consultation with the Folitical Adviser, it was tactfully suggested to
Mr. Barnacchi that he advise Fr. Lan to forward his proposala
Memoranda reference GEN/PC/1029 of 12th March, direct to Government.
1968 and SCR.15/67 of 21st March, 1968, refer.
3.
This Mr. Lan has apparently done and, having returned to tell Kr.
Bernacchi about it, the latter is now repeating the
Yr. Lan apparently feals information to the Colonial Secretary, strongly
that a delegation of leading Kaifong and Chinese Manufacters Association
sent to Canton with the tacit approval of the Hong Kong Government would
be able to negotiate with the mainland communists a settlement of the
confrontation by offering the release of prisoners
He is confident of being able to arrange and other concessions.
It
for this delegation to visit Canton through his personal contacts with
Hong Kong Anti-Persecution Struggle Committee member.. consider that Kr.
Ian's connections with the local communiste are not as close as he would
have us believe and I have absolutely no indication that any attempt to
use him as any form of intermediary would meet with any encouragement
from the Chinese authorities. is worth recalling that . Lan made a
similar proposal to the Waterworks Department to solve the water supply
crisis in July, 1967, offering, to arrange unlimited supplies of water
from China, and although two Watercorks officials (and a police officer
from Special Branch) gave him the opportunity to outline his proposals
in detail
He was reluctant at a meeting, he was very vague in his suggestions.
also to specify what contact he had with the APSC although he did
mention the names of two ordinary zombers, neither of whom are very
The meeting ended prominent communists, whom he claimed he knew.
inconclusively and those attending it were of the opinion that Mr. Lan
was no more than a sincere but ineffective well-wisher,
GISTRY
/4....
AFE CA
A. 2180
6.7.68
AWARDS
LETTU
CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL
с
4.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
Page 2.
While Mr. Lan's points regarding release of prisoners
and reinstatement concur with the current major themen of communist
propagande, I feel that there is little point in allowing the
correspondence to develop further and Mr. Lan should not be given the
slightest encouragement from Government.
(B.F. Slevin)
Director of Special Branch
for Commissioner of Police
0.0. Political Adviser (Ref. (6) in SCB.15/67) ||
GAB/mbi
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
+
ᅥ
t
P
T
(P30 130/1)
Far Eastern Department,
21 April, 1969.
Please refer to my letter of 26 March in which I suggested that you
might like to meet Mr. Garside, the officer in Peking who deals with
consular massa and who is now on leave, to discuss the detention of Mr.
Anthony Grey. I understand from Mr. James Murray that the afternoon of
either 30 April or 1 May would be convenient to you and have accordingly
arranged your appointment for 4.30 p.m. on Wednesday, 30 April.
I shall be grateful if when you come to the Main Entrance of the Foreign
Office off Downing Street you will ask to see me rather than Nr. Garside
as he of course has no permanent office in London.
Miss 8. McGuinn,
57 York Street,
London, .1.
(E. J. Sherland)
gla
FEC130/1
April 15tal армия
Exts.
213
16 Mahun Rd
Tharpe Hamler
Morwich
mor 285
one Star land,
Thank you for you
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I think I shave decline the apper of
meeting wit ohere
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Far Eastern Department,
10 April, 1969.
212
I enclose a number of press cuttings about another canard by Krs. Grey.
I am afraid that she has become an easy pray for any journalist looking
for a story,
2. As far as we are aware, there is no real evidence to support Ers.
Oray's assumption that the Chinese have held up her letters to Grey.
According to Reuters, who spoke to her about her statement to the press,
hạr deductions were based on a message to her enclosed with Gray's
latest letter to Minn KoĢuinn, This letter, dated ↳ March, arrived
towards the end of the month. In this note to his mother, Grey asked
whether she had received his January letter. was the letter which caused
us some trouble. concluded that because Grey has not received her reply
to his January letter that the Chinese must therefore be holding up her
mail. However, Reuters understand that Hrs, Gray's reply
If this was the case, it was not despatched until mid-February.
This you remember Mrs. Grey has
is unlikely that Grey would have received it before he wrote his tter to
Miss McGuinn at the beginning of March, Reuters also cemented that they
feel that Mrs. Grey has a tendency to exaggerate the number of lettere
she writes.
3. Reuters telephoned the Managing ditor of the "Sketch", which was
responsible for the report in the first instance, to warn them to treat
Hre. Grey's statement with some caution. Unfortunately the story was
already out and as you can see vas
Heuters have erches tra ted by the rest of the British press. again
spoken fairly firuly to Mrs. Gray about giving interviews of this kind
but I fear that it is not likely to have much effect. I am sending a
copy of my letter to Arthur Maddocks in Hong Kong.
7. B. Densen, Esq., OBE,
FKING.
(C. Wilson)
RESTRICTED
Mr. Baker
Bayer
SECRET
2012
100 1014 pa
.
Flag A
Flag B
Mr. Anthony Grey of Reuters
I attach a copy of my submission of 28 March about future
action in the matter of Mr. Grey. In paragraph 11 I have tried
to take account of the P.U.S.'s minute on my earlier submission
of 10 March that we ought to be prepared to swallow a lot of our
pride if we could really get a liquidation of all the outstanding
cases notably Mr. Grey. But you may find it helpful if I
develop the argument at greater length.
2. I emphatically agree that if we could secure the release
of Mr. Grey and also the other detained subjects in exchange
for the release in Hong Kong of the eleven imprisoned news
workers, we should do well to consider such a bargain carefully ·
though the Governor of Hong Kong would still expect us to take
account of the risks there. But in my view the prospects of a
bargain of this kind are very remote; and I would have the
greatest reservations about attempting to put it to the Chinese.
(a) The case of Mr. Grey and the imprisoned workers is
sui generis. Mr. Grey was detained as an act of
retaliation for the "persecution" of the Communist
press in Hong Kong. The Chinese Government presumably
hoped by his detention to prevent the Hong Kong
authorities taking further action against their
important propaganda machine in Hong Kong.
The Hong
Kong authorities were not, in the event, deterred from
so doing and the eleven newsworkers at present in prison
were all arrested and convicted after Mr. Grey was
SECRET
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(b)
detained. We are virtually certain of the price
for Mr.Grey 's release. Were we prepared to
pay it, we could have him out quickly. But there
are grave objections to paying this price now
(paragraph 9 of my submission of 28 March). The
Chinese would, however, firmly reject any attempt
to introduce the other British subjects into the
equation, maintaining that the latter have all
offended against Chinese law.
The cases of the other British subjects are wholly
unlike the case of Mr. Grey. They are not simply
hostages against the good behaviour of the authorities
in Hong Kong. Few or none of the persons involved
have entirely clean slates. They can be grouped
as follows:-
(1) The Vickers-Zimmer engineer (Mr. Watt)
(11)
(iii)
already sentenced to three years imprisonment
for alleged espionage and unlikely to be
released prematurely.
A ships' officer (Mr. Crouch) arrested on
similar grounds.
A Bank Manager (Mr. Johnston) who may have
committed acts of indiscretion or who may
be held as a hostage because of a financial
dispute between the Chartered Bank and the
Bank of China in Singapore.
(iv) A group of persons who have worked for the
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3.
Chinese propaganda machine in Peking and
who are known to have become too deeply
implicated in internal Chinese politics (the
Gordons, the Crooks, Mrs. Young, Mrs. Epstein).
(v) Two persons (Mr. Barrymaine, Captain Will)
who committed acts of folly which were bound
to bring trouble on them in the circumstances
of the Cultural Revolution.
(vi) Two British members of a group of yachtsmen
of various nationalities who sailed without
permission and against the advice of the
Hong Kong authorities through waters well
known to be claimed by the Chinese.
The Chinese are likely to solve these cases on their merits
and over a considerable period of time, We believe that the
settlement of the Grey case might improve the atmosphere of
Sino-British relations and might thereby contribute to the
swifter solution of some of these cases. But there is no
evidence of any direct link between the cases in the minds of
the Chinese authorities and I fear there is no practical
possibility of linking them with Mr. Grey in any successful
deal. If we persisted in trying to establish the link, we
should merely give the Chinese the satisfaction of having us
eat our words when in the final instance we released the eleven
newsworkers (as we shall have to do) without any commitment on their
part about British subjects in detention.
4.
I should add that the Chinese have in recent weeks granted
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long overdue exit visaa to members of the banking communi-
ties in Shanghai (the Croziers and Mrs. Johnston) despite
the continuing problem of Mr. Grey.
Copy to Mr. Moreton
Jann May.
(JAMES MURRAY)
1 April, 1969
Thank
you
I agree that you are
име the right lines
SECRET
ZONE
v. much.
waking
3/+
Амене
Mr Wilsay full Ms Boyd.
8
·
SECRET
Mr. Moreton
MR. ANTHONY GREY OF REUTERS
PROBLEM
Flag A
о
Me Bakar
paka 1614
My submission of 28 February envisaged a review of
the problem of Mr. Grey in the latter part of this month.
In the meantime we have made no progress towards his
release.
An offer to the Chinese through covert channels
in Hong Kong to release to China for the remainder of their
sentences the eleven convicted news workers whom the Chinese
have linked with Mr. Grey, has not been taken up. We must
assume therefore that the Chinese intend to keep Mr. Grey
until the news workers have been released in Hong Kong.
Barring unforseen circumstances, all eleven should now be
out of prison by mid-September. The alternatives at
present before us are:
(a) to ask the Governor of Hong Kong to arrange the
immediate release in Hong Kong of the eleven news
workers; or
(b) to let matters take their course in Hong Kong with
the reasonably confident expectation that Mr. Grey
will be let out shortly after the release of the
news workers in September, but almost certainly
not before.
RECOMMENDATION
2.
I recommend alternative (b). Hong Kong Department
concur.
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+
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BACKGROUND
3. On 28 December the New China News Agency in Peking
published a report openly linking Kr. Grey with the
communist news workers (then thirteen, now eleven) serving
prison sentences in Hong Kong. The report said that
"since the Hong Kong British authorities continue to keep
the thirteen patriotic Chinese journalists in jail, the
Chinese Government is fully justified in continuing to
restrict Mr. Grey's freedom of movement". Shortly there-
after the Chinese resumed their covert contacts with the
Hong Kong Government about Mr. Grey, describing the N.C.N.A.
statement as "the proposed swap for Grey" and indicating
that they expected a reply to their "proposal".
here concluded that the release of the news workers in Hong
Kong itself raised such difficulties as to be highly
undesirable.
Ministers
However it was decided that we should,
through the covert channel, repeat an earlier offer to the
effect that we would be ready to release the news workers
to China for the remainder of their sentences in return
for Kr. Grey.
4. Our offer has been discussed by Mr. Cater, the Hong
Kong representative, with his Chinese contact in a series
of meetings beginning on 27 January. In messages which
the contact has said he was relaying from Peking, the
Chinese have insisted on release in Hong Kong. We have
had a virtual admission that they would be unable to
persuade the news workers to return voluntarily to the
/mainland.
2
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mainland. We have modified our original proposal to the
extent of offering release in kacao. Mr. Cater, however,
has kept insisting that release in Hong Kong itself is
out of the question, in the hope that if we could convince
the Chinese of our determination on this point, they might
retreat from their intransigence. But to no avail; and
I think that we must now conclude that our offer has been
rejected.
5.
Aspects of the covert discussions are, however,
relevant to our future decisions.
In a message supposed
to emanate from Chou En-lai the Chinese offered, in return
for a settlement of the Grey case, unspecified improvements
in Sino-British relations extending both to other British
subjects in China and to trade. Balancing the benefits,
another message contained a veiled threat: if it was our
intention to release the ten of the news workers in due
course in September and then try to trade r. Grey for the
eleventh, these tactics would not work.
ARGUNENT
6. If we conclude that our offer has been rejected, we
must now proceed on the basis that the Chinese intend to
hold on to Mr. Grey until all eleven news workers have
been released. Ten of them are due for release with
remission next September. The eleventh, Wong Chak, (sentenced to five
years imprisonment in September 1967)
is not due out with full remission until February 1971.
But the Governor has now agreed to set in motion an exercise
- 3 -
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/designed
[
i
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+
designed to ensure his release by September of this year
without appearing to bend the law in a flagrant manner.
Essentially he plans to review all the cases of prisoners
sentenced to terms longer than four years. All being
well, this should result in a reduction of Wong Chak's
sentence, though it may be some weeks before this can be
made public knowledge. We are, however, justified in
proceeding on the assumption that all eleven news workers
will now be out by mid-September.
It
7. We accept that the immediate release of all the news
workers would almost certainly result in the release of
Mr. Grey. Will this still be the case in September?
might be argued that they are a declining asset; that
their value to the Chinese diminishes as September approaches;
and that their release then would therefore be regarded by
the Chinese as of practically no value. However, our
experience of the Chinese suggests that they will not be
at a loss to present the release of the eleven, whenever
it comes, as a "victory". They will have prevailed to the
extent of having held on to Mr. Grey until we have "stopped
the persecution of patriotic news workers in Hong Kong".
While there has been some variation over numbers the Chinese
have always justified their detention of Mr. Grey exclusively
in the context of the treatment of their news workers in
Hong Kong
We think it unlikely that they would start,
after the release of the news workers, to hold him against
•
a wholly different category of prisoner.
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18.
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8. I conclude therefore that the choice in practice
confronting us is:
(a) to bring the Governor to agree now to the immediate
release of all eleven news workers in Hong Kong in
(b)
return for appropriate assurances that this will
result in the release of Kr. Grey; or
to let matters take their course in Hong Kong with
the reasonable expectation that Mr. Grey will be
out in September.
9. The dangers of the first course are clear. The
Governor has throughout opposed the premature release of
convicted prisoners in Hong Kong. We agree with him that
such a move would damage public confidence in the Colony;
would be interpreted by the communists as an indication
that we lacked firmness; and, by providing a precedent
of willingness to disregard the courts in a flagrant manner
and for a political purpose, impair the future credibility
of the sanction of imprisonment. The likely encouragement to the Chinese
to adopt a similar policy again, if they now
succeed, must also be taken into account.
10. The difficulties in the way of the second course are
also formidable:
(a)
Will Mr. Grey's health stand up to this prolong-
ation of his ordeal? This is a point we continue
to watch very carefully. Though his conditions
of detention remain highly unpleasant, there has
been a slight improvement recently to the extent
/that
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י.
+
·
[
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(b)
that he is now allowed upstairs to his books.
Careful medical examination by Chinese doctors
in December appears to have relieved his mind
about his physical health; and his recent
letters to his mother, while critical of H.M.G.,
have been relatively cheerful and extremely
balanced.
Can we convince Parliament and the public that
our refusal to accept what is now generally
believed to be the Chinese price is justified?
Much must depend on Reuters. Mr. Long, the
General Manager, while fully sympathetic to our
difficulties in Hong Kong, has been pressing us
privately for the immediate release of the news
workers. But he has said that Reuters would not
wish to embarrass us by taking up this position
publicly. It is difficult to predict how public
opinion might move in coming weeks.
As we
approach September it should be easier to hold
the situation
-
provided that there is a reasonable
expectation that the affair will be settled by
September at the latest. (For this reason the
sooner the judicial process referred to in paragraph 6 above is
completed and it becomes.
public knowledge that all eleven news workers will
be coming out in September, the better). Meantime
we are not without ammunition to meet public
/criticism.
- 6 -
SCOSET
SECRET
criticism.
For tactical reasons we have not
wished to stimulate indignation against the
Chinese lest this would lead to increased
pressure for unhelpful measures against them in
this country. We have therefore refrained from
using to the full the strong arguments for refusing
to pay ransom in Hong Kong. We have, however, a
good case and could deploy it if necessary.
More-
over, if need arose, we could make public the
continuing refusal of the Chinese to entertain
the idea of a reasonable solution through deport-
ation of the news workers to China.
(c) Will continuing refusal to meet the Chinese terms
be likely to result in a hardening in their policies
towards Hong Kong? We do not know what precisely
is happening among the top leadership in Peking.
There are some indications of serious policy
differences.
However, since the beginning of
1968, even at moments of extreme internal agitation,
there has been no indication that the leaders were
prepared again to jeopardise their chances of
recovering their following in Hong Kong or, more
important, their large foreign exchange earnings
from the Colony by further radical initiatives.
We do not suppose that they would take such a risk
now.
11. Despite the difficulties therefore, my conclusion is
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/that we
*
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that we can probably hold the position until September.
If this is so, what we have to decide is whether the