that we may be forced to assert our view of Hong Kong's

status in reply.

2) We shall continue to act in Hong Kong and over the

affairs of Hong Kong in accordance with our view of

Hong Kong's status and our responsibility for its

administration.

According to our record of the talk between the Secretary

of State and Chou En-lai on 1 November 1972 Chou En-lai said:

"The British were ruling Hong Kong and were responsible. The

Chinese did not quarrel with that. They respected the British

position."7

CONFIDENTIAL

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5/2.1

TO IMMEDIATE PEKING TELEGRAM NUMBER 635 OF 8 JUNE, 1973, INFO IMMEDIATE
GOVERNOR HONG KONG.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 686: CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG.

1. WILFORD WILL BE BRIEFING REPRESENTATIVES OF THE DIPLOMATIC

MISSIONS OF THE EIGHT ON CHI'S VISIT IN GENERAL ON 11 JUNE.

HE DOES NOT PROPOSE TO VOLUNTEER ANYTHING ON THE SUBJECT.

IF HE IS ASKED ABOUT IT, HE WILL NOT GO BEYOND CONFIRMING THAT I BROUGHT
UP THE MATTER WITH CHI P'ENG-FEI AND THAT

IT WILL CONTINUE TO BE A MATTER FOR DISCUSSION BETWEEN

OURSELVES AND THE CHINESE. WE SHALL ACT LIKEWISE WITH THE AMERICANS
(THOUGH WE ARE NOT PLANNING TO GIVE THEM A SPECIAL BRIEFING ABOUT CHI'S
VISIT).

2. WILFORD WILL STRESS THE CONFIDENTIAL NATURE OF HIS BRIEFING

GIVEN THE PUBLICITY LINE AGREED WITH THE CHINESE.

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for 3/2/1

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELEGRAM NO 686 OF 8 JUNE/REPEATED FOR

INFORMATION TO IMMEDIATE GOVERNOR HONG KONG.

14

YOUR TELNO 557: CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG.

1. WHILE WE WILL OF COURSE HOLD THE LINE IN PARAGRAPH 3 OF YOUR TELEGRAM
UNDER REFERENCE TO RESIDENT CORRESPONDENTS HERE, WE SHALL FIND IT
DIFFICULT TO DO SO WITH EG OUR EEC COLLEAGUES.

2. GRATEFUL FOR GUIDANCE BY IMMEDIATE TELEGRAM ON WHAT LINE YOU PROPOSE
TAKING WITH THE EEC AND THE AMERICANS.

MORGAN

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67

AIDE MEMOIRE

I discussed this subject with you and with the Prime

Minister when I visited China last autumn. I told the Prime

Minister on 1 November that I would like to think about the

matter and I would get in touch with you in due course.

Lo.

The positions of our two Governments on the statue of

Hong Kong are necessarily different. But, as I see it, we

have two important interests in common. These are to preserve

the stability and prosperity of Hong Kong and to preserve the

relationship which has developed between our two countries.

So far as Hong Kong is concerned, stability and prosperity

depend on confidence. Confidence is a tender plant; it grows

only slowly, but can wilt very quickly. If, as I believe, we

share an interest in the stability and prosperity of Hong Kong,

it follows that we also share an interest in the preservation

of confidence there.

The

We wish to preserve, indeed to strengthen, good relations

between Britain and China. So, we believe, do you.

situation in Hong Kong is a factor of importance in these

relations. It follows that we share an interest in doing

nothing in, or over Hong Kong, which might unsettle these

relations.

I have given most careful consideration to your proposal

since I spoke to you and the Prime Minister last autumn. In

the light of this consideration, I have come to the conclusion

that the time is not ripe for a change in the pattern of your

/representation

+

representation in Hong Kong. I would therefore ask you not

to press your proposal. It is my judgement that it will be

some time before circumstances might change in such a way as

to warrant an alteration in the arrangements which now

exist.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

7 June 1973

INMEDIATE

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TO IMMEDIATE GOVERNOR HONG KONG TELNO 554 OF 7 JUNE/AND TO PEKING.

CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG.

+

1. THE CHINESE APPEARED TO ACCEPT WITH FAIRLY GOOD GRACE MY EXPOSITION
OF OUR POSITION. IN REPLY CHI DEVELOPED ON STANDARD LIXES

THE CHINESE CASE, THOUGH NOTING THAT WE HAD REACHED A DECIDION. HE

REITERATED CHIBA'S INTENTION HOT TO TRY TO SET UP A DOUBLE REGIME

MED ZADE CLEAR THAT THEY FULLY RESPECTED THE PRESENT HONG KONG

AUTORITIES, BE SAV THE PROBLE: AS A FUNCTION OF THE IMPROVEMENT IN

SIN. -VRITISH RELATIONS, HE WAS FLEXIBLE AROUT THE PUOSIBLE TITLE OF

OF A REPRESENTATIVE, SUCCESTING THAT HE MIGHT EITHER REPRESENT

KWALETUIKG PROVINCE OR THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THAT

THE QUESTION OF REVERSE ACCREDITATION OF A HOM KONG RAPdt fat [VI. 1.
MAITUL COULD ALSO SE CONSTRAINS. THE FATUS OF JONG KONG 4 14, HE SKIP,

A ATTER FOR DISCUSSION AT THIS TIME. HE THODELE THAT NG FULCTIONS THE
PERCSE TIVE COULD SE DEFINED TO ITUAL SATISFACT-

ON. THE LATTER HAS POND TO COME UP WHEN OUR PRIME

TO CHINA AED RE VOULD GO OF THE IRC ABOUT IT. G)

י

4

+

H

FIGER VÉ

2. CHI SAID THAT IF 19EPRESENTATIGH COULD NOT BE SETTLED THIS ICHT
AWTERSELY ZI FECT OTHER PROBLEMS, JUCH AS CO... ULICATIONS, NIGUSELA ALL
SERVICES VIIICH RE: "ILD **SISETTLED'',

2. CHI GVIELUBED THAT IT WAS CLEAR THAT AGREDIENT COULD LOT HE REACHED
NOW AED THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO REPORT 1 SK TO PUKING.

4. ↑ REPEATED THAT I HOPED THE CHILEGE WOULD NUT FILGS THE ISSUE,

BU. TAI VE PATINGILL

+

·

1 E

t

+

+

ACCEPTED THAT CHOU E FLAT MIGHT RAISE 17 WITH

JRED TIKT FAILURE TO REACH ACHÉE. ENT HOW

A verungli3STUMS DI. CIVIL AIR LINKS.

1

}

(20 S 2)

[CUP1:5 SET O NO 10 DANING LTÌ

4 +

L

GOLIES N:

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3/31/

TO IMMEDIATE GOVERNOR HONG KONG TEL NO 563 OF 7 JUNE 1973 INFO IMMEDIATE

PEKING.

HY TELEGRAM 10. 557 ? ckINESE REPRESENTATION' IN HONG KONG.

1. WE ARE TELEGRAPHING SEPARATELY ABOUT MY EXCHANGE WITH THE CHINESE

FOREIGN MINISTER.

2. AT THE END OF THIS MORNING'S ROUND, CHI PROPOSED THAT NOTHING SHOULD
BE SAID TO THE PRESS ON THE SUBSTANCE OF WHAT WE HAD DISCUSSED. I
AGREED.

3. I HAVE INSTRUCTED NEWS DEPARTMENT TO RESTRICT THEIR BRIEFING TO A
VERY GENERAL OUTLINE OF THE TOPICS DISCUSSED. I HAVE ASKED THEM NOT TO
CONFIRM, EITHER ON THE RECORD OR UNATTRIBUTABLY, THAT CHINESE
REPRESENTATION WAS DISCUSSED, THEY WILL COUNTER ANY SUPPLEMENTARY
QUESTIONS ABOUT THE TALKS AS A WHOLE BY SAYING THAT THEY HAVE NO

FURTHER INFORMATION TO PROVIDE.

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Se

TO IMMEDIATE GOVERNOR HONG KONG TELRO 557 OF 6 JUNE. 1973 INFO FELING

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 650: CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG

1. NEWS DEPARTMENT WILL NOT VOLUNTEER ANYTHING ON THE RECORD. ABOUT
CHINESE REPRESENTATION. THEY EXPECT TO CONFINE THEMSELVES TO TELLING THE
PRESS ABOUT THE CURATION OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S MEETINGS WITH THE
SECRETARY OF STATE AND ABOUT THE GENERAL CHARACTER OF THE SUBJECTS
DISCUSSED. IF, HOWEVER, THEY ARE ASKED WHETHER CHINESE REPRESENTATION
WAS BROUGHT UP, THEY WILL BE BOUND TO SAY THAT IT WAS, BUT THEY WILL NOT
GO BEYOND DOING THIS (EITHER WHEN THEY BRIEF JOURNALISTS AFTER THE
MEETINGS OR IN ANSWER TO QUESTIONS AT ONE OF THEIR REGULAR CONFERENCES).

2.

WHAT NEWS DEPARTMENT SAY UNATTRIBUTABLY WILL DEPEND ON HOW THE CHINESE
REACT TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S STATEMENT. WE SHALL TELEGRAPH A SET OF
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS (WHICH WE ARE NOW DRAFTING ON A CONTINGENCY BASIS)
AS SOON AS WE KNOW THE OUTCOME OF THE DISCUSSION. THESE WILL COVER THE
EVENTUALITY WHICH CONCERNS US MOST THAT THE CHINESE LEAK THE FACT THAT
WE HAVE GIVEN THEM A DISOBLIGING REPLY AND EMBROIDER WITH THEIR OWN
COMMENTS.

3. WE HAVE BRIEFED THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO PROPOSE THAT THE ROUND ON
THE MORNING OF 7 JUNE SHOULD BE DEVOTED TO INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. WE
HAVE ALSO BRIEFED HIM TO BROACH THE SUBJECT OF CHINESE REPRESENTATION
HIMSELF DURING THE ROUND IN THE AFTERNOON.

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A

Mr Winford

р

Pla

CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG

a.

R.E.

FEAT

7/6.

1. I submit the draft of a preliminary reply to

Hong Kong telegram No 600. We are now working on the

set of questions and answers referred to in paragraph 2

of the draft.

6 June 1973

cc Mr Stuart

Mr Weait

R.Mh. Evans

RE Evans

Far Eastern Department

M%

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FM HONG KONG #10935Z

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CONFIDENTAL

1973

+

TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 690 OF 1 JUNE/ INFO PEKING.

MY TELNO 581: CHINESE REPRESENTATION.

AS SOON AS YOU HAVE SEEN CHI P'ENG-FEI IN LONDON WE SHALL BE UNDER
STRONG PRESSURE HERE TO SAY WHETHER THIS QUESTION WAS DISCUSSED AND IN
WHAT TERMS. I HOPE THE DEPARTMENT WILL BE ABLE TO SEND US, PREFERABLY A
LITTLE IN ADVANCE SO THAT WE CAN SAY THE SAME THINGS AS NEAR
SIMULTANEOUSLY AS POSSIBLE, THE TEXT OF WHAT THE OFFICIAL SPOKESMAN WILL
SAY ATTRIBUTABLY ON THIS ISSUE. IT WOULD ALSO BE VERY HELPFUL TO HAVE BY
FLASH TELEGRAM IMMEDIATELY AFTERWARDS THE TEXT OF ANYTHING THE SPOKESMAN
MAY ADD UNATTRIBUTABLY.

2. I NEED HARDLY SAY THAT THIS MATTER WILL NEED VERY CAREFUL HANDLING
WITH THE PRESS HERE IF WE ARE NOT TO INVOLVE OURSELVES IN CONSIDER~

ABLE DIFFICULTIES.

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FM HONG KONG 010445Z

DEDIP

CONFIDENTIAL

TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 597 OF 1 JUNE,1973.

YOUR TELEGRAM 487.

L

SIR Y.K. KAN WILL BE CALLING ON YOU AND MR ROYLE ON 6 JUNE.

3

I SHOULD EXPECT HIS PRINCIPAL TALKING POINTS TO BE THE REPRIEVE OF TSOI
AND CHINESE REPRESENTATION.

:

2. TSQI. HIS CONCERN WILL BE NOT SO MUCH WITH THE CASE ITSELF, THOUGH HE
IS EXTREMELY WORRIED ABOUT THE GROWTH OF VIOLENT CRIME, BUT WITH THE
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE OF A DECISION OF THE GOVERNOR-IN-COUNCIL,
WHICH CLEARLY ACCORDED WITH THE WISHES OF THE POPULATION, BEING
OVERRULED IN THIS WAY. I WOULD EXPECT HIS POINTS

TO BE:-

A) PEOPLE LIKE HIMSELF WILL NOT SERVE ON EXECUTIVE COUNCIL AND ACCEPT
THE TIME, RESPONSIBILITY AND ALSO THE CRITICISM IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST
IF THEY ARE TO BE OVERRULED ON THE THEORY THAT SINCE HONG KONG IS A
COLONY IT MUST DO AS IT IS TOLD. APPLICATION OF THE LATTER PRINCIPLE
RISKS WHOLESALE RESIGNATIONS FROM EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE COUNCILS AND
THE ALIENATION OF THE POPULATION.

B) PEOPLE ARE NOW WORRIED THAT IF HMG MAY OVERRULE THE GOVERNOR-IN-
COUNCIL ON SUCH AN ISSUE THEY MIGHT SIMILARLY OVERRULE HONG KONG WISHES
ABOUT SOMETHING ELSE, THEY HAVE PARTICULARLY IN MIND THE ISSUE OF A
CHINESE REPRESENTATIVE WHICH IS OF ENORMOUS SIGNIFICANCE, BUT ALSO, SAY,
ACCESS TO THE EEC.

3. THE LINE I TOOK WITH HIM WAS:

A) THAT IT WOULD BE UNFAIR AND ENTIRELY WRONG TO GENERALISE ON THE BASIS
OF THIS CASE. EMOTION ABOUT THE DEATH SENTENCE AMONGST

CONFIDENTIAL / M.P'S WAS A UNIQUE

CONFIDENTIAL

M.P.'S WAS A UNIQUE POLITICAL PHENOMENON, AND WAS AT ITS HEIGHT AT THE
TIME OF TSOI'S APPEAL. THERE WAS NO REASON WHATEVER ANTICIPATE A SIMILAR
SITUATION IN RESPECT OF ANY OTHER ISSUE OF REAL INTEREST TO HONG KONG,
AND CERTAINLY NOT ABOUT A CHINESE REPRESENTATIVE OVER WHOM HMG HAD TAKEN
A CONSISTENTLY FIRM AND STATESMAN-LIKE LINE.

B) WHETHER THE GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE SCRAPED HOME ON A VOTE ON THIS
ISSUE OR NOT WAS A MATTER FOR THEIR JUDGEMENT, BUT IN ANY CASE IT WOULD
NOT HAVE BEEN IN HONG KONG'S INTEREST TO BE THE SUBJECT OF A MAJOR
PARLIAMENTARY STORM NO MATTER WHAT THE BASIS FOR THE LATTE

MIGHT BE.

C) IF HE RESIGNED ON SUCH AN ISSUE HE WOULD BE ENDANGERING THE WHOLE
BASIS AND STATUS OF THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE COUNCILS AND I WOULD
CONSIDER IT GROSSLY IRRESPONSIBLE. FOR MY PART I

WOULD NOT BE PREPARED TO CARRY ON HERE IF I COULD NOT COUNT ON SENSIBLE
SUPPORT FROM MY FRIENDS.........

4. CHINESE REPRESENTATION. KAN IS FUNDAMENTALLY A SHREWD, FFLEXIBLE AND
RESPONSIBLE MAN, BUT HE BECOMES EMOTIONAL WHEN HE BELIEVES HIS OWN FACE
OR THAT OF HONG KONG TO BE INVOLVED. ON THIS ISSUE HE ENTIRELY AGREES
WITH OUR LINE, BUT HE HAS A NAGGING FEAR, LIKE THE REST OF THE
ESTABLISHMENT, THAT H.M.G. AND THE C.P.G. MAY DO A DEAL BEHIND HIS BACK.
ONE CAN ONLY INSSIST THAT HIS WILL NOT HAPPEN

AND THAT HONG KONG WILL CONTINUE TO BE FULLY CONSULTED.

5. IF HE RUNS ON ABOUT THESE ISSUES I WOULD RECOMMEND CHANGING THE
SUBJECT BY ASKING HIM QUESTIONS ABOUT THE MATTERS SUCH AS THE HOUSING,
EDUCATIONAL OR SOCIAL WELFARE PROGRAMMES, OR THE REORGAINIZATION OF
GOVERNMENT INVOLVED IN THE MCKINSEY REPORT.

MACLEHOSE

FILES

HD HKIOD

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PRIORITY CYPHER/CAT A

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CONFIDENTIALTC,

1973

JC) COPY,

TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 600 OF 1 JUNE/INFO PEKING.

54

MY TELNO 5811 CHINESE REPRESENTATION.

+

ICH

61

1/2/4

AS SOON AS YOU HAVE SEEN CHI P'ENG-FEI IN LONDON WE SHALL BE UNDER
STRONG PRESSURE HERE TO SAY WHETHER THIS QUESTION WAS DISCUSSED AND IN
WHAT TERMS, I HOPE THE DEPARTMENT WILL BE ABLE TO SEND US, PREFERABLY A
LITTLE IN ADVANCE SO THAT WE CAN SAY THE SAME THINGS AS NEAR
SIMULTANEOUSLY AS POSSIBLE, THE TEXT OF WHAT THE OFFICIAL SPOKESMAN WILL
SAY ATTRIBUTABLY ON THIS ISSUE. IT WOULD ALSO BE VERY HELPFUL TO HAVE BY
FLASH TELEGRAM IMMEDIATELY AFTERWARDS THE TEXT OF ANYTHING THE SPOKESMAN
MAY ADD UNATTRIBUTABLY.

2. I NEED HARDLY SAY THAT THIS MATTER WILL NEED VERY CAREFUL HANDLING
WITH THE PRESS HERE IF WE ARE NOT TO INVOLVE OURSELVES IN CONSIDER- ABLE
DIFFICULTIES.

MACLEHOSE

FILES

TED

HKIOD

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SIRE NORRIS

CONFIDENTI AL

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr

Mr Wilford

M: Guest ME

Frivate Seofetary

Segretary

1/6.

604

Enter + prak

7/6

FEH 36

A

CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG

1. We have had another careful look at the form of words already

approved by the Secretary of State for use when he gives the Chinese
Foreign Minister his answer on the Chinese request to have an

official representative in Hong Kong. It seemed that the third paragraph
might benefit from reformulation in the interests of

softening the impact on the Chinese of our negative response.

▲,8,C. have consulted the Governor of Hong Kong and HM Embassy Peking,
an) D.

both of whom agree with the suggested redraft.

2.

I therefore submit the revised version. If the Secretary

of State approves it, the Department will substitute it for the

earlier version in the briefing on this question to be supplied

for the Chinese Foreign Minister's visit.

We

Gellark

GE Clark

Far Eastern Department

You have already approwed the revised rent of paragraph 3(which I have
sidelined). We are submitting is because the original vesion was

CONFIDENTIAL

proved

by

by Mi Royle and the secretory of siate.

Rokrow

Ev

June, 1973.

I recomms that sits

ska

approve the revised

formula. Only the wording of para 3 has been

altered.

Kun hotfro

%.

FORM OF WORDS TO BE USED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE IN TALKING TO THE
CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTER

1. I discussed this subject with you and with the Frime Minister

when I visited China last autumn. I told the Prime Minister on

1 November that I would like to think about the matter and I would

get in touch with you in due course.

2. The positions of our two Governments on the status of Hong

Kong are necessarily different. But, as I see it, we have two

important interests in common. These are to preserve the stability

and prosperity of Hong Kong and to preserve the relationship which

has developed between our two countries. So far as Hong K ̧ng is

concerned, stability and prosperity depend on confidence.

Confidence is a tender plant; it grows only slowly, but can wilt

very quickly. If, as I believe, we share an interest in the

stability and prosperity of Hong Kong, it follows that we also

share an interest in the preservation of confidence there.

3.

We wish to preserve, indeed to strengthen, good relations

between Britain and China. So, we believe, do you. The situation

It in Hong Kong is a factor of importance in these relations.

follows that we share an interest in doing nothing in, or over

Hong Kong, which might unsettle these relations.

I have given most careful consideration to your proposal

since I spoke to you and the Prime Minister last autumn. In the

light of this consideration, I have come to the conclusion that

the time is not ripe for a change in the pattern of your represent

ation in Hong Kong. I would therefore ask you not to press your

Э

/proposal.

proposal. It is my judgement that it will be some time before

circumstances might change in such a way as to warrant an

alteration in the arrangements which now exist.

- 2 -

!

I

CONFIDENTIAL

Not the Used.

OF WORDS TO BE USED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE IN TALKING T. CHINESE
FOREIGN MINISTER

-

I discussed this subject with you and with the Prime

when I visited China last autumn I told the Prime

ron 1 November that I would like to think about the

. und 1 would get in touch with you in due course. "The positions of our
two Governments on the status of

Gure necessarily different. But, as I see it, we have portant interests
in common. These are to preserve the

y and prosperity of Hong Kong and to preserve the chip which has
developed between our two countries. as Hong Kong is concerned,
stability and prosperity - en confidence. Confidence is a tender plant:
it grows slowly, but can wilt very quickly. If, as I believe, we

an interest in the stability and prosperity of Hong Kong, it follows
that we also share an interest in the preservation

confidence there.

..

"As far as the relations between Britain and China are concerned, there
can be no doubt that the situation in Hong Kong

Factor of importance. lf, therefore, we share an interest

in preserving good relations between our two countries, we also here an
interest in doing nothing in, or over, Hong Kong which

could disturb the situation there.

"I have given most careful consideration to your proposal since I spoke
to you and the Prime Minister last autumn. In the light of this
consideration I have come to the conclusion that the time is not ripe
for a change in the pattern of your representation in Hong Kong. I would
therefore ask you not to press your proposal. It is my judgement that it
will be some Liike before circumstances might change in such a way as to

"crunt an alteration in the arrangements which now exist."

·Ipproved by the seciciary of Sicie

R.E.

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TO PRIORITY GOVERNOR HONG KONG (PERSONAL FOR GOVERNOR) TELMO 51, 24/5/
AND TO PRIORITY PEKING(PERSONAL FOR MORGAN).

i

MY TELEGRAM NO. 157 TO GOVERNOR HONG KONG: CHINESE REPRESENTATION HONG
KONG,

FOLLOWING FROM WILFORD.

I I

1. AS PART OF THE WORK IN PREPARING FOR CHI P'ENG-FEI'S VISIT, 14
DEPARTMENT AND I HAVE BEEN HAVING ANOTHER LOOK AT THE TEXT I DO TELEGRAM
UNDER REFERENCE, AS YOU KNOW, THIS HAS DEEN APPROVED SECRETARY OF STATE.
WE ARE NEVERTHELESS INCLINED TO RECOMMEND FOR THE SAKE OF LOGIC AND OF A
RATHER SOFTER IMPACT ON THE GH THE THIRD PARAGRAPH S11OULD LE AMENDED TO
READ AS FOLLOWS:-

'WE WISH TO PRESERVE, INDEED TO STRENGTHEN, COOD RELATIONS DI BRITAIN
AND CHINA. SO, WE BELIEVE, DO YOU. THE SITUATION IN HOP, KONG IS A
FACTOR OF IMPORTANCE IN THESE RELATIONS. IT FOLLOWS THAT WE SHARE AN
INTEREST IN DOING NOTHING IN, OR OVER HONG KONG, WHICH MIGHT UN SETTLE
THESE RELATIONS"'.

A/...

2. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL TO KNOW WHAT YOU AND MORGAN THINK

OF PLAY ON 29 MAY,

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