88888
SECRET
Cypher/Cat A
SECRET
PRIORITY PEKING TO FOREIGN OFFICE
Telny 326
SECRET
RECEIVED 'N
11 December 1967
EC 1967
FD13
18
kodressed to Foreign ürrice telegram No. 526 of 11 December. Repeated
for information to Hong Kong.
Your telegram No. 1069: Deportation
I agree that the Chinese are unlikely to enter into discussion on this
subject. Procedure as outlined in your paragraph 2 seems best though I
think our communication should be a bare statement of ract with no
(repeat no) reference to improving relations. The Chinese would in any
case understand it in this sense.
2. I cannot guarantee that the Chinese would agree to accept deportees.
It is quite probable that they would refuse. But it is possible they
would accept them and at the same time make a lot of propaganda spout
illegal deportations. It would I think therefore be worth trying at some
stage, providing the Governor can take them back ir necessary, Even in
this case the gesture would have been made and they might come back on
it later. Let us see how we get on over wen Hui Pao before taking a
decision.
Foreign Ürrice please pass Priority Hong Kong 168.
Mr. Hopson
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
F... F.E.D.
U.0. H.A.Dept.
[Repeated as requested)
Is Myray..
I think The Hopson in
F.E. & P.D. J.L.R.D.
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SECRET
CYPHER/CAT A
PRIORITY COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO HONG KONG
0 2500
نا
Mona
O
(D.T.D.)
7 DECEMBER, 1967 (HWB 3/2)
1 DEC 1967
FD1/3
SECRET
FD1/3/113
ADDRESSED TO HONG KONG T.LEGRAM NO. 2500 OF 7 DECEMBER.
RAM NO. 2500 OF 7 DECEMBER. REPEATED
FOR INFORMATION TO PEKING POLAD SINGAPORE AND WASHINGTON. YOUR
TELEGRAMNNO 1828 PEKING STAFF EXIT VISAS.
WE ARE GRATEFUL FOR YOUR HELPFUL COMMENTS AND AGREE WITH ANALYSIS IN
YOUR PARAGRAPH 1.
THE
2. WE ACCEPT BOTH THE JUSTIFICATION AND THE NEED FOR YOUR POLICY ON
COMMUNIST SCHOOLS AND PUPILS AND DO NOT WISH TO URGE THAT YOU RECONSIDER
THE DECISION TO QUOTE DEREGISTER UNQUOTE CHUNG WAH SCHOOL OR ITS STAFF
OR FOR THE TIME BEING THE DETENTION OF THE HEADMASTER. SUBJECT TO
HOPSON'S VIEWS (SEE PARAGRAPH 4 BELOW) HE MIGHT AT SOME STAGE BE USED AS
A BARGAINING COUNTER.
3. THE CONSIDERATIONS SET OUT IN YOUR PARAGRAPHS 7 AND 8 RELATING TO
OUTSTANDING ACTIONS AGAINST THE PRESS ARE FULLY APPRECIATED AND
UNDERSTOOD, WE DO NOT THINK THAT ANY GENERAL ATTEMPT SHOULD BE MADE TO
AMELIORATE THE LEGAL CONSEQUENCES FOR THESE NEWSPAPERS, BUT YOU MIGHT
DELAY THE SEIZURE OF ASSETS OF NEWSPAPERS AS PROPOSED IN YOUR PARAGRAPH
8, UNTIL WE SEE HOW THE SITUATION DEVELOPS IN PEKING,
4. WE ALSO SUPPORT THE SUGGESTION IN PARAGRAPH 9 THAT IF THE CHINESE MFA
ARE WILLING TO ACCEPT DEPORTEES CERTAIN OF THE DETAINEES MIGHT BE
RELEASED ON CONDITION OF THEIR RETURN TO CHINA ON DEPORTATION ORDERS.
HOPSON IS, HOWEVER, BEING ASKED FOR HIS VIEWS ON THIS IN A SEPARATE
TELEGRAM.
CROSEC
DEPARTMEN
DISTRIBUTION
0.0. HONG KONG DEPT.
2.3.1.D.
عهم
J.I.R.D.
!.!.P.G.D.
NEWS DEPT.
F.O. F.2.D,
YOL AND CONFERENCE DEPT.
P.C.D.
D.S.A.C. PERSONNEL DEPT.
SECRET
+
石
CYPHER/CAT A
FD1/3.
SECRET
116
PLURITY FOREIGN OFFICE TO PEKING
TELNO. 1069
SECRET
8 DECEMBER 1967 (FED)
ADDRESSED TO PEKING TELEGRAM NUMBER 1069 OF 8 DECEMBER REPEATED
FOR INFORMATION TO HONG KONG.
HONG KONG TELEGRAM NUMBER 1820 DEPORTATION OF PRISONERS.
PARAGRAPH 9.
OUR PRELIMINARY VIEW IS THAT THE CHINESE WOULD BE UNLIKELY TO ENTER INTO
A DISCUSSION ABOUT ACCEPTING DEPORTEES AND THAT THAT ONLY EFFECT OF
PUTTING THE PROBLEM TO THEM WOULD BE TO MAKE
THEM PRESS FOR FULFILMENT OF ALL THE QUOTE FIVE DEMANDS UNQUOTE. 2.
THERE MIGHT HOWEVER BE SOME ADVANTAGE IN SELECTING A BATCH OF SUITABLE
PRISONERS AND DETAINEES AND THEN NOTIFYING THE CHINESE THAT AS AN
EARNEST OF OUR DESIRE TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WE INTENDED TO RELEASE THEM
AND RETURN THEM TO CHINA ON A CERTAIN DAY. IF THE CHINESE WERE NOT
(REPEAT NOT) PREPARED TO ACCEPT THEM THEY WOULD PROBABLY MAKE THIS CLEAR
IN ADVANCE, IF THEY MADE NO REPLY BUT, WHEN THE TIME CAME, REFUSED TO
ACCEPT THEM AT THE FRONTIER, THE PERSONS CONCERNED WOULD HAVE TO BE PUT
BACK IN CONFINEMENT. IF THE CHINESE DID ACCEPT THE FIRST BATCH IT MIGHT
THEN BE POSSIBLE TO INDICATE THAT PROVIDED AN IMPROVEMENT IN RELATIONS
WAS MAINTAINED THERE WOULD BE FURTHER RELEASES. THIS WOULD EVENTUALLY
GIVE THE CHINESE AN EXCUSE TO CLAIM THAT THEIR DEMAND ABOUT PRISONERS
HAD BEEN MET, AS WELL AS RELIEVING HONG KONG OF UNWANTED PERSONS. 3.
CLEARLY THIS MAY NOT EVEN BE A STARTER, BUT WE SHOULD WELCOME
YOUR VIEWS.
SOSFA
Now see reply.
р.с
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
7.0. C.0.
F.E.D.
H.K.D.
F.E. & P.D.
DDDDD
J.I.R.D.
SECRET
L
Registry No. 01/3.
DEPARTMENT
P.E.D.
SECUNTY CLASSIFICATION
PRIORITY MARKINGS
(Date)
despatch
Top-Secret
Secret
Restricted"
Emergency) #
Impudiate Priority
En Clair Code
[
Cypher
Security classification
[Codeword-if any}
--
Draft Telegrando:-
Addressed to
No.
(Dale)
EK ZAG
And fo:-
1069
8/12
telegram No...
And to
repeated for information to
* Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should,
reach addressee(s)
9/12
+
SECRET
Peking
Lobs (date)
ד
Hong Kong
8 Dec
(116.
.
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
Ø
Repeat to:-
FONG RONG
2512
Saving to:-
Григор
Distribution:-
8 the.
Departmental
F.E.D. H.K.D.
Copies to:--
1805787:2
Saving to..
+
1071
Hong Kong telegram No. 1820 paragraph I Deportation of prisoners
Paragraphe
Our preliminary view is that the Chinese
would be unlikely toenter into a discussion
about accepting deportees and that the only effect
of putting the problem to them would be to make
them press for fulfilment of all the "five demands".
2. There might however be some advantage in
selecting a batch of suitable prisoners and
detainees and then notifying the Chinese that as
an earnest of our desire to improve relations we
intended to release them and return them to China
on a certain day. If the Chinese were not (repeat not) prepared to
accept them they would probably
make this clear in advance If they made no reply
but, when the time came, refused to accept them
at the frontier, the persons concerned would have
to be put back in confinement. If the Chinese
did accept the first batch it might then be
possible to indicate that provided an improvement
in relations was maintained there would be further
releases. This would eventually give the Chinese
/an
SECRET
an excuse to claim that their demand about prisoners had been
met, as well as relieving Hong Kong of unwanted persons.
MANI
theim hating many
SVEN
with even
3. Clearly this
welcome you'
VILLA
VICUS.
stanter, but we should
Алеви
Departmental dist.
(2) 100% HUAJ ŠUL
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
118
~/pher/Cat A
SECRET
Tel. Sent to Hong Kong recommending postponement
FLASH PEKING TO FOREIGN OFFICE"
Tel 325
SECRET
of avermers.
11 December 1967
р-с
11 SEC 1967
3
Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 325 of 11 December, Repeated
for information to Hong Kong, Washington, POLAD Singapore
Not yet lead
Your telegram No. 2500 to Hong Kong: Measures to assist Mission in
Peking.
Not
Reedy
西
FD1/3 (102)
You will since have seen Hong Kong telegram No. 1835 and my telegram No.
322 in which I recommended evasive action in
Fen Hul Pao case. As assessment of damages is due to take place on 14
December action will have to be taken very soon.
2. I have stressed in my telegrams that as seen from here measures
against Chinese press in Hong Kong are most sensitive issue here. I may
be wrong but I believe action in suppressing violence e.g. [? ¿p
omitted] on schools is more readily under- stood here. We have reason to
think Chinese leaders dislike schools being used for this purpose though
they feel it incumbent to protest ainst raids and to exploit them as
useful propaganda theme. Action against press has always been a
particularly sore spot and has resulted in counter case here e.g.
detention of Gray and burning of this mission. The latest Chinese
protest contains warning that further counter case may be taken if we
press Wen Hui Al [sic] case to conclusion.
3. In paragraph 2 of my telegram No. 322 I argue that there is another
reason to place action against Chinese press in a different category.
According to Mr. Hsueh, Wen Hui Pao has "never incited people to make
bombs". I should be grateful if Hong Kong would confirm whether this is
broadly true. If it is not I should be grateful to receive by telegram
some inflammatory examples, which would have to be recent to be relevant
to present situation. In any case Hsueh's remarks may be relevant to the
future. If the Chinese leaders wish to disengage to some extent and go
over to "peaceful struggle" they will need their main organs Wen Hui Pao
and Ta Kung Pao to propagandise line and reassert control. If this is
true it would not (repeat not) be in our interests to interfere with
them too much at present.
4. I therefore feel obliged to revert to my strong recommendation that
we whould take some evasive action in Wen Hui Pao case. If it is too
much to get Olivier to withdraw I hope as a minimum it would be possible
to find some way of postponing assessement of damage.
5. We have just been summoned to the Consular Department this afternoon
to discuss visas. I hesitate to forecast what this will bring but if it
is a Christmas present then I think that arguments for stalling on Wen
Hui Pao will be even stronger.
/6. I am
SECRET
SECRET
PEKING TELEGRAM NO. 325 TO FOREIGN OFFICE
2
Awriting Amil
?
6.
I am replying separately to your telegram No. 1069.
Foreign Office pass Flash Hong Kong 167, Priority Singapore 47,
Washington 47.
Mr. Hopson.
[Repeated as requested]
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
ADVANCE COPIES SENT
F.0.
F.E.D. P.C.D.
D.D. P.U.S.D.
C.O. H.K.D.
P.E.F.D.
Defence Dept.
J.I.R.D.
J.I.P.G.D.
News Dept. O.P.A.
O.L.A.
DDDDD
SECRET
+
!
1
Cypher/Cat.A
SECRET
R
112
N. 31
Ná
Read
IMMEDIATE PEKING TO
Telno. 322
SECRET
FOREIGN OFFICE
9 December 1967
Soperte Rubhuise.
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ILI
1367
Fort3
"/
Addressed to Foreign Office telegram M. 322 of 9 December. Repeated for
information to Hong Kong.
Hong Kong telegram No. 1835 to Commonwealth Office: Chinese Policy
towards Hong Kong.
I see the situation as rather more complex. Ever since the Cultural
Revolution began events in Hong Kong have to a large extent reflected
events in China. Earlier this year we had a phase of extreme violence.
Now the tendency in China is to try to re-impose control. But the
leadership is finding this a difficult task in many provinces one of
which is Kwangtung where the situation is always closely relevant to
Hong Kong. It is therefore quite probable that in the present
circumstances the Chinese leadership does wish to disengage to some
extent in Hong Kong, but are finding it difficult to re-impose control
on their groups particularly there. An important cause of this
difficulty may be that the situation in Kwangtung has not yet been
settled. In order to re-assert control in Hong Kong and to strengthen
hand of the "moderates" they may deem it essential to show some kind of
"victory".
2.
The question arises therefore as to whether we should make some kind of
gesture to help this trend. There is a danger, as the Governor has
pointed out, that this would be seen as a sign of weakness and might
have an effect contrary to that desired by encouraging the extremists to
ask for more. On the other hand it might help the Chinese leaders to
reassert control and disengago. At this stage I agree that it would
probably be unwise to give substantial further grofind. Nevertheless
"Wen Hui Pao" must I think be seen as rather a special case.
Distinctions can be drawn between operations to stop violence and action
against the main Left Wing newspaper. It is relevant that on 6 December
Mr. Hsueh maintained that Wen Hui Pao had never instigated
[grp.omitted]ism. To allow ourselves to get into a position where with
damage assessed and payment refused Hong Kong Government are obliged to
take severe legal measures .g. distraint against the newspapers would I
am sure be seen by the Chinese as extreme provocation. Their wrath might
well be visited on this Mission as threatened in their latest protest by
the imposition of further restrictions. A withdrawal by civil plaintiff
would not on the other hand directly engage the prestige of Hong Kong
Government.
3. We do not wish to give the Chinese Government the impression that we
are vulnerable to pressure. Indeed here we are letting it be known that
everyone is settling down to make the most of Christmas and we have
stopped pressing daily for exit visas.
We may have
SECRET
+
SECRET
Peking telegram No. 322 to Foreign Office
- 2 -
We may have to wait some time in the hope things will calm down in Hong
Kong and this may not come till the Province of Kwangtung is settled. I
agree that meanwhile emphasis in Hong Kong must be on maintenance of law
and order but I hope this may be done with the maximum of restraint and
constant regard for possible repercussions on this Mission. Neverthe-
less I think it is essential to take some evasive action in the Wen Hui
Pao case if we are to avoid serious trouble and I recommend strongly
that plaintiff be asked to withdraw his claim for damages unless there
is some better way of shelving the case.
Foreign Office pass Immediate Hong Kong 165.
Mr. Hopson
[Repeated as requested]
FILES
F.0.
F.E.D.
Sir D. Allen
Mr. Wilkinson
P.S.
P.S.'s Dept.
P.S..to P.U.S.
H.K.D.
C.O.
F.E. & P.D.
Mr. Hall
P.S.
P.S.'s Dept.
P.S..to P.U.S.
SSSSS
SECRET
ADVANCE COPIES SENT
TELEGRAM SECTION
Room 124 K.C.S.
Communications Department FED
FD1/3
114
YTC/1
* Please send copies of the following telegram
*Copy/ies of the following telegram has/have been sent
Amended Dist 11/12/67
(* delete as applicable)
FROM PEKING 322.
TO:
9/12/67
Hong Kong Situation (" China, Altitude) Dat
(Signed)
(Department)......
(Date)......
Action taken in Communications Department:
(Initials)....
rm
(Date)....
11/12/67
AFTER ACTION THIS FORM SHOULD BE SENT TO
THE APPROPRIATE ARCHIVES DIVISION FOR RETENTION
156397 500 Pads 2/66-McC & Co Ltd-K.16430 (3609)
LOP COPY
REDES
AMENDED DISTRIBUTION
Cypher/CLV.A
ILMEDIATE PEKING TO
FOREIGN OFFICE
322
1.114
14 DECEMBER 1967-
IAR: Sew Ne 31
9 December 1967
1 20EC 1967
FD1/B
Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 322 of 9 December. Repeated for
informauion to Hong Kong.
Hong Kong telegram No. 1835 to Commonwealth Office: Chinese Policy
Towards Hong Kong.
I see the situation es rather more complex. Ever since the Cultural
Revolution began events in Hong Kong cave to a large Gliment reflected
events in Chine. Earlier this year we had a Phase of extreme violence.
Now the tendency in China is to
But the leadership is finding this a difficult task in many provinces
one of which is Kwangtung where the situation is always al gely relvant
to Hong Kong. it is
try to re-impose control.
ANTA CL
+
Tow:
Champse loddersnip does wish to disengage to some extent in hong long,
but are finding it difficult to re-impose control on th.iz groups
particularly there. Ar. important cause of this d.iculty may be that the
situation in Kwangtung has not yet been settled. In order to re-assert
control in Hong Kong and to strengthen hand of the "nuderetes" they may
deem i essential to show some kind of "victory".
2.
RAK
The question arises therefore as to whether we should sore kind of
gesture to help this trend. There is a danger, As the Governor has
pointed out, that this would be seen as a
of weakness and might have an effect contrary to that
and diseng-ge.
kypet that it wolle partake,
be unwise to give substantial further ground. Nevertheless
+
BUL FAT" Z
think he seen so manden & oneniel nese. ORDERS DEZ qe drawn Den een
operaDA ODO
is belevazu
action against the main Luib Wing newspaper. that on 6 December Kr.
Egueh zairiained that Wen Hui Pao had never
To allow ourselves to get into a instigated Igrp.omittedlism. position
where with damage assessed and payment refused Hong Kong Government are
obliged to take severe legal measures e.g. distraint against the
newspapers would I am sure be seen by the
Their wrath might well be Chinese as extreme provocation.
sited on this Mission as threatened in their latest protest bo
A withdrawal by civil the imposition of further restrictions. plaintiff
would not on the cozer land direc.ly engage the prestiD- of Hong Kong
Government.
3. We do not wish to give the Chinese Government the impression Indeed
here we are letting it tom. we are vulnerable to pressure. be known that
everyone is ttling down to make the most of Christmas and we have
stopped pressing daily for exit visas.
SECRET
We may have
I
SKOREA
Peking Telegram No. 322 to Foreign Office
- 2 -
may have to wait some time in the hope things will calm
i Eong Kong and this may not angtung is settled. I agree that
till the Province of anwhile emphasis in
Hong Kong must be on maintenance of 1. and order but I hope
15 may be done with the maximum of restraint and constant regard for
possible repercussions on this Kission. Neverthe- is I think it is
essential to take some evasive action in the Wen Hui Pao case if we are
to avoid serious trouble and I recomand strongly that plaintiff be asked
to withdraw his claim for damages unless there is some better way of
shelving the case.
Foreign Office pass Immediate Hong Kong 165.
Hopson
[Repeated as requested]
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUZION
F.O. F.E.D.
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SECRET
ADVANCE COPIES SENT
I
1
1
J
CYPHER/CAT A
IMMEDIATE HONG KONG TO COM ONWEALTH OFFICE
SECRET U
Reply sear.
#gondo
113
pay (1.T.).)
TC 1820
5 DECEMBER, 1967
FD1/3
SECRET ADDRESSED C.O. TELEGRAM 1820 OF 5 DECEMBER REPEATED FOR INFORM
TO. PEKING, POLAD SINGAPORE AND WASHIN
F2313-186
184
WASHINGTON
PEKING TELEGRAMS 296, 297 AND 298 PEKING STAFF EXIT VISAS.
I AM MOST ANXIOUS TO DO ANYTHING I CAN TO HELP THE STAFF IN PEKING IN
THE FACE OF THIS VERY UNPLEASANT DEVELOPMENT, BUT THERE HAS BEEN