NOTE:
This timetable is based on the planned timetable for the 1967 Defence
Studies, adjusted to allow for the Spring Bank Roliday (31 May to 3
June). Actual timetable in 1967 was a week later, owing to the Middle
East crisis.
CONFIDENTIAL
From: C.J. Howells, DS22
Please address any reply to MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
(
and
DS22
Your reference:
DS22/9B
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE Main Building, Whitehall, LONDON S.W.I
Telephone: WHitehall 7022, ext. 6732
6th February 1868
12
137
The Howelle listed
we
There they
are not very happy about the
Would lie to dicun
Dean Dawid paper and
it before pulling delected silicisin
on pupes Hong Kong : Draft Repoft
7:00
Thank you for suggesting that I might come to the meeting you will be
holding with Defence Department and the Planners later this week to
discuss the draft en- closed with Carter's letter of 30th January to
Murray. If you do not think it would make the meeting too unwieldy it
would be most helpful if a military member of the Defence Policy Staff
could come along with me.
Meanwhile we shall be considering the parts of the paper which concern
us, but not formulating our views until we know what the scale and
approach of the Foreign Office comments are likely to be.
Ducured with Mr Carta (co)
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David Wilson Esq.,
Far Eastern Department, Foreign Office,
S.W.1.
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RECEIVED IN
Chuis; ARCHIVES No.31
- 8 FEB 1968
FD1/3
Ed (4206)
·
!
Reference....
10113.
See Annex
136
(4/3)
RECS ¡ARL
> IN
No 31
Few 368
FDI 3
p.w.
BRITISH EMBASSY,
TOKYO
30 January, 1968
CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL
Jear later,
Fub.
M: James Manny Me sht
famu
M: Donato Maitland.
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2
135
The Secretary of State and Hong Kong
128
I am sorry to have worried you about Mr. Pao and his interpretation of a
remark, supposedly made by the Secretary of State to him in my house. I
had already suggested the explanation, which you kindly gave me in your
telegram No. 178 of 19 January, but it was helpful to have it in
attributable form. In the event, the Pao resident here decided to drop
the matter and told his brother in Hong Kong as much.
2.
Unfortunately they had between them conveyed the story to Mr. J.K. Swire
of Butterfield and Swire and he had already left for Hong Kong,
determined to put the matter to the Governor on the racecourse (old
world touch!) the next day. Butterfield and
Swire's helpful manager here succeeded in dissuading Swire by telephone
and the brothers Pao have now taken the face-saving line that Swire's
deafness was basically at fault
3. I was therefore able to tell you that this rumour had been scotched
(my telegram No. 106 of 24 January).
ever
p.a.
'i
..Z.W
7:ü
ohn
(John Pilcher)
P.A. Wilkinson, Esq., C.M.G., D.E.O., 0.B.E.,
FOREIGN OFFICE. 8.W.1.
CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL
Ed (4206)
Reference..
西
FD1/3 (130
See Annex.
En Clair
TOKYO TO FOREIGN OFFICE
Telno 106 24 January 1968
UNCLASSIFIED
Your telegram No. 178.
FG Divn. (133
Copy No....
3
RECEIVED IN ¡ARCHIVES No 31 2. JAN 1968
FD13
FD 1/3/128
Following for Wilkinson from Ambassador,
Genuine misunderstanding has I hope now been clarified.
Sir J. Pilcher
PRISEC (F.0.)
Feb.
Good.
It wa
Cochon Insumen.
a
pe.
2
13
E4 (4206)
!
Reference..
FD1/3 (129 FD1/3
See Annex.
132
L
LAST
REF.
127
FD1/3
KEXI
REF.
CYPHER/CAT A
CONFIDENTIAL
128
fema
COPY NO..3
FLASH FOREIGN OFFICE TO TOKYO
TELNO 178
CONFIDENTIAL
19 JANUARY, 1968 (F)
YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 91: HONG KONG.
FOLLOWING FROM WILKINSON,
(127
SECRETARY OF STATE IS NOW IN BONN, WE WILL SHOW HIM THE TELEGRAM ON
RETURN.
2. MR. PAO CLEARLY GOT THE WRONG END OF THE STICK. WHAT THE SECRETARY OF
STATE MAY HAVE MEANT WAS THAT THE VIOLENT PHASE OF THE COMMUNIST
CAMPAIGN IN HONG KONG WAS NOW QUOTE FINISHED UNQUOTE. PLEASE EXPLAIN
THIS TO MR. PAO AND ADD THAT THE PRIME MINISTER STATED CATEGORICALLY IN
PARLIAMENT ON 18 JANUARY THAT THERE WAS QUOTE NO QUESTION OF REDUCING
THE STRENGTH OR EFFECT- IVENESS OF THE HONG KONG GARRISON UNQUOTE WHILE,
ON 17 JANUARY, THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY SAID THAT QUOTE H.M.G.
REMAINED UNCHANGED IN THEIR DETERMINATION TO MAINTAIN THEIR AUTHORITY IN
THE COLONY AND TO DISCHARGE THEIR FULL RESPONSIBILITIES TOWARDS HONG
KONG AND ITS PEOPLE UNQUOTE.
SOSFA
PRISEC (F.0.)
CONFIDENTIAL
Registry No.
DEPARTMENT
FD1/3
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION PRIORITY MARKINGS
Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted Unclassed.
Flash
Timmediate
Priority Robur
Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should
reach addressco(s).
Dispatched
atched
129
EXPHER
---
LIL
Xxx
Private
A
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
1783/1911
PRIVACY MARKING
In Confidence
En Clair Code Cypher
Draft Telegram to:-
No.
TOKYO
[Securi
ation]
Security classification] if any
[ Privacy marking ]
-if any
[Codeword-if any]
Addressed to
telegram No.
178
And to
CONFIDENTIAL
Rakkeg (Tokyo
ve-‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒---------......dordiriideid=IMA
(date)
(Dale) 12 repeated for information to
And to:-
Repeat to:-
Saving to:-
John Denson
19/1
Distribution:-
PRISEC
Copies to:-
Ffice
Saving to....
Your telegram No. 91 : Hong Kong
Following from Wilkinson.
Secretary of State is now in Bonn. We will
show him the telegram on return.
2. Mr. Pao clearly got the wrong end of the stick.
What the Secretary of State may have meant was that
the violent phase of the comunist campaign in Hong
Kong was now "finished". Please explain this to
Kr. Pao and add that the Prime Minister stated
categorically in Parliament on 18 January that there
was "no question of reducing the strength or
effectiveness of the Hong Kong garrison" while,
on 17 January, the Commonwealth Secretary said that
"H.M.G. remained unchanged in their determination to
maintain their authority in the Colony and to
discharge their full responsibilities towards Hong
Kong and its people".
EXAMINED AT /.7.30////
↑ SIGNATURE
UPO 199
Cypher/Cat A
CONFIDENTIAL
FE Dim(127)
COPY NO: 3
IMMEDIATE TOKYO TO FOREIGN OFFICE
Telno 91
CONFIDENTIAL
19 January, 1968
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No,31
19 JAN 1968
FDI /3
Following urgent for Private Secretary from Ambassador.
Mr. C. L. Pao, & Hong Kong ship-owner, has told others that at my
reception for the Secretary of State on 8 January, on hearing he was
from Hong Kong the Secretary of State commented "finished".
2. This seems entirely contrary to the Secretary of State's attitude
towards Hong Kong as evinced in the talks. I should like to be able to
deny categorically that Mr. Pao can have understood the Secretary of
State correctly. Perhaps a personal message to Mr. Pao, who is very
sensitive and talkative, might be the most effective way. If I could be
authorized to convey this and know in what terms today I should be
grateful as Mr. Pao is likely to cause it to be taken up with the
Governor of Hong Kong within 48 hours.
3. I would then inform the Governor that I had so written to Kr. Pao.
Sir J.Pilcher
PRISEC (F.0.)
88888
LARI
MEXT
REF.
128
Reply seur
p.a.
CONFIDENTIAL
10
1
Ed (4206)
+
Reference...
FD1/3
121
то
126
See Annex.
[
ORIGINAL Copy on
F21/14/225.
Mr. Wilkinson
7
SECRET
RECEIVED IN ¡ARL: #VES No.31
20 DEC 1967
FD1/3
British Mission in Peking
and Policy towards Hong Kong
रे
Mr The
bu. (120
But I far. 68.
See Fe1/14/225
де
نا.
Flag A
Problem
The Secretary of State commented on a submission of
6 December about efforts to extract members of our Mission
in Peking that the situation was "really most unsatisfactory".
Since then there has been some improvement, in that the
Blishen family have been allowed to leave. However, the
position remains that the Chinese are linking exit visas for
the British Mission in Feking with our conduct in Hong Kong.
The problem is therefore to decide what more we can do to get
our people out of Peking within the limits imposed by the
necessity of maintaining our authority in Hong Kong.
Recommendation
2.
I recommend that:
(a) for the time being the present policy of firm
but unprovocative action in Hong Kong continues to hold out the best
hope of ameliorating conditions
for the Mission in Peking; but
(b) if no more visas are granted within a month or so,
we should consider giving publicity to the plight
of the Kission.
(c) Keantime we should continue to try to find ways of
making the Chinese anxious to withdraw some of
their personnel in London.
ןז ױ
+
/Background
SECRET
Background and Argument
Flag B
3.
Flag C
On 27 November the Chinese gave a clear indication that
they intended to issue exit visas for some of the members of
our Mission in Peking. On 2 December however this half promise
was withdrawn on the grounds that action in Hong Kong against
the communist newspapers and the closure of a communist school
proved that we were not "sincere" in seeking good relations.
The cases cited by the Chinese were such that they were almost
certainly an excuse rather than a reason for a change in policy.
It is possible that the Chinese had all along intended not to
issue visas and were only playing a sophisticated game of cat
and mouse, but I am inclined to doubt this as the tactics they
used were uncharacteristic. It seems to me more likely that
relatively junior officials were moving towards normal treat-
ment of the Mission and that this was either countermanded
higher up or no final decision has yet been taken. In either
case it is quite likely that the present state of uncertainty
about Chinese policy towards our Mission will continue for some
time.
4. On 11 December, however, the Chinese said that exit visas
would be issued to the Blishen family, which was the most
urgent outstanding case since Mrs. Blishen has been very
seriously ill and Mr. Blishen has also not been well. The
sensitiveness of the Chinese to Hr. Hopson's use of the term
"gangsters" suggests that they were reluctant to face publicity
I
Ľ
SECRET
/about
SECRET
-3-
1..
F1 20
7188
about inhumane treatment of the Blishens (Peking telegram
E22/7 (42) No. 328).
Flag E
5. Despite the Blishen case, it must be accepted that the
remainder of our Mission remain virtually hostages in Peking
for a soft policy towards the communists in Hong Kong. So
long as the "confrontation" in Hong Kong continues this is
likely to remain true, even if we manage to extract some of
the present members of the Mission, possibly by sending in
replacements.
6.
Chinese are in two minds about how to continue the campaign
against the Hong Kong Government. There is one group that
wishes to discontinue the "confrontation" and there have been
some indications that this policy may gradually be coming into
the ascendant. We cannot however expect the campaign to be
turned off suddenly and there is a danger that, even if Chira
wants a calming down, local communist extremists will take the
initiative into their own hands and precipitate further crises,
which will force Chine to come out in their support.
7. The Chinese have made it very clear that they are sensitive
about the treatment of Chinese owned communist newspapers and
of the communist schools in Hong Kong: both are of course
good vehicles for the propagation of Kao's Thoughts. Because
of their sensitivity and the consequent dangers of provoking
disorders in Hong Kong or further action against our Kission
in Peking, the Hong Kong Government have in fact persuaded
THIS IS A COPY
MEHAS
SRCHET
THE ORIGINAL HAS BEEN RETAINED
IN THE DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION
3 (4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS) ACT 1908
/two
SECRET
Flag F
two individual plaintiffs in court actions against the
communist press to postpone the assessment of damages arising
out of the successful libel actions. The Governor of Hong
Kong has also reported that the Bank of China has made
approaches to one of those concerned in what might conceivably
be an attempt to discover the terms under which the communist
press would be allowed to operate freely by the Government.
These approaches are still in an early stage and we do not
really know what the Chinese intentions are.
8.
Although the Hong Kong Government have in this way tried
to avoid provocative action, there is of course the danger of
too many minor concessions of the sort referred to in the fore-
going paragraph encouraging the communists to press for greater
I think it is right to avoid or delay action which
we know will be considered highly provocative, but I am also
convinced it is only by firm and successful action in Hong
Kong that we can persuade the Chinese that the campaign has
been a failure and must be discontinued. At some point the
victories.
Chinese will probably look for a means of saving face and
representing the campaign as a "victory", and it may well be
in our interests at that time to give them some help. But I
think that any precipitate attempt to do so would only encourage
the extremista. Sir Arthur Galsworthy, who is in Hong Kong
this week, will be discussing these issues with the Governor.
9. At present the Chinese equate treatment of our Kission
in Peking and the conduct of policy in Hong Kong.
For our
Mission
1
SECRET
[
لا
SECRET
5.
+
Kission this is obviously a dangerous equation, and it is
very much in our interests to reintroduce the Chinese Mission
in London as an element in the equation. This is, however,
not easy to do.
we might attempt to make the Chinese anxious
to remove one or more of their people from London. The possi- bilities
are not extensive, but a fairly promising scheme involving one
individual is being drawn up. The other possi- bility is to give
publicity to the plight of our Mission in Peking, particularly in
countries where the Chinese are
sensitive about their image. This is a two-edged weapon
since, although it will certainly embarrass the Chinese, it
will also make the crisis in relations between our two countrica
publicly obvious and this in turn may make it harder for the
Chinese to give concessions. It is a weapon which Mr. Hopson
has up to now been anxious that we should not use. Although I understand
Mr. Hopson's hesitation, I think that we shall be forced to use the
publicity weapon if the slight signs of
I think relaxation which have been apparent do not continue.
the timing of this should be to prepare the first moves in a carefully
directed propaganda campaign at the beginning of
January if there has been no further progress by then.
M7: Rarger
Humay
(James Kurray)
18 December, 1967
Whilkansen
+
DECHLT
THIS IS A COPY
THE ORIGINAL HAS BEEN RETAINED IN THE DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION
3 (4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1968
1
نت
SECRET
DIN
719
Cypher/Cat· A
Hu RONG TO COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (D.T.D.)
Telno 1863
SECRET
12 December, 1967
AR
b. No.31
1 DEC 1967
FD113
Addressed to Commonwealth Office telegram No.1863 of 12 December,
Repeated for information to Peking.
Your telegram No.2512: Deportation of Prisoners.
I would at present be reluctant to try this manoeuvre without some
fairly firm indication that the deportees would be accepted at the
border because once it became clear that we were unable to effect
deportation, then the threat of deportation (which still has some
deterrent value) would cease to have any credibility.
2. Arrangements can be made legally to effect release if deportacs are
accepted back or take them into custody again if they are not: the
procedures will vary with different categories of convicted prisoner or
detainee. It is not however an entirely simple matter of letting then go
or putting them under restraint again; there are legal processes to be
gone through which cannot be entirely ignored and could be quite
complex.
FD
る。
Poking telegram to Foreign Office No.326 has been received
since the above was drafted. I agree we should wait to see how we get on
over Wen Woi Pao before taking this any further; but in the meanwhile we
will examine the possibilities of proceeding as proposed
in more detail.
Foreign Office please pass routine to Peking as my telegram
No.663.
Sir D.Trench,
(Repetition to Peking referred for Departmental decision].
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
C.O. H.K.D.
F.E. & P.D.
J.I.R.D.
F.O. P.E.D.
Timmed on Jeking Minutad
326.
tel. no
3410
0 days
pe