i
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Paze 10
had been co-operative with the authorities and thus compromise his
further use within the local comunist organisation. This requires
careful consider tion and is part of a present study by Special
Branch. It will also require a carefully planned and subtle "build
up before the release to avoid the communists realizing the neture
of the operation. "e shall also, of course, have to take into account
the need not to compromise currently productive sources or to imply
the extent of our knowledge of communist organisations.
20.
SUBCKEY
(a) The 52 communist confrontation prisoners at V.R.C.
are held under 12 sonth detention orders issued under
Emergency (Principal) Regulations. The first expires on
27th September, 1968 and the last on 14th June, 1969;
(b) the C.P.G. hes stated in unequivocable terms that it
will not cocept the deportation of Chinese Nationals from
Hong Kong to China;
(c) the Chinese authorities have made it quite clear
that any attempt to arrange the return of detainees to
China is tantamount to deportetion and therefore
unccceptable;
(d) there is no detainee whose importance to the co-munists
is such that they might be prepared to retract the
stetements et (b) or (c) above to effect his release from
detention, and it is considered that there is no formula
acceptable at the present time to both the 0.3.G. and
the Hong Kong Government which will result in the return
of detainees to China;
(e) while there are security end political gro mia for
continuing to hold the detainees et present in V.R.C.
this will become more difficult to justify in future,
if present co-munist policy of non violence continues;
SECRET
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21.
SECRET
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(f) the general public place little distinction between
those held under Energency Reguletions and persons serving
prison sentences. The release of the letter category has
now become a regular occurrence and communist propaganda on
this issue is attracting little public attention, thus the
rele:se of the less important detainees is less likely to
be viewed as a major concession;
(c) released detainees are unlikely to observe any
restrictions placed upon them;
(h) the release within the Colony of a small number of the
less important detainees would provide an opportunity to
judge communist and public reaction. If this is acceptable
a phased release programme could be planned, selecting
generally the least important end longest detained for
early release, taking into account the political climate
and the level of communist activity;
(1) an attempt could be made to compromise one or more of
those released.
RECOMMENDATION
(a) No further attempt should be made to arrange the
return to China of detrinees, unless the Chinese take
some initiative in this direction;
(b) consideration should be given to the unconditional
release within the Colony of a small group of the less
important commmists held under the Emergency detention
orders;
(c) If the communist and public reaction to this initial
release is acceptable to Government s phased release
programe should be planned based on the general principle
of releasing first those who are less importent and have
SECRET
SECRET
Pare 12
been detained the longest;
(d) the political climate and the level of communist
activity, as well as the individual potential threats
posed to security by detainees, should dictate the extent
to which the release programme is effected;
(e) when practicable, consideration should be given to
considering "spoiling operations" against one or more
detainees prior to release.
SECRET
!
i
FD1/19
Mr. Murray
CONFIDENTIAL
RECFIVED IN I
Reference. No 31
-5 AUG 1968 En
Гроно
Release of Detainees in Hong Kong
394
In Peking telegram No. 698 (attached) Sir D. Hopson suggests that if the
exit visas for the Mission now outstanding are granted the Governor
should release "say ten to twenty detainees at once". without prejudging
a full consideration of possible action in Hong Kong which might improve
the position of Britisn subjects in China, I think that this proposal
deserves to be examined now. The release of four detainees by the
Governor may well have been a factor in the Chinese decision to grant
exit visas to members of the Mission. At any rate it would have helped
the case of those in the Chinese leadership (assuming they exist) who
wish to see a return to greater normality in Sino- British relations.
The release of further detainees is therefore likely to be generally
helpful. I have some doubts as to whether it would be prudent to release
ten to twenty at once as a kind of direct quid pro quo for the granting
of visas, but I would see advantage in the Governor continuing to
release small groups of detainees at fairly frequent intervals if he
feels at all able to do BO. There would be no need to link the release
of detainees directly with the grant of exit visas. A few more might be
released now and others in succeeding weeks.
We are
2. I suggest that we should explore this possibility with the
Commonwealth Office. also committed to considering the question of the
release of convicted prisoners in the context of Mr. Grey.
Jam Denson
(J. B. Deneón) 1 August, 1968
Discussed intin Mi. Mussing,
Draft Submission món copy to
Mi
Ми стати оби
Co.
иде
भा
Јарича
CYPHER/CAT A
ITY HON KONG
TELEGRAP 10. 960
SECRET
PERSONAL FOR CALEISTRY,
SECRET
390)(39
muste
TOP COP":
TC COMMONWEALTH OFFICE.
2 AUGUST 1968.
DERING TELETHALS ARE AND EN : POLICY IT HONG KONG.
RI RIVED IN
(393)
ARCHIVES N. 31
- 5 AUG 1968
FD1/1
WHILE MASON LAS DELA 3 CENTLY FE ADVISED THAT IT WORLD HE PELPFUL
IN THIS TO YOU IF I CONTINUED TO COMENT ON THE PERINC TELEGRAMS SERIES.
IV'AVE ACCORDINGLY SEEN DOING SO, AND HAVE LEEN TRYING TO KEEP MY
TELEGRAMS CONS TRUCTIVE ANL AS FREE OF ARCUMENTATION AS POSSIBLE. DIT
WHATEVER I SAY, IT IS IN THE NATURE OF TELEGRAMS DRAFTED FOR HLEVITY
THAT THE IM VITAILE MINOR INCONSISTENCIES
OF PHRAS INE, WHICH OCCUR LAY THEMSELVES OPEN TO DISSECTION:
WITHOUT THE LASIS OF THE CLICITAL CONTENTIONS REALLY FEING
IMPALLE AT FIL.
2. VILE I 27 of Coppe AXIOUS NOT TO LET OW SIDE. IN THE
EJSCUSSION AS LY IFZVLT, IT IS TOE BECOMING DIFFICULT TO CONTINUE VARIND
A USEFUL CONTA 103 105 LAR VONDERING THEKEFCHE WHETHER YOU : PALLY WANT
FURTHER DETAILER COMMENTS FROM ME ON THE
LATEST EXC!ANCE.
3. T
I TUOLIT DELTARS HOY: VER TAKE THE COMENT (PAKING TELS'GAAN 100 REFERS)
THAT APY PINT THAT KONG KONG KAY, IN ITS SHOUATION, SE TREATED AS THE
TAIL TO THE U.Y. DOC IS, AS I AR SURE YOU APPRECIATE, 7. FLELY LIAT SOL
PO · MATCHES CUT FOR ANT FEARS. IT IS WELL
+
子
UNDERSTOOD THAT HONG KONG INTERESTS CANNOT BE AUSCLUTELY PARA-
HOUT, AIR-THAT SOLETUIS MY PAVE TO DA MİYET AWAY IN THE COMEINED
U.F./P./. INTEREST, BUT ANY AWARENESS HERE OF AN INTENTION TO
SUBORDI"ATE PONG ZAR INTERCE TO ANSTHER THAT THIS COULD WELL
HAVE DISASTROUS RESULTS.
SIR D TRENCH
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION F.O. F.E.D.
C.U. H.K. DEPARTMENT
c.c. DEFENCE DEPARTLAND
+
SECRET
C.S. 41C
2600079
30,000-1/67-3352117
SECRET
TS.
SUR.1/3/1168/47
Деа Това
42
Mr. L.C. Smith
Emm
COLONIAL SECRETARIAT,
LOWER ALBERT ROAD,
HỒNG KONG,
24th July, 1968
Entis
Copy to mu
Wilson, IRD
L
11
and if PUSD Thank you for your letter of empt.
10th July enclosing a minute dated 10th June by Leslie Smith.
2.
I would go further and suggest that if Smith can be positively discour-
aged from having further contacts of that kind in Hong Kong it would be
beneficial.
Jy5/8
3.
I was surprised to hear that he had been in Hong Kong as recently as
29th May. If you happen to hear of any further visits by him we should
be glad to know of them.
You
eve
Atla
(A.F. Maddocks)
J.B. Denson Esq., 0.B.E.,
Foreign Office,
LONDON S.W.1.
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No. 31 ** JUL 1968
FD!|!
4
·
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:
SLCKET
Cypher/Cat A
SECRET
PRIORITY PEKING TO FOREIGN OFFICE
Jelno 699
SECRET
30 July, 1968
JM 1/2 391
тебник
RE. EIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31
31 JUL 1968
FD1/1
Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 699 of 30 July Repeated for
information to:- Hong Kong
(390 My immediately preceding telegram and Hong Kong
368
telegram No. 928. [British policy towards China]
It is suggested in paragraph 8 of Hong Kong telegram under reference
that release of detainees and earlier release of prisoners would be a
major concession without good grounds for expecting a response and
therefore (?grp omitted] "minority concessions made with specifio and
limited tactical aims." I question the reality of this distinction. The
concession would certainly be important, but the Chinese have repeatedly
made it clear to us that release of prisoners is the root of the
problem. To make concession on this would therefore not be acting in
void. We would be responding on a key issue and could confidently expect
a return. As I pointed out in my telegram No. 671, there is little doubt
for example that release of news workers in Hong Kong would ensure the
release of Grey.
2. Paragraph 8 of telegram under reference argues that we must wait
until the Chinese come to us and propose whatever it is they want and
when we know this we might be able to meet them at least partially, but
in fact the Chinese have already made themselves perfectly plain. Of
five demands release of prisoners is only one with any real content. In
the light of our experience over last year (e.g. over lifting of our
movement restrictions) we are most unlikely to get them to give more
explicit undertakings of what they will do if we release prisoners.
3. Paragraph 3 of telegram argues that we should not rush things.
Release of some prisoners on New Year's day 1969 could hardly be so
described.
4. I am puzzled by the arguments in paragraph 4 of Hong Kong's telegram
under reference that the public would find it harder to accept the need
for major concessions now since the situation in Hong Kong is not
unfavourable. Hitherto it has been argued strongly that concessions
could not be made because the situation was unfavourable and that any
concessions would therefore be interpreted as a sign of weakness, e.g.
Hong Kong telegram No. 928 paragraph 3. This amounted to saying (if I
understand the argument aright) that when we are under pressure
concessions are precluded because they will be seen as a sign of
weakness and when we are not under pressure they
/are
SECRET
SECRET
-2-
are precluded because it is hard to persuade the publio of the need to
make concession. Surely if the situation is now favourable this would
make it a safe time to make gesture: which would come, and be seen as
coming, from strength.
-
5. Paragraph 4 also suggests that concessions aimed at improving Sino
British relations might not be well received in Hong Kong since they
would suggest subordination
of Hong Kong to United Kingdom interests. I recognise that public
opinion in Hong Kong must be an important factor, but with respect would
not this be a case of the tail wagging the dog? I would think that the
British public and Parliamentary opinion would be concerned to think
that such an important issue as Sino British relations was being
subordinated to public opinion in Hong Kong.
But
-
in fact concessions should bring benefits in Hong Kong in the form of
reduced tension, whereas so long as confrontation persists there is
always a greater risk of renewed trouble in the Colony. It is argued
that there is little evidence to suggest that concessions already made
have significantly influenced the political atmosphere in Hong Kong.
I think the simple answer is that so far we have not made concession on
key issue that might produce results. In other areas + as paragraph 7
recognises, we have on occasions gained something from concessions.
F.0. pass Priority Hong Kong.
Sir D. Hopson
[Repeated as requested]
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
F.0.
F.E.D. S.E.A.D.
Northern Dept
Research Dept
Defence Dept
P.U.S.D.
Consular Dept
I,P.D.
C.0.
I.R.D.
H.K.D.
Defence Dept
News Dept
DIS MOD
bbbbb
SECRET
386
Cypher/Cat A
CONFIDENTIAL
la Sar 391. 390
PRIORITY
PEKING
TO
lno 698
CONFIDENT; AL
RECEIVED IN
5 N. 31
FOREIGN OFFICE
31 JUL 1968
30 July 1968
F81/1
Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 698 of 30 July, epeated for
information to Hong Kong.
Hong Kong telegram No. 928:
British policy towards China.
The key concession to bring about the benefits of better relations and
therefore the concession on which we should concentrate is the release
of Chinese in custody (detainees and prisoners convicted in Court) In
this telegram I shall deal with the detainees, My immediately following
telegram deals with earlier release of some convicted prisoners and
general points raised by Hong Kong telegram under reference.
2.
Detainees seemed to be the sector in which we can with relatively little
difficulty make restures bearing on key issue. We have flexibility. The
detainees have not been sentenced to a set term so that there is
strictly no question of "premature release". The release of four so far
has gone smoothly and Press reaction has been encouraging.
3.
As regards dividends from such release, Hong Kong telegram No. 850,
paragraph 3, agreed that tangible results were not very likely from a
trickle of detainees, so that it can hardly be a matter of complaint now
if we have not yet seen any obvious dividends from the release of four
(paragraph 1(a) of telegram under reference). In fact, however, I think
there may well have been dividends since this release has probably been
a factor in the resumption of exit visas for this Mission.
4.
*his leade me to recommend strongly that "rgent consideration be given
to the possibility of releasing a sizeable number of detainees in
response to the granting of exit visas to the staff of this Mission, if,
as we now expect, the Chinese carry out their promise of 27 July (my
telegram No. 691). It is very much in our interest to show them that
acts of de-escalation on their part are likely to be followed by a
suitable response on ours. In this case we should for once not be making
the first move. The effect might also be to encourage the Chinese to
make further concessions e.g. over British subjects detained in China in
the hope of a further response from us. I very much hope, therefore,
that if the current outstanding exit visas are granted the Governor
would be prepared to release, say, 10 to 20 detainees at
once.
Foreign Office pass Priority Hong Kong.
Sir D. Hopson
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
F.0.
NNNRIN
[Repeated as requested]
F.E.D.
C.O.
News Dept.
Consular Dept.
I.P.D.
I.R.D.
Defence Dept.
H.K.Dept. News Dept.
Defence Dept.
DIS MOD
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
Category AC: no unclassified reply or reference
CONFIDENTIAL
From:
CBP Hong Kong
Tot
MOD Army
Infot
MOD UK
CINCFE
FARELF HOLP
389 2)
2703002 July
Date: 27.7.68
Read:
04442
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31
30 JUL 1968
Foll!
PES 3149
WARNING
PARAFERASE NOT REQUIRED
NO UNCLASSIFIED REPLY OR REFERENCE
1.
References: A. Our HTT/1906502 Jul/3139.
3. Your PO2/24/2414302 Jul. (NOTAL,
Use of letters to describe different weapons in reference A only of
local significance. In fact it is misleading and we expect Hong Kong
Government to inform Commonwealth Office shortly. The references to MACE
D and MACE O were to some samples of aerosol tear gas spray of
Australian origin waich should not have been described as chemical MACE
at all. These are not in use and there is no intention that they should
be.
GOBC stands for General
2. What has been referred to as HACE A, is the only one in question. It
has marking "General, Mark IV, Chemical MACE, COEC". Ordnance Equipment
Corporation of America.
3.
Bach weapon has its own serial number on its base.
TIM Distribution ABP ↳ (AD) Action
INW/164/96
2703002
Distribution authorised by DOC.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
Category AC: no unclassified reply or reference
kr 388
Enta &pa при
CONFIDENTIAL
From: GBF Hong Kong
190650z July
ED IN
AR:.
- No.31
Date: 19.7.68.
To:
CLC FR
2- JUAL 308
Recd: 10252
Info:
MOD UK
MOD Amy PAREIF
石川
HQIF
1.
WARNING
PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED
NC UNCLASSIFIED REPLY OR REFERENCE
HIT 3139
Reference TIX/2505452 Jun/SEASEC 18
Savingram 941 from Governor to Commonwealth Office, of 17th July 1968,
is repeated for information.
1,
"Your Saving despatch No 374 and my 855 of 24th June 1968,
Chemical Mage.
I am now able to confirm that no patients admitted to Goverment
hospitals for treatment of injuries sustained during disturbances last
year suffered adverse effects from the mace used by the security forces.
2. The type of equipment in use in Hong Kong is mace A which contains
the substance chloroacetophenone, We have consulted the Government
Chemist and the Professor of Chemistry at Hong Kong University (who has
been previously employed as a Soientific Training Officer and Scientific
Adviser to United Kingdon Government Agencies). In their experience and
after reference to printed material available to them here, they state
that although lachrymation and conjunctivitis result from the use of
this substance, these effects are caused by tear-gas generally, and in
any event would normally be temporary.
3. We understand that the results of using different types of
equipment - maces B and C - which emtain oil of capsicum, are far more
serious. But we have only received samples of these manes and they have
not been used. The Government Chemist states that mace & ejects a liquid
jet which does not atomise, and when the full amount of
chloroacetophenone in mace-150 MG is sprayed it does not distribute
itself in the atmosphere, but falls rapidly to the ground. Even if it
could disperse in the air and gravitate slowly, the discharge of the
contents of six oans would be necessary to give an atmospheric
concentration of 350 MG per cubic metre in an average size room (12 foot
by 12 foot by W foot). The literature available here indicates that such
a concentration - for a period of five minutes is considered to be a
tentative safe maximum,
We have asked the bassy Washington to provide us with more information
on the maces used in the United States which gave rise to the report
contained in the enclosures to your Saving despatch No 374. When we have
received this information we may be in a position to send you more
specific details about the mace at present held in Hong Kong",
TIM Distrib CONFIDENTIAL
190650Z
LW/170
CYPHER/CAT A
ROUTINE HONG KONG
TELEGRAM NO. 940
RESTRICTED
Even + relin (38)
сора
т?ри
RE IV:
י
"ARCHIVES N. 31 29 JUL 1968
TO COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
27 JULY
1968
FDI/I
RESTRICTED.
ADDRESSED COMMONWEALTH OFFICE AS MY TELEGRAM NO. 949 DATED 27TH JULY
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO PEKING, AND BY SAVINGRAM TO POLAD SING-
APORE AND WASHINGTON.
Maeda
MY TELEGRAM 901: DEEP BAY INCIDENT.
N.C.N.A
THIS MORNING PASSED THE FOLLOWING TELEPHONE MESSAGE FROM
**THE RELEVANT KWANGTUNG AUTHORITIES** IN REPLY TO THE MESSAGE IN
MY TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE:-
BEGINS.
IT 15 KOUTINE AND NORMAL DUTY FOR CHINESE PATROL BOATS TO PATHOL
THE NEIGHBOURHOOD OF OUR OYSTER FARMS IN ORDER TO PROTECT OUR
FISHERMEN IN THEIR PRODUCTION. THIS IS A KIND OF NORMAL ACTIVITY
THAT NOBODY HAS THE RIGHT TO INTERFERE WITH. ON THE EARLY MORNING
OF JUNE 30TH, WHEN THE FISHERMEN FROM HONG KONG INTRUDED INTO THE
OYSTER FARMS OF OUR FISHERMEN TO UNDERMINE THEIR PRODUCTION, IT WAS
JUSTIFIABLE FOR OUR FISHERMEN TO DETAIN THEM FOR EDUCATION. BUT THE
BRITISH HONG KONG AUTHORITIES HAD BROUGHT IN A GUN-BOAT TO THE
VICINITY OF OUR OYSTER BEDS, THREATENING THE SAFEY OF OUR
FISHERMEN. THIS IS AN ACT OF PROVOCATION AGAINST OUR FISHERMEN. TO
PREVENT THE INCIDENT FROM DEVELOPING OUR PATROL-BOAT WAYED THE
BRITISH GUN-BOAT TO GO AWAY. SUCH IS THE ATTITUDE WE HAVE ADOPTED
TO PREVENT A CLASH. IT SHOULD BE EMPHASISED THAT THERE IS NOTHING
WRONG WITH OUR PATROL-BUAT CARRYING ON ITS NORMAL DUTY TO SAFEGUARD
THE PRODUCTION OF OUR FISHERMEN. YOUR ALLEGATION AGAINST OUR PATROL-
BOAT IS QUITE UNREASONABLE AND WE FIRMLY REFUSE SUCH AN ALLEGATION.
**THE FREQUENT SNEAKING INTO OUR OYSTER FARMS TO UNDERMINE PRODUCT-
ION BY SOME FISHERMEN FROM THE HONG KONG SIDE HAD AROUSED INDIGNAT-
ION AMONG THE LOCAL FISHERMEN, ESPECIALLY AS SOME OF THE INTRUDERS
/HAVE
RESTRICTED
RESTRICTED
-2-
HAVE CARRIED OUT SABOTAGE ACTIVITIES AGAINST CHINA AND HELPED BAD
ELEMENTS TO ESCAPE TO HONG KONG. THIS TIME MOST OF THE TRANSGRESS II
FISHERMEN WERE RELEASED AFTER THEY HAD ADMITTED THEIR MISTAKES AND
GUARANTEED NOT TO COMMIT AGAIN SUCH ACTIVITIES ENDANGERING THE
SOCIALIST CAUSE OF THEIR MOTHERLAND, AS TO THE FEW WHO ARE STILL
UNDER DETENTION, SOME OF THEM HAVE BEEN FOUND OUT TO BE U.S.- CHIANG
KAI-SHEK AGENTS WHO HAVE BEEN CONSPIRING SABOTAGE ACTIVITIES AGAINST
CHINA: SONE AKE EITHER PIRATES OR POLITICAL PRISONERS OR CRIMINALS.
THE RELEVANT DEPARTMENT OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT CERTAINLY HAS THE
RIGHT TO PUT THEM UNDER TRIAL ACCORDING TO THE LAW OF THE CHINESE
GOVERNMENT.
ENDS.
CO PLEASE PASS PEKING.
SIR D.TRENCH
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
C.O.
7.0.
H.K.D.
U.X.D.
POL AFFAIRS DEPT.
F.E. & P.D.
NEWS DEPT.
F.E.D.
DEFENCE DEPT.
P.U.S.D. DIS MOD
{ REPEATED AS REQUESTED}
RESTRICTED
+