[Codeword-if any]
Addressed to
------LI ILL.I
HƯNG ĐỪNG
telegram No. 323
LILL-.
(date)
23/2
And to
23/2
repeated for information to
Z
Peking (Runity).
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
PRIORITY
Repeat to
PEKING 183
Saving to:-
Distribution:-----
DEPARTMENTAL
FED HKD)
Copies to:-
Soving to
non moriririk YIHA
Your telegram No. 212 and Peking telegram
No. 133: Prison Visits.
that
I think/these helpful suggestions provide a
possible way forward in trying to secure access to
Grey and that we should make full use of them.
2.
I understand and share your concern lest NCNA
should establish itself in a quasi-consular role
with a right of access to broad categories of
prisoners of Chinese race, but I hope that it will
be possible to play our hand and word our approaches
to the Chinese in such a way that we concede the
minimum on this front. The suggestion in paragraph
3(c) of Peking telegram under reference seems a
good way of doing this.
3.
Ideally, I would have preferred to grant access
to "patriotic journalists", only by their employera;
but, as Peking have pointed out, we risk destroying gratight the whole
bargain by insisting on this. I am gled
/therefore
1815
23/7
Ind. 32955 Ed (4200)
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
t
CONFIDENTIAL
therefore that you are prepared to include
NCNA in such visits in some form. I think that
we must be prepared to commit ourselves to this
by telling the Chinese that visits to "patriotic
journaliste" will be allowed by their employers
accompanied by a representative of NCNA and, in
addition, that visits by NCNA alone will be
allowed if the employer is unavailable (although
we would hope that this last situation will not
arise).
I agree with all the conditions suggested
in the latter part of paragraph 5 of your tele-
gram under reference, although I think it would
be wiser not to insist on a time limit so short
as 15 minutes per visit since we would not wish
the Chinese to insist that visits to Grey should
be limited to such a short period. It might be
easier to deal with this if visits are made in
a special room as suggested in paragraph ̈7(b)
of your telegram.
5.
I do not think that there is much to be
gained by asking the Chinese to define their
meaning of "formal" visits. On the contrary it
might encourage them to increase their demands.
If we can achieve access to Grey by means of
visits of any sort, so much the better, and it
does not much matter what the Chinese call them.
I suggest that we ourselves should use the words
"special visits" to emphasise their exceptional
nature and minimise the right of those concerned
to make them.
CONFIDENTIAL
/6.
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
Dd. 32955 Ed (4290)
6.
ம்
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It is recognised here that if this fails
it is as far as we should go in making concessions
To go
in Hong Kong to gain access to Grey.
further might put at risk our position in Hong
Kong;
we would be abandoning a policy of firmness
in our dealings that has brought us through the
recent troubles and would encourage Chinese
hopes that we can still be pushed into making
substantial concessions there.
7.
Detailed suggestions on how this exercise
should be handled with the Chinese are contained
in m.i.f.t.
Dazy.
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COPIES ALSO ON -
+
Fa3/85 and FD13/320
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Cypher/Cat A
IMMEDIATE PEKING TO FOREIGN OFFICE
Подат
The reason for Miki chage of lan were di enveed bulwen T. Rogan The Rom
Серегай вибитий
ov 21 PÅ,
See
RECEIVED IN ¡ARCHIVES No.31
21 FEB 1968
FDIN
Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.133 of
Telno 133
20 February, 1968
CONFIDENTIAL
20 February, Repeated for information to Hong Kong.
ре
Not feed.
Any
Hong Kong telegram No.212: Prison Visits.
I am however
I am grateful for this clarification. surprised to learn that under the
existing rules it has all along been possible for an extra visit to a
prisoner to be granted to an outside person (given compelling reasons
and prisoner's agreement) without the prisoner having first to ask for
such a visit and that an employer is usually granted one such visit. The
position as stated in Hong Kong telegram No.1908 was that special visits
could only be granted on the P12/1 51 prior request of Biz/35 prior
request of prisoners themselves.
informed the Chinese on 31 December. sticking point in the negotiation.
2.
On instructions I so This has been a major
I think it a great pity that we should not have been informed of these
possibilities in December when prison visits were first discussed, or
even a few weeks ago when the question arose of access at Chinese New
Year. Much valuable time would have been saved and we could almost
certainly have secured access to Grey.
J
30 Proposals now put by the Governor in his paragraph 5 fall short of
the first Chinese demand of 28 January (access to NCNA and "patriotic"
journalists) in only one important respect i.e., it is suggested that
employers and not NCNA would visit the "patriotic" journalists. I
strongly recommend that we should include the NCNA in such visits 1.e.,
propose a visit by the employer plus an NCNA official, for the following
reasons:
(a) As for holding out on this one point we would endanger the whole
deal;
FD1374 41
(b) As pointed out in Hong Kong telegram No.206, in some cases the
employers of the "patriotic" journalists are themselves in gaol and may
not be easily available;
(c) By allowing the NCNA to participate in these visits we would not be
making any admission of the NCNA's quasi Consular status. We could in
any subsequent discussion justify our actions and if need be distinguish
this from Consular access by pointing out that the NCNA was allowed
visits to the journalists because it is a Press organization and that
such visits did not mean that they had any right to visit other
categories of prisoner.
/(a) I note
CONFIDENTIAL ;
T
CONFIDENTIAL
Peking telegram No.133 to Foreign Office.
-2-
(a) I note that the Governor considers the possibility of including an
NCNA official among the visitors (paragraph 7 (a) of telegram under
referen
(e) In the end our object is quick access to Grey. I consider such
access important enough to justify slight straining of the rules in the
above sense.
6.[sic] If above is agreed I could make an immediate approach to the
Chinese, though I would not propose to go into detailed points at the
end of paragraph 5 which I think would be better dealt with in Hong Kong
at time arrangements are made.
This approach would not cut across expected Chinese reply on visas and
on Grey-Hsueh-ping exchange, though we might hear something,
particularly on the second point, at the same time. Again I think it
most important we should move quickly if we want to avoid the danger of
joint communications expiring.
Sir D.Hopson
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
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FER
294)
Seen I sqs.
RY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY
Wicol
ON 16 FEBRUARY
AP
19FEB 1968
19:15
HỒNG KONG
FD
Present Situation
The situation is now quiet. In December last year the
Chinese apparently made a policy decision to change their
tactics in Hong Kong by abandoning violence in favour of a
long-term "struggle". There have been no significant incidents
in Hong Kong or Kowloon since Christmas. The border has also
remained quiet apart from occasional stone-throwing from the
Chinese side. A high level of propaganda has been maintained
in left-wing newspapers against alleged maltreatment of
political prisoners and against the salinity of the water.
(Because of water shortage it has been necessary to draw on
reservoirs which contain a noticeable but acceptable proportion
of salt water.)
Gift of Rice and Clothing from China
2. ▲ body in Kwangtung Province called the "Kwangtung
Provincial Support Hong Kong Patriots Committee" has given
5,000 tone of rice for distribution to "needy residents" and
1,000 suits of winter clothing for the inmates of Stanley
prison. The Hong Kong Government would not normally permit
extra clothing for prisoners and any gift of rice would have
to be set against the normal import quota.
Difficulties could
arise if the Chinese try to insist on distributing the rice
and clothes, particularly if a Chinese Red Cross delegation
is sent from China to do so. The local communists in Hong
/Kong
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
- 2.
This 18
Kong are apparently awaiting a decision from the authorities
in Canton as to whether the plan shall go forward.
a striking example of the restoration of the normal channel
of control over communist activities in Hong Kong which was
disrupted during the Cultural Revolution.
Mr. Anthony Grey
3. The Chinese have made it clear that they link progres8
on Mr. Grey's case with concessions in Hong Kong. In January
they indicated that access might be granted to him in exchange
for official visits by members of the New China News Agency
and others to the two N.C.N.A. representatives in prison in
Hong Kong and to "patriotic journalists". The Governor did
not feel able to agree to visits to "patriotic journalists"
and the idea came to nothing. There have been exchanges
between Sir Donald Hopson and the Governor on what might be
done to meet the Chinese requests and we now await further
proposals from Hong Kong. (It should be remembered that all
the prisoners already receive regular visite from relatives;
what the Chinese are asking for are special i.e. "official"
visits.)
Long-Term Future of Hong Kong
4. Officials are engaged on a draft report about the long-
term future of the Colony which is to be ready for the Defence
Review Working Party by 30 April. When it is eventually
approved by the Cabinet, it will be taken into account in
drafting the Defence White Paper which is to issue in July.
CONFIDENTIAL
293
23
Orka.copyon
Cy her/Cat. A
IMMEDIATE
FCB/3
CONFIDENTIAL
HONG KONG TO COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
200
15 February, 1968
CO. IDENTIAL
RECEIVED
ARCHIVES N. 31 | 10FEL
FO FDI/I
Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 200 of 15 February, Repeated
for information to Peking.
Peking telegram to Foreign Office No. 129: Prisoners.
Before we correspond further on this subject, I should be glad to have a
day or two in which to prepare some suggestions which may help to
resolve the problen.
Agreed with to. That
we
should
wait
for Hong Kongi proposale.
Six D. Trench
Was sce
34.4 days.
Se repeate
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
0.0.
H.K.D.
[Repetition to Peking
referred for departmental decision]
ADVANCE COPIES SEXT
News Dept.
F.0.
F.E.D.
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Consular Dept.
D.D._&_P.U.S.D.
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XXXXX
12.
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Onia. "Copy or Fes/3
on
43
and copy on F413/8 (147
разко
ILEDIATE HONG KONG TO COMICNWEALTH OFFICE
Telno 166 13 February 1968
CONFIDENTIAL
20
Seperate muute
Xy immediately preceding telegram. pe
Following Personal for Galsworthy.
W
2
RECEIVED ARCHIVO N".31
16 FEST
FD!|!
I am afraid there is a further important factor which must not be
overlooked, Public opinion here is sympathetic to Grey's plight, but
there would be deep resentment if what was considered to be any
substantial Hong Kong interest were sacrificed for him.
2. A second point is that unofficial members and the local Press,
although sometimes a little watchful and suspicious, broadly still trust
us in these matters and have not sought to probe into what we may or may
not be up to in attempting to obtain an amelioration of his condition;
although it is not difficult for them to guess that we are not simply
acquiescing in his imprisonment. If we once did anything in Grey's
interests that was regarded as too much of a kowtow, the Press would
seize upon it and it might thereafter become extremely difficult for me
to operate without having to parry incessant demands for full and
constant disclosure or what was being considered and discussed between
London, Peking and here. While the Press could perhaps be held off,
unofficial members might start to demand a say in these matters which
could be extremely embarrassing and unhelpful in future manoeuvres over
both Grey and the position of the Peking Mission.
3. This is not to say we cannot do something to help Grey, but whatever
we do must be able to show either that it is a reasonably. nomal
procedure and that we have not unduly bent to CPG demands (remembering
that the smallest concession will be trumpeted by the Communist Press as
a humbling of us) or that the move is in Hong Kong's interests (e.g.
deportation). The concessions proposed for these prisoters come very
close to the border line or what might be
acceptable to local opinion, and I should have to consider very
carefully whether or not we unduly risk raising a storm if we make them.
1. I have not copied this to Peking but leave you to send an appropriate
version there if you think it necessary.
Sir D. Trench
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
C.0. Hong Kong Dept.
News Dept.
F.O. F.E.D.
P.C.D.
Consular Dept. 3.D. & P.U.S.D. J.I.R.D.
News Dept.
.. Personnel Dept.
+
ADVANCE COPIES SENT:
+
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have allached
-290
290 ad -2918
тобынам
P
Note
1
1
2217
Oma copy
on
Fc 313 (
Cypher/Cat A
CONFIDENTIAL
DIATE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO HONG KONG
Telno 245
CONFIDENTIAL
9 February 1968
(F)
خ الكورية
RECEIV ARCHIVES NAJI
16 FEB 03
FOR/I
Addressed to Hong Kong telegram No. 245 of 9 February Repeated for
information to Peking
Peking telegram No. 122: [Prisoners].
We agree and consider that you should take no (repeat no) action with
regard to the wrisoners for the time being.
CROSEC
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
7.0. F.3.D.
D.D. & P.U.S.D.
News Dept.
J.I.R.D.
J.I.P.G.D.
J.I.A.D.
C.O. H.K. Dept.
F.E. & P.D..
CONFIDENTIAL
"
ра
谀
orec.copy ofisil. сору
Clair
KONG TO COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
c. 168 8 February 1968
UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
Aädressed 0.0. telegram No. 168 of 8 February Repeated for information
to:
Peking.
GAA
288
RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES NË,31
16 FEB 1968
FOM/T
Your telegram No. 221 of 6 February: [Prison Visits).
Fot
FOX / 1 237
There has been no reaction.
1
ра
A
Sir D. Trench
DEPARTMENTAL-DISTRIBUTION
Consular Dept.
0.0.
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I
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"
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CONFIDENTIAL
HONG KONG TO COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
港
287
RECEIVED IN
¡ARCHIVES No 31;.
FDCI 220
Telno. 167
CONFIDENTIAL
DOPEB J68
8 February 1968
p.c.
ед
1972
ED1/!
Addressed to Commonwealth Office telegram No. 167 of 8 February
Repeated for information to Peking.
Peking telegram No. 106 to Foreign Office: Communist
Fenrisoners.
I entirely agree that the prospect of the operation's success would be
much enhanced if the prisoners expressed willingness to return to China;
and there seems some chance that it might be possible to persuade them
to do so.
2. On the other hand, they might very well, in accordance with the
normal practice of Communist prisoners here, refuse to sign any
documents. In that event we would have to decide our line of action in
the light of their general attitude. If they refused to sign but
indicated that they would not be averse to returning to China, we would
propose to proceed with the operation to the extent of taking them to Lo
Wu Bridge and leaving them free to cross or not as they wanted. We would
not try to force them over. If, on the other hand they indicated very
positively that they were unwilling to return to China, I do not think
that it would be profitable or wise to go ahead.
Commonwealth Office pass Peking as my telegram No. 56.
Sir D. Trench.
[Repetition to Peking referred for departmental decision]
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
0.0.
F.0.
H.K.D. F.E. & P.D.
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DDDDD
CONFIDENTIAL
CYPRIOR/CAT Á
CONFIDENTI AL
pal
1872
PRIORITY COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO HONG KONG
TELEGRAM NO. 231
8 FEBRUARY, 1968 (F & KI
286
RECEIVED IN ;
ARCHIVES No.31
CFEB 968
西小
I
CONFIDENTIAL.
ADDRESSED TO HONG KONG TELEGRAM NO.231 OF 8 FEBRUARY REPEATED FOR
INFORMATION TO PEKING.
YOUR TELEGRAM NO.150: PRISONERS.
J
Foll!
ZB4
IT WAS CLEARLY RIGHT TO POSTPONE ACTION UNTIL AFTER 8 FEBRUARY.
BUT WE THINK THAT YOU SHOULD STILL STRY TO DEPORT THE TWO FILM STARS. WE
DO NOT SEE THIS IN ANY WAY AS A QUID PRO QUO FOR GREY
BUT RATHER AS A TEST CASE. IT SHOULD INDICATE TO THE CHINESE THAT WE ARE
PREPARED TO DEAL WITH CERTAIN PRISONERS IN THIS WAY, AND THE SUCCESS OR
FAILURE OF THE OPERATION SHOULD GIVE US SOME GUIDANCE
ABOUT HOW TO PROCEED WITH AN EXCHANGE FOR GREY.
2. YOU WILL SEE FROM SEPARATE TELEGRAMS THAT HOPSON HAS BREN
INSTRUCTED TO HAVE FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH THE CHINESE ABOUT EXIT
AND ENTRY VISAS, WE WANT TO TRY TO AVOID THESE TWO EXERCISES BECOMING
ENTANGLED, IT IS BEST THEREFORE THAT THE DEPORTATIONS
SHOULD NOT TAKE PLACE UNTIL KOPSON HAS MADE HIS INITIAL APPROACH
TO THE CHINESE ABOUT VISAS AND GREY. IT MIGHT THEN OR A1 A LATER STAGE
BE USEFUL TACTICALLY TO BE ABLE TO LAY ON THE DEPORTATION OF THE FILM
STARS AT SHORT NOTICE IN ORDER TO DEMONSTRATE TO THE CHINESE HOW THE
GREY CASE COULD BE SETTLED, WOULD IT BE POSSIBLE TO TAKE ALI. THE
PREPARATORY STEPS (EXCEPT INFORMING THE CHINESE) IMMEDIATELY AFTER 8