments in May,
the reduction in Wong Chak's sentence which meant that all
the eleven newsworkers would be out of prison by early
ia
October and the assurance given me by the Chinese Chargé
d'Affaires that Grey would be released from detention
the newsworkers had been released, Kr. Long saomad to me to
have accepted that we were likely to let matters take their
rospted
course in Hong Kong until October. The decision about the
Broeke affair has elearly upset him.
To foresaw that the manner of handling Kr. Brooke's
release would have repercussions for the Orgy affair.
have tried to discourage comparison between the two cases
but already we have bean subjected to some questioning by the
press. On 24 July the Secretary of State was asked by
reporter: if the handling of the Brooke oase set a precedent
for the treatment of Er. Oray. He replied:-
"There are very important differences between Mr. Gray's
case sad this. We had suggested to the Chiness some
time age that one might be able to get the release of
Kr. Grey in return for the release of certain Chinese
newsworkers in Hong Kong, they to go back to China in
the way the Krogers will presumably go back to Poland.
The Chinese made it quite clear that m arrangement of
this kind was not possible, That was in issue there
was that the Chinese newsworkers should be released and
should be free to continue to reside in Hong Kong to
sarry on their socupation. You will realise that is
rather different from what is preposed in relation to
the Krogers."
(It is to this reply that Mr. Long is presumably referring in his fifth
paragraph.)
N. CRET
SZCKET
Flag F
Fing #
Flag I
5.
Generally, Howe Department have been able to deal
with press enquiries by the use of the three points put
forward in paragraph 3 of xy submission of 23 July.
However, Er. Long's letter, which is powerfully argued,
cannot be answered simply in these terms.
As a preliminary, there is a policy point to be
decided: should we in the reply hold out any hope that the
nemoworkers my yet be released before their due dates?
In our telegram To. 444 of à July to Hong Kong the Governor
was informed that if he were to decide that the time had
come when the premature release of the newsworkers by *
matter of weeks would be regarded by the Chinese as
gesture of socommodation rather than an sot of weaknesE, WO
should not want him to exelude this. However, it is clear
from kis telegram No. 588 of 2% July, that the Governor has
no such step in mind. I intend to submit separately about
the Goremer's viewe; but in the meantime our reply to
Kr. Lang ment, I think, be based on the assumption that there
will be no fresh seves on our side. In answer to a direct
query on the telephone by Kr. Long on 25 July, I sonfirmed
that nothing new was in the offing in Hong Kong.
7.
: 3
(a)
Mr. Long's indictment is fourfold.
an early release of th He
NOT STEUBENÍ.
rismara would greatly reduno
SONÈSDOSS AL a deterrent analiss.
least equal validiir to the
orie.
|_ emnation of prices
his view, with at
· Fresera.
In an attempt to cope with this I have thought it best
SECRET
(b)
SSCRET
to refer with some frankness to the special
eiro-metanees of ilong Kong and the real implications
for the Colony should we concede defeat in this matter
by the Chinese,
wrmat
gạt that if th hinese were mossssful A
Kr.
Úr, Özer as a hostare they nicht well b
the same
with other British mblests in
future also applies with ennal validity to the release
It would seen best to leave this
of the KrorKere.
usanswered.
(0) Fhere is no per:
between
made over the
the
deal with the Chiasse te. x
Kome prisoners onteide
Coler. Ir, Lengla
Kr.
point
-
a subtle one - is that in agreeing to relance
the Krogers to 70land we were giving the Tussions what
they wanted, while in offering to release the newsworkers
to China we knew we were proposing something to which the
Chinese were strongly opposed.
There is some validity
in this. But in each case we did offer what was in
effect an exchange; and in an effort to make an exchange
more palatable to the Chinese we showed considerable
flexibility. I have thought it worth reminding Mr. Long
how far we were prepared to go in offering the Chinese
a reasonable solution. This involves setting down the
essence of the arrangements offered to the Chinese through
osvert skaanels earlier this year. I have however
avoided any mention of the channel as such (although
SEON
L
BECKET
(a)
8.
Mr. Long has in the past been informed orally of
its existence).
In comparison with Er. Brooke, Er. Grey has been
penalised for his fortitude and good senne. I think
we must concade this point, arguing in reply that had
Mr. Grey's health broken down we should have been faced
with an agonising decision; but this fortmately did
not occur and the national interest has been served
accordingly.
There is a further defence which might have been offered
to Mr. Long for our different handling of the Brooke and Grey
cases, but which on balanes I have excluded. It is this.
The deal over Ir. Brooke and Mr. Grey oovered, as far as I am
aware, all the British subjects in detention in Russia and all
the inmates of our prisons in whom the Russians had expressed
Apart from Kr. Grey and the newsworkers, there
interest.
are in detention in China a dozen other British subjects,
and in prison in Hong Kong some 230 other communists whose
premature release the Chinese have been trying to secure.
If we had made a deal over Er. Grey and the newsworkers,
have
would come under pressure from the relatives of the other
British subjects and possibly also from the Chinese to go on
making similar deals.
9. There were indications at the end of last week that
Kr. Long might be on the point of mounting a press campaign
criticising our handling of the Grey affair. This has not so
far been the oase. I had a telephone conversation with him
SECRET
- 5 -
SECRIT
on the evening of 25 July in the course of which I expressed
my anxiety last public controversy and what would be said
about Chinese attitudes sight somehow upset the tacit deal
we now have with the Chinese about Kr. Grey. This may have had
some effect.
10.
Depending in some measure on Mr. Long's reaction to
the reply, I would propose in due course to see the office-
bearers of the Reuters shapel of the National Union of
Journalists, who have kept in touch with us, med explain our
preocompations.
Copies to: Private Secretary
Xr. Goddem
Mr. Baker
Sir L. Kommen
Kr. Carter
Mr. Giffart
Xr. Haydon
MECKLE
(James Kurzny)
31 July, 1969.
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
TALL ART PRO5'1 6621AC "POT CHIZITIE
Registry No.
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
Top Secret.
Secret.
Confidential,
Restricted.
Unclassified.
PRIVACY MARKING
.....In Confidence
DRAFT Submission
To:-
Sir S. Tomlinson
Type 1+ 4 +7(1
From
James Murray
Telephone No. & Ext.
Department
Con to:
Ruark Spanking Mr. Godden Mr. Baker
Sir L. Monson Mr. Carter Fly Mr. Giffard
Mr. Haydon
Flug B, C
Flog D
Five E
THE GREY AND BROOKE CASES:
MR. LONG'S COMPLAINT
In a letter to the Secretary of State Mr. Gerald
Long, General Manager of Reuters, takes the view that
the announcement in the House of Commons on 24 July
as væchun!
concerning the arrangement made with the Russians for
the release of Mr. Gerald Brooke invalidates the argu-
ments we have offered in recent months for refusing to
release in Hong Kong the eleven imprisoned newsworkers
linked by the Chinese with Mr. Grey.
RECOMMENDATION
2. I recommend that the despatch of a reply in the
terms of the attached draft. Hong Kong Department and
East European and Soviet Department agree,
BACKGROUND AND ARGUMENT
3. Mr. Long has in recent months argued that to secure
Mr. Grey's release we should immediately pay the Chinese
price and prematurely release the eleven newsworkers in
Hong Kong. His views are set out in letters which he
mande 2,44
wrote on 17 February to the Secretary of State, who
replied on 28 February.
Secretary of State on 1
April
He spoke similarly to the
Spam 2 and 8 of my
office) However, following on
two developments in May, the reduction in Wong Chak's
sentence which meant that all the eleven newsworkers