some ground amongst the local population, and we are considering ways of
refutation. The police reverted to a lower state of readiness atand by
at 1200 hours on 29 Hay.
-
force
Stop press (30 May). A token strike from 0800 1000 at the waterworks is
in progress. Supplies are not affected.
(Paased as requested)
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Mr. T. Critchley Mr. K.W. MacLellan
CONFIDENTIAL
Cypher
SECRET No.726
SECRET
INWARD TELEGRAM
TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFIC
(The Secretary of State)
FROM MONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
D. 29 May 1967 R. 29
1
· IN
Ricz
5.31
30 MAY 1967
FD 1/1
07552
ра
3.1
194
Addressed to Commonwealth Office (D.T.D.)
Repeated to:
Peking No.281
POLAD Singapore No.137 Washington No.149
(5. of S. please pass to all)
Your telegram No.1038.
Disturbances.
I am very grateful for your response to my proposals.
2. In present lull, extreme measures are not of course immediately
necessary; but we must be careful not to be so over-tolerant as to allow
a fresh and different assault to be hatched up in total impunity, nor to
lose the initiative entirely. Posters, leaflets and the press are still
operating flagrantly outside the law, and the continued and unmolested
presence here of the worst of the leaders and agitators remains most
dangerous. While we certainly must not be unduly provocative at the
present time, it would be equally dangerous for several reasons to show
excessive complacency, weakness or apparent vacillation.
3. I am therefore considering what counteraction within the above limits
might be taken during this present phase. It could best, I believe, take
the general form of a gradual but fairly *(?omission) reinsistence on
adherence to the law (either by normal police action or through the
courts) in carefully selected cases. In this, it would not, of course,
be practicable to consult you on every occasion; but I would naturally
consult before doing anything particularly likely to stir up trouble.
4. Your paragraph 3. Possibility of deportees being refused entry at the
border has of course been very much in my mind throughout. But, if this
should occur, detention or police supervision procedures would in
suitable cases, if things got that far be available. For militant emall
fry police supervision orders might be a very useful weapon.
-
5. Your paragraph 9. It is difficult to make fire plans without knowning
what form a new and serious confronta- tion would take. We are, however,
actively planning, with the public utility companies where they are
concerned, what we would do to counter widespread and prolonged
stoppages in the essential services. This seems the most probable risk
at present, apart from a plain recurrence of violence.
SECRET
/6.
SECRET
6. Your paragraph 10. Hy intention to take leave was, of course, made
public several weeks ago, well before the present crisis, At the moment,
I am simply taking the line, in response to any enquiry that I cannot
tell at present whether I shall be able to go after all or not; but I
have to make certain public arrangements on the assumption that
conditions will permit me to go even if these arrangements have to be
cancelled at the last moment.
*(Correction being obtained)
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-
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Ħ
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忡
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#
1:
Mr. Foggon
Mr. D. Hawkins
Treasury
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Defence
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Major Koe
M.0.2
Mr. J.A.B. Darlington
7 SIR.)
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Котон Реск
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En Clair
6117
93
INWARD TELEGRAM
TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
(The Secretary of State)
FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
D. 27 May 1967 R. 27
15052
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31
30 MAY 1967
FOL/L
No.721
Addressed to Commonwealth Office Repeated to:
Peking
POLAD Singapore
Washington No.148
ро
3./
(S. of S. please pass to Washington)
My telegram No.715.
Sitrep as at 27/1800 hours.
It has been a quiet day. Rumours of impending stoppages in the transport
and ferry companies and public utilities have continued to circulate but
nothing has happened. Unless there are major developments there will be
no Sitrep on 28 May.
(Passed to D.S.A.0. for repetition to Washington and for
advance copies Resident Clerk and Foreign Office
P.E. Dept. and Secretary of State for
Commonwealth Affairs)
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I.G.D.
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It
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D.I.O., J.I.R.
P.S. tó Mr. Rodgers
Mr. de la Mare
Mr. Bolland
Mr. Wilson Mr. Denaon Kr. Foggon Mr. D. Hawkins
Export Credite Guarantee Department Ministry of Defence (Room 7365)
++
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Mr. C.P. Rawlings
Mr. Henn
Major Koe
1.0.2
Mr. J.A.B. Darlington
(Senior External Affairs Representative)
Canada House (Counsellor)
-
Mr. K.W. MacLellan
TTIR :)
I hewing Peak
Mr.T.K.Critchley
TE D
EJ (1626)
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.
+
FO!/!
Minutes.
92
SEE ANNEX
Cypher
INKEDIATE
CONFIDENTIAL
INWARD TELEGRAM
TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)
FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
D. 26 May 1967
R. 26
CONFIDENTIAL
No.715
中醫
1 31 52
Addressed to S. of S.
Repeated
EI
" Peking No.275
11
" POLAD Singapore No.134
Washington No.147
RECEIVEC A-CHIVES V.
FOLL
(S. of S. please pass PRIORITY to all)
My telegram No.705.
Sitrep as at 26/1800.
+
91
Two Government Departments had limited stoppages. 700 postmen are on
strike from 260800 to 270600, thus preventing any delivery or collection
service except airmail. Counter service remains normal but sorting has
been partially affected. Staff of the Marine Department slip-way staged
a 3-hour strike from 0800 this morning. This affected some fifty
launches and slightly disrupted transport for sanitation and port worka.
Port services to visiting ships were not affected.
2. I have had a general warning issued to the public service pointing
out that those who participate in stoppages leave themselves open to
disciplinary action including dismissal. 3. The only other strike action
was the sit-down of some 3.000 workers of the Taikoo Dockyard and
Engineering Co. in Hong Kong from 1300 to 1600. This was peaceful and
the workers are carrying out an equivalent amount of overtime this
evening. Private companies are being advised to take a firmer line on
strikers.
4.
5.
Transport services have been fully normal today.
There have been 3 rumours of strike action at the Electric Co. which
serves Kowloon, the Telephone Co. and the Hong Kong Aircraft Engineering
Co., but there have en no stoppages.
6. In the early afternoon leaflets were thrown from roof-tops and high
windows in several parts of both Hong Kong and Kowloon, These carry
invective in Chinese against British imperialism and alleged Police
brutality. Police are investigating. Two loudspeakers have been
intermittently broadcasting but subject matter has not warranted Police
action.
7. 18 court cases o' unlawful assembly were heard today without
incident. The case "volving a China motor bus employee who was the
pretext for an earlier strike was concluded but sentence deferred until
tomorrow.
(Passed as requested, also to Resident Clerk, D.S.A.0.
Far East Dept. Foreign Office and Private One re,
Commonwealth Office)
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tr
*E
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Treasury
1
+
Mr. Wilson
Mr. Denson
Mr. Foggon
Mr. D. Hawking
Export Credits Guarantee Department Ministry of Defence (Room 7365)
H
H
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[E
Australia House
Room 7163) Room 51 31
-
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Mr. C.P. Rawlings
Mr. Hern
Major Koe
M.0.2
Mr. J.A.B. Darlington
←
(Senior External Affairs Representative) Mr. T.K. Critchley Canada House
(Counsellor)
-
Mr. K.W. MacLellan
CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET
INWARD TELEGRAM
TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
(The Secretary of State)
FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
Cyeder
R. 26
D. 26 May, 1967.
1030Z
FLASH BACRET
Used
:17
RECEIVED ARCHIVES No.31
30 MAY 1967
FOUL
No.714
Addressed to Commonwealth Office (D.T.D.) Repeated
Peking No. 274
81
omponwealth Office please pase IMMEDIATE)
Reference paragraph 3 of Galsworthy's telegram from Hong Kong No.698.
The meeting between Ho Yin and Cater did not, (repeat not), take place.
2.
Ho Yin did, however, spend some time with members of local Communist
hierarchy discussing the Hong Kong situation.
3.
Later he held joint and separate meetings with R.C. Lee and Q.W. Lee (a
senior member of the Hang Seng Bank in whose office these meetings were
held, and to whom reference was made as "another Chinese friendly to ua"
in telegram No. 698). After these meetings Gater saw the two Mr. Lee's
separately, and the following covers the main points of substance.
4.
Ho reportedly said that the local Communists were firm that their "four
just demands should be met: that the Communista were aware that "face"
had to be given on both sides and accepted that Hong Kong was quite
different from Macao and allegedly had no intention of forcing a Macao
situation in Hong Kong.
5.
R.C. Lee gained the impression from his discussion with Ho that the
local hierarchy wanted first to obtain instructions from Canton: that
meanwhile the Communists would not wish to escalate the local situation
seriously, but to continue with token strikes.
6.
Q.W. Lee was a little more forthcoming over ..: discussions with Ho. In
addition to the commenta at
paragraph 4 above, he reported commenta of Ho to the effect that "time
is on our (1.6. the Communist) side" and that Q.W. Lee ahould contact Ho
if it were thought that Ho's presence might be of value and particularly
"if the Hong Kong Government wishes to modify the demande " Q.W. Lee's
assessment of his discussions with Ho are of some intereat:
(1)
On the refusal to let Ho see Cater, he thinks that one, or a combination
of the following would fit the case:
SECRET
/(a)
SECRET
7.
8.
(a) The Communist hierarchy, after the events
of the past few days, genuinely do not know what to do:
(b) They have doubts as to the "suitability" of using Họ Yin in the
present situation as he is a Macac man and not really well- known in
Hong Kong:
(c)
(0)
They are still awaiting instructions from China and, therefore, do not
wish to take precipitate action:
A form of blackmail, in that by keeping us waiting they may force us to
flap and offer terms which otherwise in the present conditions we should
not be prepared to consider.
(11) On "time is on our side", Mr. Q.W. Lee thought
(a) This could be a straight comment on the fact
that, given more time, the Communists would be able to increase their
intimidation of the local population and allow the hierarchy time to
reorganise their forces for a more efficient and successful operation or
series of operations: but
as folloWB:
(b) Knowing Mr. Ho as a wily, intelligent person
who is expert at communist type negotiations, he thought this could well
be a "planted" remark for onward transmission mainly to harry us and
force us into precipitate action in regard to the four demands etc: that
given time with no communist successes locally, the communist forces
themselves would be downhearted and the local population increasingly
confident provided they were what q.W. Lee termed "nursed along
intelligently".
Our assessment of the above is as follows:
(a) Re paragraph 4: there is reliable evidence
that, in fact, the Communists are seeking to achieve a Macao type
settlement:
(b) Re paragraph 5: while local Communists
appear to be awaiting instructions as to next major moves, token strikes
apart, there is every possibility of a further confrontation with
security forces on the ground:
(c) Re paragraph 6: bearing in mind that this
information has been obtained third hand one can but comment upon Q.W.
Lee's impressions on the face of it, they appear to be reasonable
appreciation of the present circumstances,
Our own assessment of the present situation is
SECRET
/(a)
+
(1)
SECRET
(a) Intelligence derived from reliable and
delicate sources indicates that certain members of the Communist
hierarchy consider that they have met with a set-back in their
confrontation with Government, not only in respect of their
demonstrations but also in the propaganda field, and, most important of
all, in their failure to obtain the public support they seem to have
expected (either by wooing or intimidation):
(b) It is clear that the Communists anticipate and
are planning for a "long struggle":
(c) Their present tactics are:-
To continue consolidating their position, within their own
organisations, in an effort to maintain morale of their supporters:
(11)
To demonstrate to the general public their power by organising token
stoppages in the public utilities:
(111)
To intimidate individuals and organisations that are actively supporting
Government:
(iv)
To press on with their anti-Government propaganda through the media of
newspapers, posters and Kwangtung Radio.
(a) At the time of writing there are no firm
indications as to the next positive action planned by the Communists. It
does appear that, having met with greater opposition than expected from
Government and the public as a whole, they are having a complete
re-think. They may well be waiting for further instructions or what they
consider to be a major escalation by Government before they take any
fresh steps.
(Passed as requested)
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EF
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1
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H
H
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Major Koe
1.0.2
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SECRET
Cypher
CONFIDENT TAL INWARD TELEGRAM
TO THE COMMONKEALTH OFFICE
(The Secretary of State)
FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
D. 26 May, 1967.
R. 26
CONFIDENTIAL
No. 709
6117
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31
30 MAY 1967
(89)
1050Z
160
Industrial Disputes.
The present position is as follows.
Hong Kong Artificial Flower Works.
ра
-3h
My telegram No. 644.
2.
Injection-moulding department of factory on the island reopened as
planned on 20 May without incident. 223 workers, including three of the
92 workers first diamissed, registered for work. None rejected. 220
workers now actually at work on various shifts.
3.
Discussions took place in Labour Department on 19 and 23 May between
representatives of management and of group of 240 workers, including 100
petitioners referred to in paragraph 3 of my telegram under reference.
Agreement was reached regarding conditions for reopening
injection-moulding department of factory at San Po Kong. Registration
began on 24 May. Department reopened at 7.30 a.m. today.
84 workers actually employed on day shift. No incidents were reported.
197 workers were registered. None rejected. None of 92 workers first
dismissed registered.
4.
Re-employed workers given compensation for period from 1 May to date
prior to reopening of factories at rates of 12 dollars a day for island