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(Part) 877-985 Датному. Grey
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Cabinet Documents
Folio
No.
Reference
(cc (69) 33rd Mhg
889
Extract from ☺C (69) 33id
CC
Date
16.7.69
The above-listed cabinet document(s), which was/were enclosed on this
file, has/have been removed and destroyed.
For complete series of Cabinet documents see CAB (CABINET OFFICE)
CLASSES
Signed
Hinges
Date 28.1.99
J
1
L
:
|
CLOSED
Reference...
PART "K."
SEE
NOW
[
[
[
!
An Mumay
Mr. W
Reference......
the form about doon campsen's travel aurang en onts whow as forous. For
:-
985
(c) KANA PHONAH PENH he must make an applicabar for m uša atresora mouth
in advance of the proposed stay. He should apply to the Cambodian
Eusbasse (rel. 722-8807) - 26 Townshend Rd. w.w.8.- and prescur 2
passport photographs, a vacination certificate for Cholera & Smaupox,
his passport, anot, preferably, an airhug ticket. He wili hame to
completic 2 application forms, and word absolutely have to play down muy
connection with the press! sunce. evidently, reporters cannot go to
Cambodia. This might vary well mean that his particulavappucanui would
be subject to considerable delays.
KARACIM/DACCA: he merely needs vaconiatui
@
centifrates.
(r) Moscow: there are several ways he comed
appench this one
(i) he could apply for a tomisie vša 4 therofae make the muat
awangqquents with Intonvitt, at the game Ruie perhaps maizing an attqupt
I to hold open the optar of an extenhai to thi
stay.
I he comer apply for a journalisti uza, I wish would entitle hum to Ĉ) a
more protractedt stay, if that weve recessary, and for press facilities
in Moscow.
() Mr. Campben wonid be wel achized go to the Soviet Embassy comentar
Section and tasse to a Mr. KUZNETSOV (Deputy Chief of the Confrear
section) - a
- a contact oiven me by FFS.D. - who, apparently, is likely to me
helppar (particularly given the facts of this case). Kuznetsov wond
advise uw. Campbell mthe appropriate actiui to take, and for make
arrangement with infomist on M. Campobelt behalf.
Firaun EESD strongly recommend that we waxa adriše Moscow abovu
Campbellt
mait y
it gelum ni awn way
Muu mieur.
RR
18 fik.
Play A
of the flights out of Shanghai the PIA flights seem to present the least
problém from the visa point of view. Phnom Penh, which is the
intermediate stop before Karachi on the Air France flight, clearly will
present visa difficulties for a journalist. One must expect too that
when it is known that Grey has been released the press will be examining
every passenger list out of China and would endeavour to board the plane
in Phnom Penh to have an interview with Grey. It would be essential
therefore for Mr. Campbell to meet Grey at this point if he came on this
flight. If we have any choice in the matter therefore we should try and
put Grey on one of the PIA flights,
2. On the other hand we must be prepared for the Chinese to deport Grey
by the Air France flight.
Mr. Campbell ought perhaps at least to make an attempt to get a visa for
Cambodia in case this happens.
luation
(C. Wilson)
18 September, 1969
¡
Confidential
James Murray Esq CMG
Head of Far Eastern Department Foreign & Commonwealth Office LONDON
REUTERS
16 September 1969
to discuss all item
We
will the Comfball
23 Saf.
Mr Wilson
2/ 3.30
at
I hear sch
p...
Reuters Limited 85 Fleet Street London EC4 Telephone Fleet Street 6060
Telex 24145
Dear Mr Murray
pa
22 23/7
Thank you for passing on the views of the Governor of Hong Kong and Mr
Denson about Mr Grey's route out of China.
Our sole concern is to do what is best in the interests
For of Mr Grey. It is difficult to know what is best. the last year we
have been thinking and planning in terms of Hong Kong, realising all the
while that the Chinese might decide to make exit facilities available
elsewhere.
If the Chinese do not decide the route and Mr Grey has a choice we want
him to feel free to exercise that choice.
In no circumstances can we accept that his departure should be held up
one hour longer than necessary for reasons other than his own well
being.
We attach importance to being able to meet him at his first point of
exit. This could be complicated if it happened to be Moscow or Phnom
Penh.
I am grateful to you for keeping us so well informed,
Yours sincerely,
Your Campbell
Doon Campbell
484
983
CYPHER/CAT A
PRIORITY HONG KONG TO
TELNO 764
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
призора do
зора
FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
27 SEPTEMBER 1969
ADDRESSED TO F.C.O. TELEGRAM NO. 764 OF
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO PEKING
982
YOUR TELNO. 654 GREY.
RE EIV D IN
RIS SEPTEMBER
29 SEP 1969
FEL 12/1
WE RECOGNISE THAT GREY MIGHT HAVE TO COME THROUGH HONG KONG IF
FOR EXAMPLE HE EXPRESSES A STRONG DESIRE TO DO SO BUT WE STILL HOPE
THAT THAT IT COULD BE AVOIDED.
2. THE ARGUMENTS IN PARA. 2 OF YOUR TELEGRAM ARE NOT CONCLUSIVE.
SOME ARE LESS PERSUASIVE NOW THAT IT SEEMS POSSIBLE THERE WILL BE
SOME DELAY BETWEEN GREY'S RELEASE IN PEKING AND HIS LEAVING CHINA
(PEKING TELEGRAM NO. 552 TO YOU).
3. WE HOPE LONG WILL TAKE ACCOUNT OF THIS GOVERNMENT'S PREFERENCE
FOR AVOIDING HONG KONG. POLITICAL ADVISER HAS SAID FRANKLY TO
ROUND OF REUTERS THAT IF GREY DOES CRITICISE THIS GOVERNMENT
OR H.M.G. IT WOULD BE BETTER OUTSIDE HONG KONG.
4. IF LONG IS UNMOVED WE WONDER WHETHER IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE
TO AVOID THE CLEAR CHOICE SET OUT IN PARA. 5 OF YOUR TELEGRAM
UNDER REFERENCE BY LEAVING GREATER DISCRETION TO DENSON TO ADVISE
GREY IN THE LIGHT OF GREY'S CONDITION AND OTHER FACTORS AT THE
TIME SUCH AS THE INTERVAL BETWEEN RELEASE FROM HIS HOUSE AND
DEPARTURE FROM CHINA.
POSITIVELY TO ADVISE GREY TO GO THROUGH
HONG KONG SEEMS TO BE TOO GREAT A CONCESSION TO REUTERS. IT WOULD
BE WRONG TO ENCOURAGE HOPES THAT ALL WOULD GO SMOOTHLY HERE THOUGH
IF THE OCCASION AROSE WE WOULD DO ALL WE COULD.
FCO PLEASE PASS ROUTINE PEKING.
SIR D. TRENCH
[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
F.E.D.
CONSULAR DEPT.
H.K. DEPT.
NEWS DEPT.
CONFIDENTIAL
FFFFF
982
CYPHER/CAT A
CONFIDENTIAL
IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 654
TOP COPY
гризла
TO HONG KONG 26 SEPTEMBER 1969
(FED)
FEC 120/1
CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO HONG KONG TELEGRAM NUMBER 654 OF 26 SEPTEMBER REPEATED FOR
INFORMATION TO PEKING,
1963
YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 720 OF 12 SEPTEMBER:
ANTHONY GREY.
WE HAVE DONE OUR BEST TO PERSUADE REUTERS THAT IT WOULD BE BEST THAT
GREY SHOULD BY-PASS HONG KONG. THEY ARE INSISTING, HOWEVER, THAT HE
SHOULD BE TOLD THAT WHILE IT IS FOR HIM TO DECIDE WHICH ROUTE TO TAKE
THEY ADVISE HIM TO COME OUT VIA HONG KONG AND HAVE MADE RECEPTION
ARRANGEMENTS THERE.
2. THE ARGUMENTS THEY DEPLOY ARE THESE.
(A) IN HONG KONG THEY CAN BE REASONABLY CONFIDENT THAT THEIR
ARRANGEMENTS TO MEET GREY AND ESCORT HIM TO LONDON WOULD WORK.
ALTERNATIVE ARRANGEMENTS, WHEREBY A REUTERS REPRESENTATIVE WOULD JOIN
GREY'S AIRCRAFT AT SOME INTERMEDIATE POINT COULD MORE EASILY
GO WRONG.
(B) IN HONG KONG THEY COULD MOST EFFECTIVELY LOOK AFTER GREY'S WELFARE,
E.G, BY ENSURING ADEQUATE MEDICAL AND REST FACILITIES DURING WHAT WOULD
BE A BRIEF SOJOURN THERE.
-
(C) THEY COULD WITH YOUR ASSISTANCE MORE EFFECTIVELY CONTROL HIS
CONTACTS WITH THE PRESS THERE THAN ELSEWHERE. THE FORMAL PRESS
CONFERENCE COULD BE KEPT QUITE SHORT.
/(D)
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
-2-
]
(D) AT A PRESS CONFERENCE ORGANISED BY THEM IN HONG KONG IT WOULD BE
EASIER TO HELP HIM AVOID PITFALLS THAN IF HIS FIRST CONTACTS WITH THE
PRESS AFTER LEAVING CHINA WERE IN MORE DISORGANIZED CIRCUMSTANCES IN
E.G. CAMBODIA OR PAKISTAN.
(E) HAVING READ ALL HIS RECENT CORRESPONDENCE WITH HIS MOTHER THEY ARE
CONVINCED THAT HE IS IN A VERY BALANCED AND INDEED GOOD-HUMGURED FRAME
OF MIND AND THAT HE WOULD BEHAVE ACCORDINGLY IN HONG KONG.
1
(F) ONCE HE HAD GIVEN A PRESS CONFERENCE IN HONG KONG HE WOULD BE LESS
HARASSED BY THE PRESS FOR THE REMAINDER OF HIS JOURNEY.
(G) A LONG FLIGHT SUCH AS WOULD BE THE CASE ON THE ALTERNATIVE ROUTES
WOULD BE A BAD PREPARATION FOR THE ORDEAL OF HIS FIRST CONTACT WITH THE
OUTSIDE WORLD.
3. WE MUST GIVE REUTERS THE BENEFIT OF THE DOUBT THAT THEIR PRIMARY
INTEREST IN ALL THIS IS, AS THEY INSIST GREY'S WELFARE, BUT NO DOUBT
THEY ARE IMPRESSED FROM A PROFESSIONAL POINT OF VIEW BY THE ADVANTAGES
WHICH HONG KONG WOULD GIVE THEM FOR CONTROLLING THE STORY'' AND
FORESTALLING COMPETITION.
4. WE HAVE REITERATED THE OBJECTIONS TO DEPARTURE VIA HONG KONG.
(A) GREY WOULD BE OF MUCH MORE DIRECT LOCAL INTEREST IN HONG KONG THAN
AT OTHER INTERMEDIATE POINTS, AND THE INTENSIVE AND CONTROVERSIAL PRESS
ATTENTION TO HIM WOULD BE BOUND TO IMPOSE A CONSIDERABLE STRAIN.
(B) THE COMMUNIST PRESS AND OTHERS MIGHT WELL TRY TO EXPLOIT HIS
PRESENCE IN THE COLONY FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES AND EVEN IF GREY
WERE DISCREET IN HIS REPLIES TO WHAT MIGHT WELL INCLUDE ''LOADED'' AND
UNHELPFUL QUESTIONS, THERE WOULD BE NO WAY OF CONTROLLING WHAT WOULD BE
WRITTEN. IT WOULD HARDLY BE IN THE INTERESTS OF GREY'S
WELL-BEING TO EXPOSE HIM TO THIS KIND OF ORDEAL.
CONFIDENTIAL
/(c)
CONFIDENTIAL
FCO TELEGRAM NO.654 TO HONG KONG
-3-
(C) THE CHINESE ARE PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE TO ANYTHING SAID IN HONG KONG
ABOUT THEIR POLICIES, AND MIGHT WELL REACT TO ANY REMARKS MADE BY GREY
IN A MANNER PREJUDICIAL TO THE INTERESTS OF OTHER BRITISH SUBJECTS STILL
DETAINED IN CHINA.
(WE HAVE THOUGHT IT BEST NOT TO REFER EXPLICITLY TO THE POSSIBILITY THAT
GREY MIGHT SAY THINGS CRITICAL OF H.M.G. OR THE HONG KONG AUTHORITIES,
SINCE THIS ARGUMENT IS UNLIKELY TO IMPRESS REUTERS). WE HAVE ALSO
SUGGESTED THAT MOST OF THE DISADVANTAGES OF THE OTHER ROUTES COULD BE
OVERCOME IF A MEMBER OF OUR MISSION IN PEKING WERE TO ACCOMPANY GREY TO
THE POINT AT WHICH HE IS MET BY A REPRESENTATIVE OF REUTERS,
5. WE INTEND TO MAKE A FINAL EFFORT WITH LONG, THE GENERAL MANAGER OF
REUTERS, WHEN HE RETURNS FROM LEAVE ON 29 SEPTEMBER. IF WE FAIL TO MOVE
HIM, WE SHALL BE FACED WITH A CHOICE OF TELLING REUTERS EITHER
(A) THAT WE AGREE TO ADVISE GREY TO COME THROUGH HONG KONG AND WILL DO
OUR BEST WITH THEM TO ENSURE THAT ALL GOES SMOOTHLY: OR
(B) THAT WE CONSIDER THAT, IN VIEW OF OUR OWN RESPONSIBILITIES FOR GREY
AND MORE GENERALLY, WE MUST, WHILE LEAVING THE FINAL CHOICE TO HIM,
ADVISE HIM TO RETURN VIA PAKISTAN.
6. WE HOPE THAT YOU WILL AGREE THAT WE MUST IF AT ALL POSSIBLE AVOID
COURSE (B). DESPITE DIFFICULT MOMENTS, WE HAVE MANAGED TO KEEP REUTERS
IN STEP WITH US THROUGHOUT THIS DIFFICULT CASE. IT WOULD BE UNFORTUNATE
IF WE WERE TO HAVE AN OPEN DISAGREEMENT WITH THEM AT THE FINAL STAGE.
INDEED, IT MIGHT STIMULATE THEM INTO THE VERY KIND OF CONTROVERSY ABOUT
THE WHOLE HANDLING OF THE AFFAIR WHICH WE HOPE TO AVOID. IF DESPITE OUR
ARGUMENTS LONG REMAINS ADAMANT, WE THINK WE SHOULD HAVE TO ACQUIESCE ON
THE LINES OF (A) ABOVE? WE SHOULD HOWEVER BE GRATEFUL FOR YOUR VIEWS
URGENTLY.
STEWART
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
F.E.D.
H.K.D.
CONS DEPT.
NEWS DEPT.
CONFIDENTTAT.
XX
Registry No. F
DEPARTMENT
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
PRIORITY MARKINGS
(Date)...........
JM
Top Sogret 26/9
Despatched
Flash-
• Date and time (G.M.T.) celegram should
reach addresson(s).
2619
а
I LIL
CYPHER
STIE
------
CONFIDENTIAL
In Confidence-
PRIVACY MARKING
[Secu
Security classification]
[
Privacy marking -if any
[Codeword-if any]
En Clair
Cypher
Draft Telegram to:-
Home
ONG KONG No. 654
HONG KONG
Addressed to
telegram No..
654 (date)
26 Sept
Anduto.
(Date) repeated for information to
And to:-
Repeat to:-
PEKING.
Saving to:-
Saving-to
·
PEKING
Your telegram No.72. [of 2 Septembe
Anthony Grey.
We have done our best to persuade Reuters that it would be best that
Grey should by-pass Hong Kong.
They are insisting, however, that he should be told
that while it is for him to decide which route to take
they advise him to come out via Hong Kong and have
Lade reception arrangements there.
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
Distribution:- Jefatuatel
6.D. 4.A.3.
2.
The arguments they deploy are these.
(a)
In Hong Kong they can be reasonably confident
(* want Frey and escut him to London that their resestion frangemen
is/would work. Alternative arrangements, whereby
a hentais voluntative would it any other intermédi
is the pick join Grey's miraffe at some that they might sico ovey
intimnestenta point conte mat sorily go wrong,
mien-örey
confet
In Hong Kong they e most effectively look after
Grey's welfare, e.g. by ensuring adequate medical
and rest facilities during what would be a brief
sojourn there.
(c) They could
with your assistance
-
tore
Consular Box"
(b)
Naam Duft
Copies to:-
/effectivley
Art
CONFIDENTIAL
effectively control his contacts with the
there than elsewhere. The formal press
conference could be kept quite short.
(d) At a press conference organised by them in
press
avoiel
Hong Kong it would be easier to help his ear
pitfalls
دالت
right thing than if his first contacts
with the press after leaving China were in
me.g. Cambodia or Pakistan.
disolierarzet)
revere disorganized circumsta
(e) Having read all his recent correspondence with
his mother they are convinced that he is in a
very balanced and indeed good-humoured frame
would
of kind and that he wilt behave accordingly
in Hong Kong.
(f) Once he had given a press conference in Hong
Kong he would be less harassed by the pres8
for the remainder of his journey.
(g) A long flight such as would be the case on the
alternative routes would be a bad preparation
for the ordeal of his first contact with the
outside world.
3. We must give Reuters the benefit of the doubt as they insist that
their primary interest in all this is/rey's
welfare; but no doubt they are impressed from a
professional point of view by the advantages which
Hong Kong would give them for controlling "the story"
and forestalling competion.
0377 17 E.W.& S., L. 164m 3/67.
I
4./
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
VEEL STINKE
Kong.
Depicule VIA defrandum via
We have reiterated the objections to Hong
(a) Grey would be of much more direct
local interest in Hong Kong than at
other intermediate points, and the
intensive and controversial press attention
intepeat in him would be bound to
impose a considerable strain.
The
(b)/Communist press and others might
well try to exploit his presence in
the colony for political purposes; and
even if Grey were discreet in his
knight
replies to what may well include
"loaded" and unhelpful questions,
there would be no way of controlling
what would be written. It would
hardly be in the interests of Grey's
well-being to expose him to this kind
of ordeal
(c) The Chinese are particularly
sensitive to anything said in Hong
Kong about their policies, and might
well react to any remarks made by Grey
internets
in a manner prejudicial to the wolfare
of other British subjects still detained
in China.
We have thought it best not to refer explicitly
to the possibility that Grey might say things critical of
sanpassing to HMO or the Hong Kong authorities,