Kon Hongkong (habe
D15.5.67
615.86712327
***AT HONGKONG GOVERNORS STATEMENT FOR
"MATION"://FOT
**MATION
MOST MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC WILL ALREADY BE AWARE FROM THEIR HOST
NEWSPAPERS OR FROK FROADCASTING SERVICES THAT A POTEST HAS BEEN HANDED
TO THE BRITISH CHARCE DAFFAIRES IN PERING REGARDING THE EVENTS IN
HONGKONG OVER THE LAST FEW DAYS TOP
HONGKONG
COE-474245 RT
CREAT
THIS STATEMENT DESCRIPES POLICE ACTION AS QVOJE PERSECUTION " UNQUOTE
AUF WOT:"SUPPRESSION LIQUOIE AND, SPEAKS OF JUOTE HOSTILE MEASURES
AGAINST CHINA IN HONG KONG "TA MANY PEOPLE. I HAVE NO DOUBT COMMA WILL
BL ANXIOUS TO KNOW WHAT ANSWER THIS GOVERNMENT IS GOING TO MAKE TO THESE
STATEMENTS
23/50
SIAY THEY MAY BE DISAPPOINTED WHEN ALL WE CAN SAY IS THAT THIS PROTEST
HAS BEEN MADE TO THE REPRESENTATIVE OF HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT IN
PEKING AND THAT AN ANSWER MUST THEPEFORE ☛ COME FROM HER NAJESTYS
GOVERNMENT IN LONDON ¿ STOP YET THIS IS THE POSITION AND NOTHING AT ALL
P4
TE
Sir D. Allen
5
SECRET
(40) Ent
RIVED I ARCHIVES No.31
1 7 MAY 1967
FD1/1
2.
HONG KONG
There are two decisions which we have to take very quickly.
The first, which must be made today, is whether the trial
of the twenty-odd agitators arrested on 6 Hay should proceed
tomorrow (Hong Kong time) as planned.
3. The second decision, which is not so immediate, is how we
reply to the Chinese statement about these disturbances, of
which our Mission in Peking has been handed a copy by the
Chinese Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
4. We have discussed this with our colleagues in the
Commonwealth Office. Our view on the trial is that there are
three alternatives:
(a) to postpone the trial for, say, 48 hours
in order to see how matters develop;
(b) to start the trial tomorrow as planned
but to seek an adjournment, perhaps on grounds
that further evidence is required, and to
re-offer bail which the men detained have
already been offered but have refused;
(c) to proceed with the trial as planned and
let the law take its course. Since the
charges are for illegal picketing it does not
appear that prison sentences would be involved.
One of the agitators who pleaded guilty when
tried on 8 May was fined HK$100. We cannot
/be
SECRET
SECRET
2
5.
be sure that some of the other defendents may
not have more serious charges laid against them
but on the evidence we have we assume that
fines of HK$100 (£6.5.0.) would probably meet
the situation.
Our objection to (a) is that if we show weakness from the
outset we believe that the Chinese will instigate the Hong Kong
dissidents to increase their pressure and demands against us.
6. Our objection to (b) is that, as far as we know, the
prosecution has prepared its case and if we ask for an
adjournment for further evidence this also would look like a
sign of weakness.
7. We therefore conclude that we should proceed as at (c).
We accept that in view of the demands contained in Peking'a
statement, one of which is that all the persons arrested
should immediately be set free, this may appear provocative
both in Hong Kong and in Peking and may lead to serious
escalation of the pressures against us.
But our view,
subject to Ministers' decision, is that increasing pressure is
going to be put upon us anyway and that this will be less rather
than greater if we do not give the appearance of backing down
immediately but take the position that the law of the Colony
must be upheld.
8. We shall submit separately on the second decision, i.e.
how to deal with Peking's statement.
CA. de la man
(A.J. de la Mare)
SECRET
15 May 1967
/Copies
L
WOULD BE SAINED BY MAKING OBSERVATIONS FROM HERE
28 /
HOWEVER THERE IS NO REASON WHY I★ SHOULD NOT AD
ECALL THE ASSURANCES WHICH WE HAVE ALREADY GIVEN TO THE PUBLIS
ABOUT THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE AND ORDER
THESE INCLUDE
ASSURANCE FROM THE COMMISSIONER OF LAEOUR THAT THE
* INVOLVE POLICE DO NOT REPEAT HOT AND WILL NOT REPE THEMSELVES IN
LAPOUR DISPUTES FUT WILL ONLY ENFORCE THE LAW WHEN IT IS PROKEN OPP THEY
ALSO INCLUDE THE ASSURANCE GIVEN ON THE SAME DAY THAT THE POLICY OF THE
COVERNMENT 13 NOW AS ALWAYS TO MAINTAIN THE LAW"
LANY
LOJA
I
AS IMPARTIALLY AND AS FAIRLY AS POSSIBLE FOR THE ELNEFIT OF ALL
SEMICOLOR THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO CHANGE IN THIS POLICY OR IN THE
GOVERNMENTS, POLICY OF NOT A TAKING SIDES IN INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES
Panda
Hi I MAKE NO APCLOGY FOR PEPEATING
THESE ASSURANCES ALTHOUGH THEY ARE NOT REPEAT
C
AVE, COMMENT UPON THE PROTEST NOTE TO WHICH I HAVE REFERREU STOP IN
REPEAT THEM PECAUSE I AM SURE THAT THE PRESERVATION OF PEACE AND ORDER
IS THE DEAREST WISH OF ALMOST EVERYONE IN OUR COMMUNITY G'BS INSANT
COL SHED
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SECRET
41
Flag A FD1/1/1, bal
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0020
Er. de la Mare
HONG KONG
EVED IN
{ARCHIVES No.31
1 7 MAY 1967
Folli
Euti
You referred in your submission earlier today to the problem
of how we should handle the Peking statement. We discussed this
with our colleagues in the Commonwealth Office and decided that
we should set out our preliminary views in a telegram to the
Governor, Hong Kong (copy attached) before submitting to
Ministers.
2.
Briefly, we came down in favour of not replying directly
to Peking's statement but, subject to the views of Ministers
and the Governor, Hong Kong, of the latter making a firm but
non-polemical statement on the situation in the Colony and the
policy we intend to pursue .
3. Just as this telegram was about to issue, we received the
attached press telegram from Hong Kong showing that the Governor
had already issued a statement without reference to London.
We thought nevertheless that our telegram should issue with an
additional paragraph 8, because we still think that any comment
on the Peking statement should be made indirectly in Hong Kong
rather than by a formal reply in Peking or London.
C.0.
P.U.S.
Mr. Samuel
Mr. Carter, C.0.
The
Во
Follan
(E. Bolland) 15 May, 1967
* We have held it pending your
decision.
+
Semaly of State agreed subject to miner свете Amendments. Telegram sent
by C.O.-9195 Hong Kong.
SECRET
PA.
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
* Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should
reach addressee(s).
WITH 41
Registry No.
DEPARTMENT
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified
Dill
PRIORITY MARKINGS
(Date)
Despatched
Flash
frantediate}
Priority Routine
PRIVACY MARKING
In Confidence
Cypher
Draft Telegram to:-
No...
(Date)
And to:-
PONI, LUNJkkan coklat m
❤--.--IIJELLJJ.
LLJJIL
[Being despatched by C.O.]
[Security classification] -if any
[
Privacy marking -if any
[Codeword-if any]
Addressed to
telegram No.........
And to
SECRET
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.LLINOLJNA
JJ LLOJ - c
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INPELL -
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HUNG KONG
.. ------ K DAN StemmITOIRE EL JE
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(date)
repeated for information to
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PEKING
POLAD SINGAPORE
Saving to.....
Repeat to:- PEKING
POLAD SINGAPORE
Saving to:-
Distribution:-
JIC EXPL.
Copies to:
Cabinet Office
D.I.O. J.I.A.
F.0.
Mr. de la Mare
Mr. Bolland
Your telegram No. 609: Peking Statement.
We think that Peking will probably be prepared
to engaged in a prolonged war of nerves. It is on
this assumption we have been considering how to handle
the Peking statement preparatory to submitting to
Ministers.
2. There appear to be four alternatives:
3.
(a) for Hopson to return the statement because it
is offensive;
(b) to ignore it;
(c) to refute it in detail;
(n}
(d) to issue a atatement of our own explaining
what has happened and the policy we intend to
pursue.
We cannot see that there is anything to be gained
by returning it: to slam the door in this way would
Mr. Wilson
Kr. Denson
Mr. Foggon
only aggravate the situation.
SECRET
/4.
postope in dicationg
that it was
approved by H.M.9,
SECRET
We cannot altogether ignore it because we
imagine public opinion in Hong Kong will expect
some response and be concerned to know what
Land that any
attitude we intend to adopt
undertainty
about this could very seriously affect local
confidence and morale.
5. To refute it in retail would be to play Be Kings
thefr/game and lay us open to a further round
of polemical exchanges which might cause Peking to adopt a more rigid
position and to raise their
demands.
6.
We therefore
Nevertheless, we think that for the reasons
given in paragraph ↳ above you should make
a short statement] along the following lines: outlining the recent
events, noting their origin
in an industrial dispute, explaining the means
available for settling such disputes and
confiding our intention of firmly but fairly
maintaining law and order. By this means we would
enn hope to avoid polemics and any reference to the unacceptable demands
in Peking's statement,
we' which would be bound to arise were we to try to
explain the position directly to the Chinese Government either here or
in Peking (Para. 6 of
your telegram under æeference).
7. Grateful for your views on this assessment
and, unless you see objection to the course suggested, please telegraph
urgently a draft
statement for consideration by Ministers.
8.
As we were about to despatch this telegram, we received your prese
telegram giving text of
Grateful to know your statement today.
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
reasons why you made this statement now.
It
does not invalidate views expressed above and we
would still like to have your comments on them
draft
and a statement.
SECRET
SECRET
- 3-
Copies to: P.U.S.
Private Office
Mr. Rodgers
A similar recommendation
on the
Frial is being submitted in the C.O.
J
that it should be allowed
agree
to proceed.
Denis All."/s.
(P.U.S. har him (pp).
Rivet Sexy
The secretary of Stati has apred.
C.O informed. They will despatch titipe
со
Cum
15/1
pa.
SECRET
E
SECRET
INWARD TELEGRAM
TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
(The Secretary of State)
FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31
1, MAY 1967
FDI/1
3の
Cypher
D. 15th May 1967 R. 15th
05292
FLASH SECRET No.607
Forli ED
Addressed to Commonwealth Office Repeated
Peking No.221
Reply send. ра p.a.
"POLAD Singapore No.89
(Please pass FLASH to both)
Peking telegram No.478.
Kowloon Disturbances.
ごっつん
The M.F.A. statement, which has been published here this morning in a
special edition of 'Wen Wei Pao', seems to take psychological warfare
about as far as it can go. We have at present no clear indications of
what physical action, if any, will be taken to back it up. But the
statement that the "750 million people of China" are behind them will
encourage the Left-wing rank-and-file to think that they need place no
restraint on their actions; and we know that trade union circles have
already been talking about starting disturbances in 6 or 8 places at
once in the belief that this would overstretch the police (as it might).
2.
An immediate problem arises from the fact that the 21 workers arrested
in the incident of 6th May are due to appear for trial in the South
Kowloon Magistrates' Court tomorrow 16th May at 9 a.m. local time. If
they do, it will be clear that we have rejected one of the "four
demande", and judging by a reference in a "Wen Wei Pao" editorial this
morning to the "impermissibility" of prosecuting them, this may be the
signal for trouble.
3. It would be possible to adjourn the hearing for a further period.
This would have the disadvantage of simply putting off the evil day,
while giving more time for the Left to develop their agitation and
organise counter-measures. On the other hand, it could provide a
breathing space in which to attempt to initiate negotiations. On the
whole, I incline to the view that a 48-hour adjournment might be
justified, especially as it would also provide more time for views on
the major issues posed by the note to be formed in London: on the other
hand, if the view is that we should resist the pressure fully it would
be better to give no ground by adjourning.
4. I would be grateful for instructions at least on this particular
issue in the next ten to twelve hours.
(Passed to D.§.A.0. for Resident Clerk as advance copy
and for repetition to Peking and Singapore)
SECRET
Cypher
FLASH
SECRET To.612
SECRET
INWARD TELEGRAM
TO THE COMMON"BALTH OFFICE
(The Secretary of State)
FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
D. 16th May 1967
R. 16th
0522Z
Addressed to Commonwealth office Repeated Peking No.224
RECEIVED
ARCHIVES No. 51.
1 7 MAY 1967
西川
ра
" POLAD Singapore No.93 (Please pass IMMEDIATE to Peking
PRIORITY to Singapore)
Fall 130
Your telegram No.919.
38
Peking Statement.
I made the statement referred to in your paragraph 8 because there was
great public pressure and need for some explanation of the situation. To
have refused or delayed comment could have had a most damaging effect on
local confidence and morale.
2.
At a meeting of my Executive Council this morning the point was made
with unanimous support that the reaction of the ordinary citizens of
Hong Kong to Left-wing pressure (and this after all is going to be
crucial during the next few weeks) would depend on their judgment of how
H.M.G. in London would react to that pressure, and whether H.M.G. also
was fully determined that law and order be maintained. I am sure that
if, as your telegram under reference appears to suggest, H.H.G. were to
avoid making any statement or reply to the Chinese protest, it would be
suspected here that their attitude to the Chinese demande was equivocal
and Hong Kong was being left to sink or awin on its own. The invariable
practice in the past has been for replies to Chinese Notes of protest to
be made in London or Peking, not Hong Kong. Por me to make a second
statement on the lines you suggest in paragraph 6 would not be accepted
here as a proper substitute for a firm statement of views by H.M.G. and
I do not advise it.
3. I entirely agree with your objections to alternatives (a) (b) and (c)
of your paragraph 2 and I would hope therefore that Ministers would
agree to the making of a firm official statement in London, to include
the admirable points made Hopson to Vice-Minister in Peking (his
telegram No.482)-But I feel that it is equally important that an oral
exposition of H.M.G.'s views should be given concurrently to the Chinese
Chargé d'affaires in London. It seems to me essential to try by every
means we can to get the Chinese Government (repeat Government) to
understand our essentially reasonable position. If the discussion with
the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires were used to ram home the same points, it
need not be barrenly polemical and it might be possible to avoid
detailed discussion of the "demands". Only by the maintenance of
personal contacts of this kind does it seen likely that an eventual
solution may emerge.
1440
SECRET
25-
SECRET
مبا
If you accept these views, it would seen that a statement would be
better drafted in London.
5. Your telegram No.918. We have done this so often in the recent past
that I doubt whether it would have any effect at this moment. It is a
point we try to keep constantly in front of the public.
(Passed as requested)
Distribution
-
-
H.K. W.I.D. 'C' I.G.D.
J.I.C. EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
Copies sent to:
Cabinet Office
-
D.I.O. J.I.R.
Foreign Office
-
Hr. de la Mare
-
Mr. Bolland
H
肿
-
Mr. Wilson
Hr. Denson Mr. Foggon
SECRET
+
Cypher
PLASH BEER T
No. 609.
SECRET
INWARD TELEGRAM
TO_THE_COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)
FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
D. 15th May, 1967.
R. 15th
1000Z
RECEIVED ARCHIVES No. 31
1 7 MAY 1967
pal
Foll1 (39
f
Addressed to Commonwealth Office Repeated
Peking No.223
POLAD Singapore No.91
(Please pass FLASH to both).
My telegram No. 607.
Hong Kong.
The position on the ground at 1400 hours today 15th May remained quiet.
There are no indications of unusual occurrences in the frontier area.
2.
But it is clear that as a result of the Chinese M.F.A. 's statement we
are now very near indeed to facing the choices mentioned in paragraph 4
of my telegram No. 600. The demands leave little leeway for negotiation.
We cannot offer apologies or compensation or even provide effective
guarantees' against the occurrence of similar incidents without
accepting a situation in which the left-wing here are above the law.
Some of those arrested have already been sentenced and though acts of
clemency might be justifiable in certain cases, they certainly would not
be in all. Again while the disposal of the 20 original offenders is
still within the jurisdiction of the courts and some might be bound
over, this cannot of course be guaranteed.
3.
It may well be worth attempting during the next 48 hours (if the court
hearings are adjourned) to discover whether behind the demands there is
really any scope for negotiation.
We are pursuing our efforts in this direction, but it seems unlikely
that anything usefull will result.
40
If the left-wing stick firmly by the four demands, we must face the fact
that any further attempt to seek a compromise would in the middle-term
at any rate mean an abdication of our position here. Hong Kong would
almost at once cease to be attractive to investment;
the proble" of maintaining any control or authority over left-wing
activities would intensify; and H.M.G. would not only be discredited but
saddled with an increasing economic burden. In my view this position
would only be tolerable if our aim was to buy time in order to negotiate
an orderly withdrawal (even if the Chinese allowed us to achieve that).
SECRET
15:
5.
SECRET
The alternative policy, of taking a firm but reasonable line in
resistance to the demands, of course carries major risks 1.e. of renewed
violence, probably on an increased scale, which in the long run we might
find ourselves unable to control; and finally of physical intervention
by the C.P.G. on the other hand, there is just a chance that if we took
a very fira line, offering no provocation but explaining our policy
clearly to the C.P.G. there might be sõne prospect of inducing a change
of Chinese attitude. It remains hard to believe that at the present time
the C.P.G. could really welcome the prospect of a military clash in Hong
Kong or indeed of having to take Hong Kong over, thus losing its
economic and other advantages.
6.
▲ possible line of action might now be to explain our position clearly
and in forthright terms to the G.P.G., preferably in London. Our reply
might start by stating our refusal to accept the Chinese allegations of
"atrocities
'atrocities" (there is plenty of evidence that the police acted with
great restraint throughout) and saying that the action that was taken in
no way ained either at the workers or the left-wing whose activities in
Hong Kong have always been permitted provided that they remained within