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Office will be closed down unless
they release Mr. Grey. In order
to prepare the ground a minute
should be sent to the Home Office
seeking their concurrence in this.
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Background and Argument
3. Hr. Grey has been under house arrest
since July.
All attempts to secure either
access to him or his release have so far
failed.
On 31 December Sir Donald Hopson
gave the Chinese a very clear hint that we
would be prepared to swap Mr. Grey for the
imprisoned NCNA reporter in Hong Kong (ished
p'ing). Their immediate response was not
encouraging although there is always the
possibility that they will revert to the idea,
Meanwhile, on the assumption that no further
progress will be made on the present tack,
we have to consider what alternative methods
there are for trying to secure Hr. Grey's
release. There is already some Parliamentary
interest in his fate and this is likely to
increase after the recall of Parliament on
16 Jamary. On an earlier submission by
Mr. Murray of 3 January, the Secretary of
State agreed that, before that date, we should
consider whether it would be desirable to
publicise Kr. Grey's case,
4.
One of our major difficulties up to now
has been that we have been able to entice the
[Reag A]
[Thag 3]
/Chinese
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The release of
The Grey without oblaming
Chinese to be more lenient to Mr. Grey by a
series of carrots but, when these methods have
proved ineffective, we have not been able to
goad them into action with some stick as well.
There is every indication that Chinese leaders
are highly preoccupied with their own internal
affairs which are still in considerable
confusion, and I fear it is likely that they
will not even consider Mr. Grey's case unless
we can somehow force them to do so.
It may
in fact be particularly difficult for the
Chinese to be lenient to Mr. Grey at the
moment since they are already having a hard
and quid pro que right enough time explaining to their supportera in
Wheat be even houder
to explain
Hong Kong why they have virtually called off
the confrontation campaign there.
5.
One way of putting some form of pressure on the Chinese would be
publicity.
Up to
now Reuters have been strongly against this
on the grounds that it might force the Chinese
to justify their treatment of Mr. Grey by
staging some sort of "espionage" trial. We
have so far agreed with this line. Despite
these efforts by Reuters however, the Sunday
Times produced a relatively inoffensive article
about Mr. Grey on 7 January and the story was
also picked up by the Guardian on the following
day. Although not much interest seems to have
been sparked off by these articles there is a
/strong
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(possibility
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strong likelihood public concern will grow
after Parliament reassembles on 17 January.
down for SNOWOT
6.
Whether or not we ourselves inspire
publicity about Mr. Grey it is likely that we
shall come under increasing pressure to do
something more on his behalf. The form this
pressure is most likely to take is demands to
act against the official Chinese dewragency
in London, the New China News Agency (NCNA).
It will be pointed out, with much justice, that
it is absurd to allow the NCNA a free rein in
London when the only British correspondent in
Peking has been under house arrest for many
months without any charge preferred against
him. The additional point may be made, with
equal justice, that the Chinese would be
sensitive to any threat to close the NCNA
London Office since it is of considerable
value to them both as a source of news and
propaganda base in this country and as a
communications link with NCNA correspondents
in South America.
7.
Last year we discussed in great detail
with the Home Office the question of action
against the NONA. This was done first in the
context of the violence inspired by their
/parent
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(4.32855 E4 (4200)
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Flag C
Flag).
Rag &
parent organisation in Hong Kong and the false
reporting of the Hong Kong situation which led
ultimately to the sacking of our Mission in
Shanghai and the manhandling of Mr. Hewitt
and his family. Later we asked for Home
Office concurrence in action against the NONA,
including the expulsion of all its ex-patriate
officers and the closing of its offices
offices)
in
the context of Mr. Grey's imprisonment and
the sacking of our Mission in Peking on
22 August. The Home Office were singularly
unhelpful and argued that they could only
expel officers of the NONA if it could be
shown their actions were "not conducive to the
11 and that, in any case, they public good
would have the right to appeal to a London
magistrate.
The furthest we managed to budge
them was to agree, on the night of 22 August,
that restriction orders should be placed on
the NONA The NCNA however refused to accept
that they coulą came under the jurisdiction
of such orders and the matter was not pressed
since we believed that it would have led to
a scuffle between the Police and the NCNA
which, in the state of Peking at that time,
would almost certainly have been followed by
greater violence against our own people there.
Assuming that all our present attempts
to do something for Mr. Grey fails, I think
/the
8.
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threaten
the only effective new weapon we have ia to
take action against the NCNA here.
Ideal ly
we would only threaten to expel the NCNA if
the Chinese did not release Mr. Grey but, if
we are to make the threat, we must be prepared
to carry it out if we get no response from the
Chinese. I therefore believe that the time
has come to make a further attempt to persuade
the Home Office to agree with this line. It
may be that the new Home Secretary will view
the matter differently from his predecessor.
I think there is no point in attempting to
alter the previous ruling by discussion amongst
officials and am therefore attaching a draft
minute from the Secretary of State to the
XJP9
Home Secretary. Whatever the Home Secretary's
reply, I think we must also be prepared to give
publicity to Mr. Grey's case. We have already
instructed IRD to publicise it abroad in the
general context of Chinese treatment of foreign
journalista. Such a campaign may have some
effect on Chinese thinking although we cannot
hope for too much. It is however unlikely to
be picked up and echoed in the British press.
Since there is likely to be publicity in the
British press sooner or later whatever we do,
I think there is much to be said for giving the
initial push ourselves and ensuring that it
develops on the right lines. I therefore
/recommend
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recommend that we should give the present
attempts a further week and, if the Chinese
make no move by that time, endeavour to launch
a publicity campaign here just before Parliament
reassembles.
9.
I think we must keep Sir Donald Hopson
in touch with what we are doing and I attach
a draft telegram to do this,
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130
F21318
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Ali
(129
FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.
18 January, 1968.
Derp
I sympathise with your bafflement about publicity about Grey (your
letter PEX.3 of 9 January) resulting from the Sunday Times article. All
I can say is the Department did its best and probably helped to avert
the publication of something much more damaging.
2. They first heard about the Sunday Times' intention to publish on
Thursday, 5 January. On that afternoon John Denson saw the reporter
engaged on the article, Adan Hopkins, explained the background of Grey's
case at length and suggested that it would be better if the article were
not published. Hopkins made it clear that he was under strong editorial
pressure to publish, but agreed to omit any specific references to ways
of securing Grey's release, such as an exchange and try to mute critical
references to Foreign Office "inactivity", reflected in quotations from
an earlier article in a local newspaper by Mr. Anthony Royle, M.P. On
the following day the Head of Hews Department and John Denson saw
Nicholas Carroll, the diplomatic corresponent of the Sunday Times, and
went over the ground again. He was sympathetic but indicated that the
decision rested with the editor. We had meanwhile been in touch with
uters who said that if the Sunday Times were determined to publish, they
would feel obliged to put out a short factual statement of their own. On
Friday afternoon it was finally real between Gerald Long and Harold
Evana, the Editor of the Sunday Times, that the article would appear. We
then despatched Foreign Office telegram No. 27.
3. As you know from subsequent correspondence, a decision had not at
that time been made about whether or not publicity for Grey would be
desirable. After seeing the Sunday Times article and the reactions to
it, which as we reported to you were slight, wo decided that the best
policy would be not to encourage publicity on our own behalf. We did
agree however that I.R.D. should use the article, together with other
material, in a campaign they are running outside this country to draw
attention to Chinese mistreatment of foreign Journalists as a whole. As
a result of further exchanges we have had about Grey, you have yourself
agreed (paragraph 5 of
/your
Sir D. Hopson, K.O.M.G., D.S.D., M.C., T.D.,
PEKING.
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your telegram no. 48) that publicity which might increase pressure for
retaliatory measures against, for example, N.C.N.A. in London should be
avoided.
4. We are sorry that the telegram reporting the intended publication of
the article reached you so late. There appear to have been a number of
such delays recently and we are having a check made on how long
telegrams take to reach you. It had not occurred to us, I am afraid,
that the Sunday Times would get in touch with Agence France Prease in
Peking and it had been our object to let you know what was in the wind
before the article actually appeared on Sunday. As regards the contents,
everything of substance was reported in Foreign Office telegram No. 31;
the remainder was a rehearsal of well-known facts about the Grey case.
The Reuters statement (Foreign Office telegram No. 32) was unremarkable
(a copy is enclosed).
5 We have already taken euters to task about not keeping us informed on
Davíð Chipp's activities in Hong Kong and elsewhere. On this occasion
they might, it is true, have tried to put greater pressure on the Sunday
Times not to publish. But once they had agreed it would have been quite
impossible for us to have intervened further. Indeed to have done so
might have resulted in the publication of a less sympathetic article
from our point of view than in fact appeared.
6.
When all this happened I was myself en route for Tokyo, but I have been
over the case sinc‹ my return, and I do not think that we could have
done much better than we did, and with a little bad luck, it could all
have gone much worse.
(P.A. Wilkinson)
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Registry No.
FC1348
Top Secret. Secret.
Confidential.
Restricted. Unclassified, Staff in Confidence.
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DRAFT Letter
To: --
Sir D. Hopson, K.C.M.G
D.S.O., M.C., ED.
Peking.
•
Type 1 +
From/
130
P. A. Wilkinson
Telephone No. & Ext.
Department
Hmm Densm
18].
хрести но qurativno from
ам вапан article in
Loen newspaper wm. Autumn
Royle, M.P.g
I sympathise with your bafflement about
publicity about Grey (your letter PEK.3 of
9 January) resulting from the Sunday, Times
All I can
The Difartmat article As the following account of the Did it best and
sequence of events 11, I hope, show, we were not entirely insotfue and
probably helped to
avert the publication of something much more
damaging.
Thainy
2.
He first/heard about the Sunday Times'
intention to publish on Thursday, 5 January.
d
On that afternoon John Denson saw the reporter engaged on the article,
Ad Hopkins, explaine
the background of Grey's case at length and
suggested that it would be better if the
article were not published. Hopkins made it
clear that he was under strong editorial
pressure to publish, but agreed to omit any
specific references to ways of securing Grey's
release, such as an exchange and portioularly
true to mute critical references to Foreign Office" inactivity on the
following day, the
Head of News Department and John Denson saw
Nicholas Carroll, the diplomatic correspondent
/of the
(8635) D4033274 300m 18/66 G.W.BL4d. Gip.863
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of the Sunday Times, and went over the ground
again. He was sympathetic but indicated that
the decision rested with the editor. We had
meanwhile been in touch with Reuters who seid
that if the Sunday Times" were determined to
publish, they would feel obliged to put out a
mes
short factual statement of town. On Friday
afternoon,it was finally agreed between
Gerald Long and Harold Evans, the Editor of
the Sunday Times, that the article would
appear. We then despatched Foreign Office
telegram No. 27.
3. As you know from subsequent correspondence,
a decision had not at that time been made
about whether or not publicity for Grey would
be desirable. After seeing the "Sunday Times"
article and the reactions to it, which as we
reported to you were slight, we decided that
the best policy would be not to encourage
publicity on our own behalf, though
We
le did nowwww agree that I.R.D. should use the article,
together with other material, in a campaign
they are running outside this country to draw
attention to Chinese mistreatment of foreign
journalists as a whole. As a result of further
exchanges we have had about Grey, you have gr
сопрово
agreed (paragraph 5 of your telegram no. 48)
that publicity which might increase pressure
for retaliatory measures against, for example
N.C.N.A. in London should be avoided.
14.
Flag A
Flag B
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4.
We are sorry that the telegram reporting
Fray
Flag D
the intended publication of the article reached
you so late. There appear to have been a number
of such delays recently and we are having a
check made on how long telegrama take to reach
It had not occund to us. I am afraid.
you.
We-had, of course, ne inkling/that the
Sunday Times would get in touch with Agence
Pothing
France Fresse Jand it had been, our object to let
In the WoÀ
you know what was likely before the article
actually appeared on Sunday. As regards the
contents, everything of substance was reported
in Foreign Office telegram no. 31; the remainder
was a rehearsal of well-known facts about the
(F... Felegram to 32)
Grey case. The Reuters staterent as
unremarkable (a copy is enclosed).
5. We have already taken Reuters to task about
not keeping us informed on David Chipp's
activities in Hong Kong and elsewhere.
On
this occasion they sight, it is true, have tried
to put greater pressure on the Sunday Times not to publish. But once
they had agreed it would have been quite impossible for us to have
intervened further.
Indeed to have done so
might have resulted in, the publication of a
from ou badY { new, {
leas sympathetic article than in fact appeared.
Zthan
when all these happened I
hav
6
was myself
route for Tokys,
but I have been
怂
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think that ar
batte the w
git, and with a littl
bad back, it couts all hav
для
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M: Dough
to
I sh? be grateful Ift reply.
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12
PEX. 3
P
+
Drup
Dear Peter,
Densu
187;
office of The British ECEIVED IN
Chargé d'Affaires,
Peking.
9 January, 1968.
ARCHIVES No.31
1 8 JAN 1968
Fe13/18
See reply
مان
x130 De
We were naturally a little baffled here about the way in which publicity
about Grey eventually broke. You will remember that we had suggested
that the time was coming when we should try to promote this and were
shot down by yourselves and Reuters on the grounds that it was too early
and we should wait at any rate until the end of the Parliamentary
reces8.
As a
Reuters then apparently agreed with the Sunday Times behind your backs
that a story should be published. result, when the Agence France-Presse
man told me that he had been asked for details, I told him in confidence
that both Reuters and the Foreign Office were against publicity at the
moment, and so ersuaded him to send the minimum. A few hours later, we
received Foreign office telegram No. 27, telling us that Reuters had, in
fact, agreed with the Sunday Times that the story should be published.
Coupled with David Chi, p's unannounced galliventings round the Far
East, I think this latest incident shows up Reuters in a very bad light.
We have not, of course, yet seen the full text of the Sunday Times
article, nor of the Reuters' statement released afterwards, but all this
could have been very much better done if it had been properly
co-ordinated, especially with messages from the Western co: respondents
here. I hope that someone will not fail to take the opportunity to tell
Reuters what we think of their publicity technique. Grey is one of our
major problems here and it is going to need a great deal of delicate
work to get him out. Fortunately, I do not think my relations with the
Agence France-Presse man have been compromised, as he is particularly
friendly. Incidentally, it is essential that telegrams like telegram No.
27 should have a grading higher than priority if is de to reach us in
reasonable time. If I had received it early on Saturday morning instead
of late in the afternoon, I could have briefed the Agence France-Presse
man more sensibly.
you
Donald
(D. C. Hopson)
F. A. Milkinson, Esq., C.H.G.,
D.9.0.. 0.B.Z.,
ssistant Under-Secretary of State,
Foreign Office,
London 3.7.1.
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LAFI
| 127
rop COPY
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Cypher/Cat A
H PEKING TO FOREIGN OFFICE
Telno 48
128
15 JAN 168
FL13/8
15 January 1968
Seperate subenision
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fanunty.
Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 48 of 15 January Repeated for
information to Hong Kong.
127
Your telegram No. 49: Grey.
7:
I think that first question to decide is what action if any we are
prepared to take against NCNA in London. For the reason given in my
telegram No. 42, which crossed yours, I think that action such as
restraint on moves would be ill advised and would rebound on my staff
here.
2. A threat to close NCNA office would almost certainly fail to make
Chinese release Grey. We should therefore have to carry the threat out
which would deprive us of hostages while having Grey in Chinese hands.
Closure might provoke Chinese with persona non grataing some of my
staff. This has superficial attractions but as explained in previous
correspondence the Chinese would probably choose those members we could
least afford to lose at present. Most important, closure of NCNA office
or restraint on their movements would be an act of escalation and would
reverse the trend towards a detente which I am convinced we must
maintain if we are to extricate Grey or ourselves. It would add rather
than remove difficulties.
3. I
I, therefore, recommend that at this stage we should confine ourselves
to action on residence permits as suggested in my telegram. I agree with
your telegram No. 52 that any renewals might be for 3 months only.
4. If it is felt we must go further in answer to public pressure it
might be possible to convey thoughts in a Parliamentary statement or
that if no progress is made over Grey serious consideration would have
to be given to further steps and we might have to look closely at the
position of NCNA in London. This would not commit us to action and would
be noted by the Chinese, but has risk of getting us on slippery slope
towards escalation.
5. As regards publicity for Grey's case there may be advantage in our
giving the Press some guidance, providing always we are sure of not
making it hard to confine ourselves to action as in paragraph 3 above.
If there is any doubt on this point the less publication the better.
6. The essential point about Grey is that his fate is related to
prisoners, particularly NCNA prisoners, in Hong Kong; strong action
against NCNA in London is unlikely to help him. His best chance is if we
can maintain move towards detention and arrange their release or
deportation. The fact that Hsueh was initially cool to the idea of a
/head
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Peking telegram No. 48 to Foreign Office
- 2 -
head for head exchange should not deter us from the above course. It
would seem worthwhile to take Mr. Royle into our confidence on the Grey
issue and get something of this over to him.