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A
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FDI/1.
CONFIDENT I AL
FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.
5 April, 1967.
8
I enclose a copy of a letter which we have received from Bunny Carter in
the Commonwealth office, containing guidance on the question of Hong
Kong's constitutional statua as requested in Peking telegram No. 306 of
20 March.
2. We think that he is right saying that we should concentrate on
stating our intentions broadly and not allow ourselves to be drawn into
detailed arguments about the meaning of terms that may or may not have
been used in the past, or to answer any of the specific Chinese
allegations as reported, for example, in Hong Kong telegram No. 355 to
the Commonwealth office. Do you agree? Fortunately the Chinese do not at
present seen interested in the matter.
P. Craddock Esq., Peking.
(J. B, DENSON)
•
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
ONFIDENT TAL PIDETTAL
Registry FDI No.
DRAFT
Letter
Type 1 →
To:
From
Top Secre Secret
P. Craddock Esq., Peking.
J. B. DENSON
Telephone No. & Exc
Confidential. Restricted.
Unclassified.
1/4
as requiring in
Perning Tel. No. 306 120 Mars
Enclosures
Mr. Carru's letta ar
مسلح
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letter
Department
uve received from
Bunny Carter in the Moealth office, contain-
ing `idance on tis uestion of Hong Kong's
2.
constitutional state think that he is right,on tifa el saying that we
should
concentrate on stating our intention wit
broadly
not allow ourselves to be drawn into
:letailed argments about the meaiting of terms that
may or may not save been used in the past
東華
hape to give
vering
of answer any of the specific Chiesa allegations as reported, the
examine, in Hong Kong telegram the 355 to the Commonweanor ostic Do
you agree? Fortmarking the
Onnime do mox prosent
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Mr.
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Reference...
FDI/I WITH 3
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Mr. Carter's arguments
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Tony Roadworley.
wincing.
:
|
CONFEDENIAL
Pse Deafy shor
from you to
cover from
RECEIVED IN Commonwealth Office M Cradocks.
ARCHIVES No. 31
S.W.I.
Our Ref. #B.1/12
31 MAR 367
31st March, 1967.
Dear John,
Foil (6)
FD1/1
An Galswritin
기다
стабоск
टेक भाक
Ents m. Groge.
In Feking tele,ram lo. 306 we were asked for indediate guidandé i case
Hong Kong pros: allegations about "plot to turn Hong kong into a
country" were taken up in any official Chinese protest. This hes, I am
afraid, been overlooked. But the immediacy has passed, since the recent
Chinese note was confined to visits of U.3. naval vessels.
2.
Should the matter ever be raised by the C.I.G. I a. sure we ast avoid
any detailed arguments about the leaning of the words "country" and
"nationals" and our loose uspe of tilam, or about the implications of
participating in international conferences and trade fairs etc., and
must co:.centrate on the nub of the matter that concerns the Chinese,
namely Long Long's constitutional status. They might be told that it has
been nade quite clear publicly that there is no intention of changing
Hong Long's status us a dependent territory, and their attention could
be drawn to a statement to this effect in the louse of Commons on the
21st March when the Commonwealth Secretary answered a question in the
following teras:
3.
Because of Hong Kong's special circumstances, it is not possible to
think of normal self-government in the Colony, nor to consider an
elected legislative Council."
I az sending a copy of this letter to Anthony Elliott who may wish to
comment, and enclose an additional copy in case you wish to seni one to
Faking.
J. Denson Esq.,
Foreign Office,
S...1.
Yours
Bunny
(.5.Carter)
[
Cypher/Cat. A
CONFIDENTIAL
TOP COPY
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31
20MAR 1967
IMMEDIATE PEKING TO FOREIGN OFFICE
西小
Telno. 306
20 March 1967
FD1/1
FDION(
CONFIDENTIAL
Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 306 of 20 Karch, Repeated for
information Immediate to Hong Kong.
Hong Kong telegram No. 355 to Commonwealth Office.
There has been nothing further in the Peking Press so far about American
ships in Hong Kong since 17 Karch (my telegram No. 298) and in
particular nothing about the so-called "plot to turn Hong Kong into a
country". Never- theless they may be cooking something up on this
subject so I should be grateful for some immediate guidance as to what I
should say if these allegations are included in an official Chinese
protest.
Kr. Hopson
Sent 05122/20 March 1967 Recd 08152/20 March 1967
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
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F.E.P.D.
CONFIDENTIAL
Cypher
CONFIDENTIAL
INWARD TELEGRAM
TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
(The Secretary of State)
FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
D. 18th March 1967 R. 18th
H
博
05.00 hrs.
Enter
5
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31
20 MAR 1967
FD1/1
See mint below
more
Frill
PRIORITY CONFIDENTIAL No.356
Addressed to Commonwealth Office (DTD) Repeated "Peking No.124 (please
pass)
My immediately preceding telegram.
Chinese attitudes towarda Hong Kong.
P.a. %
It seems possible that this attack, which is on entirely new lines, has
been promoted by recent views and comments expressed by members of the
public and in the press about the desirability of developing
representative institutions, introducing Elected Members into the
Legialative Council and the creation of some form of "Hong Kong
citizenship". as well as by the very full accounts which have appeared
here of Mr. James Johnson's opinions on similar themes in the House of
Commons Adjournment Debate on 27th February. The C.P.G. may well feel it
necessary now to leave us in no doubt about their attitude to moves in
the direction covering a "third China".
2. I do not think we need yet assume that these attacke indicate that
there would be objection to moves towards a better system of true local
authorities. ?
3. We have hitherto always been cautious about explaining publicly the
basic reason why Hong Kong cannot develop fully representative
institutions, and as a result there is a good deal of confusion on the
point locally, as well apparently as in the minds of certain Members of
Parliament who have visited the Colony The very clear statement on the
subject by the Minister of State (Mrs. Hart) in her reply to the
Adjournment Debate has received practically no publicity in the local
press. I understand that Mr. Rankin has put down a parliamentary
question, for answer on 21st March, asking why Hong Kong is not to have
an elected Legislative Council. It would be most useful in present
circumstances if the reply could make use of the formula employed by the
Minister of State:
"Because of Hong Kong's particular relationship with China it is not
possible to think of normal self-government in the Colony nor to
consider an elected Legislative Council". Perhaps the now very apparent
dangers of continuing to press on these lines could also be explained
privately to Mr. Rankin and others.
(Passed as requested)
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
Copy sent to:
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CONFIDENTIAL
F.E.D.
In
J
CONFIDENTIAL
INWARD TELEGRAM
TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
(The Secretary of State)
FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31
20 MAR 1967
FD!|!
M
Cypher
D. 18th March 1967 R. 18th
H
04.40 hrs.
PRIORITY
CONFIDENTIAL No.355
The is a
ik Billand
F. undereing new line 727/3
well paradoxically be of great value of the
the Hong
recchioneries
Hong hang, Gove.
Addressed to Commonwealth Office (D.T.D.)
"Peking No.123 (Please pass)
Repeated
Sin
The two leading Hong Kong left-wing papers of 17th March devoted much
attention to an alleged "plot to turn Hong Kong into a country". The
argument is that although Hong Kong is in every respect a part of the
territories of China, a number of persons, notably the "British
authorities in Hong Kong" have lately been claiming Hong Kong as a
"country". Examples by the papers given
are: -
(a) an official statement in the Legislative Council discussion on the
Bill establishing the Hong Kong Krport Credit Insurance Corporation that
"Hong Kong would be the 25th country" provided with such Facilities;
(b) alleged statements attributed to you in your
interview with Radio Hong Kong and your press conference during your
recent visit here that "Hong Kong....might be said to be a small country
as it had a population of nearly four million", and that "Hong Kong has
already attained the qualification for becoming a small atate";
(c) Hong Kong participation in many international
fairs, e.g. the 1964 Trade Fair in Milan, as a "country",
(a) references by official members in the Legislative
Council budget debate to Hong Kong "as a country" and to Hong Kong
residents as "nationals";
(e)
references during 1966 by the "Soviet Revisionists" to Hong Kong as a
country in international meetings of textile and garments workers and
international plantation workers.
2. The papers comment that there is a "serious political plot behind all
this; the aim is to reject the right of China to claim her sovereignty
over Hong Kong. There is a link with U. S. imperialist intrigue to put
their hands on Hong Kong and to turn Hong Kong into one of their bases
for aggression; and "with the plot against China planned jointly by the
U.S. and the Soviet Revisionista" "No-one should attempt to create a
so-called country in any part of Hong Kong and no-one could ever succeed
/in
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
in alienating Chinese residents in Hong Kong from the 700 million
Chinese people in mainland China" If the British authorities
the power of China for granted and continue to plot intrigues. an
attempt to provoke the Chinese people, "they will be taking up a stone
to hit their own feet".
ke
(Passed as requested)
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
Copy also sent to:
Foreign Office
-
F.E.D.
CONFIDENTIAL
FDI|1
P
SECRET
3
ре
21 February, 1967
2012
1
Thank you for sanding me a copy of the Governor of Hong Kong's despatch
No. 2879 of 15 December last. Το found it very interesting.
2.
We have no particular corments on it, except to say that, as you will
realise, there is clearly some confusion in paragraph 11 about official
Chinese protests at United States activities in Hong Kong- There were
two official protests during the period under review: the first in
September 1965, following the aircraft incident referred to in paragraph
10, and the secund in February 1966.
The reason for the second was the presence of a considerable number of
United States novel vessels. There have bear. other "complaints* in the
Hong Kong left-wing press since then, which havebeen taken up in the
mainland press, but no further official protests.
These
3. Since the despatch was written, there have of course been some
important developments in the external field having a bearing on Hong
Kong, to which you night wish to draw attention in your formal reply to
the Governor. are the Chinese campaign against Macao and the
intensification of the Cultural Revolution which took place when it was
extended to industry. This began in late December 1966. Having extracted
the maximus concessions from the Portuguess, the Chinese stopped short
et actual occupation of Maoso. There is some reason to believe that a
contributory factor in the Chinese decision may have been their
assessment that euch sotion would affect confidence in Hong Kong, which
is valuable to them economically and for intelligence purposes. Te have
no evidence to suggest that there has been a change in the basic Chinese
policy of
T. S. Carter, Esq., C.7.0..
Hồng Kong and Test Indian Department 'C',
Dependent Territories Division,
Commonwealth Office.
SECRET
/maintaining
desp!!.
ни
SECRET
maintaining the status quo in the Colony. The example of Macao, together
with the elerents of irrationality and xenophobie which hve manifested
themselves in the Cultural Revolution in its latest phase do suggest,
however, that the Chinese at present are abnormally sensitive to
external events. If, therefore, some incident, however spontaneous,
arose in Hong Kong, the Chinese might react more strongly than normally
and take up a position from which they could not retreat. It is
therefore, we think, important to avoid any sources of friction with
China and to try to ensure that there in a period of calm while any loss
of morale resulting from the Macao affair is recovered.
(E. Bolland)
SECRET
Mr. de la Mare
tr. de le
SECRET
miembr
HONG KONG
RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No.31
23 FEB 1967
FDI/
Mr. Rodgers may be interested to see the attached despatch
from the Governor of Hong Kong containing a review of the
principal developments in the Colony between April 1965 and
December 1966. Paragraphs 9-17 eal with external relations.
2. We have no particuler comments on the despatch, except that
there is clearly some confusion in paragraph 11 about official
Chinese protests at United States activities in Hong Kong.
There were two official protests during the period under review:
the first in September 1965, following the aircraft incident
referred to in paragraph 10, and the second in February 1966.
The reason for the second was the presence of a considerable
number of United States naval vessels. There have been other
"complaints" in the Hong Kong left-wing press since then, which
have been taken up in the inland press, but no further official
protests.
IT
3. The two rein developments in the external "ield having
a bearing on Hong Kong which have occurred since the review was
C
written fre the Chinese campaign against Zacao and the
intensification of the Cultural Revolution which took place when
it was extended to industry. This began in late December 1966.
Having extracted the maximum concessions from the Portuguese,
the Chinese stopped short et actual occupation of Macao.
There is some reason to believe that a contributory factor in
the Chinese decision may have been their assessment that such
action would affect confidence in Hong Kong, which is valuable
to them economically and for intelligence purposes.
no evidence to suggest that there has been a change
We have
in the basic
/Chinese
SECKET
SECRET
Chinese policy of maintaining the status quo in the Colony.
The example of Macao, together with the elements of irrationality
and xenophobia which have manifested themselves in the Cultural
Revolution in its latest phase do suggest, however, that the
Chinese at present are abnormally sensitive to external events.
If, therefore, some incident, however spontaneous, arose in
Hong Kong, the Chinese might react more strongly than normally
and take up a position from which they could not retreat. It is
therefore important to avoid any sources of friction with
China and to try to ensure that there is a period of calm while
any loss of morale resulting from the Macao affair is recovered.
4. It was with the above considerations in mind that the Chiefs
of Staff recently recommended that the cut in the Hong Kong
garrison agreed by Ministers last year should not be put into
effect immediately and that any announcement of it should also be
deferred for the moment. If the savings on the garrison
contemplated are to be made in the 1967-68 financial year, it is
likely that an announcement will have to be made in September.
By this time the dust will have settled after the Macao affair
and, although we can only guess about this, the atmosphere in
China may also have calmed down.
5. I will reply to Mr. Carter's letter of 24 January along
the lines of paragraphs 2 and 3 above when you have seen.
20 February, 1967
I doubt whether the Rodgers need see This despatch now. It is now more
than
SECHET
Pro
متما
two months old. It book the C.o.a month to send it to us, and it has
been fer almost a month before being
sath itted.
We should bear the despatch in mind for what it say about M.s. Elliott,
in "Cass that lady causes, us
by causes as further trouble but othowrie no action except to reply to
hn Carter as you propose. In Bolland.
+
am
am
hello T-Yr Caw him 21/2
вра
پلی
Our reference: FED.150/402/01
Your reference:
Dear Eddie
着
SECRET
COLONIAL OFFICE
GREAT SMITH STREET, LONDON S.W.I
Telephone: Abbey 1266, ext.
RECEIVED IN
24th January, ARCHIVES No.31
23 FEB 1967
FDI
I enclose, with apologies for the delay, a copy of despatch No. 2879 of
15th December, 1966 from the Governor of Hong Kong reporting on the
Frincipal developments in Hong Kong over the last eighteen or so months.
We are arranging to print
it.
2.
We shall be sending a formal reply in due Please let us know if you have
any comments for incorporation.
course.
Of Demen
We sprine You
تلتكم
пр
Dunnyz
بسلا
We have entrilon (W.. CARTER)
a more ticklesh period vis-à-vis Chine siner
this despatel was out. Poul. The main
E.Bolland Esq.,
Foreign Office, conclusions
2.
8.4.1.
slill sländ, I think.
SECRET
Plean Tal me
still
China's attitude
detailed commit;
any
fu
علما
for To Cort. We shld also let for Rodgers
thes: so
please prepore ро
Juhmuthal Jaz
a short draft Jahmini
с
25
SECRET
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31
-9 MAR 1967 FDBZ1
THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT"
COMMONWEALTH OFFICE PRINT DISTRIBUTION
CO Ref.: FED 150/402/01
February, 1967
Copy No. 53
HONG KONG: A REVIEW OF PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
Governor of Hong Kong to the Secretary of State for the Colonies
(No. 2879. Secret? Sir,
Government House, Hong Kong IS December, 1966
I have the honour in this despatch to attempt a review of the principal
developments that have taken place in Hong Kong since my last periodic
despatch dated 23 April, 1965,*
2. The main excitement was undoubtedly the three days of rioting in
April this year. By the standards of other countries it was a minor
affair and the injury to persons and property was slight. Its
significance lies in the fact that it happened at all. Since the clash
between Communists and nationalists in 1956 Hong Kong has been free from
mob violence. Nearly 4 million people contrive to earn a living in this
crowded territory and they have managed to rub along without producing
more than an occasional spark, and when disturbances did flare up there
was a disproportionate feeling of shock and apprehension.
3. The ostensible cause of the riots was a proposal to increase the
first-class fare of one of the cross-harbour ferry services by five
cents (the equivalent of three farthings). On 5 April a youth called So
Sau-chung staged a hunger strike in protest at the Star Ferry pier. His
action came as jam to the Press, who excited public interest in him and
in the issue generally. His arrest, for obstruction, increased the
tension and led to a peaceful, but excited, protest march (mainly by
teenagers and children) through Kowloon on the night of 5/6 April.
Tension continued to grow and further demonstrations on the following
night degenerated into violence, which, however, did not spread beyond
the south-west quarter of Kowloon. A curfew was ordered and by the early
hours of the morning order had been restored. Violence, however, broke
out again the following evening, though it was confined to a smaller
area, and a curfew was again imposed. Precautionary curfews were ordered
for the following two nights and there was no further trouble. One
person was killed as a result of police fire and 16 injured persons were
treated in Government hospitals. Others were no doubt treated privately.
1,465 persons were arrested; of these 905 were charged with various
offences (790 with breach of curfew alone).
4. So much for the actual events. The underlying causes-the "groundswell
of discontent" as The Times called it--are not so easy to analyse. A
Commission of Enquiry was set up and has completed hearing evidence. I
do not want to anticipate the Commission's conclusions, but a sketch of
the background is necessary for the riots to be seen in perspective.
5. Before the war and for some time afterwards the population of Hong
Kong, both Chinese and European, was essentially transient. However long
people lived here, their roots and their real homes were elsewhere. But
now not only are there far more people but they are a more settled
community though not necessarily from choice; many young people are
growing up who have never known and have no foreseeable hope of knowing
another home. They live in a quite appallingly overcrowded city, in a
fiercely competitive environment, where poverty and considerable wealth
are seen side by side. Real wages have been rising much faster than the
cost of living but, while there has been a considerable improvement in
living conditions generally, this in itself has inspired the desire for
still further improvement.
• Not printed.
SECRET
7620
2
SECRET
6. These feelings have been encouraged by a small group of the less
responsible of our local politicians. They have so far failed in their
efforts to arouse any genuine political-mindedness among the population,
and their talents are mainly employed in trying to persuade people that
they are discontented. They ignore the advances that have been made in
social welfare represented. among other things, by the provision of
Government housing for a million people: and concentrate their attention