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PO/CO (IPED)
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(Rm.7163) (Rm.51 31)
(CRE 4)
Commonwealth Office (Nowa Dept.) Foreign Office (News Dept.) Australia
House (Senior External
Affairs Representative)
Canada House (Counsellor) Hong Kong Government office
Dolove, JoIoR.
Mr. de la Mare
+
Mr. Bolland
Mr. Wilson
Mr. Denson
Mr. Foggon
Mr. Little John--Cook
Mr. J.E. Pack
Mr. D. Hawkins
Mr. C.P. Rawlings
- Mr. Henn
H
Major Koa
1.0.2
Mr. J.A.5. Darlington
Mr. B.E.P. MacTavish
Mr. M. Giover
-
Duty Officer
1
Mr. T. Critchley Mr. K. MacLellan
Mr. Sedgwick
Mr. de
не завате
SECRET
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31 27 JUL 1967
45.
HONG KONG
Recent violence in Hong Kong and on the border makes
it necessary to reconsider our assessment of the intentions
of both the Chinese Government and the local Communists and
the implications of this assessment for our own policy.
2.
The Situation in Hong Kong
We have no evidence at the moment of any new direct
orders from the
leadership in Hong Kong. We do however have evidence of
indirect instructions.
An editorial in the People's Daily
to be galo
包
new stage in the struggle with the Hong Kong Goverment.
This editorial again laid down strike action as the main weapon of the
campaign but it also threatened "the very few national traitors" .e.
Chinese loyal to the Hong Kong Government7 and "the incorrigible hired
thuge who have
served as sagassins".e. the police and security forces
saying specifically that "those who kill people must pay with their
lives". To' POTENT
·be hall responsible
Ꭲ.
for the recent wave of violence against the police.
3. There is some evidence to show that, in this new phase,
there are differences within the leadership of the Hong Kong
Communista. The older leaders are much more cautious in their
approach and reluctant to become involved in violence, while the féusrer
and
nanced by the
SECRET
/atmosphere
SECRET
2
+
I
atmosphere of the Cultural Revolution) are pressing for
The younger leaders appear to be
-
gradually gaining the ascendancy.
The Situation on the Border
4.
Careful examination of the evidence suggests that the
inoident at Sha Tau Kok over the weekend was planned with
the foreknowledge of at least the local authorities.
possibly an attempt to demonstrate the ability of the Chinese
It was
to create serious incidents on the border at any time. There
is however no evidence to suggest that the Communist leadership
in Hong Kong was in any way involved in the planning of this
incident. Nor do we know that Peking was involved.
There is
therefore a possibility that Peking will now try to ensure
that such incidents do not recur but, if this incident was in
fact part of a new plan for creating tension on the border,
we must expect repetitions in the near future.
Implications for our own policy
5. We have in the past assumed (rightly I think) that Peking
was reluctant
involtad
Hong Kong Goverment but was responding to events in Hong Kong
sécurred without direct orders Eren Peking. We
therefore calculated that our own policy must be determined
the need to take strong enough action in
bonfidance, and the necessity not to
by two factors:
Hong Kong
rie deciding to take tougher setion in or
against the Colony.
SECRET
/6.
SECRET
るー
Flag B
FD1/1/173
6. There is still no evidence that Peking have decided to
take over Hong Kong. Irrespective of what interpretation is
put on the Sha Tau Kok incident, the Chinese appear however
to have taken a decision to step up the campaign against the Hong Kong
Goverment and to use violence to this end, possibly
in the form of
British 'ant
galice and
Chinese with British sympathies (Hong Kong telegram No. 1013).
This is probably because of the Laddare of previous attempts
at strikes and intimidat-but- It also reflects the increasingly
extremist and doctrinaire approach to foreign policy problems
which, as we have seen in China's treatment of Burma and Nepal,
has recently appeared in Ring. The objectives of Peking
appear, however, at the moment to remain limited to Nazisting
the British as they did the Portuguese in Macao and as a consequence
forcing castats concessions from the Hong Kong
Government -
price for
donschten af violence, dovğa
Lossen. Clearly we
must still #oid creating a situation which will encourage
Peking to decide positively to take over Hong Kong, since
they would almost certainly succeed. One such situation would
be a breakdown in law and order. What we must do is to
demonstrate conclusively that the present violent tactics
are not going to succeed.
7.
At this stage I think that the arguments against certain measures in
Hong Kong on the grounds that they will provoke Peking are less strong
than before. It will probably now be /necessary
SECRET
SECRET
- 4
-
necessary to takovval
steps to disrupt the Communist
leadership in Hong Kong, if necessary by selective deportations,
and to neutralise certain Peking agencies in the Colony, e.g.
the N.C.N.A., against a member of which action has for the
first time just been taken. Such action may, of course, cause
Peking in turn to take stronger, sounterikšasures:
commenting
on the use of British troops, the "People's Daily" has said
today that the opposition will match this "serious escalation";
and the Chinese are now refusing to allow Reuter's correspondent
to leave Peking in retaliation against the arrest of the
N.C.N.A. man. But in the present situation I think that we
have less to fear froh this than from allowing the situation
in Hong Kong to get out of control. The Hong Kong Government
are already planning t ke further metion. We should, I
suggest, continue, as we are doing, to support them in this
and not try to hold them back, even though this will entail
further escalation at least for the time being and increased
risk of further unpleasantness for our Mission in Peking.
Copies to:
Mr. Samuel
Planning Staff
Mr. Carter, D.T.D.
SECRET
Slland
(2. "Holland) 14 July. 1967
/minnitas
This
д
mininths have approved the planning Activities of the Ha, Kong
Committee. This will serve to
ensure that, if minister approve any given action against the Chinese,
it can be put into effect without delay.
2 The latest situation report from Hauskang is encouraging. The more
rigorous action now being taken by the authorities against The trouble
makers is clearly welcomed by The people, and has improved the morale of
The police. The mitiative is again simsing
back to us.
Powali searcling.
Mr. Rodgers finit.
C.f. de ho ba
17/17
assome that Miiviko tive be able to casiber to comme
of
future action and not just and her steps and Ath, at all stapis, &
implications for
make clear.
is qutting
We me
wmying then these mumba Seem to take on boox. Wht the 545 Commmmuted I
his genople should mat with us
Isha
je
our
Mission in Pekking
em citmention sporopuce, fin
Pelling with be
17 Roda 14.7.4)
pa
Sax racord of the / mesting. SEE F$1/336
бы
IP
7
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(174
SECRET
INWARD TELFORAK
TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
(The Secretary of State)
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31
28 JUL 1967
FROM HONG KONG (0.A.G.)
Cypher
D. 28 July 1967 R. 28
09352
IMMEDIATE SPORET No.1129
FD!!!
怏
Addressed to Commonwealth office Repeated to: Peking No.459
POLAD Singapore No.272 Washington No.240
(8. of S. please pass to all)
Following is weekly assessment of situation as at midnight 27/28 July.
The principal features of the Communist confrontation over past week
have been:-
(a)
(b)
a continuation of home-made bomb atta
The number
-
of these attacks increased sharply on 26 July, when 11 explosions took
place, mainly in Kowloon resulting in 13 people being injured and one
man, involved in the attacks, being shot dead by police. For the first
time in more than a week, small scale mob violence broke out, also on
the 26th; however these disturbances were quickly quelled by police
action;
further minor incidents of missile throwing including incursions at
Security Forces on the border;
(c) the payment of a second month's "aubsistence allowance"
to striking workers. This will be a lengthy business as the majority of
the union members are being paid at home. In one case, the Tramways
Workers' Union, a Communist bank has refused to honour in full made out
to strikers, claiming that there a. insufficient funds available, This
has causež
dissatisfaction amongst the strikere and may indicate that the Communist
labour movement is running short of funds to support the strikers;
(d) attempts by officials of the Hong Kong Seamen's Union,
which to a large extent have proved abortive, to spread the seamen's
strike. So far only two vessels, both of which were scheduled to sail
for China, havo been delayed as a result of the strike, though a number
of others have sailed with slightly reduced crewa;
(e)
a continuation of violent anti-British propagerda ** Communist press,
the major emphasis being attar police for action against Communist orga
Propaganda from China continues to concentrata upon the arrest and trial
of N.C.N.A. and other local Communist reporters.
18
1:36
/2.
SECRET
SECRET
2.
Police action, in the larger operations assisted by military forces, has
continued against Communist organisations, in the course of which union
and school premises, Communist organisations, China product stores and
homes of Communist cadres have been raided and quantities of weapons,
inflammatory posters and documents of intelligence interest seized.
Apart from one incident in the New Territories, no physical resistenc
has been encountered in any of these operations The continued action has
had the affect of severely disrupting the Communist leadership, which
has now disappeared into hiding, and has seriously affected the morale
of Communist supporters, many of whom see little point in continuing the
struggle.
3. Perhaps the most surprising aspect of the past week has been the lack
of G.P.G. reaction to the offensive novea made by Government. Apart from
championing the cause of the N.C.N.A. staff arrested by police and
taking retaliatory measures against the Reuter's correspondent in
Peking, the Chinese have given no indication of taking official
cognizance of the developments here. This, in itself, has lowered morale
of Communist supporters even further, as they feel they are being let
down by China in their hour of need.
4. The disruption of rail services between Canton and Shum Chun seems to
have been related solely to the chaotic conditions in Canton, Deliveries
by road and sea of foodstuffs have been stepped up. Relaxation of 0.0.A.
control on the border area due to preoccupation in Canton could directly
influence the situation for the worse.
5. Despite the lull in Communist activities on the ground, apart from
the bomb attacks, there is no room for complacency in that there is no
indication that the Communist leaders will discontinue the
confrontation. At present however, the border is the main area of
tension, where the comparatively minor stone throwing could quickly
flare up into a major incident between the Army and possibly the C.C.A.
(Passed as requested with advance copies to Foreign Office
(F.E. Dept.), Commonwealth Secretary's Private Office
and News Department)
SECRET
/Distribution
SECRET
Distribution
-
H.K. W.I.D. 'C' I.G.D.
J.1.C. EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
Copies also sent to:
P.S. to Prime Minister
Cabinet Office Foreign Office
tt
1+
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#
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==
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tr
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D.I.O. J.I.R.
г
P.S. to Mr. Rodgers
Mr. de la Mare
Mr. Bolland
Mr. Wilson
-
Mr. Denson
H
FO/CO (IPGD)
IRD)
Treasury
Export Credits Guarantee Dept. Ministry of Defence (Rm.7365)
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H
H
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Board of Trade
妆
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(CRE 4)
Hong Kong Government Office
Commonwealth Office (News Dept.) Foreign Office (News Dept.)
+
-
-
Mr. Foggon
Mr. Littlejohn-Cook
Mr. J.H. Peck
Mr. D. Hawkins
Mr. C.P. Rawlings
Mr. Henn
Major Koe
1.0.2
Mr. J.A.B. Darlington Mr. B.E.P. MacTavish Mr. P. Sedgwick
Mr. Glover
Duty Officer
SECRET
Ed (1626)
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.
Minutes.
FDI/I
173
SEE ANNEX
171
R 117. 172)
Cypher
INMEDIATE
CONFIDENTIAL
INWARD TELEGRAM
TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)
FROM FONG KONG (0.A.G.)
D. 25 July 1967 R. 25
CONFIDENTIAL
No.1109
Repeated to:
1000Z
***
"FIVED IN
jARCHIVES No.31
26 JUL 1967
FD!|!
geke
متر
Addressed to Commonwealth Office
Peking No.447
POLAD Singapore No.266 Washington No.238
Canberra No.67
(Please pass PRIORITY to all)
Sitrep as at 25 1600.
1. The Colony has remained generally quiet although sporadic bomb and
incendiary attacks have occurred. On the border stone throwing at
police, immigration officials and troops has continued despite
intervention from time to time by C.C.A. guards. Police raids on
Communist premises have recovered more documents and improvised arms and
a number of people have been arrested including one senior Communist
official. The Seamen's Union strike has still not had any significant
effect on shipping (my telegram No.1105 refers). There are reports that
there is to be another
oyment from Communist funds to those dismissed after recent strikes.
There has been no rail traffic from Canton to Shum Chun since 23 July.
(My telegram No.1107 refers.)
Fuße
2.
There have been two or three bombing attacks a day for the last four
days, none causing any casualties or major damage. Police stations and
army married quarters and billets have been the main targets, though
there have been two explosions, one in a lavatory and anether at the
entrance to a subway, which could have been designed to cause civilian
casualties. Two bomb throwers have been injured and arrested. Incendiary
attacks, sometimes with home made bombs, have continued with slightly
more success, the main targeta being taxis and buses.
3. Stoning of Security Forces on the border both by children and adults
who advance into British territory for the purpose, bas continued.
C.C.A. guards on at least two occasions have ordered the demonstrators
away, but the possibility of an incident, which could have
repercussions, increases as the Chinese become more arrogant and our
forces more irritated.
4+ Police raids have continued without resistance but with decreasing
dividends. However, one prominent Communist leader has been arrested and
also one trouble maker from Kowloon City whe jumped his bail in early
May. Improvised weapons and gas masks in considerable numbers have been
recevered as well as a great deal of propaganda material and some
documents. A school raided on 24 July produced the largest single haul
of subversive leaflets etc. and had obviously been used as a
distribution point. Police
/have
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
have also removed or obliterated inflammatory propaganda on Communist
buildings in some cases painting over windows where there are illegal
displays.
5. There are reports that union members who have been discharged for
industrial misconduct are shortly to receive further payments from
Communist funds. The degree of confusion caused by police raids on union
premises is bound to make this a lengthy and difficult process.
6. The continued bomb and incendiary attacks, although ineffective and
infrequent, have succeeded in maintaining a certain degree of tension.
Otherwise there has been a noticeable increase in confidence in all
quarters except among the Communista whose morale appears still to be
declining. The main problen at the moment is the border which remains
difficult.
(Passed to D.S.A.0. for repetition to Washington
and Canberra and as advance copies for Commonweal th Secretary, Far
Eastern Dept., Foreign Office
and News Dept., Commonwealth Office)
(Fncyphered text passed to L.T.C. for repetition
to Peking and POLAD Singapore)
Distribution
-
H.K. W.1.D. 'C' 1.G.D.
J.I.C. EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
Copies also sent to:
P.8. to Prime Minister
Cabinet Office
Foreign Office
H
tt
H
D.1.0. J.I.R. P.S. to Mr. Rodgers Mr. de la Mare
Mr. Bolland
Mr. Wilson
H
H
PO/CO (IPGD)
IRD)
Treasury
Export Credita Guarantee Dept.
Ministry of Defence (Rm.7365)
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Rm.7163) (Rm.5131)
Board of Trade (CRE 4)
H
Hong Kong Government Office Commonwealth Office (News Dept.) Foreign
Office (News Dept.) Australia House (Senior External
Affairs Representative) Canada House (Counsellor)
Mr. Dengon
Mr. Foggon
Mr. Littlejohn-Cook
Mr. J.E. Peck
Mr. D. Hawkins
Mr. C.P. Rawlings
Kr. Henn
Major Koe
1.0.2
Mr. J.A.B. Darlington
+
Mr. B.E.P. MacTavish
-
Mr. P. Sedgwick
Mr. Glever
Duty Officer
-
Mr. T. Critchley
H
Mr. K. McLellan
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENT I AL
·
R
INWARD TELEGRAM
TO_THE_COMMON.BALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)
FROM HONG KONG (0.A.G.)
Cypher
D. 25 July 1967
081 32
R. 25
17.
171
IVED IN
¡ÅRCHIVES No.31
26 JUL 1967
FDI/!
If Shotad
Mr
站 B. Jensen
рако
PRIORITY
CONFIDENTIAL
No.1105
Addressed to Commonwealth Office (D.T.D.) Repeated to: Peking No.443
POLAD Singapore No.264
(Please pass to both)
Seamen's Strike.
The strike has now been on for nine days. Hong Kong Seamen's Union which
is normally well organized, is making every possible effort to prosecute
the strike, but has so far not been very effective. Where seamen have
left their ships because of the expiry of agreement or for other reasons
there has been little difficulty in finding replacements through the
seamen's recruiting office. One or two ships have sailed short with the
intention of picking up crew in Singapore. No ship has been prevented
from sailing.
2.
One effect of the strike has been to make owners of ships cautious about
sailing to South China ports because of threats to boycott them and of
arrest and detention. S.S. TAILUNGSHAN at Whampoa is not yet working
cargo, but this may be no more than normal congestion there. 3.5. HOI
KUNG carrying passengers for Whampoa from Singapore overcarried Hong
Kong-bound cargo. She has reloaded at Whampoa and is returning to
Singapore direct. Our knowledge of the situation in North China la
sparse. Congestion and delay have been a feature of these porte for a
long time. China transhipment cargo normally exported through Hong Kong
has ceased but this representa 1% of cargo handled here. Mainland Export
Corporation are now making alternative arrangements for transhipment in
Japan, Singapore or within China or by direct services.
3. A shipping intelligence unit has been set up to gather and analyse
information obtainable through ships* Masters and crawa on arrival here.
Pressures within China might cause shipowners to make the choice of