SECRET
SECRET
IMMEDIATE AFHER/CAT A
300
FII HONG KONG 2809307
DEDIP
SECRET
1973
TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 581 OF 28 MAY/INFO IMMEDIATE PEKING.
FOR WILFORD.
YOUR TELEGRAM 517. CHINESE REPRESENTATION.
I AGREE WITH THE SUGGESTED AMENDMENT.
2. SINCE MY LETTER OF 4 MAY THE PRESS HAVE KEPT THE ISSUE ON THE BOIL.
THERE HAVE BEEN FEW NEW IDEAS, BUT THE UNDERLYING FEELING AGAINST THE
IDEA OF AN OFFICIAL REPRESENTATIVE HAS, I THINK, HARDENED, AS PEOPLE
HAVE INCREASINGLY REALISED HOW THE REPRESENTATIVE COULD BECOME A FOCUS
BOTH FOR LOYALTY AND FOR DISCONTENT.
FURTHERMORE THE REPREIVE OF TSOI HAS PROVOKED ANXIETY
THAT H.M.G. MIGHT OVERRULE THE WISHES OF HONG KONG ALSO ON THE ISSUE OF
A REPRESENTATIVE, AND THIS HAS CAUSED FEARS TO BE EXPRESSED THAT
PREVIOUSLY PEOPLE KEPT TO THEMSELVES.
3. THE LEFT WING PRESS HAVE REMAINED ENTIRELY SILENT. THE LOCAL
COMMUNISTS HAVE APPARENTLY REPORTED TO PEKING ALL PRESS COMMENT WITHOUT
HOWEVER GIVING A GLOSS ON IT. THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE SIGN OF THE ISSUE
BEING DISCUSSED AMONGST THEMSELVES. IT THUS APPEARS THAT PEKING HAVE
BEEN PLAYING THEIR OWN HAND.
4. CHI P'ENG-FEI MAY DRAW THE ATTENTION OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO
SOME OF THE PRESS COMMENTS SELECTED BECAUSE THEY ARE LEAST UNFAVOURABLE
OR EVEN SUPERFICIALLY FAVOURABLE. IF SO I SUGGEST THAT WITHOUT BEING
DRAWN INTO ARGUMENT THE SECRETARY OF STATE SHOULD REPLY THAT REACTIONS
IN HONG KONG TO THIS PRESS SPECULATION INITIATED BY OFFICIALS IN PEKING
HAVE IMPRESSED HIM QUITE DIFFERENTLY:-
SECRET
/ A)
SECRET
A) VIRTUALLY ALL COMMENT EMPHASISED THE PROBLEM OF CONFIDENCE POSED BY
THE CHINESE PROPOSAL,
B) HIS READING OF THE UNDERLYING FEELING IN HONG KONG CONFIRMED WHAT
HE HAS SAID TO MR CHI IN PEKING.
MACLEHOSE
FILES HD FED
HD HKIOD SIR E NORRIS MR WILFORD
- 2 -
SECRET
·
Торсору
Top copy +1
124%
PP FCO
FF GOVERNOR LONG KONG
DEDIF
CYPHER CAT A
FM FEKING 261020Z
SECRET
DEDIP
Din Wilford
NO DISTRIBUTIAL
60
PRIORI.
CYPHER
M'Evans (FED) 29%
TO PRIORITY FCO (PERSONAL FOR WILFORD) TELEGRAM NO 622 OF 26 SAY
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO HONG KONG (FERSONAL FOR GOVERNOR).
FOLLOWING FOR WILFORD
57
YOUR TELNO. 517: CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG
1. | AGREE WITH THE SUGGESTED REDRAFT.
MORGAN
NNNN
SECRET
59
¡EDIATE HER/CAT A 13 300
FM HONG KONG 280930Z
DEDI?
SECRET
Spoken, MiWork Swierige Pe. speak.
1973
TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELKO 581 OF 28 MAY/INFO IMMEDIATE PEKING.
FOR WILFORD.
$1
YOUR TELEGRAM 517. CHINESE REPRESENTATION.
R.
2に
29/5
і
! AGREE WITH THE SUGGESTED AMENDMENT.
2. SINCE MY LETTER OF 4 MAY THE PRESS HAVE KEPT THE ISSUE ON THE BOIL.
THERE HAVE BEEN FEW NEW IDEAS, BUT THE UNDERLYING FEELING AGAINST THE
IDEA OF AN OFFICIAL REPRESENTATIVE HAS, I THINK, HARDENED, AS PEOPLE
HAVE INCREASINGLY REALISED HOW THE REPRESENTATIVE COULD BECOME A FOCUS
BOTH FOR LOYALTY AND FOR DISCONTENT.
FURTHERMORE THE REPREIVE OF TSO HAS PROVOKED ANXIETY
THAT H.N.G. MIGHT OVERRULE THE WISHES OF HONG KONG ALSO ON THE ISSUE OF
A REPRESENTATIVE, AND THIS HAS CAUSED FEARS TO BE EXPRESSED THAT
PREVIOUSLY PEOPLE KEPT TO THEMSELVES.
3. THE LEFT WING PRESS HAVE REMAINED ENTIRELY SILENT. THE LOCAL
COMMUNISTS HAVE APPARENTLY REPORTED TO PEKING ALL PRESS COMMENT WITHOUT
HOWEVER GIVING A GLOSS ON IT. THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE SIGN OF THE ISSUE
BEING DISCUSSED AMONGST THEMSELVES. IT THUS APPEARS THAT PEKING HAVE
BEEN PLAYING THEIR OWN HAND.
4. CHI P'ENG-FEI MAY DRAW THE ATTENTION OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO
SOME OF THE PRESS COMMENTS SELECTED BECAUSE THEY ARE LEAST UNFAVOURABLE
OR EVEN SUPERFICIALLY FAVOURABLE. IF SO I SUGGEST THAT WITHOUT BEING
DRAWN INTO ARGUMENT THE SECRETARY OF STATE SHOULD REPLY THAT REACTIONS
IN HONG KONG TO THIS PRESS SPECULATION INITIATED BY OFFICIALS IN PEKING
HAVE IMPRESSED HIM QUITE DIFFERENTLY:-
SECRET
/A)
F
+
SECRET
A) VIRTUALLY ALL COMMENT EMPHASISED THE PROBLEM OF CONFIDENCE POSED BY
THE CHINESE PROPOSAL,
B) HIS READING OF THE UNDERLYING FEELING IN HONG KONG CONFIRMED WHAT
HE HAS SAID TO MR CHI IN PEKING.
MACLEHOSE
FILES HD FED
HD HKIOD
SIR E NORRIS
MR WILFORD
1
2 -
SECRET
}
+
SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, LIMITED
TONG CHONG STREET HONG KONG
58
P.O. Box 47
TELEPHONE 5.620161
CABLES 'POSTSCRIPTI
Mr Anthony Royle,
House of Commons,
London.
May 25
News Departmen
CC FED
HK-10D
ta
Dear Mr Royle,
Many thanks indeed for your cable concerning the
recent developments regarding the Chinese request for
a representative to be stationed in the Colony.
As you can see I have now attempted to enroll Sir
Alex into the ranks of the Morning Post reporting staff,
and I would be grateful for anything you could do which
would help us to get a swift and full coverage of the
discussions between Sir Alex and Mr Chi.
Once again, many thanks,
"ours "aithfully,
Re
Kevin Sinclair
+
---
Soun
CHINA MORNING POST, LIMITED
TONG CHONG STREET
HONG KONG
P.O. Box 47
TELEPHONE 3-020181
GABLED "POST=CRIPT
May 25, 1973
ir Alex Douglas-Home,
Secretary of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs,
House of Commons,
London.
De r år Alex,
There is considerable interest in Hongkong about your forthcoming
meeting with Mr Chi Teng-fei, the Foreign Minister of the People's
Republic of China, particularly in reward to discussions you may be
having with Kr Chi concerning the Chinese Government's request to
station a reprenentative of the Foreign Ministry in the Colony.
I would be most grateful if you could arrange with your st: ff for a
full account of your discussions with Er Chi concernin Tongkong to be
cabled to us as soon as possible after your meeting with him, with any
comment on the discussions which you would lil e to add.
Any details of the discussions on the air services between Buitain,
ilongkong and China would also be api pecinton,
In advance, many thanks for your ansistance.
Yours faithfully,
Kevin Gincluir, News Editor,
5.0.M.Poat.
J
PRIORITY
SECRET
CYPHER CAT A GRPS 150
A F C O 241108Z
HD|FED 157
Enici. R.E.
31/5.
DEDIP
SECRET
TO PRIORITY GOVERNOR HONG KONG (PERSONAL FOR GOVERNOR) TELNO 517 OF
24/5/ AND TO PRIORITY PEKING(PERSONAL FOR MORGAN).
MY TELEGRAM NO. 157 TO GOVERNOR HONG KONG: CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN
HONG KONG.
FOLLOWING FROM WILFORD.
1. AS PART OF THE WORK IN PREPARING FOR CHI P'ENG-FEI'S VISIT, THE
DEPARTMENT AND 1 HAVE BEEN HAVING ANOTHER LOOK AT THE TEXT IN FCO
TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE. AS YOU KNOW, THIS HAS BEEN APPROVED BY THE
SECRETARY OF STATE. WE ARE NEVERTHELESS INCLINED TO RECOMMEND THAT, FOR
THE SAKE OF LOGIC AND OF A RATHER SOFTER IMPACT ON THE CHINESE, THE
THIRD PARAGRAPH SHOULD BE AMENDED TO READ AS FOLLOWS:- **WE WISH TO
PRESERVE, INDEED TO STRENGTHEN, COOD RELATIONS BETWEEN BRITAIN AND
CHINA. SO, WE BELIEVE, DO YOU. THE SITUATION IN HONG KONG IS A FACTOR OF
IMPORTANCE IN THESE RELATIONS. IT FOLLOWS THAT WE SHARE AN INTEREST IN
DOING NOTHING IN, OR OVER HONG KONG, WHICH NIGHT UNSETTLE THESE
RELATIONS''.
2. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL TO KNOW WHAT YOU AND MORGAN THINK BY CLOSE
OF PLAY ON 29 MAY.
DOUGLAS-HOME
FILES
HD F.E.D.
HD HKIOD SIR E NORRI B
MR WILFORD
SECRET
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EN CLAIR
GPS 15
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FA FCO 1711472
UNCLASSIFIED
L
Ado
(FG)
1973
56
TO PRIORITY GOVERNOR HONG KONG TEL NO 486 OF 17 MAY/INFO PEKING
YOUR TEL NO 539.
I AGREE.
DOUGLAS-HOME
FILES
FED
HKIOD
PIK WILFORD PS/MR ROYLE
SIR E NORRIS
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[
Reference
FAL 3/2.1. Enter
178
55
CONFIDENTIAL
Ir prens
ME
• Wreford.
Copyis: The Thelson, Сори
CHINESE OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG
1.
I understand that the Chinese Government have proposed that Chi P'ng-Fei
should visit London from 7-10 or 11 June; and that they have been told
in return that these dates would be suitable.
2. As I recall it, the Chinese have been pressing for an answer to be
given to their request for official representation in Hong Kong; and
there have been hints that the progress of civil air services talks
would be linked to a favourable reply to this request. The latest of
these suggestions was made in the course of an interview given to the
Financial Times Far East correspondent (FCO tel. No. 365 to Governor
Hong Kong).
3. When this topic has come up in inter-departmental discussions on
UK/China A.. we have been told that there was no such link in our minds
and that a decision would be taken by the Secretary of State on the
question on its own merits. I have also understood that it was the
intention to inform the Chinese Foreign Minister of the Secretary of
State's decision when they next met, which was expected to be here in
London.
4. If, as I also expect, the answer to the Chinese request is in the
negative, then could I propose that special attention should be paid to
the fact that the UK/China ASA negotiations begin in Peking on 28 May
and could still be in progress when the Chinese Foreign Minister arrives
here To volunteer at that point that we had decided not to agree to
Chinese represen- tation in Hong Kong could possibly provoke a breakdown
in Hong Kong could possibly provoke a breakdow in the negotiations for
an ASA, with inevitable and unfavourable publicity in relation to the
ASA talks and to the Foreign Minister's visit.
5. Unless there are reasons which lead you to believe that we must
volunteer such a response, I would propose that:
(a)
་
a negative reply should not be given to the Chinese Foreign Minister
unless he again raises the point himself;
or
(b) that the terms of the reply, while being
negative should not imply finality. II some such phrase as "in present
circumstances" even for the foreseeable future" were included this might
be sufficient to make it difficult for the Chinese to react in the air
services sphere.
/6.
DO 897261230443 500M 3/71 GH NG2
CONFIDENTIAL
L
CONFIDENTIAL
6. If there should be any need to discuss this further I hope that we
can do so early next week before I leave the Office on my way to Hong
Kong.
11 May 1973
J/ Mellon
Line & Transport Dept
Cupies to: Mr Goodfellow, HKIODept
Mr Wilford
yerone
Hr Parry, Legal Advisers
He will have
1. It has now been decided that Chi P'eng-fei should visit this country
from 7 June to 10 June. talks with the Secretary of State on 7 June.
2. There is indeed some danger that the delivery by the Secretary of
State to Chi P'eng-fei of an unfavourable response over Chinese
representation might have an impact on the negotiations in Peking about
an Air Services Agreement. But I think that this is a danger which we
must accept. I do not myself believe that the delivery of an
unfavourable response would put the negotiations in jeopardy; if the
Chinese had intended to make the negotiation of an agreement conditional
on our giving a favourable response, they would not have agreed to the
negotiations beginning before our response had been made.
3. My comments on the two suggestions in paragraph 5 of Mr Mallon's
minute are as follows:-
(a)
(b)
I do not think that we could reasonably recommend to the Secretary of
State that he should not deliver our response (which will be "negative")
unless the subject is brought up by Chi P'eng-fei. The Secretary of
State told Chou En-lai at the beginning of November that he would get in
touch with Chi P'eng-fei and he will not wish to seen reluctant to
broach the subject. In any case, I doubt whether anything would be
gained by the use of this tactic, if the Secretary of State does not
bring the subject up, Chi P'eng-fei will be bound to do so himself;
The terms of our response do not imply finality (as Mr Mellon will see
from the copy of the text which I am sending him with his copy of this
minute) Admittedly, the door is left only very slightly
/ajar.
I
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
Reference
4.
ajar. But I very much doubt whether we could persuade Sir Murray
Maclehose to let us open it wider. Besides, the Secretary of State
himself has now approved the text.
On studying the text again, however, I have a small change of my own to
suggest. I think that the logic of the third paragraph would be improved
by the substitution of "disturb these relations" for "disturb the
situation there". I wonder whether you agree.
२.
R.M. Frans
RM Evans
16 May 1973
Far Eastern Department
CC Mr Mellon
Mi Wigford-again
be spoke. I now subomi a arqiTelegram To Hong kong and
Peking.
Rin. Evens
24 May, 1973.
Tel. respatched
2015
MicRark. Mi Davies.
CONFIDENTIAL
له
24
RE. 24/5
(17293) DI897445 400m 1/731 G.W.B.LH. Gp.863
CONFIDENTIAL
Not the Used
FORM OF WORDS TO BE USED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE IN TAIKING TO THE
CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTER
"I discussed this subject with you and with the Prime Minister when I
visited China last autumn. I told the Prime Minister on 1 November that
I would like to think about the matter and I would get in touch with you
in due course.
"The positions of our two Governments on the status of Hong Kong are
necessarily different. But, as I see it, we have two important interests
in common. These are to preserve the stability and prosperity of Hong
Kong and to preserve the relationship which has developed between our
two countries. So far as Hong Kong is concerned, stability and
prosperity depend on confidence. Confidence is a tender plant; it grows
only slowly, but can wilt very quickly. If, as I believe, we share an
interest in the stability and prosperity of Hong Kong, it follows that
we also share an interest in the preservation of confidence there.
"As far as the relations between Britain and China are concerned, there
can be no doubt that the situation in Hong Kong is a factor of
importance. If, therefore, we share an interest in preserving good
relations between our two countries, we also share an interest in doing
nothing in, or over, Hong Kong which could disturb the situation there]
these relations
"I have given most careful consideration to your proposal since I spoke
to you and the Prime Minister laat autumn. In the light of this
consideration I have come to the conclusion that the time is not ripe
for a change in the pattern of your representation in Hong Kong. I would
therefore ask you not to press your proposal. It is my judgement that it
will be some time before circumstances might change in such a way as to
warrant an alteration in the arrangements which now exist."
Approved by the seciciary 87-sicie
R.E. 375.
CONFIDENTIAL
S
L.
CYPHER CAT A
FM FCO 121846Z
DEDIP
SECRET
E T R.E.
(FE)
Now Enie.
MiHeinlicho
нет
M: Clark. Auk Свайк
and R Tome-
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1312 for the Thef for Cars
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for turinerection
TO PRIORITY GOVERNOR HONG KONG(PERSONAL FOR GOVERNOR) TEL NO 157 OF 12
FEBRUARY AND TO PEKING" (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR) INFO PRIORITY TOKYO
(PERSONAL FOR WILFORD)
R.E. 13.
HONG KONG TELEGRAMS NO 133 AND NO 142 AND PEKING TELEGRAM NO 199 (NONE
TO TOKYO): CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG.
FOLLOWING FROM NORRIS.
#
1. WE ARE MOST GRATEFUL TO YOU SOTH FOR YOUR HELPFUL ADVICE ON
THIS DIFFICULT SUBJECT.
2. THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAS DECIDED TO USE THE FOLLOWING FORMS OF
WORDS WHEN CHI P'ENG-FEI VISITS LONDON.
BEGINS:
''I DISCUSSED THIS SUBJECT WITH YOU AND WITH THE PRIME MINISTER MIEN I
VISITED CHINA LAST AUTUMN. TOLD THE PRIME MINISTER 0% 1 NOVEMBER THAT I
WOULD LIKE TO THINK ABOUT THE MATTER AND 1 WOULD GET IN TOUCH WITH YOU
IN DUE COURSE.
THE POSITIONS OF OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS ON THE STATUS OF HONG KONG ARE
NECESSARILY DIFFERENT. BUT, AS I SEE IT, WE HAVE TVO IMPORTANT INTERESTS
TH COMMON. THESE ARE TO PRESERVE THE STABILITY AND PROSPERITY OF HONG
KONG AND TO PRESERVE THE RELATIONSHIP WHICH HAS DEVELOPED BETWEEN OUR
TWO COUNTRIES, SO FAR AS HONG KONG IS CONCERNED, STABILITY AND
PROSPERITY DEPEND ON CONFIDENCE. CONFIDENCE IS A TENDER PLANT IT GROWS
ONLY SLOWLY, BUT CAN WILT VERY QUICKLY. IF, AS I BELIEVE, WE SHARE AN
INTEREST IN THE STABILITY AND PROSPERITY OF HONG KONG, IT FOLLOWS THAT
WE ALSO SHARE AN INTEREST IN THE PRESERVATION OF CONFIDENCE THERE.
AS FAR AS THE RELATIONS BETWEEN BRITAIN AND CHINA ARE CONCERNED, THERE
CAN DE NO DOURT THAT THE SITUATION IN HONG KONG IS A FACTOR OF
IMPORTANCE, IF, THEREFORE, WE SHARE AN INTEREST IN PRESERVING COOD
RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES, WE ALSO SHARE AN INTEREST IN DOING
NOTHING IN, OR OVER, HONG KONG WHICH COULD DISTURB THE SITUATION THERE.
/ HAVE
7
SECRET
+
H
-
SCRET
GIVEN MOST CAREFUL CONSIDERATION TO YOUR PROPOSAL SINCE
I SPOKE TO YOU AND THE PRIME MINISTER LAST AUTUMN. IN THE LIGHT OF THIS
CONSIDERATION 1 HAVE CONE TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE TIME .. NOT RIPE
FOR A CHANGE IN THE PATTERN OF YOUR REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG. I WOULD
THEREFORE ASK YOU NOT TO PRESS YOUR PROPOSAL. IT IS MY JUDGEMENT THAT IT
WILL BE SOME TIME BEFORE CIRCUMSTANCES MIGIIT CHANGE IN SUCH A WAY AS TO
WARRANT AN ALTERATION IN THE ARRANGEMENTS
WHICH NOW EXIST'".
ENDS.
47.
HE WILL GIVE CHI P'ENG-FEI A COPY OF THIS TEXT.
3. OUR PURPOSE IS TO PERSUADE THE CHINESE TO SHELVE THEIR PROPOSAL
FOR A MATTER OF YEARS, WITHOUT DOING ANY SERIOUS DAMAGE TO ANGLO-
CHINESE RELATIONS. WE BELIEVE THAT THE USE OF THIS FORM OF WORDS
WILL GIVE US THE BEST HOPE OF ACHIEVING THIS PURPOSE.
4. WE NOW KNOW THAT CHI P'ENG-FEI VILL NOT VISIT LONDON FROM 22 FEBRUARY
TO 25 FEBRUARY (PEKING TELEGRAM NO 157 NOT TO TOKYO).
BUT THE SECRETARY OF STATE WILL INEVITABLY SEE A GOOD DEAL OF HIM
AT THE CONFERENCE ON VIETNAM IN PARIS. WE SHALL RECOMMEND TO HIM
THAT HE SHOULD NOT BROACH THE SUBJECT WITH CHI P'ENG-FEI IN PARIS. WE
SHALL ALSO RECOMMEND THAT, IF THE LATTER SHOULD BRING IT UP, HE SHOULD
CONFINE HIMSELF TO SAYING THAT HE HAS GIVEN THE CHINESE PROPOSAL MOST
CAREFUL CONSIDERATION AND WILL BE READY TO SPEAK ABOUT IT WHEN CHI
P'ENG-FEI VISITS LONDON.
DOUGLAS-HOME
FILES
HD FED
HD HKIOD
PS/MR ROYLE PS/PUS
SIR E NORRIS '
MR WILFORD
2
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1
*015/02
SEC
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00 F C O
ADVAN
✪ PEKING
GRPS 199
CYPHER/CAT A
FM HONG KONG 0200502
SECRET
شدم
Refered to
Sii & Norris HD FED
TO IMMEDIATE FCO TGLNO 142 OF 2ND FEBRUARY, 1973. INFO IMMEDIATE
PEKING.
PEKING TELNO 109.
FOLLOWING FOR NORRIS.
Not me intention
R.E. 272.
PARA, 2, 1ST SENTENCE QUITE RIGHT, BUT I MUST ADMIT TO HAVING SEEN
COURSE (D) AS A PRESENTATIONAL VARIANT OF (A) SO FAR AS THE FORESEKÁBLE
FUTURE IS CONCERNED.
2. THIS ISSUE SEEMS TO TURN ON ONE'S JUDGEMENT OF WHETHER A MORE OR LESS
CONTINUING DIALOGUE ON TINS QUESTION WITH THE CHINESE IS THE BEST WAY OF
KEEPING THE TEMPERATURE DOWN IF RPT IF WE DO NOT INTEND TO GIVE WAY
WITHIN THE NEXT YEAR OR TWO, HM AMBASSADOR DOES, I DO NOT, EITHER MIGHT
DE RIGHT.
2. DUT WHEREAS IF I AM PROVED WRONG WE CAN SHIFT TO HIS LINE, IF HE IS
WRONG WE WILL HAVG GIVEN THE GAME AWAY.
MACLEHOSE
MINN
SENT AT 10442/02 EJH
SECRET
Me Evena
(copy gwen
سا
Bolgerven
212
ī
1.
CAT A
* FM PEKING #1881WZ
SECRET
DEDIP
I
1973
TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELEGRAM NO 189 OF 1 FEBRUARY/INFO IMMEDIATE HONG KONG
( PERSONAL FOR GOVERNOR)
FOLLOWING FOR NORRIS.
MAYOR)
YOUR TELNO 116 TO TIONG KONG AND HONG KONG TELMO 133: CHINESE
PEPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG.
1. MY OWN RECOMMENDATION HAS TO BE AS YOU KNOW IN FAVOUR OF COURSE
D WHICH MIGHT HOWEVER BE COMBINED WITH SOMETHING OF COURSE B. THAT IS TO
SAY WHILE INFORMING THE CHINESE THAT THE TIME IS NOT
YET RIPE FOR AGREEING TO THEIR REQUEST WE COULD LOOK FORWARD TO
CONFIDENTIAL DILATERAL DISCUSSIONS AT A LATER STAGE. SOMETHING OF THIS
KIND WOULD I THINK BE THE BEST WAY TO GUARD
AGAINST CONTINUING AND INCREASING PRESSURE.
2.
SIR MURRAY MACLEHOSE IN HIS TELEGRAM SEENS TO ME TO PE REALLY
ADVOCATING COURSE A. I THINK THAT THE ARGUMENT IN HIS PARAGRAPH 2 IS
WRONG. IF WE NOW GIVE WHAT THE CHINESE INTERPRET AS A FIRM REFUSAL
LOOKING FORWARD TO NO RELAXATION IN THE FUTURE THAT
IS IN MY OPINION THE BEST WAY TO ENSURE THAT PRESSURE WILL CONTINUE AND
POSSIBLY ALSO THAT A CHANGE OF POLICY MAY BE
DECIDED ON IN CHINESE CONDUCT TOWARDS HONG KONG.
3. IF THE RECOMIENDATION TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAS TO BE
IN FAVOUR OF AN UNMODIFIED COURSE B THE ONLY CHANGE WHICH I WOULD
SUGGEST IN THE DRAFT IN YOUR PARAGRAPH 3 IS TO REPLACE THE FIRST TWO
SENTENCES BY THE FOLLOWING SENTENCE: * THE POSITIONS
OF OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS ON THE STATUS OF HONG KONG ARE
NECESSARILY DIFFERENT''.
ADDIS
PILES:
HEAD FED HEAD HKIOD
PS/MR. HOYLE SIR E. NORRIS
SECRET
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I
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HER/CAT A
TONG KONG
3110322
DELAP
TOP COR
TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 133 OF 31ST JANUARY, 1973. INFO IMMED NATE
PEKING.
FOLLOWING PERSONAL FROM GOVERNOR FOR NORRIS.
YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 1161 CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG.
I AM NATURALLY GLAD AND RELIEVED THAT YOU PROPOSE TO RECOMMEND THAT WE
SHOULD CONTINUE TO RESIST THIS CHINESE PROPOSAL.
2. THE MOST IMPORTANT THING SEEMS TO ME TO BE THAT IN SPEAKING TO CHI
P'ENG FE! THE SECRETARY OF STATE SHOULD USE TERMINOLOGY WHICH, IN THE
OPINION OF THE DEPARTMENT AND OF HM AMBASSADOR AT PEKING, IS BEST
CALCULATED TO ENSURE THAT THE CHINESE DO NOT DEDUCE THAT WE WILL GIVE
WAY NEXT YEAR IT NOT THIS, IF THEY KEEP PRESSING. HM AMBASSADOR MIGHT
REPLY THAT THEY WILL PRESS ANYWAY, BUT THERE WOULD BE A GOOD DEAL OF