the Chinese statement of last December. What is its signi-
ficance for the handling of the Grey case and in particular
what public use should we make of it?
CONCLUSIONS
2. I think that for practical purposes we can regard the
statement as a formal assurance that Mr. Grey will be released
if we release the eleven newsworkers. As far as the public
is concerned however I think we should merely treat it as a
confirmation of the basis on which we have already been
handling the case. We have so far tried not to involve
ourselves in public controversy about the meaning of the
December statement, which the public have tended to interpret
as a firm statement of a price for Mr. Grey. Since, however,
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232
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we have in the past expressed some reservations about the
December statement both to Mr. Long of Reuters and to
Mrs. Grey, I think that we might explain to them that Ma's
recent visit has reinforced our confidence that Grey should
be out by October at the latest. I attach a draft telegram
on these lines.
ARGUMENT
3. From the delay on which Ma insisted between the summons
and his visit, I think that we can conclude that he was in
urgent touch with his Government for instructions.
He was
reading from a prepared text; and I think we must conclude
that his words had been carefully chosen for him by his
masters.
Interpreted literally, they mean merely that
Mr. Grey will be allowed to move about Peking; but I consider
that if the Chinese do remove the restraints on Mr. Grey they
are most unlikely to withhold an exit visa. All in all, I
think that, though Ma's statement is perhaps less authoritative
than would have been a government statement published in
New China News Agency we are justified in treating it as a
firm assurance by the Chinese Government that Mr. Grey will
be allowed to leave China when the newsworkers are released.
4. The N.C.N.A. statement of last December was: "Since the
Hong Kong authorities contrive to keep thirteen now eleven 7
patriotic journalists in jail, the Chinese Government is fully
justified in continuing to restrict Grey's freedom of
10
movement." We noted at the time that it was carefully short
SECRET
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SECRET
of a commitment. Either we were being over-cautious, or
the Chinese, for their own purposes, have now decided to
move from a position of some equivocation to a considered
declaration of readiness for a bargain. The former is
doubtful since particularly on an issue like this the
Chinese could be expected to choose their words with care.
If the latter case, the presumption must be that they wish
to influence us towards the early release of the eleven
newsworkers. The best interpretation to be put on their
motives is that, keen to get the Grey affair out of the way,
they are responding to the indication given by the reduction
of Wong Chak's sentence that we were ready to play our part
in settling the affair by October at the latest. Leas
charitably they may judge that an unequivocal assurance of
this kind, if it becomes known, is likely to increase
pressure on us to release the eleven immediately.
-
5. If as I think we must
-
we accept the assurance at its
face value, there are two implications of substance for our
handling of the Grey affair.
a) The statement provides an answer to the argument put
forward that while the premature release of the eleven
might in the past have secured the release of Mr. Grey or
might even do so now, we should not conclude that their
release on their due dates in September and October
would necessarily be regarded by the Chinese as an
adequate "concession" for the release of Mr. Grey.
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•
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(There may well still be a case for the premature
release of the eleven, but now it can be properly
based only on the desirability of shortening Mr. Grey's
ordeal or of making some general gesture of readiness
for accommodation in Hong Kong.)
b) The statement should help to allay the apprehensions
which the Governor of Hong Kong has understandably
expressed in the past about the situation with which he
would be confronted were he to release the eleven
prematurely and the Chinese were not to match this by
the release of Mr. Grey. (However the Governor has in
practice accepted, in part as the result of a communication
through the covert channel last February, that the release
of the eleven was a firm price for Mr. Grey.)
In short, the statement has facilitated our handling of the
case in that whether the decision is to let matters take their
course in Hong Kong until October or to press for the premature
release of the eleven, we can proceed on either course in a
somewhat easier frame of mind.
6. As far as the public is concerned I think we should treat
the statement unspectacularly. In press criticism of our
handling of the case, the December statement has been generally
interpreted as meaning that the Chinese would release Mr. Grey
if the eleven were released. Though we have struck a note of
caution with those directly concerned we have been careful not
to emphasise our doubts in public. If we now give prominence
to Ma's statement we shall certainly be asked whether we accept
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3
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it as a firm assurance or not; and since with the Chinese
one should certainly not be sure of anything we should
probably have to make some reservation which the Chinese
might choose to regard as casting doubts on their good faith
(cf. Ma's defensive remark that "the Chinese Government means
what it says"). Accordingly in commenting in yesterday's
Parliamentary reply and to the press on Ma's visit, we have
not let it be known there was any new development; and I
would propose that when in future we are asked by the press
or in Parliament about Chinese intentions we should confine
ourselves to a general statement that the Chinese have
indicated to us that they would release Mr. Grey when the
newsworkers were released in Hong Kong. I think however
that we should inform Mrs. Grey prefereably by telephone that
Ma's visit has reinforced our view that the Chinese will let
her son out on the release of the eleven; and that we should
explain the circumstances fully to Mr. Long of Reuters.
Jo
Humay
(James Murray)
20 May, 1969.
Copies to:
Mr. Baker
Sir A. Galsworthy
Mr. Carter
Mr. Haydon
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19
に
9
адке.
1.
Governor
A draft letter from the
P.U.S. &
6 14
also thing straited.
Vlarch
215.
Private Secretary
CONFIDENTIAL
MR. ANTHONY GREY OF REUTERS
Recent Developments in Hong Kong
Entrapa
2016/5
As requested, I attach a defensive speaking note
for possible use by the Secretary of State in Cabinet
tomorrow, and brief background.
Copies to: Miss Deas
Mr. Moreton
г
еу
вати James Umay
(James Murray)
14 May, 1969.
CONFIDENTIAL
236
CONFIDENTIAL
Les 2015
MR. ANTHONY GREY OF REUTERS
Recent Developments in Hong Kong
731
SPEAKING NOTE (Defensive]
On 9 May the Hong Kong Government announced the
first results of a review of the sentences on long-term
prisoners convicted for offences arising out of the
troubles in 1967. Those who had their sentences reduced
included Wong Chak, one of the eleven imprisoned news-
workers whom the Chinese have linked with Mr. Anthony Grey,
the Reuters correspondent detained in Peking. Wong Chak
had his sentence reduced from five to three years, which
means that he should be released with full remission on
4 October. The other ten newsworkers are already due out
Thus by the first week in
at various dates in September.
October all eleven will be out of prison, and the Chinese
will have been deprived of the only justification they
themselves have advanced for detaining Mr. Grey. We cannot
of course be certain that they in turn will release Mr. Grey.
But we can be reasonably hopeful that they will.
Nevertheless we must continue to do all we can to shorten
his ordeal. Probably this could only be achieved by the
premature release of all eleven newsworkers in Hong Kong
through the exercise of the Governor's discretionary powers
of remission. It has so far been considered that such a
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concession to Chinese pressure would have most damaging
effects for Hong Kong.
of State (Lord Shepherd)
However, I have asked the Minister
who will be visiting Hong Kong in
the first week of June, to weigh all the issues carefully
with the Governor.
colleagues again.
Thereafter I shall be reporting to my
Ar Eastern Department,
14 May, 1969.
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENT IAL
BACKGROUND
At the end of December 1968 the New China News Agency
published a statement which included the following:-
"Since the Hong Kong British authorities continue to
keep 13 now 117 patriotic Chinese journalists in
jail, the Chinese Government is fully justified in
continuing to restrict Grey's freedom of movement."
It will be noted that the N.C.N.A. carefully refrained from
committing the Chinese Government to release Mr. Grey should
the newspaper workers be freed. We are reasonably confident,
however, that they would. Our grounds are these. The
Chinese have made considerable use of the N.C.N.A. statement
throughout the world in justifying their position. We have
had various indications that Mr. Grey's continuing detention
has been an embarrassment to them, particularly in those
countries whose esteem they want. They would not find it
easy now to change their ground, and advance a new justification
for detaining him. But the possibility cannot be excluded,
particularly if they thought that we were losing our nerve and
could be pressed into paying a higher price for Mr. Grey in
terms of other "confrontation" prisoners.
2. By the time of Lord Shepherd's visit to Hong Kong, we
may have some indication of Chinese reactions to the recent
announcement in Hong Kong.
Far Eastern Department,
14 May, 1969.
CONFIDENTIAL
72
Flag A
Private Secretary
Secreta
etary
COVERING CONFIDENTIAL
Enter
730
1) M= Murrzy 42015/5 Миту
равогов
Mr. Anthony Grey of Reuters
As previously arranged, a delegation of six members
of the family of Mr. Anthony Grey called on the Parliamentary
Under-Secretary yesterday to present a petition (attached)
for the Secretary of State.
Press treatment of the
2. F.C.O. telegram No. 168 of 12 May to Peking describes
and comments on the meeting.
meeting has been reasonably restrained, and seems unlikely
to increase the pressure on us over the Grey affair.
must however expect something of a splash in "The People"
next Sunday.
3. No further action would seem to be necessary about
the petition.
We
W
James Vermany.
(James Murray)
13 May, 1969.
Copies to: Miss Deas
Mr. Moreton
Pay thanks. The Secretary
of State has seen the telegram and the fress. It seems to have gue as
well as could possibly be exfected.
COVERING CONFIDENT 1.
14
·
CONFIDENTIAL
BACKGROUND NOTE
British Subjects Detained in China
Mr. Anthony Grey
Following the arrest of a New China News Agency corres- pondent in Hong
Kong, Hsueh P'ing, Mr. Anthony Grey was put under house arrest in Peking
on 19 July, 1967. On 22 July, 1967, the Chinese Foreign Ministry
announced that "in view of the Hong Kong British Authorities'
unreasonable persecution of
the correspondents of the Hong Kong branch of the N.C.N.A. and
other patriotic newsmen, the Chinese Government had decided to
limit the freedom of movement of the British Reuters' corres-
pondent in Peking until further notice", With the release of
Hsueh on 16 November 1968 all the newspapermen covered by this
announcement had completed their prison sentences and been
released.
2. Subsequent to Mr. Grey's detention, another N.C.N.A.
correspondent, Lo, and several other communist newspaper workers
were convicted and are still serving their sentences. They
number eleven at the present time. On 28 December 1968 the New
China News Agency said that the continued imprisonment of these
men made the Chinese fully justified in continuing to detain
Kr. Grey. However, the N.C.N.A. carefully refrained from
committing the Chinese Government to release Mr. Grey should
the newspaper workers be freed.
3.
Provided maximum remission of sentence for good behaviour
is granted in all cases, the last of the news workers will be
released by early October, 1969.
SONFIDENTIAL
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4.
Mr. Grey has been visited twice by officials from our
Mission in Peking (in April 1968 by Sir D. Hopson and in
November 1968 by Mr. Cradock). Both of these visits have
been in exchange for special visits to a number of Chinese
journalists and news workers in prison in Hong Kong.
5. Repeated representations have been made to the Chinese
in London and Peking demanding Mr. Grey's release and normal
Consular access to him. Mr. Cradock made strong represen-
tations to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 9
December requesting improvements in Mr. Grey's conditions and,
at the same time, demanding his speedy release.
also took up the question of Mr. Grey's health.
Mr. Grey reported by letter to his mother that he had received
a thorough medical examination; and on 8 March Mr. Denson was
Mr. Cradock
Subsequently
told by the Chinese that Mr. Grey now had direct access to his
books. On 9 January Lord Shepherd summoned the Chinese Chargé
d'Affaires and made further representations on behalf of Mr. Grey
and other British subjects detained in China.
6. On 14 January Mrs. Grey called on Lord Shepherd to discuss
her son's detention. After the meeting she told the press that
she was satisfied that the Government were doing everything
possible in the present circumstances to secure Mr. Grey's
release. However, on 12 May a petition for the release of the
news workers, signed by 53 of Mr. Grey's relations, was delivered
to the Foreign and Commonwealth office. Mr. Foley met the
delegation.
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о
SPEAKING NOTES
Hr. Anthony Grey of Reuters
You are already aware of our deep concern
about Mr. Grey and our anxiety to do all we
reasonably can to secure his release. Lord
Shepherd told Krs. Grey about this when she
called on him on 14 January. He has aaked
be to say how sorry he is to be unable to meet
you today. He has kept me informed about
developments.
Until last autum I had
responsibilities for Far Eastern affairs and
had already made clear to Chinese officials
in London our views about their deplorable
treatment of Mr. Grey.
Representations
It is
2. We have made repeated representations to
the Chinese about Mr. Grey both here in
London and in Peking. We have tried to secure
his release; and failing that, some ameliora-
tion of his conditions of confinement.
disappointing that there has been so little
progress. But we may have managed to bring
about some small improvement in his conditions
When Mr. Denson, our Charge d'Affaires in
Peking, saw the Chinese on 8 March, he was
told that Mr. Grey had now access to his books
upstairs.
Prisoners in Hong Kong
3. The Chinese have attempted to draw an
equation between the release of Mr. Grey and
news
release of the eleven communist/workers
remaining in prison in Hong Kong. I should
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like to make several points on this:-
(a) A comparison between Mr. Grey and
the eleven communist newaworkers is
misleading:
(1)
Unlike Mr. Grey who has done
nothing wrong, the eleven news
workers were sentenced for
specific crimes committed
during the communist-inspired
disturbances in Hong Kong in
1967.
(ii) Unlike Mr. Grey, not all the
communist news workers are
bona fide Journalists.
(b) We are responsible for the security
of Hong Kong. The security of the
Colony depends upon proper respect
for the law. It could have grave
consequences for the future main-
tenance of order if the Hong Kong
Government were seen, as a result of
Chinese pressure, to be ready to
bend the law when the Chinese
demanded it. This is what the pre-
mature release of the eleven news
workers in Hong Kong might mean. If
we were to yield to Chinese pressure
tactica of this kind, it would grave-
ly impair the future value of prison
sentences as a deterrent.
Communist
wrong-doers would not take them
seriously, since they would hope that
we would again yield to pressure
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from the Chinese authorities, and
release or rescind the sentences.
All this would immediately be inter-
preted in Hong Kong as a sign of
weakness.
The local people would
lose faith in our determination to
resist, on their behalf, presaures
exerted on Hong Kong by the Chinese.
(c) Consequences for other British EJEK
Bubjects:
(1) The attempt to secure the
(11)
release of the news workers
by holding Mr. Grey is a
cynical case of the Chinese
attempting to obtain ransom.
If the Chinese are successful
in these tactics they will be
encouraged to try the same
methods towards other British
subjects in future.
(111) Apart from the Chinese, other
governments may also come to
the conclusion that they can
exert pressure on us by similar
methods. This could have
serious consequences for Britis
subjects and especially the
press in many countries.
Hopes for Mr. Grev's Release
14. What now are the proposals for Mr. Grey's
release? Ten of the eleven news workers are in
any case due out with full remission in
September.
As you will have seen from Saturday s
/press
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press, the Governor of Hong Kong has accepted
a recommendation from his Review Board of long
term sentences that the sentence of the
eleventh newsworker should be reduced from five
to three years. He should thus be out with
full remission in the first week of October.
Thus all eleven news workers will be released
by the first week of October. If we accept
that the Chinese regard the eleven news workers
and Hr. Grey as equivalent we can be reasonably
hopeful that Mr. Grey's ordeal should end about
the same time at the latest.
Tribute to Mr. Grey
5. I would like to say how deeply impressed
I have been at the strength of character which
Mr. Grey has shown under these appalling con-
ditions. Mr. Grey has in a sense been bearing
single-handed a large part of the burden of
safeguarding the wellbeing of the millions in
Hong Kong for whom we are responsible. We have
been in the difficult situation of having to
ask him to make the sacrifice of his own
liberty for a very long period without being
able to consult him or to explain to him the
significance of his privations. But all this
will have been wasted and to no purpose if his
release were secured in circumstances in which
the Chinese could claim effectively to the
people of Hong Kong that they had forced the
Hong Kong Government to do their bidding.