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PISILII-
Sırldımı
ki
CONFIDENTIAL
papano
R
- 8 JUL 1969
C 134/1
Int. J.MY:
If this refut is well. frameal. I taken it wo
compfermentini
that the Chines expret to be releasing At Sory in Odster.
IR. AUSHONY GREY:
for wive
Mr Mouton. Wohn
John Dickie of the Daily Mail, who has been 2/1.
taking a special interest in the Brooke and, to a lesser
extent, the Grey cases, told me today that a Daily Mail
correspondent abroad had, within the last 24 hours, been Witting 32.
told by a Chinese diplomat that "your Mr. Grey might be
out before your Mr. Brooke".
The
Водет
? Bem
jm
2.
When he first told me this, Dickie let slip,
accidentally I think, that this conversation took place in
Bonn. Later, however, when I asked him if he could be a bit
more specific about this information, he said he could not be.
(It is, I imagine, highly unlikely that a Chinese diplomat
would have a conversation with a Daily Mail correspondent in
Bonn, since Bonn and Peking do not have relations;
I suppose it is not impossible).
3.
however,
I said I did not think publication of this story
would be helpful to Grey and might have an adverse effect
upon his mother, raising her hopes perhaps without good reason.
He said he agreed with this and did not think the story would
be written.
copies to:
Sir T.Brinelow;
whittay
ак
(Well Haydon)
30 June, 1969.
Mr. Giffard;
P.5. to P.U.S.
CONFIDENTIA
Flag A
CONFIDENTIAL
COVERING TOP SECRET
Sir J. Jolusk
Mr. Moreton
padaly
MR. ANTHONY GREY OF REUTERS
AND THE CONVICTED NEWSWORKERS IN HONG KONG
RE L.
REGIC:
L
- 8 JUL 1969
638
32
FEL 124/11
The Governor of Hong Kong has still to be informed
that the Secretary of State has agreed the recommendation
Flag B (in my submission of 18 June that, at the present stage of
the Grey case, the least unsatisfactory course is probably
to have the eleven convicted newsworkers in Hong Kong serve
out their sentences until their due release dates in
September/October.
I have delayed informing the Governor
in the hope that we might be able to give him a precise
indication of the timetable in the Brooke case.
This
however is not yet clear. The Permanent Under-Secretary informed the
Soviet Chargé d'Affaires of our latest counter-
proposals yesterday; but it could be some time before
agreement is reached on procedures.
I think, therefore,
that we should inform the Governor now of the Secretary of
State's decision about the newsworkers, and promise him
further guidance in due course about the implications of
the Brooke case.
2. I submit a draft telegram to Hong Kong.
Department concur.
Hong Kong
3. A further submission is being prepared about the
implications of the Brooke case for the Grey case.
Copies to: Sir T. Brimelow
пошида
16 Boyd. B
h
Mr. Giffard
Mening
Janne Telmang.
(James Murray)
4 July, 1969.
16
CONFIDENTIAL TelSent 182.4/2
COVERING TOP SECRET
Toknow L
4/2
SECRETARY OF STATE.
SECRET
has.
seer and
MR. ANTHONY GREY.
80
ayready 262
G
pajamo
I have the following comments on the foregoing
submission.
2.
You will recall that in my minute of 8 May,
I recommended that we should urge Sir David Trench to
find ways and means, without prejudicing the security
of Hong Kong, of releasing all eleven new workers
(including Wong Chak) in June or July. You accepted
this recommendation and instructed me to pursue it
during my recent visit to Hong Kong. This I did.
3. After the Governor had given me his initial
reaction which, in essence, was that the prospects of his
finding a defensible means for the earlier release of all
eleven newsworkers were not good, he agreed to re-examine
every aspect of the matter and to send me a full
appraisal by my return to this country on 19 June.
Accordingly I decided to defer my recommendation to you
in this matter until I had seen the Governor's
assessment.
4.
Since I minuted to you on 8 May there are four
new factors which have to be taken into account:-
(i) The Governor's promised re-appraisal (Flag B).
(ii) The time factor. It is now only eight
SECRET
or/
S
SECRET
or nine weeks before the first of the newsworkers is
due for release and the last will be out within a
month of the first.
(iii) The possibility of serious riots and
troubles in the Hong Kong prisons if further concessions
were made to "left-wing" prisoners without similar
concessions being made to the other prisoners.
(iv) The news announced yesterday that the
Chinese had eased still further the conditions under
which they are holding hr. Grey. According to Mr.
Grey his period of open-air exercise has been greatly
extended and he has now been given access to all his
books and is allowed to listen to the radio. This
encourages the belief that the Chinese intend to
release him after all the newsworkers are released in
Hong Kong.
5.
In the light of these factors I accept the
recommendation of the Department though I think
-
it desirable that Cater in Hong Kong should continue
to keep in touch with his "contact" in order to
reduce any possibility of any misunderstanding arising
over the next few weeks.
6./
SECRET
[
6.
SECRET
There is, however, one point which still
causes me considerable concern. As I pointed out in
(82) my telegram from Hong Kong on 7 June (Flag A) we
have repeatedly told the Chinese that we could not
get involved in a direct bargain over Mr. Grey.
If they suspect, before Wong Chak is released on
3 October, that we are going to do a deal with the
Russians (their current No. 1 enemy) over Mr. Brooke,
it might jeopardise the chance of Mr. Grey being
released without our being asked to make further
concessions. I strongly hope, therefore, that
nothing will be done or said about the release of
Mr. Brooke until after 3 October,
L
HEXD)
25 June, 1969.
cc: Sir Denis Greenhill
Sir J.Johnston
Sir A. Galsworthy
hr. Moreton
SECRET
SECRET
разбир
871
Sir A. Galéworthy
Lord Shepherd
I agree with this submission and Mr. Murray's conclusion.
I am sure our capacity to continue to govern Hong Kong and to
keep faith with the Chinese there must be the over-riding
consideration, both in moral terms, because of our responsibility
for the welfare of the population in Hong Kong, and in economic
terms, to the degree we benefit from the prosperity which Hong
Kong enjoys, which is dependent on continuing internal
confidence in our will to govern and to stand firm under Chinese
pressure. We have told the Chinese quite unequivocally over a
long period that we will not suspend the rule of law by releasing
convicted prisoners in response to blackmail. To do so now would
be to throw away all we have gained from this firmness and to
heighten the Chinese victory, since they would not only have got
us to do their bidding, but to do it after we had said we would
not, and when we were within sight of having sat it out with them
over Grey. And I believe, far from attracting acclaim, we might
be very seriously criticised on the grounds that if it were
possible to release prisoners now, then they could have been
released earlier, and that we had therefore unnecessarily
prolonged the restrictions on Mr. Grey by our own indecision.
Copy to:
Private Secretary
Mr. Baker
Sir T. Brimelow
Mr. Carter
L& Lunston
(J.B. JOHNSTON)
20.6.69.
I strongly agree.
Anhalsaniy
220/6
Mr. Giffard
Mr. Murray
SECRET
1075
Sir J. Johnston
SECRET
(Covering TOP SECRET
Flag A (826
Flag B Flag B
MR. ANTHONY GREY OF REUTERS
In Hong Kong telegram No. 466 of 7 June Lord Shepherd
reported that the Governor of Hong Kong would be sending a
re-
full/appraisal of the problem of Mr. Grey and the convicted
newsworkers to reach London before Lord Shepherd's return.
This re-appraisal has now been received (Hong Kong telegram
No. 478 of 13 June).
RECOMMENDATION
2.
Subject always to such observations as Lord Shepherd
may have on his return, I recommend that the Governor should
thereafter be informed that, as we now see it, the least
unsatisfactory course is probably to have the newsworkers
complete their sentences in September/October, in the
reasonably confident expectation that Mr. Grey will be
released immediately thereafter. Hong Kong Department concur.
BACKGROUND
3.
The Governor makes the following points:-
(a) Any concession not directly connected with the eleven
newsworkers would be irrelevant to the solution of the
Grey case.
(1)
(b) If anything is to be done there are only two possibilities:
to release the eleven newsworkers as an open
political gesture (course A); Or
(11)
to find a cover story for remission of their
sentences (course B).
SECRET
(Covering TOP SECRET
1
SECRET
(c) But to interfere with the present equation of
Mr. Grey with the newsworkers might cause the Chinese
to raise their price and could embarrass the Chinese
"moderates".
(a) There are major objections to the release of the
newsworkers as a political gesture (course A):
(1)
It would weaken our stance that we govern Hong
Kong under the rule of law, and would encourage
future Communist pressure.
(11) It would result in a significant loss of political
confidence in Hong Kong. Morale of police, prison
staff and security forces would be adversely affected.
(e) The objections to releasing the newsworkers under a cover
story (course B) are:
(1) It is hard to find such a story.
(ii) Nobody would believe it.
(f) The Governor advises firmly against course A but states
that he will continue to search for a cover story under
course B, although he is pessimistic about finding one.
(g) Finally the Governor compares the cases of Mr. Brooke
and Mr. Grey: the former cannot be said to involve a
threat to the security of the United Kingdom;
in the
latter a serious threat to the security of Hong Kong is
the essence of the difficulty.
ARGUMENT
I have the following comments on the Governor's arguments.
SECRET
- 2 -
SECRET
(a) I agree that nothing less than the release of the eleven
newsworkers in Hong Kong will secure the release of
Mr. Grey. I do not think that the Chinese will release
Mr. Grey prematurely. But I am reasonably confident
that the release of the eleven will be followed by the
release of Mr. Grey, since I think it would be difficult
for the Chinese to change the price to which they are
publicly committed (but see also paragraph 7(a) below).
(b) I find it difficult to understand the alleged puzzlement
of the Chinese at the recent reductions in sentences and
the embarrassment of Chou Enl-Lai.
(c) I share the Governor's dislike of both courses A and B.
The objections to course A are strong. As I have argued
in past submissions, I believe that there is no doubt that
open defeat in this matter would encourage the Chinese to
conclude that, when subjected by them to sufficient
pressure, we shall always be prepared to bend the law for
political ends. They would consequently be encouraged to
try the same tactics when it suited them.
(a) More important, however, than the conclusions drawn by the
Chinese Government, are those drawn by the inhabitants of
Hong Kong. As long as the inhabitants of Hong Kong believe
that we are prepared to resist, on their behalf, pressures
from the communists, we can continue to run the Colony.
If our determination to do so were put seriously in doubt,
our position would become progressively more difficult.
A "kowtow" over Mr. Grey would be interpreted as a rebuff
SECRET
- 3 -
SECRET
by those Hong Kong Chinese who remained steadfast
throughout the "confrontation".
(e) As regards course B, I think it would be impossible to
contrive a cover story that would be accepted by the
press and the public. In the case of Wong Chak, the
eleventh newsworker, we were able to contrive means to
bring his sentence into line with those of the other ten
newsworkers and thus to ensure the release of all eleven
5.
by 3 October this year. The credulity of observers was
already strained by this exercise. Course B would mean
a contrived story not only for each of the other ten
newsworkers but also for Wong Chak for the second time.
I fear that any such attempt could only make the Hong
Kong authorities look dangerously foolish and undermine
public confidence.
Thus it seems to me that the Governor should not be pressed
further for the immediate release of the newsworkers. Except
for the real risk of trouble in the prisons (to which the
Governor has drawn attention) I think that in the short term
the security situation is probably sufficiently improved for
the shock to be absorbed. But in the long term, we would be
conceding a Chinese victory which would have incalculable
consequences for the future of the Colony. Our position in
Hong Kong depends on the belief of the local population in our
determination. If they doubt this they will start to re-insure
with the other side.
This means that we are concerned not
SECRET
-
4
SECRET
simply about a loss of face but about the erosion of public
support for and confidence in the Hong Kong Government's
ability to withstand communist pressure. And our only
possible gain from these risks would be the curtailment of
Mr. Grey's ordeal by a matter of 3-4 months.
6. There is an important secondary argument against our
trying to insist on the release of the newsworkers against
the better judgement of the Governor. In the storm of
criticism likely to arise in Hong Kong, it would almost
certainly become public knowledge that the releases had been
against the advice of the Governor and others bearing
responsibility on the spot. It could have most unfortunate
effects in Hong Kong if the impression were thus to be created
of a serious divergence of view between the Hong Kong
authorities and ourselves on a matter pertaining to the
security of Hong Kong.
7. There is a further much less considerable argument
against premature releases. Relations of other British
subjects detained in China e.g. the Gordon family, would
claim that we had in effect done a deal with the Chinese to
secure the release of Mr. Grey, and would press us to propose
further deals to the Chinese (involving other convicted
prisoners in Hong Kong) to secure the release of our other
nationals.
8. What bearing has the Brooke case on all this? There