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PONTICAL AFFAIRS (INTERNAL) GENERAL

SITUATION AND POLICY

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Reference: GEN/14/368/50

Page No. 1 of 28 Pages,

Copy No. 38 of 40 Copies.

Special Branch,

Hong Kong Police.

Date: 5th March, 1968.

F348

CHINESE COMMUNIST CONFRONTATION WITH HONG KONG GOVERNMENT

ASSESSMENT OF RECENT ACTIVITIES AND FUTURE CAPABILITIES

INTRODUCTION

The Special Branch paper GEN/14/368/16 dated

15th January, 1968, examined future communist policy and

tactics in Hong Kong. From that study it was clear that

all available hard intelligence indicated the Chinese

Authorities in Peking were re-asserting direct control of

communist activities in Hong Kong. Further, that the

present Peking policy was to conduct a long term political

struggle, without the use of violence, aimed at eroding

the position of the Hong Kong Government and increasing

communist influence here, while at the same time enjoying

the economic benefits of the Colony. It was considered

that local militant elements might continue to initiate

isolated incidents but it seemed unlikely that violence

would receive support from local communist leaders here

in the face of direct instructions from Peking to the

contrary.

2.

The paper concluded that the Hong Kong

Government was faced with a long term insidious campaign

during which the communists would endeavour:-

a)

to consolidate their ranks and improve

morale;

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/b)......

10170, B.P. 117

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b)

c)

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to intensify their indoctrination programme,

making extensive use of the thoughts of

MAO Tse Tung;

to maintain a strong anti-Government

propaganda campaign, staying on the fringe

of the law;

d) the press apart, overtly to comply with the

law, thus avoiding as far as possible,

direct clashes with Government;

e)

f)

to continue and intensify attempts to

subvert and vilify Government Servants,

particularly the Police Force; and

to initiate a concerted campaign to widen

their base of support among the general

public, taking up and exploiting, whenever

possible, grievances in all spheres of

society.

The purpose of this paper is:-

a)

to assess the capability of the communists

to conduct this campaign successfully;

b) to examine the methods so far used in

pursuance of their aims; and

c)

to give some idea of the success, or lack

of success, which they are meeting •

GENERAL

4.

Over the years, and especially since 1949

when the C.P.G. came into power, the local communists

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19126 9.8, 317

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have spent much time, money and energy building up their

presence in various sectors of the community. They have

sought to ingratiate themselves with members of the general

public, particularly by appealing to their national pride.

This structure has been disrupted in varying degrees by

Government action arising from confrontation and many

members of communist organisations have severed their

connections. The communists have too, by their actions,

isolated themselves from the rest of the community and

in so doing, have created an ugly public image. However,

their loyal supporters are dedicated men who should not

be underestimated; they have been tried and tested and

their loyalty has not been found wanting. Nevertheless,

in general terms, there is little doubt that the last

nine months have taken a serious toll of the strength of the communist
movement in Hong Kong, particularly in the field of labour (Figures of
estimated communist strength are at Appendix 'A'.)

5.

The principal tasks now facing communist leaders are to build on the
nucleus remaining, to recover lost ground and finally to expand. They
realise this revival and expansion will be a long term project, taking a
very considerable time, perhaps years to accomplish to their
satisfaction. In the circumstances, and subject to caveats mentioned
later in this paper, it seems unlikely that they will be prepared to
have a planned head-on confrontation with Government again until they
have obtained a base of public support much wider than that obtaining
prior to

May, 1967.

UNITED FRONT ACTIVITIES

6

The communists are already making renewed efforts

/to.....

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to ingratiate themselves with certain sectors of the

public, particularly the low-paid and under-privileged, in an attempt to
increase their influence and regain a following from people who are not
members of their

organisations.

They are seeking to do so through the medium of a united front campaign
which is being carried out largely by propaganda but sometimes
manifested by practical demonstrations of assistance on the ground.
However, at the present time, the violence of last year is too fresh in
most people's minds for this "smiling

face" campaign to have much success. Nevertheless,

memories tend to be short and if there are practical advantages to be
gained by falling in behind the communists it is quite likely that the
communists may start to regain

some of their lost ground.

7.

The principal issues on which the "smile campaign" have been based so
far have been salinity of

water, devaluation, the offer of free rice from Kwangtung

and assistance to fire victims. The attacks on Government

in respect of water salinity, which were followed by distribution of
"fresh water" in the urban areas by members

of various communist organisations, were designed to

prove to members of the public that the communists were

interested in their welfare. The "fresh water" was

obtained mainly from public stand pipes in areas where

there was little salt content in the mains supply and,

to a limited extent, from C.P.G. vessels arriving from

China. Disappointingly for the communists, public response was poor,
despite continuous publicity in the communist press, thus indicating
that the communist propaganda campaign, at least on this issue, was
having

/little.....

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little effect.

Additionally, there is evidence that the

in

communists themselves were unhappy about their inability, for reasons
not yet clear, to establish a comprehensive system of distribution. The
salinity issue is now, fact, fast dying out, having seemingly gained
little or

nothing for the communists.

8.

The devaluation of the local currency, linked with claims of increased
unemployment and a rise in the cost of living, has been a major
propaganda theme in recent weeks. These attacks have been interspersed
with general criticism, including deliberate misrepresentation of
Government's policy in various fields, particularly with regard to
resettlement and relief for victims of natural disasters. Such issues
will no doubt remain a feature of communist propaganda, to be repeated
from time to time. They illustrate how the communists will support, and
if necessary misrepresent, any subject which they consider will improve
their public standing.

9.

At present the main communist effort is centred

around the offer of 5,000 tons of rice from China for free distribution
to "compatriots" in Hong Kong. Originally this rice was scheduled to be
given to unemployed workers and to genuinely needy families. massive
propaganda campaign was launched to attract registration of potential
recipients. There is some recent indication that this campaign may not
have achieved the success desired in that the categories of people
entitled

There is to register have been considerably widened.

little doubt that if this rice is imported into the

Colony its distribution will be accompanied by powerful propaganda
designed to show the local communists in the

/best.....

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best possible light and to illustrate to the local

populace the concern which the "Mother Country" has for

them. Nevertheless, it is considered unlikely that

this gift, in itself, will attract many new supporters

to the communist cause, because there is a general

awareness that their aid invariably has strings.

CONSOLIDATION

10.

Proceeding hand in hand with this united front

activity is a concerted movement within communist

organisations in all spheres to consolidate their ranks

through political indoctrination. Study classes,

exhibitions of "the application of MAO's Thoughts" and

variety shows have become a regular feature of all

communist organisations' activities since December, 1967.

Visiting groups to China by their members have also been

resuscitated, during which they attend political meetings

and discussion sessions. While this campaign of constant

indoctrination may possibly strengthen the beliefs of the

politically committed and produce a group of fanatics who

will be prepared to undertake any allotted tasks to

further the communist cause, it is unlikely that it will

do much to win over any new adherents, unless fence sitters

can be persuaded that more practical support is forthcoming

from China. There are, in fact, indications that some

members of communist organisations, particularly the older

employees, are already tiring of this incessant

indoctrination. But these malcontents represent only a

minority of the communists and generally speaking, morale

in communist organisations has been steadily rising.

This can be attributed, in part, to the reduction in

Government action against communist organisations sinoe

/cessation.....

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cessation of the violent phases of confrontation.

11.

Another step being taken by the communists is

an attempt to demonstrate to the public that they no

longer have anything to fear from Government. "Sing

song" and picnic groups to the N.T., where revolutionary

songs are chanted, and very minor and short lived

demonstrations are being staged for propaganda purposes.

While participants in these activities are possibly in

technical breach of the law they are not committing

serious offences.

These groups call attention to

themselves in a potentially dangerous manner and create

a difficult problem for the police.

12.

At the same time events of the last few months,

and particularly in recent weeks, such as the payment of

fines by the suppressed newspapers, indicate that local

communist leaders are not prepared to press for a direct

clash with Government, and will back-down when it becomes

clear that a firm stand is being taken. In this way

they ensure that the morale of their rank and file does

not run the risk of further defeats and that Government

is prevented from taking legal action against them.

13.

It is apparent that the confidence of the

communist supporters is steadily growing, despite the fact

that, so far, their united front activities do not appear

to have achieved much in the way of material success

The improved morale in local communist circles together

with continued MAC Thought indoctrination and anti-

Government propaganda will constantly present the danger

of outbreaks of incidents, despite the wishes of the

communist leadership to avoid the use of violence,

/LABOUR......

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LABOUR

14.

In an urban society a communist movement, to

be effective, must have a powerful representation in

the trade union field. In Hong Kong the communists

spent years building up their representation in public utilities,
transport and other key industries as well as in Government. In many of
these areas, the communist

union was the only channel of representation open to

employees.

These unions, well organised and capably run

by a band of dedicated full-time officials, had the

objective of attaining sufficient strength in vital areas

to paralyse the Colony if and when required. With the

onset of confrontation it appeared to many of the

communist leaders, particularly in the labour field,

that their moment of glory had arrived. Nevertheless,

when they called on their supporters to stop work they

were bitterly disappointed in that, on an average, about

half their members in many of the vital areas ignored

their call and continued working, despite intimidatory

threats and actions. When the people who did stop work

were dismissed the communists lost, virtually over-night,

a powerful machine (figures at Appendix 'B'). For example,

of the claimed communist union membership of some

6,400 employees in Government, only 1,632 answered the

call to stop work and at present it is estimated that

of those remaining, only 325 are participating in union

activity. These represent less than 1.7% of the

19,415 low-paid employees in the Government Departments

affected by work stoppages. Communist union

representation in public transport, the utilities and

the dockyards showed an oven greater loss. Pre-

confrontation the communists had a claimed support of

/more.....

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170 G.P. 317

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more than 10,000 out of 29,000 workers in these spheres.

Over 9,500 people were dismissed in June, 1967, following

their refusal to resume work and active communist union

members employed in these areas are now estimated to be less

than 300. From these figures it is clear the communists

are not in any position to take concerted action from

within Government or vital industries. They do, however,

still retain considerable strength in some sectors of industry,
particularly in textiles, the metal industry, shipping and distributive
trades. However, the amount of

actual support that these unions would obtain should they

wish to strike on purely political grounds is open to

considerable doubt, particularly in the light of the poor

response to the strike call in other areas in June, 1967.

15.

increases

The union members who refused to stop work are

currently being subjected to pressure from their former

workmates to return to active participation in union.

affairs. One means of inducement is the claim by the

communist unions that they are agitating for wage

on behalf of members and so far demands have been submitted

by representatives from unions of Government employees and

some unions in the transport field. The communists'

efforts to take the lead in asking for wage increases are

however, being forestalled in some instances by similar

demands by right-wing unions or by awards being made by

management before demands are, in fact, presented.

the efforts of the communists to attract back to the

unions former members who severed connections during

confrontation are, so far, meeting with very limited

success, the slow trickle of former members willing to

return, is likely to continue, and possibly increase,

/if....

While

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if no alternative channels of labour/management

discussions are established. Many firms are establishing joint
consultative machinery to fill the vacuum left by

the dismissal of communist union members and there is

little doubt that this will go some way towarde foiling the

efforts of the communists.

16.

The workers who are currently in receipt of

strike pay from the communist labour movement are

probably presenting the communist leaders with their

biggest headache.

It must now be apparent to them that

they have no hope of reinstatement.

The local communist

movement cannot continue, on an indefinite basis, to

pay out nearly $5,000,000 a month in strike pay and it

is unlikely that China will be prepared to foot the bill

much longer. There are already reports that some strikers

have been instructed to find themselves work, and this

has caused considerable discontent amongst those affected, which could
become widespread amongst communist supporters if the "return to work"
move became general. The strikers

are the hard-core nucleus of the communist labour movement

and any attempt to get them to return to work, without

the compensation they have been promised by their leaders,

may have a serious effect upon their morale.

17.

Although the ability of the communists to stage

effective strike action has diminished considerably,

they can, if they so desire, create and maintain an air

of tension, by laying on demonstrations at will using

only a handful of supporters.

While the tactics they used

in the early days of confrontation of paying hoodlums

to create trouble, may not be so effective in the

immediate future, in that these sections of the population

/now.......

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now have a greater respect for the forces of law and

order, the possibilities of minor incidents escalating

quickly because of the participation of non-communist,

semi-criminal elements must grow as time goes by and

memories fade.

EDUCATION

18.

The communist schools in Hong Kong originally

aimed at producing graduates to go to China for higher education. This
policy changed from 1959 onwards when

more and more of the graduates from the schools turned

to the local employment market. Since then, the schools

have followed a more or less normal local school

curriculum and there has been a steady expansion in

the facilities they provided for education. The cheap

places offered by the schools and the good organisation

and discipline they maintained, proved attractive to

many parents and consequently the school authorities had

no difficulty in filling their places. Just before

confrontation some 46 schools were assessed by Special

Branch to be communist controlled with a total student

enrolment of 19,598. Plans were in hand by a number

of the schools to provide an additional 2,000 places.

19.

Students from communist schools were not used a

great deal for subversive activity in the early phases

of confrontation. However, during the later stages they

came into increasing prominence, particularly with

regard to the planting of bombs, both hoax and real.

The schools abandoned their normal curriculum and

concentrated on political studies. They withdrew

their entries from the Hong Kong Chinese School

/Certificate...........

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Certificate examination and eliminated their normal

school examinations and tests. During confrontation

there was a fall off in the enrolment in communist

schools, particularly in the vocational and evening

classes and while it is possible that some of this fall

off was accounted for by people who did not wish to go

out at nights, there is little doubt that at least some

of the students who stayed away did so because their

parents no longer wished to have them educated in

communist schools. The latest indications are, however,

that the communists are having some success in building

up their primary and kindergarten sections,

20.

The main effect of confrontation on school

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