nonsense of the careful explanation given to the Hong Kong
public that its reduction by the Review Board in May from
5 years to 3 years resulted from normal review processes
and was in no way connected with the Grey case. I foresaw
that if ten only were released, and this was not judged
sufficient by the Chinese, we should face a trying time until
the release of Wong Chak on 3 October.
Flag E (5.
Flag
In my submission of 18 June (paragraph 8 (a)) I argued
that while our deal with the Russians over Mr. Brooke was
unlikely to affect the Chinese handling of the Grey case, it
might well lead to further pressure by them in the matter of
the whole problem of convicted "confrontation" prisoners in
Hong Kong and possibly even to attempts to strike bargaina
over other British subjects now in detention in China.
6. This last argument was also put forward with rather more
force by Mr. Denson in his letter of 15 July. In this he
expressed the view that as a result of the Brooke case the
Chinese might be encouraged, after Mr. Grey's release, to
take an entirely unyielding line on the other British subjects
in detention in China in the hope of extracting further
concessions in Hong Kong which it would presumably become
increasingly difficult to make; if however there were to be
- 3 -
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
Flag F
a gesture over the newsworkers which seemed, in Mr. Denson's
view, likely to cost very little in present circumstances in
Hong Kong, this could accelerate the trend towards further
"normalisation" and might result in at any rate some of the
other detained prisoners being released more quickly.
He
[1] 7.
In his latest letter of 7 August to the Secretary of
State, Mr. Long says that he had hoped that the chances of
the Chinese honouring their assurance over Mr. Grey might
have been increased by the release of the Hong Kong prisoners
some very short time before the end of their sentences.
added that at the moment the British Government had in its
hand a gesture which most people believed would free Mr. Grey,
but what would it have if Mr. Grey's release did not follow
that of the Hong Kong prisoners.
8. In brief, the arguments in favour of the premature
release of all eleven newsworkers within the next fortnight
are these.
(a)
(b)
(c)
It would be a re-insurance that the Chinese will abide
by their undertaking to release Mr. Grey.
It could shorten Mr. Grey's ordeal.
It would be a gesture which might help, even if only
slightly, towards an accommodation with the Chinese
over Hong Kong.
(a) It might pre-dispose the Chinese to be less intransigent
in the matter of other British subjects detained in China.
4
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
9. I still see a certain amount of force in these
arguments, and I would welcome the premature release of
the newsworkers if the Governor, having taken full account
of local circumstances, were to decide it on his own
initiative.
I now attach less weight than I did in May
to the snags presented by Wong Chak. I think that with
the passage of time the public would no longer be inclined
to differentiate him from the other ten, and that the Governor
could make a collective gesture in respect of all eleven
without calling in question the use of the review procedure
last May.
10. However, the crux of the matter is that in our telegram
Fleg B 6) No. 444 we have left it to the Governor to decide whether
premature release is compatible with the security of Hong Kong
in the short and in the long term. I am sure that the
Governor and his advisers would not be convinced by the
arguments in paragraph 8. They would maintain, as they have
done from the outset, that a policy of firmness is called for.
(69) In his telegram No. 588, the Governor argues that "concessionary
Flag D
actions" encourage a belief in our susceptibility to pressure
rather than stimulate any genuine reciprocity by the Chinese
and he would certainly regard the premature release of the
newsworkers as a "concessionary action".
I do not propose
to analyse his arguments in detail here, since I am doing so
in another submission of wider context. But I am sure that if
we were to ask him specifically to consider premature release
- 5 -
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
He
he would simply repeat the arguments in his telegram.
might well add that so far from increasing the prospects of
Mr. Grey's release the gesture might only encourage the
Chinese to believe that they had us on the run, and to stick
out for further concessions, notably the remission of sentences
of other convicted prisoners in Hong Kong, before they would
release Mr. Grey. There is also the argument
-
-
to which
that since we have stood
Mr. Carter, with whom I discussed the matter before he went
on holiday, attached importance
out so long on the principle that the due processes of law
should be observed, it would be undesirable to breach that
principle for a gain of a matter of weeks.
11. Moreover I think that if we were to re-open the question
with the Governor he might see in this the dangerous lack of
resolution on our part which he fears and which his telegram
588
Flag Do No. was clearly intended to forestall, This would be a
bad preparation for the difficult period which may well lie
shead both for him and for us if the Chinese, on the assumption
that they release Mr. Grey in October, thereafter demand the
premature release of other convicted prisoners in Hong Kong
as a price for other British subjects detained in China.
12. Nevertheless if I were firmly convinced that a gesture
to the Chinese in the next three weeks was right I would
recommend that its advantages be put squarely before the
Governor and that he be reminded that anything which might
pre-dispose the Chinese to be less intransigent over other
- 6-
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
British subjects is likely to be as much in his interest as
in ours. But I acknowledge that there are cons as well as
pros. I therefore conclude that, particularly in view of
paragraph 11 above, things are best left as they are.
Jan Telmay.
(James Murray)
18 August, 1969.
Copies to: Mr. Godden
Sir S. Tomlinson
Mr. Baker
Mr. Gaminara
(868)
I agree with Mr. Murray that we should not jog the
Governor's elbow further at the moment. F.C.0. telegram No. 444
of 4 July puts the onus squarely on him to recommend any
premature releases if he thinks this can safely be done (from his
point of view).
2. You will note that the penultimate prisoner is due out on
12 September and thereafter there is a gap of three weeks before
Wong Chak is released. In the light of any Chinese reaction
to the release of the first ten prisoners we should then review
the situation.
3. It is, I suppose, possible that the Chinese will take the
- 7 -
/opportunity
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
opportunity of the celebrations of the 20th Anniversary of the
founding of the C.P.R. on 1 October to disembarrass themselves of
Mr. Grey. I think that we should put this thought in the
Governor's mind in case he wishes to reciprocate and needs to
take any preparatory action to enable himself to do so. I would
not suggest that anything need be said to him about this yet.
Sir S. Tompkinson.
K.M. hifford
(K.M. Wilford)
19 August, 1969.
Copies to: Mr. Godden
8ie 9. Tomlinson Mr. Baker
Mr. Gaminara
M: Muray
I agree gine ally
with both the above
minutes. I had
вол
wondered myself whether the Chinese night let a few people
out on
Oct. 1.
to ther communist
action
rments have taken a Government, land
this character but I cannot
ne call
any
Chinese precedents.
is fes combinson
MW?% zoluži
M' Murray
CONFIDENTIAL Wils
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The Buye
17322/5
E Delt
REUTERS
This is as satisfactory as are combat
have heffast for, and no reply is required.
выбрать
I have inchustuse a
last
in
pare.
Personal and Confidential
The Rt Hon Michael Stewart CH MP Secretary of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs
Foreign and Commonwealth Office London SW1
refers to 175 Rong's subanoscien dated fooday.
Mis Aug.
August 7 1969
Enter
渡川 M=BAD J/31/1 M2 Mute 12A.
18818
Dear Mr Stewart
pako22/8
FEC
I am grateful to you for your letter of August 4 and for your frank and
detailed reply to the points I have raised. Although your letter makes
no concession to the point of view I have urged, it has for me the
virtue of making the situation completely clear: you cannot do that
which is necessary to secure Grey's early release since you hold it to
be against the national interest. You tell me that the comparison I had
sought to make with the Brooke case is invalid since the release of the
Krogers, on the contrary, was not against the national interest.
These are matters on which my views can only be those of a moderately
informed private citizen and they have no place here. I see that I can-
not move you and it is pointless to go on trying.
I write again, therefore, to thank you particularly for one passage in
your letter and to make one final point after which I shall be silent.
I am particularly grateful for your recognition of Grey's fortitude and
of his having had to put up with a great deal on behalf of this country
and of Hong Kong. I am glad that this is recognised here and in the
colony.
For my final point I return to the fear I put forward in my letter to
you of April 29 that the Chinese might wish for some gesture going
beyond the release of the Hong Kong prisoners on the due dates. You say
that you are as sure as you can be in dealing with the Chinese that they
will honour the assurance that Grey will be released when the Hong Kong
prisoners are free again. I had hoped that the chances of their doing
this might have been increased by the release of the Hong Kong prisoners
some very short time before the end of their sentences. At the moment
926
(41)
Gerald Long General Manager Reuters Limited 85 Fleet Street London EC4
Telephone Fleet Street 6060
139
2
the British Government has in its hand a gesture which most people
believe Would free Grey. What will it have if Grey's release does not
follow that of the Hong Kong prisoners? This is a hypothetical question
and one which I hope, as I know you do, will never have any reality. But
it is a grim question and an insistent one. I leave it with you.
Yours sincerely
Berold Lay
Flog A
Er. Golden
938
F.E. Regul
pa czo
EL 10:1
MR. ANTHONY GREY
letter from Tations) Union
Hr. Bradley, the General Secretary of the National
Union of Journalists, has written to the Foreign med
Commonwealth Secretary asking if the Council of the Union
sould be told, if necessary in confidence, of our appraisal
of likely future developments in the Grey osas.
2. Mr. Bradley has been in touch with Far Eastern
Department in the past; and I think the best way to deal
with his request would be for us to see him again. I
however, told by his secretary that he is abroad at an
international conference and will thereafter be on leave
until 25 August.
I attach a draft reply from Lord Shephard.
3. I
(Janes Murray)
11 August, 1969.
(IET) DU 391959 1,90 299 Hw.
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
+
Registry No.
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
DRAFT
Letter
Type 1 +
To:-
Top Secrel
Secres.
Confidential
Restricted. Unclassified.
PRIVACY MARKING
H. J. Bradley, Esq.,
General-Secretary,
NATIONAL UNION OF JOURNALETS,
Acorn House,
In Confidence 314-320 Gray's Inn Road,
LONDON, W.0.1.
From Lord Shepherd
Telephone No. & Ext,
Department
11
Mr. Anthony Grey
In the absence on holiday of the Foreign and
Commonwealth Secretary, I am replying to your letter
IJO/G of 4 August, about Mr. Anthony Grey.
I know that you have in the past been in touch
with the Far Eastern Department here; and I think it
would be best if you were now to see them again and
to discuss with them fully where matters now stand.
They tell me that they have learnt from your
Secretary that you are to be on leave until 25 August
I have asked them to be in touch with you as soon as
you return.
+
From The Minister of State
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London S.W.1
8 August, 1969,
fear it.
1937,
равно pako 22/5
REC Wel
I understand that Michael Stewart discussed the
case of Mr. Anthony Gray with you in the House of Commons
on 25 July and that he said he would let you have details
of the action which we have been taking on his behalf.
In Michael's absence I am passing these on to you.
As you will know from various replies given in the
House, we have made repeated representations to the Chinese
both here and in Peking, asking for his immediate release.
Despite Mr. Grey's innoncence of any offence, the Chinese
have attempted to justify their behaviour by linking his
detention to the imprisonment of certain communist news-
workers in Hong Kong. That these men are in prison is,
of course, entirely due to the part which they played in
the violent disturbances in Hong Kong in 1967. As all
were sentenced in open court on serious charges, I am
sure you will appreciate the serious dangers of undermining
confidence/
William Molloy Esq., M.P.
House of Commons.
4
+
ו
י
confidence in the ability of the Hong Kong Government to withstand
communist pressure if we had acceded to Chinese demands for their
premature release in Hong Kong. But within the limit thus prescribed, we
have, in our efforts to achieve Mr. Grey's release, shown a good deal of
flexibil- ity. Since August 1967, when George Brown indicated to the
Chinese his readiness to try to arrange the release
to China of the newsworkers in return for an undertaking that Mr. Grey
and other British subjects would be free to return to the U.K., we have
put variants of this formula
to the Chinese on a number of occasions. The Chinese in
their intransigence have rejected all these overtures.
Comparisons have, I know, been made between Mr. Gray's case and that of
Mr. Gerald Brooke. However, there are
differences which cannot be overlooked. In particular the
Chinese, as will be evident from what I have said above, demonstrated
firmly that they had no interest in a balanced exchange involving the
return of Mr. Grey to the United Kingdom and the return of the
newsworkers to China.
The position at present is that the Chinese have indicated to us that
Mr. Gray will be released from
detention/
!
!
+
:
detention when all the newsworkers in prison in Hong
Kong are released. Under normal circumstances all the
newsworkers will have been released, with full remission,
by early October; and we must hope that Mr. Grey's long
ordeal will then come to an end.
You will know that when members of our Mission
in Peking visited Mr. Grey on 14 July they found him very
composed and in reasonable health and spirits. All of
us have been greatly impressed by the resilience and
strength of character which he has shown in bearing the
strains of his detention.
Sueue l
L
(SHEPHERD)
Registry No.
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
Top Secret.
Secret.
Confidential,
Restricted. Unclassified,
PRIVACY MARKING
DRAFT
Letter
Type 1 +
From
To:-
William Molloy, Esq., M.P.,
House of Commona,
LONDON, S.W.1.
In Confidence
I understand that
Lord Shepherd
Telephone No. & Ext.
Department
I am Dacry
·you
War on
the Focsign and Demmonwealth Secretary When discussed the case of Mr.
Anthony Grey with
and the he
you in the House of Commons on 25 Julye said t the
would write to you with details of the action which we Miters' atomu
have been taking on his behalf.
NI
I share your concern about the žeplorable way in
which Mr. Grey has been treated. As you will know
from various replies given in the House, we have made
repeated representations to the Chinese both here and
in Peking, asking for his immediate release. It is
deeply disappointing that these have been ineffective.
Despite Mr. Grey's innocence of any offence, the
Chinese have attempted to justify their behaviour by
linking his detention to the imprisonment of certain
communist newsworkers in Hong Kong. That these men
are in prison is, of course, entirely due to the part
which they played in the violent disturbances in Hong
Kong in 1967. As all were sentenced in open court on
serious charges, I am sure you will appreciate the
serious dangers of undermining confidence in the abilit
of the Hong Kong Government to withstand communist
pressure if we had acceded to Chinese demands for their
thug
premature release in Hong Kong. But within the limit/ prescribed, we
have, in our efforts to achieve
Mr. Grey's release, shown a good deal of flexibility. Since August 1967,
when George Brown indicated to the
(118281) Dd. 391999 1,500M 2/09 Hw.
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
WEL ST-3406
Chinese his readiness to try to arrange the
release to China of the newsworkers in return
for an undertaking that Mr. Grey and other
British subjects would be free to return to the
U.K., we have put variants of this formula to
the Chinese on a number of occasions. The
Chinese in their intransigence have rejected
all these overtures.
Comparisons have,
know, been made
between Mr. Grey's case and that of Mr. Gerald
Brooke. However, there are differences which
cannot be overlooked. In particular the
Chinese, as will be evident from what I have
said above, demonstrated firmly that they had
no interest in a balanced exchange involving
the return of Mr. Grey to the United Kingdom
and the return of the newsworkers to China.
The position at present is that the
Chinese have indicated to us that Mr. Grey
will be released from detention when all the
newsworkers in prison in Hong Kong are released.
Under norial circumstances all the newsworkers
will have been released, with full remission,
by early October; and we must hope that
Mr. Grey's long ordeal will then come to an end.
You will know that when members of our
Mission in Peking visited Mr. Grey on 14 July
they found him very composed and in reasonable
ал Audio
health and spirits. have been greatly
impressed by the resilience and strength of
character which he has shown in bearing the
atraing of his detention.
Mr. Godden
Mr. Anthony Grey
RECEIVED IN R C. TRY N
14 AUG 1969
EC 134/1
Mrs. Hartles has informed us that, when the
Secretary of State met Kr. William Molloy in the
Commons on 25 July, he promised him a letter about
the action which has been taken to secure Mr. Grey's
release.
2. I attach a draft letter from Lord Shepherd to
Mr. Molloy.
3.
The reference to the case of Mr. Gerald Brooke
has been cleared with EESD.
پول
for (James Murray)
5 August, 1969.
Свон
Плете The Buga Grei
1936
I
|
RESTRICTED
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In BonD FED
Reference.....
Gunt pa
I attouch below some observativis which have been made in two Tony frey
mouse messages. The lijhr truly shed in some körs short o dazzling.
Mavertin
PUSD
(1933)
ל
14 AUG 1969
Fc iscli
2.
If you read the lines of the original morse version from the bottom
upwards, the following is obtained:
"ANTHONY GREY TACISM AMITABHA BUDDHA UNDER CODE HIMALANÁ
AND MAIALANA ANNIVERSARY GGATAMA RELEASED KABUL FOR FURTHER NEWS
TUCKSWOOD #PARK 17 AND HALF P.M. (T?) MARGUERITE MORRIS HINI YPK 537 OUR
2ORWICH REP END"
3. This makes much more sense than Schibit E but apart from the
appointment place, tine, car registration and reference to Norwich rep
(presumably representative) the meaning is still obscure.
4. •Further points are:
(a) Amateur users of morse often confuse L (.-.1) and F (....-.) 80
I have replaced LOR LURTHER with FOR FURTUER,
(b) L (..........) and Y (-.--) aight also be confused since they are
"opposites". HINALANA and MARALANA are obviously BİRAYANA and MAHAYAKA;
which are the two great divisions of Buddhism.
RESTRICTED
!