has kept insisting that release in Hong Kong itself is
out of the question, in the hope that if we could convince
the Chinese of our determination on this point, they might
retreat from their intransigence. But to no avail; and
I think that we must now conclude that our offer has been
rejected.
5.
Aspects of the covert discussions are, however,
relevant to our future decisions.
In a message supposed
to emanate from Chou En-lai the Chinese offered, in return
for a settlement of the Grey case, unspecified improvements
in Sino-British relations extending both to other British
subjects in China and to trade.
Balancing the benefits,
another message contained a veiled threat: if it was our
intention to release the ten of the news workers in due
course in September and then try to trade Mr. Grey for the
eleventh, these tactics would not work.
ARGUMENT
6. If we conclude that our offer has been rejected, we
must now proceed on the basis that the Chinese intend to
hold on to Mr. Grey until all eleven news workers have
been released. Ten of them are due for release with
remission next September. The eleventh, Wong Chak,
(sentenced to five years imprisonment in September 1967)
is not due out with full remission until February 1971.
But the Governor has now agreed to set in motion an exercise
/designed
- 3 -
SECRET
SECRET
designed to ensure his release by September of this year
without appearing to bend the law in a flagrant manner.
Essentially he plans to review all the cases of prisoners
sentenced to terms longer than four years. All being
well, this should result in a reduction of Wong Chak's
sentence, though it may be some weeks before this can be
made public knowledge. We are, however, justified in
proceeding on the assumption that all eleven news workers
will now be out by mid-September.
It
We accept that the immediate release of all the news
workers would almost certainly result in the release of
Mr. Grey. Will this still be the case in September?
might be argued that they are a declining asset; that
their value to the Chinese diminishes as September approaches;
and that their release then would therefore be regarded by
the Chinese as of practically no value. However, our
experience of the Chinese suggests that they will not be
at a loss to present the release of the eleven, whenever
it comes, as a "victory".
extent of having held on to Mr. Grey until we have "stopped
the persecution of patriotic news workers in Hong Kong".
While there has been some variation over numbers the Chinese
have always justified their detention of Mr. Grey exclusively
in the context of the treatment of their news workers in
Hong Kong. We think it unlikely that they would start,
after the release of the news workers, to hold him against
a wholly different category of prisoner.
They will have prevailed to the
- 4-
SECRET
18.
SECRET
1
8. I conclude therefore that the choice in practice
confronting us is:
9.
(a) to bring the Governor to agree now to the immediate
release of all eleven news workers in Hong Kong in
return for appropriate assurances that this will
result in the release of Mr. Grey; or
(b) to let matters take their course in Hong Kong with
the reasonable expectation that Kr. Grey will be
out in September.
The dangers of the first course are clear. The
Governor has throughout opposed the premature release of
convicted prisoners in Hong Kong, We agree with him that
such a move would damage public confidence in the Colony;
would be interpreted by the communists as an indication
that we lacked firmness; and, by providing a precedent
of willingness to disregard the courts in a flagrant manner
and for a political purpose, impair the future credibility
of the sanction of imprisonment. The likely encouragement
to the Chinese to adopt a similar policy again, if they now
succeed, must also be taken into account.
10. The difficulties in the way of the second course are
also formidable:
(a) Will Mr. Grey's health stand up to this prolong-
ation of his ordeal? This is a point we continue
to watch very carefully. Though his conditions
of detention remain highly unpleasant, there has
been a slight improvement recently to the extent
/that
- 5-
SECRET
SECRET
that he is now allowed upstairs to his books.
Careful medical examination by Chinese doctors
in December appears to have relieved his mind
about his physical health; and his recent
letters to his mother, while critical of H.K.G.,
have been relatively cheerful and extremely
balanced.
(b) Can we convince Parliament and the public that
our refusal to accept what is now generally
believed to be the Chinese price is justified?
Much must depend on Reuters. Mr. Long, the
General Manager, while fully sympathetic to our
difficulties in Hong Kong, has been pressing us
privately for the immediate release of the news
workers. But he has said that Reuters would not
wish to embarrase us by taking up this position
publicly. It is difficult to predict how public
opinion might move in coming weeks.
As we
approach September it should be easier to hold
the situation
-
provided that there is a reasonable
expectation that the affair will be settled by
September at the latest. (For this reason the
sooner the judicial process referred to in
paragraph 6 above is completed and it becomes
public knowledge that all eleven news workers will
be coming out in September, the better). Meantime
we are not without ammunition to meet public
/criticism.
- 6 -
SECRET
SECRET
11.
criticism.
For tactical reasons we have not
wished to stimulate indignation against the
Chinese lest this would lead to increased
pressure for unhelpful measures against them in
this country. We have therefore refrained from
using to the full the strong arguments for refusing
to pay ransom in Hong Kong. We have, however, a
good case and could deploy it if necessary. More-
over, if need arose, we could make public the
continuing refusal of the Chinese to entertain
the idea of a reasonable solution through deport-
ation of the news workers to China.
(c) Will continuing refusal to meet the Chinese terms
be likely to result in a hardening in their policies
towards Hong Kong? We do not know what precisely
is happening among the top leadership in Peking.
There are some indications of serious policy
differences.
However, since the beginning of
1968, even at moments of extreme internal agitation,
there has been no indication that the leaders were
prepared again to jeopardise their chances of
recovering their following in Hong Kong or, more
important, their large foreign exchange earnings
from the Colony by further radical initiatives.
We do not suppose that they would take such a risk
now.
Despite the difficulties therefore, my conclusion is
/that we
- 7 -
SECRET
SECRET
that we can probably hold the position until September.
If this is so, what we have to decide is whether the
risks of the premature release of the eleven news workers
in Hong Kong continue to outweigh the advantages of an
immediate settlement of the Grey affair. It may be felt
that the argument has laid undue stress on the factor of
public confidence in Hong Kong. It is always difficult
to pronounce with certainly on the likely effect of any
particular action in Hong Kong. Nevertheless we must
leave ourselves a margin of error since any action which might
lead the inhabitants of Hong Kong to conclude that we have
lost our nerve could very quickly become disastrous.
Admittedly there would be much to be said for taking risks
in Hong Kong and indeed for swallowing a lot of our pride
if we could really settle all outstanding cases of British
subjects not only Mr. Grey. But the prospects of this
are remote. There is little to indicate that the remaining
British subjects are being held as hostages. They, like
the majority of other foreigners in trouble in China, are
held for a variety of alleged misdemeanours on their part.
Their cases would only be resolved slowly and with difficulty.
If we were to try to extend negotiations for the release of
Mr. Grey into a comprehensive bargain covering other British
subjects as well, I am sure that this would not help the
latter and would impede any progress over Fr. Grey. (This
is not to rule out the possibility that the solution of the
Grey problem might lead to some slight improvement in the
-
/atmosphere
- 8 -
SECRET
SECRET
atmosphere of Sino-British relations, which could in the
longer term enhance the chances of other British subjects;
but we should not expect any early results). Thus the
only immediate dividend we can expect from the release of
the news workers is the release of Mr. Grey; and,
important though it undoubtedly is on humanitarian grounds
to terminate his ordeal as soon as possible, this does not
seem to me to justify our pressing the Governor to take
what he regards as an unacceptable risk in Hong Kong.
Copies to:
Kr. Godden
Mr. Baker
Sir A. Galsworthy
Sir J. Johnston
Mr. Carter
Jan May
James Murray
28 March, 1969
− 9 -
SECRET
In view
of
RESTRICTED
рут
$220,
Far Eastern Department,
( 13 C/1)
6 May, 1969.
B.B.C. and Grey
Please refer to Arthur Maddocks' letter of 20 March to Colin Wilson
about the Berger broadcast. For the record you will want to know that we
did speak, energetically, to the B.B.C. on 27 March.
(J. D. I. Boyd)
R. J. T. McLaren, Esq.,
HOW KONG.
RESTRICTED
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
་་
WEL 51-7406
Restrictio
FE
Fec 13 c/1
from for
RJT Mc Laren Esq
Home Kms
BBC and Grey.
Please refer in Arthur Maddocks'
celûr of
! 20 March to Colin
Wilson: about
The Berger
broadcast. For in read you
will want to know
that
we did speak, energetically,
15 The BBC
on 27 March. A
6/5
Private & Confidential
The Rt Hon Michael Stewart CH MP Secretary of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs
Foreign and Commonwealth Office London SW1
REUTERS
29 April 1969
Extere pe retum
6s 3014
FEDENN FE Dent for diff. reply from 5/state Ase.
Dear Mr Stewart
FEC 130|1
When you received me on April 1 you encouraged me by saying that you
wished to give consideration to the idea that the Chinese newspaper
workers imprisoned in Hong Kong should be released in an attempt to free
Anthony Grey.
I write to inquire whether you have come to any conclusion on this
point.
I have, since seeing you, become more than ever convinced that the
Chinese in Hong Kong must be released before September if Grey is to be
helped. It seems likely that the Chinese wish for some gesture. To
release the prisoners at the end of their sentence will not be a gesture
and I doubt if the small concession you suggested might be made in
September would be sufficient.
No doubt you saw a report in yesterday's Daily Telegraph suggesting that
the defection of a number of Chinese to Hong Kong last Saturday could
affect Mr Grey's situation. I think that such speculation is unfortunate
but it nevertheless remains that the longer Mr Grey is held the greater
is the danger of incidents producing fresh Chinese demands and fresh
pretexts for continuing to hold Mr Grey, I believe that there is urgency
in moving to bring about Mr Grey's release and I ask you once again to
persuade the Governor of Hong Kong to release the imprisoned Chinese.
Yours sincerely
Casts Log
Gerald Long General Manager Reuters Limited 85 Fleet Street London EC4
Telephone Fleet Street 6060
From the Editor-in-Chief
RI EVO IN
James Murray Esq CMG
218
REUTERS
24 April 1969
497
Head, Far Eastern Department
Foreign and Commonweal uppgice
London SW 1
Dear Mr Murray
FEC 13/1
Ms Boy
·
MM 20 Mure
Grein
Many thanks for your letter of April 21 about Mr Lan. I do not suppose
that there is much to be made out of his suggestions.
Mr Long is travelling in the United States at present but when he gets
back I have no doubt that he will be in touch with you to see whether
there is any further news since his talk with Mr Stewart on April 1.
Yours sincerely
вый нолой
ہیں
Brian Horton Reuters Limited 85 Fleet Street London EC4 Telephone 01-353
6080
りょ
CYPHER/CAT A
FROM ROUTINE HONG KONG
TELEGRAM NUMBER 325
SECRET
SECRET
TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
APRIL 25/1969
RECEIVED IN
R*..
palo 5/5
Ke 130
207
ADDRESSED FCO TELEGRAM 325 OF 25 APRIL RFI PEKING.
PERSONAL FOR GALSWORTHY,
MY TELEGRAM 232: GREY.
4428
YOU WILL BE GLAD TO KNOW THAT THIS EXERCISE IS PROCEEDING SATIS-
FACTORILY SO FAR AND COMMITTEE YESTERDAY RECOMMENDED REDUCTION OF WONG
CHAK'S SENTENCE TO 3 YEARS, 1.E. ENABLING HIM TO BE RELEASED ON 4TH
OCTOBER WITH REMISSION. REDUCTIONS FOR ABOUT A DOZEN OTHERS
WERE ALSO I UNDERSTAND RECOMMENDED.
2. I AM NOW URGENTLY CONSIDERING DETAILS OF HOW TO PROCEED ON MATTERS
COVERED IN PARAGRAPHS 6 - 9 OF MY TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE AND
INTENTIONS WILL BE CONVEYED TO YOU AS SOON AS THEY ARE FULLY WORKED
OUT. THIS IS A QUICK PROGRESS REPORT ONLY.
FCO PLEASE PASS ROUTINE TO PEKING.
SIR D. TRENCH
FILES
F.E.D.
H.K. DEPT.
SIR J. JOHNSTON
MR. MORETON
SIR A. GALSWORTHY
[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]
SECRET
0 130/1
216
Enteropa
ko22/4
21 April, 1969.
I now have the information about Mr. Lan, a letter from whom you
attached to your letter of 19 March.
2.64
It appears that he has been in the habit of corresponding with prominent
publie figures and Government officials on a wide range of matters in
which he feels he can sake a contribution. In Hong Kong he has claimed
to have special relations with local Communiste which would make him
useful as an intermediary. However, on past occasions when he has made
upscific suggestions about matters in Hong Kong it has been evident that
his local contuota were perhaps not as close as he makes out.
The points which he makes in his latter of 14 Karch to Gerald Long about
a general settlement echo a major theme of Communist propaganda in Hong
Kong. For the present we have no indication that an acceptable
settlement could be achieved using the channels suggested by Mr. Lan and
be would certainly not be a reliable intermediary with local Cornuists.
On the case of Tony Grey we have nothing new to report to you since the
Foreign and Commonwealth secretary's talk with Gerald Long on 1 April.
(Janes Murray)
par
Head, Far Eastern Department
Brian Horton, Esq.,
Editor-in-Chief,
RETERS LTD.,
85 Fleet Street,
LONDON, F.C.A.
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
Registry No.
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
Top Secret
Secret,
Confidential.
Restricted Unclassified.
PRIVACY MARKING
In Confidence
DRAFT Letter
To:-
Brian Horton, Esq.,
Editor-in-Chief, Reuters Ltd.,
85 Fleet Street,
London, K.C.4.
Type 1 +
From
James Murray
Telephone No. & Ext.
Department
On the call,
of Tony Svang
I, now have the information about Mr. La
altuations to yhan
letter from shema
you asked for in your letter of 19 March.
EL
which
£. It appears that he has been in the habit of
corresponding on a wide range of matters in which he
feels he can make a contribution/with prominent public
figures and Government officials, In Hong Kong/he
claimed to have special relations with local Communists
which would make him useful as an intermediary,
However, on past occasions when he has made/suggestions
about matters in Hong Kong it has been evident that his
core portabas
local contacts are not as close as he makes out.
2. The points which he makes in his letter of 14
Cavalot Long
March to Mo.-karig about a general settlement echo a
major theme of Communist propaganda in Hong Kong. At
present
the moment we have no indication that an acceptable
settlement could be achieved using the channels
suggested by Mr. Lad and he would certainly not be a
reliable intermediary with local Communists,
As you will forms from cartier discanime which we have heat the only
concesions on our part which would be likely to help Toy Grey would be
the premature release of the news water. This world undoubted by remain
in any more general arrangement. It would be nly by further major
concesions, at present unacceptable, a on "Confrontatiom' hammers wale
prismes in Hay Kang, that
immediate improvement in the situation of other British subjects
detained in China could be obtained,
we have withining new to fit to Thu Saince the
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Mr.
I attach a draft reply from you to Horton's letter of 19 March.
2. The relevant information about M2 Lan is contained in 11=
Fly B (609) Slavin's Memorandum of 22 June, 1968
Fains. Our
(I. C. Orr) 18 Apr. '69
The que
C.S. 4C
2600079
30.000-1/67-B52117
No.
TS 1/68
CONFIDENTIAL
423
Entrapano 2014
COLONIAL SECRETARIAT,
LOWER ALBERT ROAD,
HONG KONG.
3 April, 1969.
Dear Jones 134/11
Thank you for your letter
HWB 3/2 of 25 March about Mr. D. R. Lan. I think the enclosed copy of a
memorandum of 3 July 1968 from Special Branch tells you all you want to
know about him. It is plain that he has no particular insight into
communist policy and need not be taken seriously.
You
ove
Athe
(A.F. Maddocks)
пред For chaft reply now
6
Io Haton's letter of 14 Real
James Murray, Esq., CMG, Far Eastern Department,
Foreign & Commonwealth Office,
LONDON, S.W.1.
Encl.
Прив
Ms Our 201814
CONFIDENTIAL
to M. Harten
Reply to M.
прив
0000703
CONFIDENTIADENTIAL
From
Commissioner of Police (D.S.B.)
Ref. (18) in GEN/PC/1029
Tel. No.
Date
234011 Ext. 291
3rd July, 1968.
MEMO
To....
Defence Secretary
(Attention: P.B, Williams, Esq.,)
Your Ref. (64)
doted
L'I
......
CR 17/3371/67
22nd June, 1968.
||
L'II
KR. D.R. LAN
This gentleman has for some years been in the habit of corresponding
with both prominent public figures and Government officials on matters
of interest in which he feels he can make a contribution. These range
from letters to President Lyndon Johnson and other U.S. officials
suggesting solutions to the Kashmir, Vietnam and China problems, to
letters to police in Hong Kong 'on how to solve the riots and bomb
planting incidents in Hong Kong.
2.
Kr. Lan contacted Kr. Bernacchi in late 1967 in an effort to interest
him in his proposals for a settlement of confrontation in Hong Kong. As
a result, Mr. Bernacchi contacted Special Branch
After in March 1968 seeking advice on how to deal with Mr. Lan,