SHALL SIGN INSIDE HONG KONG OF ANY ATTEMPT BY THE COMMUNISTS TO
NORMALISE THE SITUATION SEMICOLON BOMB ATTACKS CONTINUE REGULARLY
AND THE PRESS HAS MAINTAINED ITS VIRULENT CRITICISM OF GOVERNMENT
PRAISING VIOLENCE AND CALLING FOR PERSISTENT COUNTER-ATTACKS. SCHOOLS
AND UNIONS HOLD REGULAR 'DENUNCIATION MEETINGS' AND ADVOCATE CONTIN-
VALCE OF THE STRUGGLE. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES, THERE COULD BE. A
LOSS OF PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IF I WERE NOW OUT OF THE BLUE TO MAKE
SUBSTANTIAL CONCESSIONS TO THE COMMUNISTS. AGAIN, I SHOULD HAVZ THOUGHT
THERE WAS A DANGER THAT IF WE YIELD MUCH GROUND IN RESPONSE
TO THIS LATEST FORII OF PRESSURE, THE COMMUNISTS CWHO MAY ALREADY HAVE
BEEN ENCOURAGED BY GAINING MUCH OF WHAT THEY 'DEMANDED' IN THE
BORDER TALKS) MAY SIMPLY ASK FOR HORE.
·
2. THE POSITION IS THEREFORE A DIFFICULT ONE FROM HY POINT OF VIEW
SEMICOLON BUT I TAKE THE VARIOUS HAJOR CURRENT ISSUES IN TURN SELOW
TO INDICATE WHAT MIGHT BE DONE.
3. SCHOOLS. TO ASK THE COURTS TO GIVE ONLY LIGHT SENTENCES TO PUPILS
AND TEACHERS, HANY OF WHOM HAVE COMMITTED SERIOUS OFFENCES, WOULD SE
I
BE
A DANGEROUS INTERFERENCE WITH THE NORMAL PROCESSES OF LAW. IN FACT
COURTS HAVE FREQUENTLY TRIED TO BIND OVER COMMUNIST PRISONERS INSTEAD
OF SENTENCING, BUT IMPRISONMENT HAS FOLLOWED BECAUSE PRISOMERS
AAFUSED TO ENTER INTO A DOMD.
4. ON THE OTHER HAND, IN DEALING WITH COMMUNIST SCHOOLS WE HAVE
ALWAYS DONE OUR BEST TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT WE ARE CONCERNED TO
PREVENT
·
SECRET
SECRET
HONG KONG TELEGRM 89. 18OD KT. GOUNOHIFA TH OFFIGU
FOR
..
PREVRGE THE USE OF THE PAS MER HELLAL PURPOSES RATHER LIAN
I
INSTRUCTION IN THE THOUGHTS OF AO SERICOLOT! AND WE SHALL TAKE THE
GREATEST CARE IN FUTURE (AS HITHERTO) TO ENSURE THAT RAIDS TAKE
PLACE ONLY WHEN WE HAVE THE CLEAREST REASON TO BELIEVE THAT OFFENCES
ARE BEING COMMITTED IN A PARTICULAR SCHOOL.
5. THE ACTION AGAINST CHUNG WALL SCHOOL WAS NOT 'PUNITIVE'. PUPILS AND
STAFF OF THE SCHOOL HAVE BEEN INCREASINGLY INVOLVED IN BREACHES
OF THE LAW SEMICOLON TUO TEACHERS AND SEVENTEEN PUPILS HAVE BEEN
ARRESTED FOR 'STRUGGLE' OFFENCES SINCE SEPTEMBER SEMICOLON AND WHEN
WE GOT SUCH VERY DRAMATIC AND PUBLIC EVIDENCE THAT THE PREMISES
WERE BEING USED FOR THE HANUFACTURE OF EXPLOSIVES WE HAD NO OPTION
BUT TO TAKE ACTION.EXECUTIVE COUNCIL TODAY ADVISED THE DEREGISTRATION
OF THE CHUNG WAH SCHOOL AND THE HEADMASTER AND TEACHERS SEMICOLON BUT
THE TIMING OF THE DEREGISTRATIONS AND THEIR ANNOUNCEMENT HAVE
BEZH LEFT TO MY DISCRETION: AND I WILL TAKE NO FURTHER ACTION UNTIL I
HEAR FURTHER FROM YOU. IF THE SCHOOL IS MOT TO BE DEREGISTERED
IRCUNST
HAP
IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, HOWEVER, IT IS HARD TO THINK OF ANY MORE
!
VALID GROUNDS FOR THE DEREGISTRATION OF A SCHOOL.
6. I COULD ALSO RECONSIDER THE DETENTION OF THE HEADMASTER WONG CHO-
I FAN LATER: BUT I DOUBT IF I COULD BOTH RELEASE HIM AND NOT DEREGISTER
THE SCHOOL.
7. THE PRESS. THE MAJOR DIFFICULTY HERE IS THAT 'WEN WEI PAO' HAVE
ALREADY IN EFFECT 'DARED' US TO CONTINUE THE ACTION CHY TELEGRAN 1771
PARAGRAPII 1 REFERS) AND HAVE PROPHESIED THAT WE SHALL HOT DO
SO BECAUSE WE ARE FRIGHTENED OF THE CONSEQUENCES. NEVERTHELESS,
INTOPAGANDA CLAINS OF THIS SORT BY THE COMMUNISTS NO LONGER CUT TUD RUCH
ICE IN HONG KONG SEMICOLON AND I AM PREPARED TO ASK OLIVIER IF,
IN VIEW OF THE APPARENT BEARING OF HIS CASE ON THE TREATMENT OF THE
STAFF IN PEKING, HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO WAIVE THE CLAIM FOR DAMAGES
AS PROPOSED IN PARAGRAPH 3 OF PEKING TELEGRAM 298. ASSESSMENT OF
DAHAGES 15 DUE ON DECENLER 14, BUT 1-AM ADVISED THAT IT WOULD DE AS
VELL TO DISCONTINUE THE ACTION BEFORE THE DAY SET FOR THE HEAR ING. IF
THIS CONCESSION HAD ANY USEFUL EFFECT ON THE C.P.G., I WOULD DE
/PREPARED TO
SECRET
!
SECRET
تا
1
HONG KONG TELEGRAM NO. 1820 TO COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
-3-
PREPARED TO CONSIDER SIMILAR ACTION IN THE OTHER THREE OUTSTANDING
CINTERLOCUTORY JUDGMENTS HAVE DEEN GIVEN IN ALL, BUT DANAGES
ARE NOT LIKELY TO BE ASSESSED DEFORE THE END OF THE YEAR. I CANNOT
OF COURSE' GUARANTEE THAT THOSE CONCERNED WILL AGREE,
ALSO
8. I AN ALSO PREPARED TO DELAY FOR A TIME THE SEIZURE OF THE ASSETS
OF THE NEWSPAPERS CLOSED IN AUGUST CHY TELEGRAM 545 TO PEKINGS
WHICH HAVE NOT YET PAID THEIR FINES. HOWEVER THIS ACTION MUST
EVENTUALLY. BE TAKEN IN TIME TO PREVENT THE PAPERS RESUMING
PUBLICATION IN FEBRUARY.
9. DETAINEES. WE HAVE EARLIER DISCUSSED (SEE MY TELNO 1501)
THE QUESTION OF RELEASING DETAINEES AND/OR PRISONERS. ISUEN'S
REMARKS CPEKING TELNO 272) ABOUT NORMALISATION GEING DEPENDENT
O!! **THE RELEASE OF ALL PRISONERS'' SUGGEST THAT THE CHINESE MAY '....
ATTACH PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE TO THIS ISSUE. I COULD NOT IN
L
PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES AGREE TO THE UNCONDITIONAL RELEASE IN THE
COLONY OF ANY OF THESE PEOPLE SENICOLOM BUT I WOULD BE PREPARED
ON
+
TO RELLASE CERTAIN OF THEN ON CONDITION OF THEIR RETURN TO CHINA
ON DEPORTATION ORDERS, AND INDEED I WOULD GREATLY WELCOME THE
ASSURED ABILITY TO DO SO AND WOULD BE ABLE TO ACT WITH MORE
TOLERANCE IN OTHER WAYS IF THIS POSITION WERE ACHIEVED. IF HM
CHARGE D'AFFAIRES THOUGHT THERE WAS ANY ADVANTAGE IN SOUNDING
OUT THE CHINSES MFA ON THEIR WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT DEPORTEES,
I WOULD BE HAPPY TO PROVIDE NINI WITH DETAILS OF AN INITIAL BATCH
OF THESE PEOPLE FOR CONSIDERATION.
10. I AM AFRAID THAT NONE OF THIS HAY BE VERY EFFECTIVE, BUT IT
GOES AS FAR AS I THINK WE CAN HERE. I AM AFRAID ALSO THAT ALL
THIS MERELY ILLUSTRATES THE DANGERS OF THE DILEMHA WE ARE CONSTANTLY
III AS DETWEEN THE INTERESTS OF JONG KONG AND OUR MISSION, I WOULD
WELCOME YOUR EARLY VIEWS.
SECRET
/F.0. PLEASE PASS
'L
من
سا
SECRET
KONG TELEGRAM NO. 1820 TO COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
F.O. PLEASE PASS IMMEDIATE PEKING AS MY TELNO 648 AND ROUTINE
WASHINGTON AS MY 404.
SIR D. TRENCH
[REPETITION TO PEKING REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION,
REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POST.]
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
C.O. HONG KONG DEPT.
FAR EAST & PACIFIC DEPT.
J.I.R.D.
NEWS DEPT.
J.I.P.G.D.
F.O. FAR EASTERN DEPT.
PROTOCOL & CONFERENCE DEPT.
PASSPORT CONTROL DEPT.
DSAO PERSONNEL DEPT.
WWWWW
SECRET
ADVANCE COPIES SENT
Mr. de la Mure
Mr. Murray o/r
SECRET
Rr.
426HIVE: Day 3
-
12.
FD1/3
100
Mr. Wilford's Paper on Hong Kong
The Defence Review Working Party have been commissioned
to make a study of the long term future of Hong Kong for the
Defence and Oversea Policy Committee. The first rough draft
has been sent to the Cabinet Office by Mr. Carter. (This is
the only copy and in the interests of speed it has not been
cleared with us at this stage.) I understand that the draft
is to be circulated for comment by interested departments.
It will inevitably cover some of the ground in Mr. Wilford's
interesting paper. I have mentioned the paper informally to
the Commonwealth Office and we have agreed that any points in
it which we consider should be brought to the notice of the
Defence Review Working Party can be included as amendments
proposed by the Foreign Office.
2. My general comment is that unless there is a radical
change in the nature of the Chinese Government, it seems
unlikely that they would be prepared to negotiate on any terms
for the extension of the New Territories' lease after 1997.
A more moderate and pragmatic Government might however be
willing to negotiate about a smooth and peaceful handover of
the Colony and about any continuing British interest. Fe
will be submitting the Commonwealth Office draft with our
comments in due course.
SECRET
John Denson
(J. B. Denson) 22 November, 1967
L
Vens
2
NI
Very well. Please ensure that (a) the Memay sees 0/2 (6) in Wilkinson
sees on animal(abul "See 4)
I
I writ that, even in the interests of specs, The C.0 had not sent a
draft to the Cabinet Effice with and fist apeeing it with us. kinow that
we shall have an opportunity to comment, but if a craft to which we have
sting objecting has already been inculated to a number of Whittall
defalmeck it will be
difficult to have it amended. The then putin of thinskay is after all in
were which depends primarily
much more
with China
on om relations and I think that in the whole
we should have had if any had this is thing a greater share in the
drafting than the C.'O. This is not simply a matter of jurisdiction. it
is an F.O. responsibility to ensure that we fel the jinglet policy.
hom
24
am
23/4
May Wilson
23
pe
291
With the Compliments of the
Political Adviser
Hang rộng
PERSONAL
SECRET
(99)
November láth,' 1967.
FD1/31
I am so sorry not to have sent an earlier reply to your letter of
Outober 19th (which owing to some vagary of the bag I did not get until
the end of the month). I now enclose a copy of your paper with many
apologies for not having sent it before. Unfortunately, I have as yet
been unable, in the caelstrom of events connected with the frontier, to
get it finally approved here. I am, however, sending a copy of it, with
a copy of this letter to Arthur de la Mare.
2. Tung".
3.
I also enclose your copy of the "Thoughts of Mao Tse
You will have seen that the spate of curious events in the frontiur area
contimed for a considerable time, and
I should be very surprised if more do not happen in the future, though
just for the present wo have a lull, for obvious reasons. I am afraid
that, given the pressures from both sides, the prospects of reaching any
sensible settlement seem din.
K.M. Wilford, Esq., British Embassy, WASHINGTON.
do please
Mu Dungen for de
An
Sup as wi
100
SECRET
2014
(T.A.K. Elliott)
Mle
1744
No...
ghofred by Typed by-
This is the only fully corrected aby taking account f
Commento by
OAG.
FS
DES
SLO APA.
38/8.
Mo
+
41. Wilford.
2.
and
DRAFT
P
MASTER CO PY
In the annexed paper I soci
(a) to all the origins of the aorzisítion
by the British Crown of the various
parts of what is today the GroWM
Colony of Hong Kong;
(b) to assess the likely devolopmento oz
internat
ធម៌
the China scone in co far as tim,
affect Hong Kong;
(c) to outline the possible
--thos
which China and Eritain zu *
resolve their recpuctive pos.bions
over Hong Kong;
(d) to select which of the altorno.
at (c) above is most likely to your butt
Couns Sachin
a practicable in the long term.
I submit this paper for czivi.ás-
discussion. I believe that the procent permut
has had at least the virtue of convincing people
that the future of the Colony must be seriously
pigeon-horac рідеа
considered and not pushed tanker themes for faer
of effecting confidence. I do not believe the
future is wholly black and I think it is vital
that H.N.G.. in the U.K.,as woll as the HVX.
Government, should seriously consider the Loe
with a view to deciding which of the possible
solutions outlined ought to be acceptable to them,
on the assumption that something short of total
retro-cession to China of all the Colony Duiritory
is acceptable to whatever regins onergas in Okina
from the Cultural Revolution.
سمت
AREVA
SECRET
MWA
3
L
:
0001740 0.8. 174
DRAFT
Te No. Drafted by- Typed by-
+
Hone Fong, its past and future,
In 1841 following continued allegationsor 111 treatment of the British
merchants at Canton
it was decided to mount a naval show of force ofI
the forts at the entrance to the post of Canton
on the Pearl River. This show of forcu hovlag
proved successful the Chinese Viconcy as Gantun agreed to ceãe to
Britain in the same year wo
island on which Victoria now stands as a baɛe tru which British
merchants might prosecuto their trado with China. The Emperor
subsequently repudiabet this Viceroy's signature end it uas not able Dho
Troaty of Manking was signed in 1342 at the -ù c2
e first Anglo-Chinese Lar that the cassida zas
we had of may lakon possession of the island. legally confirmed, The
island, at the moment of ¡ cession, was virtually barren apart rem
prvy-Ling
Though
barg
the home and livelihood wer a few fisherful..
2.
It is worth recalling that Fortumna lis already been in possession of
the settlement of
Facao since 1557; H.. tas therefore only the second such cession to Rest
European peters chich China had been obliged to incode. She had
however since the 17th century bean involved in the placation of
Imperial Jussia's culto 1.
Kanchuria, where Russian end Chinesc ingerich
interests had first came into collision about
1651.
3.
In 1856 war broke out between Britain
and China for the second tine. Following the
advance of British forces from Tientsin to Pulling
العب
SECE
/0
+
+
0001740 4.F. 174
+
DRAFT
-2-
File No.
Drafted by- Typed by-
1
a further agreement was made, repudiated again
and subsequently ensirined in the Convention of
Poking of 1860 by which Chins coded, also in
perpetuity, the piece of the minimă opposite
Hong Kong island on which the British had, during
the second Angle-Chinese war, boom recustomed to
Erm
billet troops, which today we know as Kowloon.
The land which we acquired by this second cocsion
is limited by what is today known as Boundary
Stroot (in the middle of the built up area of Kowloon) and
Twe
aproximately 2 miles from the
Star Ferry, and boussou on the Leat approximately
by the present site of Had Tali alıyort. 70 the
came time as Kowloon was acquirJÁ 23 200
Stonecutters Island; no doubt at that t
little more than a quarrying site as ilu met -
* implied.
For the next 35 years the Crown Colony
of Hong Kong romained about 40 square miles in
extent. In 1995 however China suffered a further
shattering defeat at the hands of Japan and by
the Treaty of Shimonoseki had to make turritezial
concessions to the Japanese - particularly in
Korea - over which Ching had previously exercicod
a protectorate. Other imperial powers felt that
they could not be left out in the racc
concessions from the Chinesc; the hul
obtained concessions in Kanchuria, apart from
enormous gains at Chinese expense in what aro
SELEN
/tolay
3H |
I
0001740 0.7. 174
DRAFT
File No. Drafted by- Typed by-
Kat she
feeding rected ₤
space to answer
the foroper refence
of the Colony, decited
←
today the Far Eastern maritime provinco of the Soviet Union. The Germans
sought and obtainod concessions in Shantung. The French, at the
conclusion of the Franco/thinese war of 1235, had obtained a foothold in
southern China. Britain, feeling harcelë obligod-not to
ta-loft-buhanásán the-sereable for concessions, but n
wat my
MOPARSITY-G Caca-to
10 SOPA
تا
mêy in 1898 2/r the incorporation of the Hou
in toccosby it
Territories size passiemosinalitatii on a
99 years leace. Although the extent of the loase was fairly easily
agroed, questicas of jizzodietien in the lensed area and the sethod of
herdoves proved core difficult problems and in the and the area was, in
April 1899, more or un itches ally
lescą takon ovos
the Chinese being in no
lien
to resist. By this Icase Britain acquirtù not only the New Territories
as we know them today, but also the island Swithin what we call tho
Square Boundary, that is, in particular, the island of lentao, but also
many other islands.
5.
-
:
To the Chinese Government the Treaty of Nanking, the Convention of
Feking and the agreement by which the New Territorics vore lɛased all
caus within the heading of "unequal treaties" ca unoqual treaty being
defined as a treaty imposed on vaina following military defcat, or,
alternatively, a truaty imposed upon her at a moment of Stato to
Accordingly to their mind not cly is
weakness.
SP...
/tho
0001740
DRAFT
-4-
די
File No.
Drafted by-
Typad by--
That remment fre
but it is also own
to the stimulus to
production given by
the lease of the New Territories invalid
which
in any case is due to come to an end in 1997, but
the cessions are also invalid.
6.
of view
It is perhaps
-
from the British point
most logical to consider the future
situation of Hong Kong using the explay of the lease of the New
Territories as a starting point. The New Territories provide that
elcmcnt of space
without which the Island and Kowloon cannot breathe.
also
They/contain the international airport and the major part of Hong Kong's
industrial production factories. Joday/H.X. is able to produce tex
201
ريد
407
of its vegetables, and a small proportion of ita
pigs, chickens and eggs,
(hip is largel, State
1-18/
becsuce of the improved methods of farming which have been developed in
the New Territories,e to-s-ii-jv extent tug to the fantastic increase in
the
Colony's population first because of the Japanese invasion of China in
1937 and more recently
following the establishment of the Feople's Rep- ublic of China across
the border. Coupled with the
high birth rate this has led to an increase in the
population of the Colony from 1.6 million in 1941 when the Japanese
invaded and captured the Colony to almost 4 million toway, though in the
intervening period it had dropped sharply, there being only
approximately 600,000 at the end of
the Japanese occupation. Kore important hotover
is the fact that the New Territories provide
the catchment areas for the Colony's main
SECRET
/reservoirs
DRAFT
-4A
File No.
Drafted by- Typed by-
reservoirs at Tai Lam Cheung (Castle Peak),
Jubilee reservoir at Tsuen Wan and at Shek Pik on
Lantac island. There are smaller reservoirs on
1
SECRET
+
.. island
0001740
UN. 174
DRAFT
-5-
File No.
Drafted by- Typed by-
444H
and cutting sependence
Ź
-com China
whom the East Rive supply had just bee arrvangend
H.K. island itself at' Pokfulam, Tad Tan Tak and
Aberdeen.
Added to the existing resorvoir capacity
new
of the New Territories will be the/Plover Cove scheme in 1968 which will
practically treble storage capacity to a total of 47,000 million
gallons. It is already coming into use, Bere
an arm of the sea has been dammed and is being gradually diluted so that
it will eventually be a fresh water res.rvoir. By far the largest
proportion, therefore, of Hong Kong's water supply
(while) is conserved in the New Territories,
(passed the pipe line) through the few ferrit Some taten sup.13
(through) (watas) from the East River in China/which is provided under
an agreement signed by Hong Kong and the Kwangtung provincial
authorities in 1964 at a cost of HK41.06 per 1,000 gallons. A possiþlo
zeans
pasiple Comoply of the Colonyd
I
of adding to the fresh water/would be by the construction of
desalinisation plants.
tw
A pilot
plant converting about 2 million gallons per day
was rejected by Government some
being far too costly and too small
;
'months ago; as
s cake
to affect the
issue, when daily consumption now varios between 60 and 130 million
gallons depending upon whether severe rationing or a 24 hour supply is
in force. The supply_from the Sast River had then just-boca arranged. It
is for future consideration ho....JP whether a nuclear plant, coupled
with electricity generation might help to solve Hong Kong's
Encha problems as these are developca, though to raise even more
delicate problems in relatie..
China, if China remained hostile. Moreover, the
economic disposal of the electricity might be a problem.
SECRET
0001740
1121
DRAFT
1
-6-
I File No.
Drafted by- Typed by-