DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THEIR HUNTING TO VIEW AND RUNNING A DOUBTFUL LINE.
3. I SHOULD HAVE THOUGH THAT THE BEST WAY TO ACHIEVE THIS EFFECT YOULD
BE TO STICK AS NEARLY AS POSSIBLE TO WHAT WAS SAID IN PEKING. THIS WOULD
INDICATE THAT ON RECONSIDERATION OUR POSITION HAS NOT CHANGED, AND AVOID
ANY MISUNDERSTANDING BASED ON COMPARISON OF WHAT WAS SAID ON THE TWO
OCCASIONS.
4. FOR THIS REASON I SUGGEST YOU SHOULD HAVE ANOTHER LOOK AT THE › LAST
3 SENTENCES OF THE DRAFT STATEMENT. THIS GOES SIGNIFICANTLY FURTHER THAN
WHAT THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID IN PEKING ('TIME IS A HEALER''), WHICH
ITSELF WAS AN ADVANCE ON WHAT WAS SAID BY MR. ROYLE, WHO OFFERED NO HOPE
OF ANY EVENTUAL CHANGE OF VIEW.
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5. I THINK THAT OUR OBJECT SHOULD BE TO USE WORDS TO WHICH HM HIBASSADOR
CAN REFER AS EXCLUDING FURTHER DISCUSSION IF PRESSED BY THE MFA, AND DO
NOT EXPOSE HIM OR HIS SUCCESSOR TO RENEWED REPRESENTATIONS, IN THE WAY
THE LANGUAGE USED IN 1956 EXPOSED US TO REPRESENTATIONS AS SOON AS
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WERE ESTABLISHED.
6. HAVING MADE THIS GENERAL POINT, I WOULD PREFER TO LEAVE IT TO YOU AND
HM AMBASSADOR TO DECIDE HOW IT CAN BEST BE MET.
7. YOUR PARA. 4. NOTED.
HACLEHOSE
FILES:
HEAD FED
HEAD HKIOD
FS/MR. ROYLE
SIR E. NORRIS
2
SECRET
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E
:
CHER CAT A
FM FCU 33168WZ
DEDIP
SECRET
1973
TO IZNEDIATE G WERNOR HUNG KONG TÆLKO 116 OF 33 JAH./HFO NIHEDIATE
PEK ING.
(PERSONAL FOR GOVERNOR)
FILLOVING FROM HORRIS,
61
YOUR DESPATCIL OF 11 JANUARY AND SIR JOHN ADDIS'S DESPATCH OF 18 DECE
BER: CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN LONG KONG
1.. THE COURSES OPEN TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE WHEN HE MEETS CHI
PLENG
(火)
(B)
(C)
(D)
(E)
(F)
FEI ARE:
TO MAINTAIN OUR REFUSAL TO CONSIDER THE CHINESE PROPOSAL: TO SAY THAT WE
HAVE GIVEN VERY CAREFUL CONSIDERATION TO THE CHINESE PROPOSAL, BUT THAT
VE DO NOT THINK THE THE 1S RIPE FOR THE CHINESE TO PURSUE IT:
TO SAY THAT WE MIGHT BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER THE CHINESE PROPOSAL ON
CONDITION THAT THE CHINESE WOULD DE PREPARED TO DESIGNATE THEIR OFFICIAL
REPRESENTATIVE AS A CONSOL
GENERAL:
·
TO SAY THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO EXPLORE THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE CHINESE
PROPOSAL IN CONFIDENTIAL BILATERAL DISCUS310BSI TO ACCEPT THE CHINESE
PROPOSAL IN PRINCIPLE AS IT STANDS:
AND
TO SAY THAT WE NEED FURTHER TIME TO CONSIDER THE CHINESE
PROPOSAL.
2. .R ROYLE HAS AGREED THAT LE SHOULD RECOMMEND COURSE (B) TO THE
SECRETARY OF STATE. HE HAS ASKED US TO PREPARE THE DRAFT OF A STATE.ENT
FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO USE IN SPEALING TO CH P'ENT FEI. THIS
FOLLOWS IN PARAGRAPH 3 BELOW. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD
HELEGRAPH YOUR CONENTS BY 13007 ON 31 JABLJARY AND IF SIR JOHN ADDIS
WOULD TELEGRAPII HIS COMMENTS TAKING YOURS INTO ACCOUNT DY THE SAME THE
ON 1 FEBRUARY.
H
3. FOLLOWING IS DRAFT.
I
PEGINS:
LI
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I DISCUSSED
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1
''I DISCUSSED THIS SUBJECT VIR YOU AND WITH THE PRIME MINISTER WHEN I
VISITED CHINA LAST AUTUM. I TOLD THE PRIME MINI **R
MUL ON 1 NOVEMBER THAT I VOULD LIKE TO THINK ABOUT THE HATTER AND THAT I
WOULD GET IN TOUCH WITH YOU IN DIE COURSE.
**WE DISAGREE ABOUT THE STATUS OF HONG KONG. THAT IS SOME- TÙNG WHICH IS
A FACT ALD WHICH I DO NOT THINK IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO DISCUSS. BUT, AS
I SEE IT, NE HAVE TWO 1->PORTANT INTERESTS IN COLD. THESE ARE TO
PRESERVE THE STABILITY AND PROSPERITY OF HONG KONG AND TO PRESERVE THE
RELATIONSHIP WHICH HAS DEVELOPED DET.EEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES, SJ FAR AS
HUNG KONG IS CONCERĦED, STABILITY AND PROSPERITY DEPEND ON CONFILENCE.
CONFIDENCE IS A TENDER PLANTI 11 GROWS ONLY SLOWLY, BUT CAN WILT VERY
QUICKLY. IF, AS I BELIEVE, YE SHARE AN INTEREST. IN THE STABILITY AND
PROSPERITY OF FONG KONG, IT FOLLO IS THAT WE ALSO SHARE AN INTEREST IN
THE PRESERVATION OF CONFIDENCE THERE.
''AS FAR AS RELATIONS LEVEEN DRITAIN AND CHINA ARE CONCERNED, THERE CAN
BE NO DOUBT THAT THE SITUATION IN HONG KONG IS A FACTOR OF HVORTANCE.
IF, THEREFORE, WE SHARE AN INTEREST IN PRESERVING GOOD RELATIONS BETWEEN
OUR TWO COUNTRIES, WE ALSO SHARE AN INTEREST IN DOING NOTHING NI, OR
OVER, HONG KONG WHICH COULD DISTURB THE SITUATION THERE.
''I WOULD THEREFORE ASK YOU NOT TO PRESS YOUR PROPOSAL. ME DO HOT THINK
THAT THE TIME IS RIPE TO CONSIDER IT. I AM NOT A PROPHET. I CARROT
FORETELL THE FUTURE. BUT IT IS MY JUDGEMENT THAT IT WILL BE SOME TIME A
NATTER OF YEARS BEFORE CIRCUMSTANCES MIGHT WARRANT A CHANGE IN THE
ARRANGEMENTS WHICH NOW EXIST FOR YOUR REPRESENTATION IN HONG HONG.**
ENDS.
4. IN RECOMMENDING COURSE (B), VE SHALL ALSO RECOMEND THAT YOU SHOULD HE
AUTHORISED TO MAKE THE MOVES IN HONG KONG WHICH ARE OUTLINED IN
PARAGRAPHS 20 AND 21 OF YOUR DESPATCH. WE ARE LOST GRATEFUL FOR YOUR
OFFER. GIVEN THE A QUNT OF TIME AVAILABLE. WE DOUBT, HOWEVER: WHETHER
YOU COULD MAKE ANY GESTURE WHICH WOULD REGISTER FIRMLY WITH THE CHINESE
IN PEKING DEFORE CHI P'ENG SETS JUT FOR LONDON.
DOUGLAS-HOC
FILES:
-
FEI
L
I
HEAD FED
HEAD HKIOD
PS/MR. ROYLE
SIR E. NORRIS
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keren ente
CONFIDENTIAL
$5
Mr Prins
Соре
Mi Wilford.
Copy is: Mi chelson,
CHINESE OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG
1.
I understand that the Chinese Government have proposed that Chi P'ng-rei
should visit London from 7-10 or 11 June; and that they have been told
in return that these dates would be suitable.
I
2. As I recall it, the Chinese have been pressing for an answer to be
given to their request for official representation in Hong Kong; and
there have been hinta that the progress of civil air services talks
would be linked to a favourable reply to this request. The latest of
these suggestions was made in the course of an interview given to the
Financial Times Far East correspondent (FCO tel. No. 365 to Governor
Hong Kong).
3.
When this topic has come up in inter-departmental discussions on
UK/China AS.. we have been told that there was no such link in our minds
and that a decision would be taken by the Secretary of State on the
question on its own merits. I have also understood that it was the
intention to inform the Chinese Foreign Minister of the Secretary of
State's decision when they next met, which was expected to be here in
London.
4. If, as I also expect, the answer to the Chinese request is in the
negative, then could I propose that special attention should be paid to
the fact that the UK/China ASA negotiations begin in Peking on 28 May
and could still be in progress when the Chinese Foreig Minister arrives
here. To volunteer at that point that we had decided not to agree to
Chinese represen- tation in Hong Kong could possibly provoke a breakdown
in itong itong -could possibly provoke a breakdowr in the negotiations
for an ASA, with inevitable and unfavourable publicity in relation to
the ASA talks and to the Foreign Minister's visit.
5. Unless there are reasons which lead you to believe that we must
volunteer such a response, I would propose that:
(a)
a negative reply should not be given to the Chinese Foreign Minister
unless he again raises the point himself;
(b) that the terms of the reply, widle being
negative should not imply finality. If some such phrase as "in present
circumstances" or even for the foreseeable future" were included this
might be sufficient to make it difficult for the Chinese to react in the
air services sphere.
/6.
CONFIDENTIAL
DO 197241 220443 KOM 377 ON MGA
CONFIDENTIAL
6. If there should be any need to discuss this further I hope that we
can do so early next week before
,
I leave the Office on my way to liong Kong.
11 May 1973
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Jf Hellon
Fine & Transport Dept
Copies to: Mr Goodfellow, HKIODept
Hr Parry, Legal Advisers
1
Mr Wilford
1.
It has now been decided that Chi P'eng-fei should visit this country
from 7 June to 10 June. He will have talks with the Secretary of State
on 7 June.
2.
There is indeed some danger that the delivery by the Secretary of State
to Chi P'eng-fei of an unfavourable response over Chinese representation
might have an impact on the negotiations in Peking about an Air Services
Agreement. But I think that this is a danger which we must accept. I do
not myself believe that the delivery of an unfavourable response would
put the negotiations in jeopardy; if the Chinese had intended to make
the negotiation of an agreement conditional on our giving a favourable
response, they would not have agreed to the negotiations beginning
before our response had been made.
3. My comments on the two suggestions in paragraph 5 of Mr Mellon's
minute are as follows:-
(a)
A
I do not think that we could reasonably recommend to the Secretary of
State that he should not deliver our response (which will be "negative")
unless the subject is brought up by Chi P'eng-fei. The Secretary of
State told Chou En-lai at the beginning of November that he would get in
touch with Chi P'eng-fei and he will not wish to seem reluctant to
broach the subject. In any case, I doubt whether anything would be
gained by the use of this tactic, if the Secretary of State does not
bring the subject up, Chi P'eng-fei will be bound to do so himself;
(b) The terms of our response do not imply finality
(as Mr Mellon will see from the copy of the text which I am sending him
with his copy of this minute) Admittedly, the door is left only very
slightly
CONFIDENTIAL ·
/ajar.
I
Kelerence...
4.
ajar. But I very much doubt whether we could persuade Sir Murray
Maclehose to let us open it wider. Besides, the Secretary of State
himself has now approved the text.
On studying the text again, however, I have a small change of my own to
suggest. I think that the logic of the third paragraph would be improved
by the substitution of "disturb these relations" for "disturb the
situation there", I wonder whether you agree.
R M Evans
16 May 1973
Far Eastern Department
CC
Mr Mellon
CONFIDENTIAL
(17293) D4297445 400m 1771 O.WALA, Op.163
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CONFIDENTIAL
Not the Used.
FORM OF WORDS TO BE USED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE IN TAIKING TO THE
CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTER
"I discussed this subject with you and with the Prime Minister when I
visited China last autumn. I told the Prime Minister on 1 November that
I would like to think about the matter and I would get in touch with you
in due course,
"The positions of our two Governments on the status of Hong Kong are
necessarily different. But, as I see it, we have two important interests
in common. These are to preserve the stability and prosperity of Hong
Kong and to preserve the relationship which has developed between our
two countries, So far as Hong Kong is concerned, stability and
prosperity depend on confidence. Confidence is a tender plant; it grows
only slowly, but can wilt very quickly. If, as I believe, we share an
interest in the stability and prosperity of Hong Kong, it follows that
we also share an interest in the preservation of confidence there.
As far as the relations between Britain and China are concerned, there
can be no doubt that the situation in Hong Kong is a factor of
importance. If, therefore, we share an interest cy in preserving good
relations between our two countries, we also share an interest in doing
nothing in, or over, Hong Kong which could[disturb the situation there.
I have given most careful consideration to your proposal since I spoke
to you and the Prime Minister last autum. In the light of this
consideration I have come to the conclusion that the time is not ripe
for a change in the pattern of your representation in Hong Kong. I would
therefore ask you not to press your proposal. It is my judgement that it
will be some time before circumstances might change in such a way as to
warrant an alteration in the arrangemente which now exist."
نا
Approved by The Seciciary of Sicie.
R.K. 376.
CONFIDENTIAL
Fir
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