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File No.
PART
8C
425
FOREIGN OFFICE
SECRET
CLOSET
DEPT. FAR EASTERN
TITLE: HONG
HONG KONG FOLITICAL AFFAIRS
AFFAIRS INTERNAL GENERAL SITUATION & Poucy.
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Private Din K
s =
REGISTRY Room No. 139.
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DO NOT RETAIN FILES AND PAPERS UNNECESSARILY
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OPENED
CLOSED
24.2.671185.67 FDI/I
that of the highest graded
HIT ACTINIJŲ
SECRET
CLOSED,
HK.
Cypher
SECRET
INWARD TELEGRAM
TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)
FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
D. 15th May, 1967.
R. 15th
10002
FCEIVED IN CHIVES No.81 - 1 JUN 1967
←
FLASH SECRET
No. 609.
LAST PAI
ра
Addressed to Commonwealth Office
Repeated
#
Peking No.223
POLAD Singapore No.91
FD i/
(Please pass FLASH to both).
My telegram No. 607.
Hong Kong.
The position on the ground at 1400 hours today 15th May romained quiet.
There are no indications of unusual occurrences in the frontier area.
2.
We cannot
But it is clear that as a result of the Chinese M.F.A. 'a statement we
are now very near indeed to facing the choices mentioned in paragraph 4
of my telegram No. 600. The demands leave little leeway for negotiation.
offer apologies or compensation or even provide effective * guarantees
against the occurrence of similar incidents without accepting a
situation in which the left-wing here are above the law. Jone of those
arrested have already been sentenced and though acts of clemency might
be Justifiable in certain cases, they certainly would not be in
Again while the disposal of the 20 original offenders is still within
the jurisdiction of the courts and some might be bound over, this cannot
of course be guaranteed.
all.
3.
It may well be worth attempting during the next 48 hours (if the court
hearings are adjourned) to discover whether behind the demands there is
really any scope for negotiation. We are pursuing our efforts in this
direction, but it seems unlikely that any thing usefull will result.
4.
If the left-wing stick firmly by the four demanda, we must face the fact
that any further attempt to seek a compromise would in the middle-term
at any rate mean an abdication of our position here. Hong Kong would
almost at once cease to be attractive to investment; the problem of
maintaining any control or authority over left-wing activities would
intensify; and H.M.G. would not only be discredited but saddled with an
increasing economic burden. In my view this position would only be
tolerable if our aim was to buy tine in order to negotiate an orderly
withdrawal (even if the Chinese allowed us to achieve that).
15.
SECRET
·
5.
SECRET
The alternative policy, of taking a firm but reasonable line in
resistance to the demands, of course carries major risks 1.0. of renewed
violence, probably on an increased scale, which in the long run we might
find ourselves unable to control and finally of physical intervention by
the C.P.G. on the other hand, there is just a chance that if we took a
very firm line, offering no provocation but explaining our policy
clearly to the Č.P.G. there might be some prospect of inducing a change
of Chinese attitude. It remains hard to believe that at the present time
the C.P.G. could really welcome the prospect of a military clash in Hong
Kong or indeed of having to take Hong Kong over, thus losing its
economic and other advantages.
6.
A possible line of action might now be to explain our position clearly
and in forthright terms to the C.P.G., preferably in London. Our reply
night start by stating our refusal to accept the Chinese allegations of
"atrocities" (there is plenty of evidence that the police acted with
great restraint throughout) and saying that the action that was taken in
no way aimed either at the workers or the left-wing whose activities in
Hong Kong have always been permitted provided that they remained within
the law, The intention of the Hong Kong Government is, and remains,
solely to uphold the law, which is published and accessible to all and
equally applicable to all members of the community. The C.P.G. must
realise that unless the law is upheld and public order maintained the
interests of all the population of Hong Kong will suffer. H.M.G. are
therefore unable to understand the arguments in the statements of the
M.F.A.
7.
A reply in these reasonable, though firm, terms would for the moment
preclude drastic action against the left-wing of the sort suggested in
paragraph 4 of my telegram No.600, since this would be going further
than the maintenance of the existing law. But at the moment it seems
that a seizure by us of the initiative along those lines would in the
immediate future destroy any slim chances there may be of reaching a
reasonable solution; and though preparatione for such action are being
made they should not in my view be put into operation except as a last
resort in the event of a further breach of the law by the left.
8.
It now seems essential that I should know as soon as possible whether
Ministers would wish me to seek a compromise along the lines of the four
demands; or whether they would favour a firmer line as in paragraph 6.
In any case, there 18 no longer any possibility of treating this as a
labour dispute, and hence a visit by Foggon would not in my view serve a
useful purpose. On the other hand, 80 soon as Ministers have reached a
decision on the point in paragraph 7 above, it would be most helpful if
a senior official could come out here immediately to give me the fullest
possible picture of what is in their minde.
(Passed as requested)
BECRET
/Distribution
SECRET
Distribution
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-
H.K.W.I.D. "C* I.G.D.
J.I.C. EXPERNAL DISTRIBUTION
Copies also sent to:-
Cabinet Office Foreign Office
H
轄
==
D.1.0., J.I,R. Mr. Denson Mr. de la Mare Kr. Wilson Kr. Foggon
SECRET
SECRET
INWARD TELEGRAM
TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)
FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
1.
L
HK.
49
DECEIVED
* No.51
-1
Cypher
D. 13th May 1967 R. 13th
1230Z
IMMEDIATE
SECRET
No.600
Addressed to Commonwealth Office
Repeated
Peking No.215
POLAD Singapore No.82
(S. of S. please pass IMMEDIATE
to both)
FOY/1
pajek dui
My telegram No.599.
Kowloon Disturbances.
Left-wing action outside the industries immediately concerned in the
disputes has so far been confined to mustering moral and financial
support for the arrested workers and the four demands' (my telegram
No.557) throughout Left- wing organisations. But secret sources indicate
that in many Left-wing circles the line is being taken that the dispute
has escalated as a result of deliberate Government action; and that the
Left must therefore prepare for a further escalation. Plans are being
made to organise the physical defence of Left- wing properties and also
of demonstrations in which children (as in Macao) would play a prominent
part.
2. We seem at present to be in a stage of psychological warfare in which
the main weapon of the Left has been their sustained press campaign
aimed (so far quite meuccessfully). at undermining the morale of the
policë, as well as at discredit- ing Government and destroying public
confidence in its will and capacity to resist. The coat-trailing attacks
on myself in the Communist press of 12 May (my telegram No.583) may well
have been aimed at placing us in the dilemma of either attacking
'press freedom' or appearing to be meekly tolerating sedition.
3. Probably the Communists have not yet taken the decision to launch an
all-out Macau-style attack. There are obviously some elements on the
Left who are concerned about the prospect of a head-on confrontation.
Our discussions with Left-wing contacta continue, but they have not so
far yielded any pointers towards an acceptable settlement. As things
stand, we seem likely to be in for a prolonged period of gradually
increasing pressure.
A prolonged crisis, however, would be the worst of all possible
situations for Hong Kong. Morale here would tend to deteriorate rapidly,
capital would depart, and the effects on the economy could be
irreparable. If we are to avoid this situation, we may before long have
to choose between: -
(a) seeking a solution which would involve the
Hong Kong Government in substantial loss of face and authority, or
SECRET
/(b)
·
+
SECRET
(0)
ourselves taking the initiative against the Left-wing e.g. by taking
legal action against the press, arresting key Left-wing leaders and
perhaps deporting them to China.
But
5. At an Executive Council meeting today there was a substantial body of
opinion (especially among Chinese members) in favour of firm though
careful action against the Left. the choice evidently needs deep
thought. Solution (a) would in effect put us in pawn to the Chinese and
turn Hong Kong into a second Macau; and I would not think it tolerable
waless it were linked with a second decision subsequently to negotiate
our withdrawal as soon as possible. Solution (b) would clearly involve
the risk of an all-out confrontation with the G.P.G.
6. For the time being I shall of course concentrate on trying to hold
the present situation in Kowloon while seeking to reach some
understanding with the Left that would eliminate the present disorder.
But it would be a great help to me if I could have some indication of
your preliminary thinking on the issues in paragraph 5 above. It may
well be that within the next few days I shall have to advise that a
Minister or senior official should fly out here to discuss the problem
in detail; or alternatively that I should return home for the same
purpose.
(Passed as requested)
Distribution H.K. W.I.D. 'C'
-
I.G.D.
J.I.C. EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION
Copies also sent to:
1
·
-
Cabinet Office D.1.0.
Foreign Office
LI
==
H
-
J.I.R.
Mr. de la Mare
Mr. Denson
Mr. Wilson
Mr. Poggon
SECRET
+
·
T
CONFIDENTIAL
23 May, 1967
Enter
dpa.
RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No.31
Sir Alec Douglas-Home cal on the Foreign secretary yesterday primarily
to discuss the situation in the Middle East. At the end of the call the
conversation turned to Hong Kong and I enclose a copy of the record of
that p..rt of the disty:sion.
DM. DAY
- 1 JUN 1967
FD
0. 0. For..ter, Esq., M.V.O., Private secretry,
Commonwealth office.
CONFIDE PIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
FA CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FOREIGN AND STR ALEG DOUGLAS HOME AT THE
DIFICE ON 22 BAY, 1967
Present:
The Rt. Hon. George
Brown, M.P.
The Rt. Hon. Sir Alec
Douglas-Home, K.T., M.P.
H1s
Mr. Brown explained the situation in Hong Kong where be thought the
Governor had had matters under control. The Chinese were, however,
nsking us to quit Shanghai within 48 hours. instinct was to react
against this but the Department was now considering the matter. Sir Alec
Douglas-Hone asked whether Mr. Brown thought that the Communists in Hong
Kong should be threatened with deport:tion to the mainl. nd. There was
some discussion on this point and it was gezerally agreed th t this
presented grave difficulties.
CONFIDENTIAL
INWARD TELEGRAM
TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
(The Secretary of State)
FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
197
RF FIVED IN
FARCH 45 No.51
-
-1 Jul, 1967
Cypher
D. 31 May 1967
FD 1/1
R. 31
0800Z
IMMEDIATE
CONFIDENTIAL
ра
No.738
pa 12016
Фоль
Addressed to Commonwealth office
Repeated IMMEDIATE to POLAD Singapore No.145
H
ROUTINE
14
Peking No.289 "Washington No.155
(Commonwealth Office please pass to all)
My telegram No.731.
Sitrep as at 31/0900.
On 30 May a two-hour token stoppage by non-essential workers in two
waterworks depots passed without incident
or interruption of supplies. There were further stoppages in two textile
factories in Tsuen Wan, both of which had stoppages on 29 Kay. In one
case R.W. workers were responsible. There was an unsuccessful attempt to
delay early morning tram services.
2. There are many rumours that Communist sympathisers are being advised
to stock up with two months supplies of food. Communist concerns
particularly the Bank of China are known to be building up considerable
reserves of rice.
3. Efforts to spread the policy of stoppages to all major public
concerns including armed forces depots and hospitals are reported.
4. Action is now being taken to prevent the display of posters on
Government buildings and vehicles etc.
(Passed as requested)
(Passed to D.8.A.0. for Messrs. de la Kare, Bolland
and Wilson and Private Office (Commonwealth Secretary) Distribution H.K.
V.I.D.
I.G.D.
J.I.C. External Distribution
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
Copies also sent to:
P.S. to Prime Minister Cabinet Office
Foreign Office
#t
17
H
ㄓㄓ
H
#
Treasury
= = =
D.I.O., J.I.R.
P.3. to Mr. Rodgers Mr. de la Mare
Mr. Bolland
Mr. Wilson Mr. Denson
Mr. Foggon Mr. D. Hawkins
CONFIDENTIAL
/Export
[
CONFIDENTIAL
Export Credits Guarantee Department Ministry of Defence (Rm.7365)
Board of Trade
Rm.7163)
11 (Rm.51 31 )
-
-
--
Mr. C.P. Rawlings
Mr. Henn
Major Koe M.0.2
Mr. J.A.B. Darlington
Australia House (Senior External Affairs
Representative)
Canada House (Counsellor)
Hr. T. Critchley Mr. K. MacLellan
CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET
INWARD TELEGRAM
TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)
FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
RIME
196
OF FIVED ARCHIVES No.*
30 MAY 1967
Cypher
D. 30 May, 1967.
R.
30
0922Z.
PRIORITY SECRET
No. 734.
FD!/!
ре
Addressed to Commonwealth office.
Repeated
Ħ
廿
"Peking No. 287.
"P.A. Singapore No. 144.
"Washington No. 154. (Please pass
PRIORITY to Washington only).
Your telegram No. 1038.
Disturbances.
Paragraph 8. A statement of this kind would be
most helpful here at this time, since some public apprehension still
exists as to the real extent of H.M.G.'a support for Hong Kong. To
assist with publicity for the statement locally, it would also be most
helpful to know when it is likely to be made and its content.
(Passed as requested)
(Advance copies to Messrs. de la Mare, Bolland
and Wilson and Private office (Commonwealth Secretary)).
Distribution
-
H.K. WID 'C' 1.G.D.
J.I.C. External Distribution
EPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
Copies also sent to:-
P.S. to Frime Minister
Cabinet Office
Foreign office
*
忏
H
H
#
[1]
H
H
-
D.I.O.. J.I.R.
-
P.S. to Mr. Rodgers
Mr. de la Kare
-
Mr. Bolland
Mr. Wilson
-
Mr. Denson
Treasury
Export Credits Guarantee
Department
Ministry of Defence (Rm. 7365)
H
H
Board of Trade
#
Rm. 7163)
Rm. 5131)
I
Kr. Foggon
Mr. D. Hawkins
Mr. C.P. Rawlings
Mr. Henn
hajor Koe
M.0.2.
Er. J.A.B. Darlington
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
INWARD TELEGRAM
TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
(The Secretary of State)
FROM HONG KONG (31r D. Trench)
2117.
95
#FCEIVED IN
CHIVES No.3
30 MAY 1967
FD1/!
Cypher
D. 30 May 1967
03202
R. 30
INVEDIATE CONFIDENTIAL No. 731
علام
Addressed to Commonwealth Office (D.T.D.) Repeated PRIORITY to: Peking
No.284
POLAD Singapore No.141 Washington No.153
(Commonwealth office please pass to all)
Sitrep as at 29 2000 local time.
My telegram No.721.
After a quiet and uneventful weekend there were
stoppages in one public transport and three industrial concerns today.
The Hong Kong Yaumati Ferry Company's operations were mainly brought to
a halt from 0600 to 0900. In Teuen Wan, three textile factories had
token stoppages, in one case repeated in each succeeding shift. There is
a strong right wing element in Tauen Wan and representations were made
to the police about intimidation. Tomorrow we expect a limited stoppage
on two bus routes in Kowloon. We are considering the taking of a
stronger line over the pay of a Government employee who joins in
stoppages to stiffen the resistance to intimidation of right wing and
neutral workers.
The pro-Communist press has today attacked gunboat diplomacy as
exemplified by the arrival of M.M.8. "BULWARK". A campaign is also in
progress against the police for alloged brutal treatment after the
arrest of those in custody as a result of riota etc. This is gaining